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THE DYNAMICS OF MORALS

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THE DYNAMICS OF MORALS

A SOCIOPSYCHOLOGICAL THEORY OF ETHICS

By
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INTRODUCTION

A journey to India meant for me the opportunity to meet and share ideas with inspiring creative thinkers in the social sciences. Among these a cherished friend is Radhakamal Mukerjee, veteran sociologist and economist, who needs no introduction from me or any one else. With him I shared hours of intensely stimulating intellectual exchange, marked by the range and incisiveness of his observations and his reflections. From human ecology to psycho-analysis, and from group dynamics and the UNESCO studies of social tensions to the broadest problems of human culture, I found him an inexhaustible treasure-house of ideas.

In the present volume he builds upon decades of earlier work both by others and by himself in the establishment of a rational ethical theory based both on the biology of human nature and on the cohesive forces of human culture. We find ourselves lifted altogether out of the false antithesis between the biological and the cultural sciences, and confronted with the challenge to create a science of ethics in which the biosocial nature of man's needs is fully realized with equal attention to what is common to all humanity and to what is special, unique, unrepeatable in the individual ethical choice. The doctrine is not finished; it will take much more work both empirical and integrative. But the challenge is clear, and it is time for thoughtful men and women to awake fully to it. It is time to build an ethics which expresses fully and also flexibly both the personal and the inter-personal realities of human existence, rejecting with equal courage the absolutism of sheer tradition or authority on the one hand, and on the other hand the absolutism of

a supposedly self-contained and isolated individual whose needs inevitably conflict with the needs of others.

I believe that Radhakamal Mukerjee is exceptionally qualified to guide us in this endeavour. He is at home both in Eastern and in Western culture; he is at home both in the empirical and in the theoretical disciplines which meet here; and he has the precious gift of integration. How I wish the reader could not only *read* him, but also *listen* to the sparkling flow of his thought !

DELHI

December 24, 1950

GARDNER MURPHY

PREFACE

Man is a unity, but the knowledge of man and his behaviour is now dispersed between two separate compartments of research with their own conceptual mirrors and logical equipment and no doors and windows for communication with each other—one assigned to the sciences and their various applications, and the other to ethics, aesthetics, philosophy, metaphysics and religion. In one part of this mansion of human knowledge we have values, meanings, symbols, morals and culture; in the other part there are the social relations and processes as these are in the actual world, the harsh inequalities and affirmations of brute force, rational calculation and struggle for survival and power that the sciences treat, often with an overweening sense of authority and pride. The separation between the two parts that goes back to the rationalism and mind-body dualism of Descartes denotes a crisis in modern civilisation impeding both the advance and effective social application of human knowledge.

Such a deep-seated division is largely responsible for the development of contemporary ethics as a formal doctrine of eternal essences of man's moral perfection, independent of the social structure and processes, and for a sort of antithesis, in the words of Niebuhr, between "moral man and immoral society" in which are rooted individual and collective frustration and aggression in modern culture. An integration between the two parts is to be achieved as much for peace, goodness and justice in collective living as for the validation of the causal hypotheses, explanations and laws of the sciences grounded on a satisfactory epistemology.

Psychology and sociology which are synoptic disciplines are vitally concerned with the present chaos in values, morals and culture, and best fitted to take the first steps towards bringing about a reunion between individual and social ethics. Modern psychology has already developed techniques and methods for an objective study of values. Clyde Kluckhohn has aptly observed: "It is perhaps already established that values can be discovered and described with rigorous objectivity. The test for extrinsic values has also been pointed out by Thorndike: are the means effective to the ends? Methods for scrutinising intrinsic values (ends) have admittedly not yet attained scientific level. Nevertheless Northrop has shown the direction which such enquiry must take: is a given set of values congruent, given a specific set of conditions, with what we have learned of human nature by scientific methods?" Each culture or group decides on its set of goals and values. How far do these freely express or stifle human nature and the potentialities of personality? Given such goals and values as acceptable, the principles for their structuration and control through dominant groups and institutions must also rise to a scientific level. There are integration, appraisal and gradation of goals and values achieved through the development of norms and ideals that constantly call out new behaviour towards progressively higher levels of stable organisation. The normal process of adjustment of the individual in society implies the priority and hierarchy of values, including moral values. The latter show higher levels of stable integration through inwardness, deliberation and intellectual construction of certain permanent, ultimate ideals and norms that rise above the demands of shifting environmental and social situations. The system of values, myths, symbols and ideology constitutes, indeed, the governing frame of reference for the total functioning and adaptation of the

social person. His acceptance of a set of symbols, ideology and values, his specific group rôle or status in society as well as his reaction to a definite source and means of control as points of reference are all interrelated. Neither new values and beliefs nor new morals can emerge except by change in the entire group configuration, by a heightened group participation, a feeling of freedom and spontaneity and complete interiorisation of group values, beliefs and standards as one's super-ego or conscience. Such is the intimate, dynamic and often elusive interchange between the individual and the group.

But sociology is still dominated by the mechanistic outlook, and does not adequately appreciate the social integration of personality and values nor the interrelations between human nature, values and groups or institutions nor, again, the possibilities of redirecting groups and institutions to new and potentially better symbols, meanings and values or making them more productive of the conservative, status quo ones. Similarly for modern ethics the starting point is still the rational, atomised individual. Ethical theory still roots itself largely in abstract metaphysical principles and ignores man's social nature and group and institutional processes and relations. All this has been the legacy of the trend of European liberalism and social philosophy in the nineteenth century. In the first phase of industrialisation in Western Europe these speeded up the decay of feudalism, religion and the intimacy and idealism of small, spontaneous primary groups such as families, neighbourhoods and stable occupational groups; and in the transition from status to contract identified freedom with voluntary contractual relationships in the vast, ramifying secondary groups such as classes, states and nations. Ethics took the fully formed rational individual guided by self-interest as the isolated datum and focus of its enquiry, and made an ideally complete satisfaction of indivi-

dual choices the measure of moral values. Underlying ethics were also the assumptions of the older, hedonistic psychology in respect of the blind course of man's atomic desires and satisfactions and the association of ideas and of society as constituted of discrete, rational, non-institutionalised individuals, "living and trading each on his private stock of reason." The postulation of the moral priority of the rational man in ethics was as misleading as the notions of the economic, the political or the juristic man incapable of doing anything in life except a conscious calculation and pursuit of advantage and of society as a mere aggregate of atomised, anarchic individuals.

We need to introduce a new "frame of reference" or functional "field" into ethics in line with modern Gestalt psychology and sociology that bring out into full force the merging of individuals into one another and into the milieu on the one hand and the organic interrelationship of the processes of the human mind on the other. As a matter of fact the configuration or Gestalt in ethics, comprising as it does the entire system of values, ideals and norms that guide men, groups and cultures, is at once the most fundamental and comprehensive whole man can understand or appreciate. Indeed, it is more significant than the smaller and less inclusive Gestalten of perceptions and beliefs. In a functionally and empirically inflected ethics moral principles or categories may be viewed, like the processes involved in value-achievement and integration of personality, as emergents of the social configuration. Attitudes, expectations, judgments and imperatives are all inherent in the group "field". It is the improvement of group participation or intimacy of individual loyalties in different types of groupings that throws out the successive constitutional imperatives of Reciprocity, Justice, Sympathy and Love. Group identification or communion is the medium of moral development, the level of human

communication determining the order and dimension of the individual's moral responsibility and freedom. Thus the four "ideal types" of grouping, Crowd, Interest-group, Society and Commonalty that cover in a successive functional series all possible human bonds provide the clue to man's conscience and obligations. Moral responsibility and creativeness depend upon the character of the nexus of relations in the various categories of groups and institutions. Morals accordingly are a function of structure of the group situation. The total group situation includes man's various rôles, statuses and positions that produce and nurture his personality, character and conduct, the values he cherishes as well as the disvalues he affects, his anxieties as well as his fulfilments. He identifies himself with the particular constellation of values or norms that are defined and consolidated by the group and that guide his adjustments in life. Deviant value systems are in some measure a pre-condition of the highly integrated structure of values and the group pattern. Crime, misbehaviour, neurosis and psychosis are all necessary costs for the stability of the existing value system and institutional order. Man's conscience and sense of perfection and self-censure on the one hand, and his hate and aggressiveness on the other are alike group structured and manipulated.

Each category of group and institution introjects its own type of super-ego or conscience into the structure of the child's personality. This operates unconsciously and in partial detachment from the self, and also assimilates with full awareness taboos, proprieties and norms from the group as the child grows up. Thus what the individual's moral life will be is largely conditioned by the moral expectancies and imperatives of his childhood's enviroing group patterns. Such is the importance of the dominant groups and institutions in social culture for man's moral development. At the same time in a per-

plexing situation or social crisis the individual's definition of the total social system and values in a clear elemental way focusses a new value pattern and directs society to new channels of genuine self-fulfilment, new vistas of understanding, equality and love. Man's conscience or values and his environing group structure together comprise a single arch supporting the ascending, aspiring moral spire of goodness, justice and love that touches the infinite and the perfect.

Man, who is a creature and creator of many groups and institutions, develops and expresses his highly intellectualised moral personality and character in and through his many rôles, positions and statuses in society imposing a certain order and organisation of his inner life—faith, reason, ideal and norm. Between his conscience and moral sensibility and group values and institutional norms there is constant interpenetration in the total pattern of culture. His desires, conscience and ideals and his forms of social control, myths and symbol patterns cannot be treated separately. The more ethics relates right and wrong and the scheme of rights and duties, symbols, imperatives and norms to the dynamics of group integration and participation and the depth-level of man's personality—all reciprocally interdependent—the more does it come in line with modern scientific humanism and to close grips with the present chaos in morals and culture.

The quality of moral life and experience, the depth and integration of self as well as morale or participation in group endeavour undergo a marked improvement as we proceed from the nexus of Reciprocity in the Interest-group to the relationship of Equity and Justice in the Society or Community and that of Communion, Love and Sharing in the abstract Commonalty. As the self-contained individuality is "lost" or absorbed in the Commonalty (whether the family, the church, the nation in crisis, or

the community of humanity)—the universal non-self matrix of selfhood—new types of relations with fellowmen and with the cosmos emerge. Such are the moral transformation and enrichment of personality that schools of mysticism and socialism equally emphasise.

Equally also does the Western man strenuously combat the threats to his individuality; for Western psychology, as Gardner Murphy observes, is largely concerned with those aspects of selfhood which are in the area of individual threat against individual and corresponding defence and counter-threat. Such psychology stems from the early empirical doctrines of John Locke who posited the isolation of persons as well as minds or "mental substances"—"windowless monads," as Liebnitz called the latter. Man not only cannot know the existence of fellowmen, but so far as knowledge is concerned, is shut up in himself. One important corollary that follows from the absence of any intrinsic relations between individuals is that "social compact" becomes the basis of civil government. Atomism in modern psychology, ethics and politics has been the outcome of the Cartesian certitude of the existence of man's self as a mental substance and of the assumption of reality in British empiricism as an aggregate of isolated "mental substances" or minds acted upon by the material substances of the physical universe, aided by Newtonian physics.

It is also probable that the atomism of man's separate reality and awareness and the notion of sharply defined selfhood are products of a certain toughness and arduousness in Western life and culture. On the other hand, it is the same West that has produced or nurtured through the ages the ideal of altruism and love and complete sacrifice for the community, though founded on a different theory of human nature and knowledge from that of Buddhism and the Vedanta. The Indian psychologies carefully distinguish between the immediate, restricted, time-and-space-

oriented aspect of the self and its absolute cosmic aspect—a phase in the process of man's cultural development or Becoming. In Eastern religion and ethics, whether Brahmanical and Buddhist, Taoist and Zen, Arab and Sufi, the self's removal of the "screens" and illusions of biological self-hood and its merger in the non-self, cosmic reality constitute full self-realisation and enhancement accompanied by profound insight, love and goodness, though Western psychologists are apt to characterise this as social escapism and fatalism. Could there be "escapism" in the following analysis of equality of self and neighbour in the Mahayanist text, the Bodhicharyavatara of Santideva, that has supplied the stimulus for active personal ministration and institutional charity in Asian culture for centuries? "As a man loves his hands and feet, because they are limbs of his body, so all other living beings have a right to his love, as they are members of the same world of the loving. It is only a habit to regard our body, which does not really exist at all, as our ego; in exactly the same way we can form the habit of regarding our neighbour as our ego."

There is in fact a marked contrast between the Eastern and Western mode of defining individuality and its relations to the cosmos, rooted in differences in religious and aesthetic experience and the resultant frame of reference and ethic of personal development. The Eastern mode of defining self-hood and ethic of self-identification with non-self or true universal self may well receive the support of the modern methods of science, integrating with the ancient intuitive or aesthetic insights. On the other hand, the contemporary school of Gestalt psychology in the West, supported by Semantics, attacks the orthodox logic of definition of the individual and his mental processes and experiences through their abstraction or isolation. Thus a new view of self and of individual existence and experience is bound to emerge with less of the present, acute self-awareness and

more akin to a universal matrix of a beyond-self-oriented type of reality. When psychology will systematically explore, as Murphy suggests, aspects of the self's deeper inter-individual unity that is a phase of the man-cosmos unity, and the non-individualistic or perhaps super-individualistic aspects of human experience and conduct, new moral principles and laws will be formulated, less man-centred and more universalist or cosmic.

Man's cultural progress enables him to cross the boundaries of time and space, and establish his harmony with the principles of order in the cosmos; and yet modern psychology and ethics largely treat him as if he were only a time-and-space bound creature. The scientific method here, as underlined in the contrast between evolutionary and cultural studies, belies its material and shows insufficiency. Max Scheler aptly observes: "In no other period of human knowledge has man become more problematic to himself than in our own days. We have a scientific or philosophical and a theological anthropology that know nothing of each other. Therefore we no longer possess any clear and consistent idea of man."¹ This idea we have to fashion and acquire.

We have now to discover man as a creative, symbolising, evaluative person whose nature and conduct could no longer be artificially segmented and segregated by our scientific and social studies into biological, economic, moral, aesthetic or religious ones. It is only in the case of the modern Western man that we find—as the result of the trends of naturalism and humanism—rationalism and modes of empirical thought invading the domain of ritual, law, religion and morals. Most cultures still get on through relegating a large part of human life and conduct to myth, religion and morals. The very term 'morals' indicates its

¹ Quoted in Cassirer: *An Essay On Man*.

filiation with mores or folkways and customs which, and not rational skills and techniques, are considered as defining right conduct. Rituals, ceremonies and other forms of symbolic behaviour are essential mechanisms of proper and good conduct in most cultures. These give a mystic or supernatural justification to both routine and special behaviour and invest the latter with rich meanings, significances and values in terms of a beyond-human ideology of an exceedingly complex total social pattern. For a considerable part of civilised humanity ritualistic and symbolic behaviour related to metaphysical understandings and values indeed provides the pattern of adjustment to the commonplace situations and crises in life although underlying it there is usually a core of definite, utilitarian social function. The advantage is that man's goals and routine of social action are largely oriented in the light of his participation in a cosmic moral and ritual order and dimension of being that stands over and above the frustrations and fulfilments of life, and introjects such certitude, disinterestedness and sensitiveness in human conduct as are the very soul of ethical life. Morality from this viewpoint is a reflection of man's contact with the inner order of the universe that establishes both stability and well-being of the community and self-enhancement and detachment of the individual. It becomes a phase of religion that is the mode of his adaptation of reality to a universal, normative order. Says Robert Ulich: "The *summum verum*, as experienced in thought, meets in the Kingdom of the Spirit not only the *summum pulchrum* as expressed in art, but also the *summum bonum* as expressed in great deeds. For ethical action, in the deepest sense of the word, springs from man's capacity to harmonise his life with the constructive order inherent in existence." A creative, aspiring, complete person, as modern thought discerns him, takes due care of aesthetic, moral and religious values that are inclusive but inherently

independent of the empirical world and its scheme of ends and means.

We have also to rediscover society which is not a mere aggregate of individuals bound together by the herd impulse, by the sense of fear and insecurity or by contractual ties engendered in the compounding of man's egoistic interests. Society is not some kind of a superimposition on the scene of the human animal for taming his egoism and selfishness for social living, nor a mass organisation demanding a rigid conformity for his moral perfection. Man is no mere "political animal". He is a striving, aspiring creature whose values and aspirations are not circumscribed by society, still less by the state. These send forth their groping tendrils of appropriation and fulfilment to realms and dimensions that neither politics nor law can picture. Yet for many of his major values he, indeed, depends for definition, manner and conditions of fulfilment upon society. Man no doubt is deeply embedded and moulded in the matrix of society. He absorbs, conserves, communicates and bequeaths society. But he also embellishes, enriches, deepens and fabricates it. Society is a changing medium of creation and expression of his deep-seated desires, values and aspirations. It defines and shapes man's social nature, conscience and morals, as he also constantly and insistently projects into it his own values and experiences from the depth of his consciousness where he is alone and unique. Man is thus a dual mirror of society and of the larger cosmos to which he belongs. He has a feeling of utter loneliness in his isolation, and of profound exaltation in his loyalty to his group even to the degree of self-immolation. At the same time his impulses and obligations to a more comprehensive world of order reveal the true nature of himself, of society and the cosmos alike. The antinomy between the idea of social progress and that of individual moral perfection, forcefully presented by Aldous and Julian Huxley in

their recent writings, can be resolved only when neither the individual is regarded as a mere organ of society or of the cosmic process, nor his transcendent values and experiences removed from the dynamic relations of social life and morals in action.¹ Society is good, just and perfect to the extent it assimilates and utilises as goals and standards the individual's ultimate and timeless experiences that must be realised and embodied in interpersonal norms of goodness, justice and love, ever receding forward in the dynamic interchange of self, society and cosmos. / /

As there is effective assimilation of the separate scientific methods and outlooks in respect of man and his social integration and development, the faith in the laws of physical universe strengthens the analogous but profounder faith in the ethical values of human personality and the dialectic of human communion—the “laws” of the social universe, the spiritual realities and processes of the Universal Man and the Universal Community. These “laws” or “imperatives” bring balance and harmony between the individual's finite desires and reason, between moral intuition and concrete achievement, between happiness and self-realization in the universal social community. Such faith rediscovers the norms of the universal man and society and redefines the ideal of human progress.

Ethics, as it embodies and establishes man's infinite and universal values and ideals in the interpretation and direction of his social destiny, frees the latter from the incubus of scientific or historical materialism that has today obtained the status of a metaphysical principle. Philosophical materialism tacitly assumes that all things in the world are geared with one another mechanically, and that human beings as they form parts of the economic, political or any other

¹ Aldous Huxley : *The Perennial Philosophy*, and Julian Huxley : *A Re-definition of Progress in Reflections on Our Age*.

system or machine are simply hands or tools, mere means for certain ends and goals of others that they do not understand nor appreciate. Scientific or historical materialism of the modern brand in its exclusive emphasis on economic conditions and forces and on the blind necessities of the march of history is equally contemptuous of the formative moral and spiritual factors, both in the lives of individuals and the destinies of organised communities. Both these types of materialism have constantly to reckon with the ineradicable finiteness and inequality of man, coupled with his claims for equal participation in the major values of life and the consequent frustrations and conflicts. Against the limitation and inequality of his rôles, capacities and rewards, inevitable in any society, which the various sciences unravel but cannot redress, ethics postulates the metaphysical equality and universality of the human person. Accordingly justice, sharing and service, as the ultimate and eternal values embodied in every human relation, seek to conquer the imperfections, inequalities and conflicts of man.

Scientific socialism formulates the norm of equalisation thus: "From each according to his abilities, to each according to his needs." But the Socialist Revolution, dominated by the mere scientific outlook, identifies material with spiritual values, and the regimentation that comes in its wake destroys many of the higher values of personality. "Ethical individualism," observes Royce, "has been in fact one great foe of the Great Community. Ethical individualism whether it takes the form of democracy or of the irresponsible search on the part of the individual for private happiness or for any other merely individual good will never save mankind. Equally useless, however, for the attainment of humanity's great end would be any form of merely ethical collectivism." The antithesis between ethical individualism and ethical collectivism that today forebodes a global armed conflict cannot be resolved

except by the interpenetration of personal and social selves that rests on the right ordering of the values of life and of the spiritual dimensions of personality, society, humanity and universe. Not only a proper scaling of biological, economic and spiritual values but also an identification of the individual personal values with the common universal values is essential for the renovation of humanity.

Such is the moral process by which individuals, groups and nations can transform themselves and their mutual relations, accepting the economic, political and moral imperatives of the Universal Man and the Universal Community—the norms of “Each for All,” “All for Each” and “All with All.” Ethics, politics and law, all will have to collaborate in the establishment of equal participation of all in the universal values of life in democratic, humanitarian commonalty. This, in the 20th century, is co-extensive with mankind, economically and technologically welded into one system but sharply divided ideologically, emotionally and politically into nations and blocs. From such a moral ideal stem the rights, now being articulated, of the Common Man of one world to the basic goods of civilisation that can be implemented only by the world state or the international community. The Common Man is not the workman of the factory nor the man in the street. He is truly *Homo Communis* or the Universal Man, Christos or the Atman, seated in the hearts, not only of all men, but of all beings (Sarvabhutan-taratman). From this metaphysical notion of immanence of the deity in the world arises the gospel of love, service and sharing as the genuine education of the spirit in man.

It is the task of ethics to formulate in contemporary culture a universalist morality appropriate for world security, co-operation and citizenship. Moral norms need definition and elucidation today in terms of what the sage, the poet or the saint experience as mystical communion or sharing, what the psychologist and psychoanalyst define

as integrated, poised self-hood or personality, what the academic social scientist prophesies as the solidarity of the human species and the U.N.O. exhorts in the name of justice, peace and progress in the affairs of the nations. The ethic which, in Aristotle's words, "promotes good conduct by discovering and explaining the mark at which all things aim", comprises the same basic principles of comprehension, knowledge and love which are arrived at by the intuition and dialectic of the mystic, by psychoanalysis and resolution of inner tensions in the clinic, by the empirical study of the structuring of society, values and self by the social scientists and by collective discussion and judgment in the international bodies.

Ethics cannot be separated from politics or from law, nor from any other sector of human endeavour. In fact both politics and law are handmaids of ethics. Politics through the formulation and implementation of human rights offers individuals opportunities of, and removes hindrances for, fulfilment of the major values of life. Law protects and augments all values, and subordinates the lower to the higher. It reconciles duties with rights, freedom with power, and merit with equality. All interpersonal relations become through the mechanisms of custom, law and government vehicles of expression of the abundant, perfect life. Religion now comes into the picture with its definition of the social character of human perfection, linked with the infinite and the universal, and its certitude of realisation of this perfection in everyday living, notwithstanding man's finiteness and frustration. Ethics is inextricably intermeshed in all human activities and relations, searching for and establishing perfect relations in the concrete structure of society.

The opposition between morality and law (as the ethical minimum), between morality and religion (as ethically neutral or transcendent) and between morality and cosmic

evolutionary progress is as untenable as the attempt to isolate the ethical nature of man's conscience and create the dilemma between individual and social ethics. For man is an integral whole as the carrier of values of different dimensions. To ignore the creative unity and organicity of his moral, religious, economic and political life would be a travesty of human nature and conduct. This demands a close, intimate interweaving of politics, economics, ethics and religion for dealing with the interrelatedness of human values and experience.

Man as he strives to obtain the best out of life and society, both quantitatively and qualitatively, merges the inner and the outer, the microcosm and the macrocosm. This fusion continually enlarges itself in human experience. As the free, self-directing microcosm, man bends the forces of nature, the unconscious macrocosm to his will and direction by the eternal and ultimate values that now take charge of cosmic change and evolution and act as their focus and measure alike. His moral norms and principles, as these develop from Reciprocity through Equity and Justice to Love and Sharing in the course of social and cultural evolution, indeed, become a part of the mechanism of evolutionary advance. At the same time as he appreciates and creates moral and spiritual values, and plans and directs human life and evolution according to these, he becomes himself the transcendent embodiment and product of the whole cosmic process. From his social relations, goals and experiences and his own mind he produces love, goodness and beauty that could never previously be realised in the microcosm, and that now constitute the scale of judgment of the entire evolutionary process, actual or potential. He thus goes on building up the microcosm and macrocosm into a larger and more harmonious working unity with a yet nobler quality of moral aspiration, understanding and love. Out of this intellectual and emotional harmony arises

ethical faith that is to be clearly distinguished from belief in certain doctrines or symbols. Moral faith is the highest expression in the character structure of genuine, creative adventure and experience when all psychic tension, phobia, doubt, illusion and wishful thinking are completely resolved, and rational vision or insight, firm, unswerving will for service and sharing and self-transcending universal love and goodness take their places.

For the last three decades man has envisioned his oneness with the whole of mankind and some kind of political unification of the globe. In the preamble to the constitution of the UNESCO that is devoted to the harnessing of science, education and culture for the maintenance of world peace, we read that "a peace based exclusively upon the political and economic arrangements of governments would not be a peace which could secure unanimous, lasting and sincere support of the peoples of the world; the peace must, therefore, be founded, if it is not to fail, upon the intellectual and moral solidarity of mankind."

For the first time in the history of the race the social destiny of universal humanity has come to the fore in man's intellectual and moral conscience. With his new perception of the reality of the Universal Man, he seeks to apply the one irrefragable law of universal truth, justice and love on a global scale. This is the new moral imperative of this century. Cannot the upbringing and education of children and inculcation of a general ethico-religious code of amity and non-violence produce in the coming generation the same strong emotional sense of absolute wrongness about national bullying, blackmailing and aggressiveness as the present generation feels towards personal aggressiveness, deceit and cruelty? The mechanism may be irrational but can be rationally used by ethics for the promotion of the system of values that humanity needs in this epoch for its very existence. This is more essential in the movement

towards universalism, towards world security, later on towards world co-operation and, finally, towards world government than the elaboration of any framework of international treaties. The discoveries in the psychological techniques of education and evocation, such as the use of emotionally loaded myths and symbols and policy designs, offer immeasurable opportunities for moulding human nature and character. In the coming profound transformation of individuals and nations and achievement of a global social democracy, ethics will play a significant rôle by abandoning its autonomy, rooted in the older inadequate, intellectualistic psychology and sociology, and becoming an integral part of the general education and experience of humanity. Harnessing man's vast noumenal energy, ethics will establish the unity of self, the microcosm, and of non-self, the macrocosm, in the justice, peace and progress of the world order, and direct his life, his humanity and his global society to their manifold powers and possibilities. If ethics cannot recover from its pusillanimity in this atomic age, the world that is one technically but racially and politically divided will be, in the words of Kant, "the graveyard of the human race." Recovering and fortifying itself, modern ethics like the ancient ethics of India and Israel will be prophetic, giving the soul-stirring Bodhisattvan, Avatarist and Messianic promise of "a new heaven and a new earth," and inaugurate a decisive phase in the moral and spiritual advance of humanity.

Certain materials of this book have recently appeared as articles in such well-known Journals as *Ethics*, the *Journal of Philosophy*, *Social Forces*, *Sociology and Social Research*, and the *Proceedings of the Congress of the International Sociological Association in Zurich* and the *XIVth International Congress of Sociology in Rome* and the *Essays in Honour of Dr. Sampurnanand*. I have also utilised in this volume lectures which I have been privileged to deliver in the *Harvard University*, the *Columbia University*, *New York*,

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UNIVERSITY OF LUCKNOW

CHAPTER I

A BIOSOCIAL APPROACH TO MORALS

The Eclipse of Ethics

There is hardly any ancient major branch of human knowledge which has suffered such complete eclipse in this century as ethics. With scientists the terms 'conscience' and 'morality' have become taboo. Psychologists speak only of inner tensions and conflicts that develop out of gaps between moral values and ego-centric impulses and behaviour. They identify fitness of adjustment with rightness and goodness, and moral principles with the rationalisations and symbolisations of the interests of a group, class or culture. Sociologists also rigorously eschew moral considerations in their study of social relations and processes although certain moral standards are implicit or hidden in their analysis. Such trend is due largely to the mechanical-individualistic bias and positivistic frame of reference of the social sciences following the model of the physical sciences. More direct and corrosive in its influence on the standards of right and wrong in conventional ethics is the development of Darwin's doctrine of evolution. Bertrand Russell aptly observes that this doctrine "made everything a matter of degree, obliterating the absoluteness of white and black, right and wrong. It seemed that there had once been animals of whom it could not be said with any certainty whether they were men or apes. This was most unfortunate. It seemed that everything, instead of being so or not so, as in logic books, was only more or less so. And in this mush of compromise

all the old splendid certainties dissolved." Evolutionism, the new governing conception of life, society and the universe, has been the greatest single factor in destroying moral certitude and engendering flexibility, insecurity and trial and error in moral habits and actions that have to be adjusted to the impact of science and technology on economic and social life.

Among the founders of sociology such thinkers as Herbert Spencer, Schaffle and Lilienfeld laid the basis of a positivistic sociology by the application of the methods and concepts of biological evolution to human society and its development. Where the emphasis was on the unity, interdependence and continuity of the social organism, sociology glorified nationalism; where it was placed on the struggle for existence and the survival of the fittest it supported class struggle, the right of the strong and even racial conflict and war; and opposed the ancient Stoic-Christian ideal of the unity and brotherhood of man as well as the contemporary humanitarian trend and legislation. Although the biologist Huxley defined "law and morals" to be "restraints upon the struggle for existence between men in society," social Darwinism on the whole continued to extol struggle, survival and power in the human scene, paying little heed to his conclusion that "the ethical progress of society consists not in imitating the cosmic process, still less in running away from it, but in combating it." Social Darwinism held the field for several decades and seemed to obtain fresh support from the Weismannian theory of the non-inheritance of acquired characters as well as from the statistical investigations of Galton and the school of eugenics. It easily stood the challenges of Kropotkin and Drummond who showed the significance of mutual aid and co-operation—the endeavours of parent for offspring, of mate for mate and of kin for kin—as factors in organic evolution; and of Wilhelm Stern,

who stressed that the struggle of animals of diverse species against the onslaughts of nature produces a common kinship and solidarity. In Stern the moral becomes a part and parcel of the universal and cosmic process—a conclusion opposite to that of T. H. Huxley.

The development of modern ecology with its emphasis of a viable balance and solidarity of different species and communities of plants and animals in the same habitat has now greatly attenuated the emphasis of struggle and competition in the older biology. Symbiosis and the web of life with a progressive integration and complexity of subtle linkages, weaving an intricate vibrating system in the ecological complex, indeed, reveal mutualism as the key to higher levels of adaptation and fuller exploitation of the limited sources of the environment by different interlocked parts of the living world. Patrick Geddes, Thomson, Julian Huxley and Elton, among the biologists, have reoriented and restated the Darwinian concept of natural selection as the central mechanism of organic evolution. In human evolution we reach a different level of adaptation altogether, in which man's moral and social values and ideals come to take charge of the course of his development, and become a part and parcel of the evolutionary process.¹ Thomson and Geddes observe: "Man has in the past replaced natural selection by social or rational selection. To a large extent it is his prerogative to make his own sieves. The non-dependable person increasingly tends to be sifted out by our social web. Man is concerned with his social heritage which is supreme—with, for instance, his traditions and ideals of honour, veracity, courage, justice and goodwill among men. Hence ever more clearly appears the urgent need of planning and mobilising truly evolutionary progress, with its nobler rivalries."²

¹ See chapter IV.

² Geddes and Thomson: *Life: Outlines of General Biology*.

J. B. S. Haldane also remarks that there is no dichotomy or contradiction between the cosmic and the moral process, if the issue be treated dialectically. The cosmic process which is responsible for human evolution negates itself by generating the ethical process. In virtue of a higher synthesis morality, however, carries on the evolutionary trend at a more advanced level and by more efficient and less wasteful methods. Cosmic and human evolution is no doubt similar in many respects, especially with reference to the principles of differentiation, integration and balance that provide the bases of a universally acceptable and effective system of ethics. The processes of integration, balance and solidarity have received special emphasis in ecology. But social ecology is now in its infancy. Sociology has hardly derived any lessons from the new ecological outlook in evolutionary progress.

In the past evolutionary theories of ethics, such as those of Herbert Spencer and Nietzsche, misled sociology by disregarding the fundamental difference between the biological and sociological level of evolution, and hence the quality of life. In various ways Geddes, Lloyd Morgan, Smuts and Sherrington revealed the true character and direction of human evolution. But they hardly influenced the broad trend of sociological thinking that had accepted the rather crude notions of cosmic struggle and of the inevitability of evolutionary progress. Meanwhile anthropology, cultural history and sociology discovered that different cultures and regions exhibit codes of morals that are markedly divergent, often contradictory and sometimes bizarre. Hobhouse, Westermarck and Sumner, among the sociologists, and Marett, Rivers and Malinowski, among the anthropologists, assembled data in respect of mores, customs and moral codes of various primitive, less advanced and advanced peoples, and stressed, largely from the biological angle, their adaptations to the

environmental condition and the social structure. Out of these have been distilled the modern notions of 'ethical relativism' and 'ethno-centrism' that have contributed to no small extent to loosen the hold of morals on civilisation. That the picture of a chaotic moral universe of peoples of different regions and races is somewhat over-simply and uncritically drawn by historical sociology is borne out in the writings of Max Scheler, Giddings, Sorokin and Ginsberg, among others. In the broad and disregarding special social circumstances and environmental pressures and isolated groups and communities, man's ethical development shows an order and certain main stages that of course sometimes mingle and overlap, and sometimes are skipped over and telescoped. But the belief in the variability of ethical systems and standards dies hard, and accounts for much moral pessimism, diffidence or cynicism. This is strengthened by the general positive and scientific approach in the social sciences that shuns any consideration of values, purposes and ideals, and by the opposing dogmas of 'metaphysical individualism' of the philosophers and historical materialism of the Marxists, all such trends of thought being entirely congruent with the stress of competition and mobility, utility and pleasure in a mechanical-industrial age.

Yet no age and no society can gloss over urgent and perennial moral problems that encounter them at every step, particularly the present age and society that have witnessed the rebarbarisation of some of the leading intellectual nations and general repudiation of moral principles and categories among large sections of civilised humanity. The moral insecurity and scepticism of this epoch have been compared with those prevalent in such previous periods of futility or decadence as the fifth century B. C. in Greece, the times of the later Emperors in Rome and the first half of eighteenth century in Europe. The contemporary

prevalence of mental disorder and psychopathic behaviour on a mass scale is perhaps unparalleled in the history of man.

Relation between Psycho-analysis and Ethics

It is, however, by no means true that the subject-matter of ethics has disappeared or has even been attenuated. Psycho-analysis and psycho-pathology throw a flood of new light on the dynamics of moral behaviour. These now yield a new, dynamic view of the human personality with its tensions, behaviours and expectancies oriented in an integral manner at conscious and unconscious levels, and lay bare many strivings, conflicts and imperatives governing behaviour that could not be clarified by introspective analysis. Recent developments of clinical psychology and of sociology reveal morals as the inescapable, bipartite psychological framework of the individual's and society's adaptations to each other, seen in the light of meanings and values of rightness or wrongness, and heavily charged with emotions from the different layers of consciousness. One part is conscience, or what Freud calls the super-ego, which is the social culture interiorised in the structure of child's self largely through the mediation of the family and later on, as the child grows, of other cultural, economic and political groups and associations. The other part is the external structure of social control represented by law, custom, myth, religion and moral code. The super-ego is also built up from inside embodying residues of earlier periods of development and former cultures. Besides there is the ego which is formed after parental *imagos* but gradually assimilates social, moral and religious ideals from the social groups. A balanced functioning of the ego-organisation that maintains and strengthens self-status—which is also connected with social status in the individual's major rôles and positions in institutional life—is basic to moral development and fulfilment. Between the three different parts of

the personality—the ego, the super-ego and the id (of which sexuality is the best known part, the reservoir of the biologically rooted drives)—and the organised structure of social control that exercises constraint and pressure, there are constant exchange, introjection and projection. Thus there are fusion of ego needs, ideals and phantasies with group interests, norms and utopias as well as conflict between the rebellious urgings welling from the unconscious (id) and the laws and norms of society.

The conscious and the unconscious parts of the machinery are, however, in time assimilated to each other, and this is of profound significance to both moral obligations and mechanisms of social control. Laws, codes and manners become woven into the unconscious in the course of cultural development largely through parent, adult and group identification, making morality a matter of habit and routine; while the primeval unconscious also works upon the pattern of culture and modifies it according to its imperative urgings that rebel against severe repressions.

Mature morality rests on the absence of inhibitions, inconsistencies and distortions in this dynamic reciprocity. This postulates accordingly the sublimation of the forces of the id and rational and inclusive assimilation of the ego with the super-ego, i.e., the submission of the archaic and exaggerated super-ego to the ego or a more rational conscience on the one hand, and the dominance of aesthetic-expressive over repressive forms of control as well as the opportunity for self-assertion, sublimation and creative expression of urgings in the social culture, on the other. Immature morality, on the contrary, involves such techniques as projection, rationalisation, repression, substitution, symbolisation and regression by which the organisation of self achieves a new psychodynamic balance in the course of tensions and conflicts between unconscious impulses and moral norms and

neurotic frustrations. The above deeply ingrained techniques are used by everybody with greater or lesser stress upon one or the other so that one's schematised picture of his self can be retained without loss and frustration, and without aggression towards fellowman or the self. Moral advance may be measured largely by the reduction of the amount of man's frustration by re-orienting the pattern of culture, social rôles and norms that surround him. The above baldly drawn psycho-analytic picture of the functioning of personality is a theoretical construct, based on phylogenetic and ontogenetic experience and therapeutic result, and is as much scientifically valid as the concept of electron, proton and neuron in atomic physics.

The Psycho-biological Frame of Reference

We may now briefly indicate the important trends in psycho-biological analysis that provide a new frame of reference of ethics.

First, the fundamental psycho-analytic concept of the primitive super-ego that bears and transmits the moral heritage of society and culture, as the germ plasm carries the organic heritage, and that once installed in the psyche of each human child becomes the nucleus of development of his moral feelings and sentiments in adulthood, serves as an invaluable bridge between ethics and psychology.

Second, the view of human mind as a continual flux of drives, complexes, emotions, images and symbols, forming an integral inseparable series, now blending smoothly and now in irreconcilable conflict with one another, along with their reminiscences from ancestry or the distant past and their intimations and yearnings of future human relations, provides the scientific foundation of a dynamic, functional ethics. Such fusion or conflict is partial or complete at both unconscious and conscious levels as a result of which human frustrations produce different degrees of inner

tension and the mechanisms of social control are of different degrees of imperativeness. The urgency and ambivalence of tension and obligation are rooted in the growth of the self as a dynamic process in its social setting.

Third, the theory of psycho-dynamic equilibrium that every psychic conflict is resolved by the psyche through the most economical distribution of forces in its conscious, fore-conscious and unconscious segments, achieving a new balance in the total configuration, is also of profound significance for ethics. Man's anxieties, aggressions, and neuroses, due to chronic frustrations, are revealed as adjustive psychic patterns and habits of life entrenched in the dynamic interplay between the ego and the environment, physical and social-cultural. Neurosis, psychosis or criminosis have to be traced to both factors of individual heredity and environment and the surrounding social milieu and its expectancies and compulsives. The psycho-dynamic theory that no group, institution or scheme of culture meets human urgings fully and adequately focusses attention where culture fits into human nature and its potentialities unsatisfactorily. Many ethical commands and cultural taboos and compulsives in society are too severe in their interference with fundamental urges, while new goals are not yet learned and adopted. As opportunities for transference of urges, sublimation, limited expression or catharses are not available in full measure, frustration leads to aggression, directed both towards the self at the price of great inner tension and towards society. On the other hand, the progress of culture and morality implies the supercession of coercive authority, whether the tyrannical super-ego of the individual or the pressure and constraint of the group, by creative rational conscience and aesthetic-symbolic patterns of social control. A new functional ethics should be deeply concerned with the causes of mass frustrations in society in which is psycho-biologically rooted the wide prevalence of collective neurosis, psychosis and criminosis. Unless it grounds itself

on the Freudian "therapy" of both diminution of modes of repressive control and frustrations in society and rational integration of the super-ego in the self—both organically interwoven with each other—it cannot guide individual and group adjustment in a smooth and harmonious working unity.

The super-ego of psycho-analytic theory, thanks to the ego-ideal in it, comprises the germs from which all morality and religion have evolved. Out of the comparison of the ego with its ideals have arisen, according to Freud, the humility of religious feeling, the censorship of conscience, the sense of guilt, reparation and goodness, in short, the representatives of all moral limitations: it is the advocate of the striving after fulfilment and perfection. Some modern psycho-analysts emphasise as the result of their clinical experience that the neurotic is the victim of chronic, unsolved moral conflicts and his cure is possible only through the conquest of the dual resistances of the burden of conscience, originating in an exaggerated and distorted sense of guilt and need for punishment, and of narcissism by appeals to his truthfulness, uprightness, higher moral sacrifice and sense of duty, to forces "beyond the pleasure principle" and, again, by "narcissistic humiliation" or sublimation of his narcissistic striving after pleasure. Unless his dual bulwarks of the burden of conscience and narcissism are morally assailed through transference and instruction by explanation of the analysts, their therapeutic efforts come to grief. Analysing the psychoses of the patient to the rock-bottom, they find that mere intellectual insight is not enough, and that it is indispensable for the purpose of genuine cure to stress the higher values—ethics, religion and social sense. Jung similarly observes: "The patient does not feel himself accepted unless the very worst of him is accepted too."¹ Again, he points out that the

¹ C. G. Jung : *Modern Man in Search of a Soul*, p. 270.

task of coming to terms with his philosophy of life is one which psycho-therapy inevitably sets itself, even though not every patient probes to the deepest levels. The emotional disturbance of the patient should, indeed, activate the corresponding religio-philosophical factors* in the therapist, who "must go with his patient, for better or worse, without any pre-conceived notions, in search of those religio-philosophical conceptions which correspond to the emotional state of the patient. These conceptions come up in an archetypal form, freshly sprung from that maternal soil from which all religio-philosophical systems ultimately arose."¹ Psycho-analytic therapy, accordingly, tends to stress the significance of ethical, religious and metaphysical symbols, processes and experiences as necessary to healing especially, as Max Levy-Suhl finds, for overcoming the last barriers which can oppose the completion of an analytic cure.

The Freudian Neglect of Conscious Mechanisms

We, therefore, come back to ethics by the well-trodden road of science and experimental procedure, psychology and psycho-therapy traversed by Charcot, Janet, Freud, Adler and Jung. But ethics here has to deal not with static attributes of objects and phenomena but with dynamic processes—fluctuating wishes, aspirations and repressed complexes and social constraints, repressions and suppressions in their regular, devious or dramatic interplay in the personality, on the one hand, and the environmental circumstances, group changes and shifting social and cultural pressures on the other.

Ethics is therefore concerned, first, with the growth and development of the personality as a biologically based dynamic process under the influence of the social-cultural

* ¹ C. G. Jung : *Essays on Contemporary Events*, p. 38-41.

milieu; and, secondly, with the individual's fluctuating group rôles, relations and situations that create and sustain functionally appropriate moral expectancies, demands and pressures. Both conscious and unconscious mechanisms are involved in the development and enforcement of the moral attitude. The Freudian school has on the whole exaggerated man's ignorance of, and incapacity to manipulate, his unconscious with its bubbling reservoir of sexuality which is a source of both tension and creative activity. The id brings inner conflicts and neuroses when brought to the conscious sphere, but may elicit profound creative inspiration and ecstasy as it retains the mystery of the unconscious in the processes of sublimation. The psychoanalysts as they contribute to make sexuality conscious underrate the rôle of consciousness in the development of man's moral attitude and creative imagination. The contents and mechanisms of man's conscience include conscious elements and processes, while the super-ego is anchored upon the whole normative system of rôles, property, manners and mores and not merely upon sexual taboos and regulations that are all internalised by the child with full awareness. Conscious processes are also significant in symbolic rôle-playing that fusing with actual rôle-playing in society controls attitudes and norms involving right and wrong. The more complex the social culture, the more dominant, indeed, is the influence of intellectual and aesthetic symbols and models and imaginative rôle-playing in regulating the actual behaviour of men. The Freudians disregard man's conscious striving with the aid of symbol patterns to combat the unconscious trends of sex, assertiveness and aggressiveness as well as hidden anxieties, self-deceptions, illusions and indirections, and to construct a broad, stable and secure style of life amidst its many bafflements. Man's potential social dispositions are also powerful aids to self-mastery and self-

fulfilment that Freudianism does not take fully into account. Here, again, the entire legacy of language, sign-pattern and artistic and cultural symbolism is of help to him in identification with a consciously re-made social world for active participation. This introduces an altogether new dimension to morality. Just as man's mind and behaviour represent a unity, so his super-ego and reason as well as the cultural, moral and legal order are tied to one another as an integral whole—the world of symbols, meanings and values. Conscience is as much sustained by laws and institutions as the latter are nourished by conscience. The ideal values and symbols and the entire framework of social relations, taboos, laws, disciplines and manners are inseparable and continuous. Psycho-analytic theory on the whole misses this continuity in the mechanisms and patterns of super-ego and culture.

Continuity of Conscience and Culture

Morality is not an external restraint nor an independent binder of society. Man's desires, values and rôles make the group, and the group acting on the desires, values, rôles and super-ego of the young makes morals and personality. Yet man is not soft, malleable clay, moulded by group forces and pressures alien to his nature. He reflects, evaluates and chooses; his morality and personality are integrated out of his own needs, wishes, symbols and phantasies in relations to his rôle and self-status and to the cosmos to which he feels he belongs. Sometimes he cannot identify himself with the group, his conscience with group expectancy, and his rôles with the scheme of culture, resulting in tension, frustration, neurosis and psychosis. Sometimes as he rejects a given rôle and life-pattern, and fights against social and cultural pressures, leaning upon the rational, creative rather than the coercive aspect of his conscience, he makes new rôles, new morals.

Many are the Freudian dynamisms by which an acceptable individuality and morals are created and maintained as the self seeks its anchorage on the social-cultural milieu through its functionally appropriate rôles and positions. We find here also of much significance Adler's theory of the instincts of self-assertion and power, and of neuroses arising out of inferiority feelings in humiliating rôles of the personality. Man's self-recognition or self-esteem is pieced together out of his various self-social rôles. Self-status needs defence, nurture and enhancement in man's divergent rôles and positions in society, whether actual or ideal and symbolical. Rebuffed, slighted and frustrated, the self adopts devices of compensatory enhancement. The human personality and its social-cultural milieu ought to be both understood as dynamic processes, and the type, manner and direction of the changes in each case clearly ascertained. Ethics is to be viewed not as a fixed set of attitudes, beliefs and sentiments or system of doctrines but as a dynamic psychological mechanism of individual and group adaptations that begin with a harsh, admonishing conscience and social constraint but consummate themselves in rational aesthetic symbols, ideals and norms, all of varying degrees of imperativeness, sometimes integrated into a unity, sometimes coming into conflict with one another.

The Group Environmental "Field" in Ethics: The Four Ideal Typical Groups of Moral Quality

These tensions and integrations of moral imperatives are largely a matter of group configuration. From Gestalt psychology we can usefully derive the central notion of the group environmental "field" and forces in ethics. In sociology the notion of the group is gradually superseding the older Spencerian concept of "society." Several contemporary investigations in the subject deal with the relations between the individual personality and the social group,

the processes of personality adjustment or maladjustment as these are determined by status-gaining or status-losing, and with group morale and "at homeness." But no integral or structural-functional group theory has emerged. The analysis and description of group behaviour are on the whole fractional, and hardly benefit from the Gestalt perspective in which human values, conscience, morals, personality, group rôle or status and form of social control may be viewed in their togetherness and dynamic interdependence. We have now to advance towards a field theory in ethics, remembering that the quality of human behaviour in social-moral space rises to the level of values and rôles, judgments and imperatives of both the group and the wider social community. Moral values and imperatives follow the dialectic of the human association, the communion of man in group life. These take different forms as the process of group participation, mutuality, develops and issues into its consummation. Social psychology has already provided ethics with a frame of reference for the investigation and measurement of group formation and change, including group disintegration, revolution or collapse that correspond at the cultural level to neurosis, psychosis and criminosis at the individual level. But the theory of the social group as a dynamic structural-functional system which is developing largely as the result of the impact of psycho-analytic principles on sociology has not been scientifically related to the individual's moral attitude, norm and experience.

We suggest a classification of human groupings into four ideal categories of moral quality and level of human communion viz., Crowd, Interest-group, Society or Community and abstract Commonalty. As we rise from level to level of group communion or participation we mark a deepening of the self through the dominance of its universal and transcending aspects over those that are immediate,

restricted and fragmentary, and a consciousness of interpenetration and identity. These constitute the core of personality development and the moral process.

The dogma of metaphysical individualism of the 19th century established a barrier between self and not self, which, modern psychologists since William James delineated the expansion of the self insist, cannot be rigidly drawn. From early childhood the self spreads out into its belongings, the home, the family and the primary group. The intensity of self-feeling, of course, diminishes as the self oversteps the primary group world. But mystics and artists can most readily reach out to the universe, and their reason, feeling and emotion become functional components in a vast collective living. For the normal individual the self easily extends to the Interest-group, Community and Commonalty without that social pressure that sociologists usually postulate due to their narrow, rigid delimitation of the boundaries of the self. Only the frustrated, superficial, restricted self cannot show extension, intimacy or identification. The crowd or mob shows at once man's self in the lowest level of immediacy, irrationality and superficiality and his gregariousness in its most dramatic manifestation. It, of course, represents a phase of social disintegration, a lapse or dissolution of the moral values, habits and standards of the community. It does not throw off any moral principle or norm. The crowd manifests psychopathic behaviour. For a scientific study of social morality crowd behaviour is, however, as important as the behaviour of psychopaths is for the study of individual morality.

In the dynamic pattern of Interest-group, Community and Commonalty the successive moral principles of Reciprocity, Justice and Love emerge as the contained imperatives of the typical associations and social relations, comprising a functional series of ethical development that exhaust all possible

moral relations in human culture. Reciprocity or Fair Play, Justice or Equity, Love or Sharing are different ways of ego involvement or communion, which in their totality coincide with the full dignity and humanity of man. The form of the moral value or imperative is to be sought in the nature of the ego involvement or communion itself, as defined and stabilised by the group configuration; moral perfection is the final stage or fulfilment of the process of group participation. Thus, as Whitehead would say, the process constitutes the essence of the thing.

Moral norm is the outcome of the specific form of group participation in and through which it articulates itself. Interest-group with its moral norm of Reciprocity or Fair Dealing, Community with its norm of Justice or Equality, and Commonalty with its norm of Love or Service, comprise all the logical possibilities of human communion. Man's social communion pertains entirely or mainly to either one or other of the three basic groups with their constitutional expectancies and imperatives. His moral sentiments and behaviours, standards and virtues are also grounded on the valuations, expectancies and judgments in these three fundamental categories of grouping.

Morals in relation to Group Dynamics

The above group classification is social-psychological and functional. Each category of group in this scheme may be studied as a typological construct (in Max Weber's sense) with which deviations and transitions to other forms may be analysed and compared. From the impulsive-hallucinatory rapport of the Crowd, Mass or Mob, man rises to the rational-contractual connection of the Interest-group, and to the affective-rational bond of the Society or Community, and finally to the affective-rational-mystical communion of the concrete or ideal Commonalty. On the other

hand, compact well-knit Commonalty-groups under changed circumstances split up and revert to the loose, inchoate structure of Interest-groups, Crowds or Masses, with the entire transformation of moral sentiments and behaviours. The bond of group connection and associated moral expectancy and imperative are dynamic, fluent in the context of the total moral situation and value pattern. There is, indeed, constant to and fro movement of groups from one kind of basic social participation and relations to another.

All groups under the stress of insecurity, anxiety, persecution or threat of isolation become *solidare* and participate in the nature of a Commonalty-group or regress to the level of Crowds before disintegration. A Commonalty-group like the family or the sect is, however, so much entrenched in its unitive mores, moral habitudes, symbolic patterns of rational, unitive behaviour and idealisations that regressions to the primitive, impulsive crowd level are unusual. The family in stable social cultures, indeed, seldom lapses into a mob, although famines, epidemics and wars are known to break up families and dissolve kinship groups into a floating mass that commits transgressions against cherished duties and obligations. On the other hand, in many modern, unstable industrial-urban communities the family is attenuated into the dyad, and hardly exhibits the "we-feeling" and solidarity of the Commonalty, but comes largely to rest on contractual considerations. As it partakes of the quality of the Interest-group, divorce or the broken dyad becomes common. New sex and parent-hood mores and standards also emerge in the wake of the unstable family pattern.

In the midst of the changing configuration of group life with its distinctive social ties and bonds, its specific quality of group interaction, morale or *esprit de corps*, man finds his ways of social behaviour and their norms; for the latter are simply standardised, meaningful, idealised

patterns of conduct that emerge in the group process itself.

The group with its system of mores and morals, symbols and myths not only moulds him but also requires him to play his due rôle in its complex pattern of activities. Man's rights and duties and virtues are focalised round his social rôles and positions. Since man is a member of many groups, the structuring of his morality or the patterning of his virtues depends upon the compounding and crystallising of his various group rôles. He is the kind and tender self in the family, the irrational and pugnacious self in the crowd, mass or political party, and also the highly egoistic and self-assertive self in his class, profession or trade-union with which he identifies himself as he seeks improvement of security, status and prestige; and he is, again, the lonely and humble self as he belongs to the vast cosmos. Every complex social culture offers a multiplicity of group selves; and human morality and personality are largely matters of perception and enactment of rôles and of self-evaluation and self-status in a complex, interdependent system of rôle behaviour.

There is constant shift in moral norms derived from different group contexts of individual functioning; yet a consistent, balanced and conscious moral personality grows up in and through the behaviour of a number of mutually exclusive selves. The integration of the different rôles is however neither easy nor mechanical as the balancing of the various moral norms and standards is not obvious nor smooth.

But it is the dominant and central group of the social-cultural milieu that moulds and orders the general outlook and feeling tone, what is described as "ethos." It is the feeling tone or "ethos" of the dominant group that profoundly affects both personality types and mores and morals. As a matter of fact, it is the ethos and morality of the dominant and determinative group--

in the West it is the Interest-group or the economic class—which is the ethos of the people and culture. In the Orient, especially in India, China and Japan, the unity, security and consequent solidarity of the family as the central Commonalty group are the bedrocks of the ethos and system of mores and morals of the peoples to which of course is added the leaven of the sense of oneness with the cosmos.

The study of man's rôles and groups giving their distinctive quality to his feelings, mores and morals, his cognitions, symbols and phantasies in the community is fundamental in ethics. The group is a functional whole, a vital social-moral "conjuncture," and the Gestaltist approach affords rich possibilities for the comparative study of groups and their inner mechanisms, evaluations and controls. What is true of individuals and inter-personal moral relations is also true of groups and of inter-group moral relations.

The Dialectic of Human Communion and Morals

Reciprocity, Justice and Love sustain the realisation of the process of communion, level by level; and as each level is satisfactorily concluded a specific moral principle or norm emerges, constituting a consummatory phase of communion. The consummation of human communion in Commonalty, with its contained moral principle or norm of Love, is relative to the earlier stages of communion in the Community and the Interest-group with their respective norms of Justice and Reciprocity. Thus both group and norm develop or approximate to the next phase of social integration maturing into its fulfilment. Commonalty is the final stage of human communion, as its associated norm of Love or Sharing constitutes the essence of moral perfection. Love or Sharing is, indeed, the highest moral principle; it is the feeling and behaviour proceeding from the most profound, boundless solidarity that man can experience and establish in all its concreteness. Accordingly

the dialectic of the human communion creates or rather constitutes the functional series of appropriate rôle-playing patterns, moral imperatives and virtues that embody the essence of humanity, regardless of region, race or culture. Thus sociology gives to empirical ethics a generalised moral evolution theory, which provides a dynamic framework for the ordering and organisation of the phenomena of morals. Moral standards are viewed here not as intuitions derived from the individual's innate sense of right or wrong, but as precipitates or emergents from the ideal-typical group "field;" and so far as experienced inside as largely deduced from the latter, mediated through the parents and intimate groups as well as through ideological-cultural symbols and models.

Societies and cultures everywhere exhibit a wide variety of groups of different moral quality and level of integration that indeed make up the moral complexion of the community. If Crowds and Mobs awaken catastrophic psychopathic behaviour in modern industrial culture by appealing to the primitive insecurities and anxieties of infancy, and by projecting as attainable the longed-for megalomania of cradle days among a body of under-privileged men who share similar frustrations and aggressions, abstract or ideal Commonalty groupings also arouse goodness, love and charity, and bind together man and man in new moral and spiritual ties. Man's experiences of moral nobility can be enormously enlarged by the right organisation of groups and institutions; while wrong or diseased groups and institutions lower the level of individual morale and "at homeness."

We thus see the relation between individual and social morality in new light. The higher types of social groups such as Commonalties and Communities rather than Interest-groups and Crowds by introjecting a more rational, inclusive super-ego or conscience into the personality structure can start the individual better and surer on the rough

moral road. Besides, these condition and train individuals by sublimations, displacements, symbolisations and reaction-formations of love, goodwill and fellow-feeling that can effectively combat primitive aggressive and self-assertive tendencies. The process of group integration is in fact the crux of the moral process. It is the group pattern and its contained basic expectancies and imperatives, rights and duties, norms and symbols that determine what moral life he can create for himself, to what extent he can deepen and expand his self, and what virtues he can attach to the fulfilments and inhibitions of himself and of his fellowmen.

The Ambivalence of Self-assertion and Love in European Morals

Western ethical systems have largely been rooted in the central notion of self-fulfilment, and marked in greater or less degree by a fundamental antinomy of the ideals of self-realisation and self-sacrifice in love and sharing. The former have been the legacy of Greece and Rome and 19th. century liberalism, while the latter are the gifts of Judaism and Christianity to the European ethical tradition. The entire evolutionary and sociological thought and modern psychological movement of this century have stressed the psycho-biological individuality and separateness of a time-and-space bound creature, competing with his fellows for the limited and divisible values of the environment. These have developed a view of human nature that can adequately and effectively function only in the individualistic social climate of rivalry, struggle and power. Thus these have aggravated the confusion of the moral issue of individualistic perfection and the social goal. Marxist ethics today by focussing simultaneously the identification of the self with the Interest-group and self-realisation in an egalitarian but competitive pattern of living sharply defines the dilemma of individual and social perfection in the Western world.

In the last generation the dilemma troubled such master minds as Huxley and Nietzsche. For the former the cosmic process has no sort of relation to moral ends, and produces what is evil in moral life. Morality is, according to Huxley, an "exclusive human manufacture," and in the long run will be defeated by the cosmic process which will resume its sway when evolution enters on its downward course. Nietzsche summarily rejected the Buddhist-Judæo-Christian ethics of love, pity and compassion, and preached the lordly virtues of the super-man, who lives dangerously and yet loves and needs his 'herd.' As man frees himself from the slave morality of repentance and self-immolation, there will be constituted "a new vast aristocracy based upon the most severe self-discipline in which the will of philosophical men of power and artist-tyrants will be stamped upon thousands of years." While Huxley's pessimism contradicted the hope and promise of the Victorian Age, Nietzsche's "master morality" on the whole went against modern socialism and the whole egalitarian movement. Nietzsche yet conceived of a higher ethics which will be undistorted by "the conscience vivisection and self-crucifixion of two thousand years," and created by the symbiosis of the regenerated masters and slaves who will commune with one another in a lyrical ecstasy in the vast collective soul—the super-human life.¹ In the Nietzschean ideal the super-man combines the Will to Power with the Bestowing Virtue and exhibits "true kindness, nobility and greatness of soul" though his emergence is through a dangerous life in which the neighbour is not spared. Society is here regarded as a foundation or scaffolding by means of which a select breed of strong men can elevate itself. Man in the West is torn

¹ For a vivid contrast between the ethics of Buddha and Nietzsche, see Bertrand Russell: *A History of Western Philosophy*, pp. 799-800.

by the ambivalence of self-assertion and love, rivalry and sharing in all his mores, myths and moral codes.

Proposed Solutions of the Ethical Dilemma in Contemporary Thought

We may refer in this connection to four outstanding contemporary philosophical endeavours to solve this ethical dilemma in Europe. Max Scheler in his "philosophical anthropology" treats the problem of man as an independent philosophical problem and bases his ethics on the value of personality, highest in the scale of values. He stresses that man's self is the only place of the becoming of God which is accessible to us and at the same time a true part of the process of this becoming of God, and that the spiritual attribute, the godhead, *deitas*, in the ground of being acquired power in him by starvation, repression and sublimation of the life-instincts. Scheler borrows his psychological analysis from Freud and believes that the human spirit, originally powerless, is invested with power through man's sublimation of instinctive energy to spiritual capacity. "Being in itself becomes a being worthy to be called divine existence only to the extent that it realises, in and through man, the eternal *deitas* in the impulse of world history." Man is "without doubt a cul-de-sac of nature," but "as a potential spiritual being, he is the bright and glorious way out of the cul-de-sac."

Another significant philosophical speculation in the same direction is that of Martin Buber who has proposed a new philosophical science of man with its central subject as neither the individual nor the collective but "man with man" that provides a full genuine image of both the person and the community. The sphere of "between" man and man is common to both but reaches out to transcending experience in which "deep calls unto deep" beyond the special sphere of each. Though being is realised in very different degrees,

it is a primal category of human reality "that" shows the way leading beyond individualism and collectivism.¹

We may next mention the philosophical ethics of Berdyaev, who, like Scheler and Buber, emphasises that human personality in order to reach out to the supreme values should break through the limitations of a temporal, spatial existence through myth and mysticism. Personality is not self-contained, as Scheler thinks on the basis of his faith in God as a Person. Personality, according to Berdyaev, is not the absolute, and God as the Absolute is not a Person. God as a Person presupposes His other, another Person, and is love and sacrifice. On another plane the personality of God and of man presupposes each other. Personality exists in the relation of love and sacrifice. It must come out of itself, transcend the confines of any fixed order or organisation as if it were a prison—this is the task set to it by God. The moral life of the personality must be eternal creativeness i.e., perpetual youth and virginity of the human spirit. It must rest on primary intuitions, free from the suggestions of man's social environment which paralyse the freedom of his moral judgments. Both Buber and Berdyaev agree that the ethical problem of the relation between the individual and the society is wrongly solved by individualistic and by universalistic social theories.

But perhaps the most successful attempt to resolve the ethical paradox has been made by Bergson, who in his *Two Sources of Morality and Religion* emphasises the super-individual, cosmic context of man and his living and his moral perfection as identity with the boundless, creative impetus of the cosmos. On this Bergson bases the distinction between the mystical morality of the "open society" embracing the entire human species and the conventional,

¹ Buber: *Between Man and Man*, pp. 203, 205.

² Berdyaev: *The Destiny of Man*, pp. 72-75.

static morality of the "closed society" or the established order of life with its conforming behaviour, customs and symbols. The insights of Scheler, Buber, Berdyaev and Bergson are so far a cry in the Western ethical wilderness, although these are in consonance with the "perennial philosophy" in both the East and the West.

World Unification, the Major Moral Imperative of the Age

Perhaps the coming technological and political transformation of the globe will contribute more towards the moral consummation than a reoriented ethical system. Throughout human history social and economic change has often sponsored moral change, if not revolution, and revaluation of the traditional pattern of rights and duties and virtues. The coming inevitable moral revolution of the one world milieu and atomic epoch will be more fundamental than that associated with the Industrial and Commercial Revolution of nineteenth century Europe. The latter has not yet completed its tour round the globe, and is now transforming the moral outlook and social values in the less advanced continents. In this century machine, technology and communications are knitting different parts of the globe into an integral whole. The economic and political unification of the globe no doubt demands a universal system of ethics. It cannot be expected that this would ground itself on wide-spread transcending experience, although a few sensitive international souls are there to proclaim the law of love as transcending even the ideal of justice in international economic and political action. But a universalist economic and political morality, creating and sustaining global unity for man, is now developing on the basis of three fundamental norms of solidarity: first, the norm of conservation (and prudential utilisation of the world's resources that demands the sacri-

fice of the interests of the present for future generations; second, the norm of freedom, justice and equality of opportunities for the less advanced peoples of the world demanding sacrifice on the part of the more advanced and powerful nations; and, third, the norm of intellectual, cultural and spiritual oneness of mankind demanding a free interchange and dissemination of knowledge, culture and scientific and technical research in various fields. As the above moral principles strengthen themselves and produce a more sensitive and earnest international conscience and sense of honour, the world will move towards an effective, unified world government and economy without which the end of this century may see man's rebarbarisation or extinction.

Through the ages and in all countries and races mankind's highest moral ideal has been embodied by sensitives, poets, artists and prophets in the experience of a great Commonalty of the Earth. But today this has become the major moral imperative to achieve global unity for mankind. Julian Huxley rightly points out that the critical point in human evolution, following the development of the mechanisms for the transmission of the social heritage, is marked by the union of all separate social traditions of nations in a single common pool. He asks: "Of what future possibilities beyond the human this may be the first foundation, who can say? But at least it will for the first time give full scope to man's distinctive method of evolution, and open the door to many human potentialities that are yet scarcely dreamt of." Thus history will judge modern men, groups and nations as moral or immoral according as they can or cannot assign a new content to all general ethical concepts, such as reciprocity, justice, equality, social benevolence and rights-and-duties, for the promotion of world unification.

Morals, Symbols and Models

Ethics always speaks in the language of symbols and myths. Thus the re-orientation in moral outlook and duties can be reached only through the replacement of the current myths and symbols of status, power and prestige that grip men, classes and nations by new symbolic devices that may appropriately express and focus the new morality and philosophy of life. Could not aesthetic and metaphysical symbols and myths elicit an unfailing allegiance to the world community, a sensitive sentiment of the brotherhood of mankind? On an answer to this largely depends the future of mankind. Man introjects moral principles into the structure of his life, and also projects these into society and the universe through symbolical and mythical construction. Today in modern industrial culture he has lost many ancient paradigmatic symbols, myths and models and their restoration or the creation of new ones will be an integral part of his new ethical dynamic.

Moral life is operative through the instrumentality of dual symbolisation mechanisms, internal and external. Within the personality man establishes not only the parental images but also various symbolical "self-social" rôles as he matures and participates in group life. His several symbolical selves or expectancy and response rôles facilitate his moral adjustment to taboos and mores in respect of sex, property and authority and reciprocity in general social intercourse. He achieves within two to three years of his birth through such symbolic envisagement the appearance, if not the reality, of conformity; while any rewards or punishments associated with improprieties or deviations are also largely symbolical. He also projects into the social order his own wishes, phantasies and complexes, whether angry, beneficent and jealous gods or myths of creation and destruction, whether the laws of the sequence of births,

and *karma* or the promises of incarnation and resurrection. All these sustain his morale by securing a working balance between fulfilment and frustration of his major urgings. Dynamic, empirical ethics should go into the contents of the various inner symbolisms or models that influence ego and super-ego formations as well as the outer group symbolisms or ideals that secure conformity to one's social group and the solidarity of society.

Such symbols and myths become invested with an attribute of absoluteness, and accordingly these not only check and restrain, but also command and enslave. Thence spring the universal, categorical or divine character of man's moral call and obligation. Such quality of absoluteness whether of symbols as of parents and parent substitutes or of their demands for the control of primitive aggression and hatred is due to several causes. The child's imitation of, and identification with, parental behaviour, the ambivalence of his love and hate, the intensity of his hostility and the ability to turn this aggression into himself are paramount factors. "The super-ego," aptly observes Gardner Murphy, "is, after all omniscient and omnipotent at the time when it takes articulate form; hence, "owing to the timelessness of the unconscious" it retains these valences."¹ To these have to be added as the child matures the narcissistic need in re-inforcing the ego-organisation, which leads him to compensate his self-esteem by worshipping another person, an idea or god that never fails him. Besides, the peculiarities of human speech also strengthen the sense of certitude. Man's capacity of symbolical envisagement and his sense of absoluteness of moral demands make ethics often full of imperative, conscription and slavery on the one hand, and withdrawal, asceticism and self-torture on the other.

¹ *Personality*.

The ethics of the future should establish an alliance with social psychology, psycho-analysis and psychiatry in paving the way towards mature, rational and inclusive integration of the personality without any exaggerated sense of guilt arising from thwarted strivings and resistances, and towards a co-operative social purpose of society and culture without any class dogmatism and over-protestation arising from social suppressions, distortions and inhibitions. Neither segregation and vengeful punishment nor exhortation, but sympathetic understanding, treatment, rehabilitation, and above all, systematic prevention will characterise the new morality in dealing with all types of social offenders, inadequate and defectives. Baulked social groups, dispossessed classes or disinherited minorities, economically insecure and anxious, often produce an ethics of aggression and revolution or of subservience and apathy that is in marked contrast with the ethics of dominance and aggression of the elite groups.

The Ethics of Class

The most ubiquitous, dominant and potentially disruptive and bellicose group in modern industrial culture is the class. In the normal routine of economic life the class seeks its goals through legal and socially approved or tolerated means—agitation, strike, bargaining and agreement—following one another in a long-drawn imperceptible class struggle. But soon occasions arise that produce or are produced by demagogues and audacious leaders, and the class regresses to the crowd or mob that leads the mass to direct action, revolt and revolution. The mechanisms of frustration and aggression are the same for men as for groups, and are analysed by Dollard and his colleagues. The occurrence of frustration creates simultaneously an internal instigator to aggression, whose strength depends upon that of the frustrated response, upon the threat to personality—inse-

curity, loss of status, prestige and power and isolation, upon counter-aggression and upon the phantasy of reward by aggression. Each frustration-aggression situation elicits its own class ideology and ethics and dynamics of social aggressive behaviour. Class-ridden societies in modern cultures exhibit divergences and contradictions of moral standards that are always defended in times of crisis with exaggerated protestation and aggressiveness on one side, and excessive severity and compulsiveness on the other.

It is only a fully integrated, uninhibited social culture that nurtures and operates on a common, humane ethics of disciplined goodness, shared living and loving service for all individuals and groups. Its status-scheme would reflect not the dominance of wealth, privilege and economic power but of learning and moral and spiritual perfection; and its dominant groups would be abstract Commonalty associations with their pure ethics of love, sharing and solidarity, having an acosmic and beyond-human as well as social and temporal orientation. Such an ethics is secure, consistent and all-inclusive; since subjectively goodness is guaranteed by power, and objectively the highest status, prestige and power in the society belong to the genuinely good men as the elite group. The moral standards of groups and individuals here merge in order to build up the spiritual brotherhood of the universe and the perfection of the human personality at the same time.

Modern industrial civilisation, on the contrary, is confronted with the moral tragedy arising out of the dilemma that imperatives of class and nation contradict the moral demands of the individual. Moral man has to bow to the labels of right and wrong of his immoral class or state, which due to technological and economic circumstances looms the largest in modern life, and invades and eclipses the traditional moralities of the family, the neighbourhood and the church. The individual and the class or

the state therefore accumulate thwartings and resistances in an atmosphere of antagonism, repression and violence. Moral good is taken as "natural good" and the way to its achievement becomes conflict. Thus morality arises, as T. V. Smith observes, as a specific byproduct of wholesale immorality; and rightly does he ask: "Can a class-less society assuming it to be the desideratum arise from the dead ashes of one class burned at the stake of another?" The ethics and techniques of violence and immorality thrown off by the class structure vitiate the morality of whole nations and peoples.

Much of the disparate ethical demand and resistance of classes, characteristic of modern industrial communities lacking in cohesion, can be processed out by the equalisation of economic and political opportunities and free public discussion, undistorted by propagandist camouflaging of real thwartings and frustrations. Both these are moral achievements that could bridge the widening cleavage between the mutually intolerant and frantic convictions of working class and bourgeois ethics. The methods of individual and group therapy through cathartic understanding, functional analysis and breaking down of the barriers of narcissism by appeal to broader and higher frames of meanings and values in man are similar. Moreno's technique of the 'psychodrama' utilises spontaneous rôle-playing of persons in the group situation for purposes of diagnosis and therapy. Experimentally induced rôles enable persons to experience catharsis in the process of unfolding their conflicts and to find adequate responses to them on the spur of the moment, thus creating new personality configurations and group norms and standards. In the technique called the 'sociodrama' the rôles represent collective ideas and experiences dealing with inter-group relations and ethical problems, rather than personal issues. If psycho-analysis and psycho-therapy succeed so much in curing the indivi-

dual patient of his neuroses and psychoses, cannot a dynamic functional ethics take up the challenge of the modern age with its collective neuroses and chronic outbursts of aggression, understand, analyse and interpret these and guide society and culture towards wisdom, happiness and goodness?

The Significance of Group Psycho-therapy

Fundamentally the latter task is the more enduring and surer strategy; for without social wholesomeness and creative way of living in an integrated, genuinely humane and civilised culture, individual neuroticism and psychic dissociation cannot be combated successfully. Group analysis or group-therapy, based on a full causal-functional analysis of the familial, personal and social-cultural strivings and frustrations that accentuate and perpetuate vicious circles of neuroses of vast masses of men, and on collective therapeutic interaction, is a developing technique. Ethics should benefit from this even more than sociology and education.

Psychology and psycho-pathology, aided by anthropology and sociology, are today revealing the causes and consequences of cultural inhibitions and frustrations as well as the processes by which we may build up a saner culture with less of repressions, tensions and conflicts that will be more tolerable for a considerable portion of normal persons in the community. There is no doubt that social psycho-technics or group therapy will increasingly provide ethics with the objective background of social amelioration, reconstruction and re-education processes. Ethics will then integrate into one myth of the striving, aspiring complete Social Man—far different from the contemporary myths of the dissected Economic, Political or Crowd and Mass Man—all the subjective truths of introspection and analysis from philosophy and all the objective facts of human behaviour and culture from psychology, psycho-pathology, anthropo-

logy and sociology, and help him to heal, control and perfect himself.

Morality sometimes grovels in the dirt and dust of psychopathic behaviour brought down by the load of childhood traumas and conflicts, group frustrations and antagonisms and national hatreds and aggressions. It now and then soars to the skies on the angelic wings of mature, all-inclusive reason, self-sacrificing universal love and self-transcending faith. Ethical rational faith is a trait in the character structure which is grounded on the complete resolution of psychic conflicts, eradication of the phobia of death and profound intellectual insight into life-goals and means of their realisation. The faith by which man can live and die for a "cause," by which, in the words of the Indian scripture, "the dumb can speak volubly, and the crippled can traverse the mountains," is the end product of mental and moral creative experience and freedom. As a truly functional science, no more metaphysical or pietistic nor neutral, ethics has to study the entire gamut of dynamics of behaviour, normal, abnormal and super-normal, and direct conflict-torn personality, culture and society to the fullest adjustive realisation and the highest moral faith, meaning and purpose. Thus will ethics recover from the complete eclipse due to the converging impact of the Darwinian theory of evolution, the Spencerian theory of sociological individualism, the Marxian theory of economic determinism and the mechanical determinism and atomism of methods of the philosophy of science. It will provide, with the assistance of the psychological sciences and experimental techniques, a universally acceptable and effective system of social behaviour for a complete man and for a universal community. The greatest unifying principle of the second half of the twentieth century will be the equilibrium and harmony of man both within himself and in his group and culture—the world community. Ethics will guide him in

building up a harmonious, comprehensive macrocosm in his self and without, and consciously fusing inner and outer in his life and conduct.

CHAPTER II

ORIGIN AND DEVELOPMENT OF CONSCIENCE

The Organismic Viewpoint in the Social Sciences and Ethics

A major task of the modern philosophy of culture is to correct the current, sophisticated divorce between values and facts in the social sciences on the one hand, and between personal and social ethics on the other. Two germinal conceptions recently stressed in modern thought aid the social sciences and ethics in their tasks of synthesis and reconstruction of the picture of man as a creative, evaluative, complete person, and of society as the medium of creation and fulfilment of his manifold desires and values—a picture that has been destroyed by the prevalent atomism of methods. One of the conceptions is derived from psychology, viz. Gestaltism, the notion that man and his behaviour, imperatives and values can be understood only as patterning in a whole configuration, system or field. The other is derived from sociology, viz. Functionalism, the notion that society or culture can be understood only as a single functioning system or pattern distributed between individual and social culture areas or fields. The basic “frame of reference” in dynamic ethics is the “personality-value-group” situation corresponding to the “organism-function-environment” and the “group-status-social space” reference in biology and social ecology respectively. This is the organismic point of view stressing whole to part causation and field determination under the laws of balance.

In both sociology and psychology this organismic point

of view today finds emphasis under various names. In social psychology and study of personality we find greater stress than before on the structuring activities of the person, and on the importance of centrally initiated, future-oriented and symbolic motive patterns rather than those that are peripheral and genetic. There is also more emphasis on cognitive dynamisms—including ideology, schemata of meaning and frames of reference. We find the contemporaneity of motives stressed as well as the important functions of self-status and ego-involvement in mental and moral development. Gordon W. Allport indicates on the basis of these theoretical developments that the study of motivations and symbols, and hence of the foundations of moral life and behaviour should now be systematically oriented towards a more scientific as well as humane “model;” indeed, personnel placement, psycho-therapy, improvement of morale, all represent successful practical movements based on the discard of old and inappropriate models and concepts.¹ In no field of thinking is there, however, greater psychological resistance to new scientific models and designs than in ethics.

Modern ethics still leans too heavily upon man's innate ideas and intuitions, his original nature and cardinal virtues. It derives itself largely from abstract metaphysical principles or absolutes of right and wrong, and ignores man's group and institutional processes and relations in which modern psychology finds the essential roots of his ethical attitudes and imperatives. It has hardly taken into cognisance the important findings of genetic and clinical psychology and psycho-analysis. The former shows the wide range and variety of the child's emotional and intellectual adjustment under the influence of social-cultural conditions. The latter lays bare the conflicts and stresses of human will and

¹Scientific Models and Human Morals, *Psychological Review*, July 1947.

behaviour due to unconscious desires, the tensions and disharmonies between human nature and the social order, and the pathology of both individuals and groups. Out of such adjustive psychologies emerge the basic concepts in respect of the origin, structure and dynamics of conscience so much needed by any theory of ethics.

Conscience, a Psycho-biological Heritage

The psycho-biological function of conscience, if we disregard its confused and even conflicting later developments, but turn to its origins in human infancy, is to promote social adjustment of the child, threatened by his own anger and aggression due to inevitable physical discomfort and frustration as he comes out of the security and equableness of his mother's womb. The prolonged infancy and family care establish and incorporate the unconscious, social adjustive or ethical mechanism into structure of the child's mind as the super-ego or conscience, whose tyrannical dominance and repression of the aggressive ego rest upon the exaggeration of both infantile impulse and parental disapproval in the fantasy life of childhood. Conscience is social, approximating to the age-old values, standards and traditions of the community with which the parents identify themselves for the training and education of the child; hence it is stern and severe in fact, while the severity and sternness are much magnified by childish fantasy.

Psycho-analysts have abundantly shown how the parents' indifference and withholding of tenderness, severe reprimand or criticism as well as promotion of an exaggerated sense of guilt and self-censure produce in children entrenched neuroses and habits incapacitating them for normal social life and adjustment. Healy and Bonner's study of twin brothers, six years old, one of whom is a delinquent, shows the relation between deviation and the quarrel among the parents, one of whom—the father—shows complete indiffer-

ence, chillness and other forms of discrimination to the delinquent boy who testifies that he has keenly felt these. The boy's delinquencies are interpreted by the investigators as attempts to escape from unpleasant situations, to obtain revenge and to get substitute satisfactions.¹

It appears that the deprivation of parental love and tenderness produces profound emotional insecurity and disbalance, and prevents the full development of the primitive super-ego or conscience mechanism with its ambivalent tendencies of love and hate, guilt and reparation and is the dominant factor in originating the child's deviant and delinquent traits due to his characteristic solution of the crises of anxiety and insecurity. The immaturity of the super-ego may be due to a variety of factors of which the most significant are the absence of paternal care and tenderness or over-indulgence, vacillation and inconsistency in parental authority and differences in standards and attitudes between the father and mother. Children who grow up in orphan asylums where their relationship to attendants is distant and official tend to be deficient in feeling and lack ordinary super-ego responsiveness.² Upon the nucleus of formation of the child's super-ego or conscience, with its sense of guilt and perfection and its ambivalence of anger and love, aggression and goodness, destruction and reparation, are superimposed layer upon layer of social taboos and injunctions and cultural norms, on both conscious and irrational levels, integrating and completing the primordial ethical framework of very strong emotive quality.

Normally the super-ego or conscience evolves in the family setting, and there is also a close agreement between the ideas of right and wrong of the child and those of his

¹ Healy and Bonner: *New Light on Delinquency*.

² Goldfarb, quoted in Symonds: *The Dynamics of Human Adjustment*, p. 290.

parents. This has been demonstrated by Harshorne and May who tested a large number of children as to their moral judgments.¹ The results correlated with the scores of the children's associates are as follows:—

| | | | |
|--------------------------------------|----|----|------|
| Child and his parents | .. | .. | .545 |
| Child and his friends | .. | .. | .353 |
| Child and his Club leaders | .. | .. | .137 |
| Child and his day-school teachers | .. | .. | .028 |
| Child and his Sunday-school teachers | .. | .. | .002 |

As would be expected, the mother's concepts are more closely allied to the children's than are the father's, reflecting the more intimate relationship usually enjoyed by the mother. Not merely are the authority of the parents, whether mother or father, and the clearness and preciseness with which it imposes demands for conforming behaviour significant for the moral development of the child, but also the quality of the child's response to such demands. There is no doubt that children show different responses to parental authority and love, and hence their learning and adjustment in the social situation work within certain relatively fixed ranges or boundaries.

Man inherits the super-ego or conscience as part of his hereditary equipment that also determines the pre-potent impulses influencing the kind of conscience he develops. Contemporary psychologists now stress that the more purely instinctive and biological approach of Freudianism is inadequate. Kardiner, Horney, Faris, Dunham and others agree that Freudianism gives insufficient recognition to the expectancies, moral standards and ideals which are built up from the earliest age by direct conditioning and learning from the social environment. The maturation of the child and

¹ Quoted in M. K. Nimkoff: *The Role of the Family in Personality Development*, *Encyclopedia of Psychology*, p. 494.

his adoption of various rôles in intimate groups fabricate moral standards, expectancies and imperatives into his personality structure with which is closely bound the removal of various tensions and anxieties arising out of conflicts between his behaviour and what he feels is due from him in his various rôles. The child carries with him not merely the "imagos" of his parents but also of many other loved persons and intimate groups, and the standards and expectations of all of them are introjected into the self. Every kind and degree of inter-personal relationship and group participation involve in some measure the modification of the moral self. The maintenance of self-status and narcissism in man's different rôles in society, and of the love and respect of other persons is bound up with each other. Thus the moral self is created out of the factors of heredity, the demands of parents in early childhood and the group expectations, standards and ideals in the complex, dynamic, interweaving system of man's divergent rôles, positions and statuses in society. Education, religion, law, arts and morals also play their respective rôles in inculcating and interiorising the moral standards and ideals of culture, making the super-ego choices freer, more elastic and resilient for harmonious social adaptation. The entire ideological "frame of reference" of the individual, comprising his religion, faith and myth, builds up the super-ego and sense of guilt on the primary foundation largely of the parent-child relationship, and at the same time provides various methods of resolving guilt through sublimation, reparation and all other constructive activities through which the highest human values find expression in society. Especially important are religious myth and symbolism that introject a not too tyrannical super-ego and uncontrollable self-censure, but just a mild dose that serves as a stimulus for overcoming the aggressive impulses, partially turned inward on the self, and for learning, sublimation, restitution, catharsis and idealisation and for cons-

cious control and direction of constructive activities. All these latter are long processes, associated with the social learning and fabrication of civilised moral, artistic and scientific values, norms and symbols, that have removed human urges and impulses far from their naive, deviant and dangerous expression in order to secure man's peace with himself and with society. The heritage of language, and of artistic, religious and ethical symbolism facilitates his symbolic rôle-playing in full awareness. It enables him to overcome his infancy, inadequacy and failure, and enhances his sense of self-esteem and worthiness. The intellectual systematisation and learning of symbols, myths and models and idealisation and imaginative enactment of rôles and statuses in life add, indeed, a new dimension to morality and contribute towards the maximum enjoyment of life. Instinct and depth psychologies have indeed both underrated the influence of social conditioning and training, which begins at a much earlier age and has much more to do with the determination, manifestation and relative strength of motivating forces for morality than they have shown.

Piaget reports that children adhere naively to parental attitudes, tastes and norms as they learn the techniques and ways of living, convenient and practical in the family and society. Rightness or wrongness inheres in the behaviour of the individual without reference to its social consequences. This is called by Piaget "moral realism" which is largely the outcome of social conditioning and the process of identification with the parents in their different rôles.

Besides, the process of development brings with it change of the innate patterns due to maturation in neural patterns. Piaget distinguishes what he calls "two moralities" among children. Very young children exhibit an ego-centric type of behaviour characterised by a tendency to conform to rules as these are handed down by parents and other elders. Later in their lives they show the desire

for creativeness as contrasted with conformity and "mutual respect of child for child."¹ The two moralities co-exist and the second never precedes the first. This coupled with increase of co-operative play among children and the change in the interests of youth with the maturation of sex functions leads Jones to suggest that the "wants" of children change not only through training but also through maturation in neural patterns.²

Finally, the entire social-cultural milieu, especially that associated with the community's or the group's heritage of signs and symbols, arts and rituals, links strong emotionally toned reactions with certain motivations of the individual and guides and directs moral behaviour. Here again the influence of verbalised concepts, symbols, norms and ideals on moral behaviour has been underestimated by instinct and depth psychologies.

Divergent Roots of Conscience or Moral Call

Westermarck rightly stresses that man's moral call or judgment is rooted in the strong feelings of gratification or anger at the activities of other men who aid or injure him, and that the processes of transfer, abstraction, generalisation and symbolisation both define certain categories of acts as helpful or dangerous with associated sanctions and develop notions of rightness and wrongness abstracted from the total. His analysis of the moral emotions is supported and amplified by the later Freudian analysis of the child's conscience and moral attitude. On the other hand, Piaget's analysis fails to account for the strong sense of injury, guilt and remorse as well as of reparation associated with the child's interiorisation of the parental taboos and injunctions. His theory of the child's assimilation of moral

¹ Piaget: *The Moral Judgment of the Child*.

² V. Jones: *Character Development in Children* in Carmichael (Ed.) *Manual of Child Psychology*, pp. 735-37.

norms from the parents resembling exactly the imitation of their practical, objective ways of adjustment, with none of the character of inwardness in these, cannot account for the feeling of self-censure or masochism universally associated with wrong behaviour.

The normative needs of man are in fact accounted for better by Westermarck and best by Freud. But while the Freudian approach most satisfactorily explains the origin of absolutist, compulsive standards of right and wrong in moral behaviour, it does not adequately recognise the rôle of conscious mechanisms of symbolisation, transfer, projection and identification that proceed from group and institutional conditioning, evocation and control in social culture.

Society's complex system of signs and symbols, from words and gestures to taboos, myths and maxims, from the show of physical coercion to symbolic reward, governs the pattern of values and morals, and canalises the flow of desires, satisfactions and emotions into the cognitive frame. Social culture consciously secures conformity to moral standards with varying degrees of success through a complex variety of symbols and signs—mnemonic gestures of approval, warning and punishment of which men are often unaware.

The moral attitude is indeed made up of various trends that have different influences according to the life-history of the individual and his social-cultural situation. Gardner Murphy aptly remarks: "Within the same individual in a stress situation the Piaget type, the Westermarck type and the Freudian type of attitudes appear furtively and fluidly as he looks for anchors which secure his need to defend himself. When a situation arises which requires both overt action and at the same time a defence of one's picture of oneself, one searches for an anchor that will permit an appropriate autism."¹

¹ *Personality*, p. 388.

The Sociological Theory of Conscience

A comprehensive theory of moral motivation should include not merely "wants" and "urgings" in the direction of goals consciously sought and achieved but also remote and unconscious goals, intentions and values that are a part of a chain of activities, motivating further activities, and that may be achieved but partially or not at all. The social environment of man is a derivative, artificial environment that demands usually a series of intermediate activities that become his goals for the time being. He is as much motivated by these proximate ends or goals as by his remote goals. This has been emphasised in the study of behaviour by McDougall and Woodworth. Motivation in moral or "immoral" behaviour cannot be easily discerned due to the screen of intermediate goals, values and activities, and besides is much obscured, magnified or side-tracked, due to baulking or frustration of elemental impulses and entrenched habit mechanisms and neuroses.

Accordingly the motivating forces of the individual are linked intimately with man's group rôles and situations as these develop, forming links in a chain of on-going social goals, activities and situations, and this at both conscious and unconscious levels. It is the fluctuating group rôles, relations and situations of the individual as a part of his relatively permanent social milieu with their various projected tensions, conflicts and satisfactions as well as group standards and pressures that condition his ego-ideal and moral responsibility, and determine and at the same constantly modify his notions of right and wrong behaviour. Every individual builds up out of his experiences in diverse group rôles, and the expectancies and imperatives of groups his own conscience, notions and feelings of self-perfection, happiness and freedoms, rights-and-duties and virtues, and even arrives at broad generalised moral principles or concepts through reflection, criticism and judgment. These enable him to choose what

is right in novel and unforeseen situations and act with poise, self-assurance and self-transcendence that become the sources of new moral insights and valuations for society.

Man acquires from society through the sociological laws of conditioning, education and social control both his motives and goals and his conforming as well as creative conscience, moral routine as well as adventure. There is interiorisation of cultural norms and standards through group pressures and expectancies, rewards and punishments. Learning is a complex process in which the group situation is all-important. Murphy and Newcomb observe, "If we are to describe the abstract laws of social learning we must know the differences between families in gusto or heartiness of living; the differences between occupational groups in times of spontaneity and changeability of mood; the differences between the same cultural group before, during and after a time of crisis and transition; and the differences between widely diverse cultures in respect to the way in which external stimulating factors are accepted, organised and given definition by the individual as something to respond to."¹ There is also projection of man's unique values and judgments into the community's moral heritage of values and ideals derived from the individual's own clarifications, criticisms and choices made at deep levels of his moral consciousness. Such is the operation of the dual ethical mechanisms organically interwoven with each other—the conscience of the individual and the culture of the group that guide man in his moral behaviour and fulfilment.

The Freudian Super-ego, only a Fragment of Conscience

No formulation of ethics is sound that makes morality either an organ only of the society and culture or only of the

¹ *Experimental Social Psychology*, pp. 206-7.

personality. The routine of moral life exhibits gaps and discontinuities between the moral judgment of the community and the individual's own scale of values, leading to personality conflicts and maladjustments that have now become a fertile field of social-psychological studies. Modern psycho-analysis establishes the super-ego as an inherited instinct which, however, differs from individual to individual. Biology, however, regards gregariousness or sociability as the more primary, inherited instinct, the super-ego being the definite form in which the sociability manifests itself in both conscious and unconscious life of the child. Sociology stresses the educability and transformation of the primitive super-ego through long years of cultural conditioning and institutional training that bring about a new balance between expression and repression, goal and striving, intention and imagination. In ethics we are concerned not merely with the instinct or mechanism of the super-ego or conscience as the relatively permanent core of the individual's moral sense but also with the variable conditions and factors of development of man's group selves in social culture. If we accept Freud's conception that the super-ego is assigned duties of self-scrutiny, self-censure as well as the pursuit of self-perfection, with the supposedly perfect parents or parent-substitutes as models, we cannot regard man's moral sense merely as a social instrument. On the contrary, morality by unloading in some measure the burden of guilt and guiding the individual towards the "higher things" in life has invaluable functions in achieving the autonomy, integration and organisation of the ego. H.A. Murray rightly observes, "There are other needs of super-ego—intellectual standards and ethical standards that are almost as important as Freud's moral censor. Furthermore, Freud's super-ego, the internalisation of parental and social mores, does not cover all of conscience. There are certain original (id-born) moral conceptions derived from sensitive-

ness to pain, from empathy and love, which are often "higher" than anything that parents or authorities teach or practise. If not, how one can account for the prophets, romantic idealists and reformers who have raised the super-ego of their societies to new levels? The most moral men are not submissive citizens, but non-conformists."¹ There is in fact another significant, creative, rational part or aspect of conscience, to which Freudian theory has not given adequate attention—that which is largely independent of man's social and cultural norm and standard, and of his own happiness and pain, but expresses the fullness of his personality and completeness of his will. Such creative conscience, as that of the mystic, prophet or artist, guides him with clarity, simplicity and straight-forwardness, that rise far above the complications and bafflements of life, and elicits his noblest enterprises, irrespective of humiliation, injury and agony of the body. The calm triumph and exaltation of man's conscience or will over the limitations of his weak body, associated with some of his supreme moral adventures, cannot be explained away as self-torture and self-censure by psycho-analysts.

Jung designates conscience as a most powerful objective-psychic element underlying greatness and the liberating effect of all genuine personality. He points out that the smaller the personality, the "inner voice" of man, his "vocation" or "calling" becomes more veiled and unconscious; while personality development means that he follows the law and the "vocation" as his own, and subordinates himself to these "higher powers" and places his will and abilities at their service.² Similarly Erich Fromm speaks of two consciences of man, "authoritarian" conscience concerned with his obedience, self-sacrifice, duty or his "social adjustment,"

¹ What should Psychologists do about Psycho-analysis? *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology*, Vol. 35, 1940.

² *The Integration of Personality*, pp. 292-294.

and "humanistic" conscience which is the expression of his true and integral self, "the reaction of the total personality to its proper functioning and dys-functioning."¹ Often does man suffer from a sense of guilt and self-censure for not being able to reach his own ideal of self-functioning, self-fulfilment and self-perfection. The history of civilisation with its various religious and ethical systems has defined an ideal of human perfection and potentialities that is in large measure common to different peoples and cultures. Man, conscious of his own responsibility for the full unfolding of his complete personality, everywhere develops a feeling of inner joy, competence, poise and pride as he is true to his own self. This is one of the essential ingredients of good conscience which is ratiocinative, creative and relatively independent of external sanctions, and is entrusted with the rôles of self-scrutiny and self-control and of unfolding the image of self-perfection. Conscience, according to Nietzsche, is the "ability to guarantee one's self with all due pride, and also at the same time to say 'yes' to one's self." Freud's super-ego includes man's image of ego-perfection that is oriented to the moral code and religious system of a country through education and cultural conditioning. Yet due to the commonness of the image of human perfection and art of social living among different peoples, there is such a thing as the conscience of the race. Often, however, man lives a life of unconscious desires and passions, of immediacy and irrationality, and obeys conscience or the super-ego not because it represents truly his "inner voice" or image of self-perfection but because it is the interiorised echo of the coercive, external constraint of the group or community. Mankind's progress in its unconscious, social state depends upon individuals who follow their own unborn law and image of self-perfection, isolate them-

¹*Man for Himself*, pp. 158-159.

selves from the social group, and break away from its norms and conventions that hold people unconsciously by routine and determine in large measure their moral choice. Between man's internal moral framework of conscience, which is partly inherited and primitive, and partly adapted, acquired and unique, and his external moral framework, as represented by the legacy of his culture—his myths, values and morals—that is wholly acquired, there are constant action and reaction, inward and outward. Man's exterior social conscience is often as tyrannical, 'fantastic' and 'slapdash' (to use the words of Karin Stephen) as his internal conscience, both rendering his moral progress slow, uncertain and full of set-backs.

The Validity of the Notion of Social Conscience

That there is a group conscience holding the same relations to the members of a social community or culture as the individual conscience does to the moral attitudes and behaviour of an individual cannot, of course, be "scientifically" demonstrated. There are no psychological operational techniques to affirm or deny the existence of a social conscience or the moral attributes of groups, institutions and cultures. But man's social life and his mind's logical, introspective and symbolising phase have created the various components of his culture—words, symbols, values, moral ideas and sentiments as well as groups and institutions that serve as the basis of both social inter-stimulation and adaptation. Man can individually think and feel about right and wrong, good and evil, but what he thinks, feels strongly, remembers, and judges about is usually a social relation or moral behaviour. What is even more significant is that not only does he conserve and transmit this moral valuation, judgment and experience as customs, moral codes and laws, an integral part of his external social inheritance, but he also interiorises the essential and universal part of this external inheritance that observes, guides and threatens him from

within from about the second year of his birth. This is what is meant by group or social conscience, which, like other psychological functions in his long upward march, is a product of variation and natural selection of the human animal in his social-cultural environment. In man's evolutionary march the narrowness and exclusiveness of the group conscience are consequences of, and aids in, the group's struggle for existence. Human social evolution in its early stages with its stress of struggle and elimination on the animal level has developed in man a dual conscience. Early man has always had one code of right and wrong for his in-group, family, clan, tribe, kin or folk, and another for the out-group, a neighbouring clan, tribe or folk. The moral principle dominating group selection is that form of "justice that is doing good to friends and evil to enemies." A dual conscience cemented the solidarity of the primary groups of mankind living in small, isolated, local groups or communities for at least a millenium. There were developed instinctive love, sympathy and sharing within the closed society; while an altogether opposite code of morality was adopted towards outside groups, towards "barbarians" and enemies. Early man was accordingly both loving and cruel, truthful and deceitful, compassionate and fierce according to the "field" of his behaviour, as he was dealing with his friends in the in-group or with enemies in the out-group. Arthur Keith has recently suggested that man's evolutionary advance was made possible by the practice of this dual code of justice. "Evolution," he says, "would certainly have become disorganised, indeterminate, inchoate as indeed it is becoming in the modern world." The duality of man's mentality, the ambivalence of a code of amity and a code of enmity, Arthur Keith insists, is a necessity for group evolution and struggle for existence.¹ Man's mind and behaviour

¹ Keith: *A New Theory of Human Evolution*, pp. 115-123.

are, however, a single, integral whole, and it is wrong to infer that the tribal mind is so stereotyped that contradiction is not at all felt in the use of two opposite codes of conduct, one towards friends and the other towards enemies. Nor does the closed society always remain closed. As the in-group or the closed society changes its composition with the admission of strangers and erstwhile enemies, the moral boundary of early man is bound to be enlarged. Thus as different clans and tribes in the normal course of ethnological evolution are assimilated with one another, forming large, compound, heterogeneous folks and communities as the result of conquest, inter-marriage or absorption, the dual code is recurrently challenged and considerably modified. Group opinion or conscience in the course of ethnic development becomes more liberal, rational and inclusive. Even in primitive communities certain individuals would show altruism, generosity and compassion towards outsiders that are tolerated breaches of group custom. The entire trend of human social evolution has been gradually to extend the bounds of man's feeling and "consciousness of kind." This has been as significant in man's selection and survival as his clannishness, tribalism, class or party spirit and nationalism. Accordingly man experiences grave inner conflicts as a dual code makes its demands on him in respect of the "foreign affairs" of his group, class or nation in the same manner as he experiences these when a harsh tyrannical super-ego supervenes upon and admonishes his ego in respect of contravention of injunctions and taboos in the home-group. The ambivalence of love and hate, goodness and aggressiveness is partly hereditary and partly acquired by man as his basic disposition from his childhood's relationship with the parents or parent-substitutes in the family group; while the ambivalence of the code of amity and of enmity towards the in-group and the out-group respectively is due to his training and cultural conditioning in adulthood

in the total milieu of group struggle and elimination. The maturity of his mind implies a consistency and wholeness of attitudes and behaviour, free from inner conflicts and outer contradictions. This is favoured by the strength of his social dispositions and by his membership of several groups and associations, sometimes with different standards of right and wrong to whom he owes equal allegiance. Most individuals in society, however, have split minds and conflicting group consciences that are reconciled and compromised or come into disguised or open conflict in the daily routine of social transactions. That group conscience usually prevails which is most clamant in a particular value situation. Only the individual higher than the average can evolve a rational, inclusive and consistent social conscience that seeks, here with success, there with failure, to humanise, plan and direct evolution according to the scale of personal values. True human evolution consists in an enlargement of the "consciousness of kind" and of other intellectual, aesthetic and moral values and experiences. The latter, indeed, lift evolution to another plane or dimension in man's social-cultural milieu, in spite of the pressure of his biological values and limitations and his subjection to chronic inner tensions and group contradictions and conflicts. Thus an integrated, rational, inclusive conscience, an infinite extension of justice, love and compassion become new, dominant modes or avenues of evolutionary progress. The human species in this manner through the development of the human personality, conscience and virtue—the end-products of millenia of organic evolution—achieves its ultimate freedom from the exigencies of the time-and-space defined environment.

The reflective, intellectualising, moral phase of the human mind accordingly fabricates divergent consciences for the individual in his intimate groups, the family; the kin, the class, the community, the state or the abstract commonalty.

But for these several group consciences the inner tensions and conflicts of the individual in social life would have been intolerable. For much of his moral routine he falls back upon the imperatives of some group or other, keeping the deeper and more intense problems for the decisions of his own conscience which is the final court of appeal. The human animal's group or social existence is, to be sure, impossible unless his mind evolves an appropriate framework of adjustive moral values, beliefs and imperatives common to most members of the society—the ethos of the culture.

Different social cultures or peoples of course develop divergent patterns of social conscience that are studied now by various tests of national attitudes and temperaments and other techniques. Man's evolution includes the development of society, institutions and culture, and his mind unlike that of the lower animals and infants in their early months achieves in the social setting a new dimension or phase. It develops moral judgments, values and imperatives in a new, symbolical plane of experience that provides the major key to his success in adapting himself to an environment that is both physical or natural and social-cultural or artificial.

The inference, then, is that due to the change of psychological functions in the artificial, social-cultural or institutional environment of man, group conscience must be included among his mind's new and higher resources in evolutionary progress. The validity of the concept of group conscience rests on the facts that the reflective, evaluating, symbolising moral self of man is thoroughly a group or social self with his moral attitudes, faiths, prejudices and sentiments usually the same as those of his group and society. To state the same thing in a different manner, the reflective, evaluating, symbolising moral self is that part of a man's external cultural heritage that is singularly appropriated by a person

and integrated into his consciousness. The values of life become assimilated as elements of the reflective moral self, and psychologically and sociologically valid in proportion as an individual culture area is made equivalent to the nature of the mind itself.

The Reflective, Critical and Creative Aspect of the Self

Whenever in the course of reflection, criticism and comprehension man's mind can come to know itself sufficiently well, affirm self-growth, freedom and fulfilment in relation to fellowmen and apprehend therefore its essential moral principles, an absolute standard for conduct will have been set and the "germinal" and unique individual conscience encountered.¹ But moral values, beliefs and ideals, supplied in the dynamic context of social give and take, constantly keep alive the evaluating processes of the creative mind that judges both adjustment or maladjustment as well as the rightness or wrongness of conduct in various group and institutional relations. Evaluative selves, conscience and patterns of belief fuse in all social actions. What is a defence reaction against frustration, what embodies a desire for social recognition or an escape from an intolerable group and institutional situation, or again, any other adjustive resolution of group pressures may be judged morally right or wrong and may initiate an entirely new train of individual and group responses. Thus does the reflective, evaluating self sit in judgment upon the nature of groups, group loyalties, group values and group consciences. The values, feelings and beliefs by which men live are no doubt derived from their group and cultural areas; but these compel a constant critical reflection of both adjustive or maladjusted and right or wrong behaviour in a dynamic, experimental group situation.

¹ See T.V. Smith: *Beyond Conscience*, and Griffith: *Principles of Systematic Psychology*, pp. 316-317.

The Building Up of a Rational, All-inclusive Social Conscience

The reflective, evaluative moral self cannot however function for a single day outside the social climate. It distributes itself among myriads of groups in different stages of social integration with their particular interests, attitudes, "morals" and group consciences. There are unequal opportunities and inequities in life, and just as individuals compete and struggle with individuals, group struggles with group, each unifying group attitudes, sentiments and prejudices and eliciting a particularist loyalty through the individuals projecting their super-ego upon it. No community however can maintain itself without constant threats of group egoism and aggression unless it develops and consolidates through the instrumentality of its cultural symbolism a generalised social conscience, an emotional-aesthetic integration that cannot only resist and repress readily, but also supersede group passions and violence likely to recur due to the transfer of individual conscience to groups. Like the individual, every community must have a more or less consistent, complete and inclusive 'social conscience' based on a rational integration and balance of expression and repression of group impulses and emotions at the cultural level.

If the social conscience be too severe and forceful, the blocked group impulses and exaggerated emotions may rise in rebellion resulting in social disintegration and revolution. Every community builds up on the cultural plane through myths, stereotypes, rituals and symbols a consensus and social morale and conscience, so that group aggressiveness may be effectively checked; group, class or sectional loyalties may not compete with the generalised social allegiance; and group consciences may not be too dogmatic and repressive, permitting group conflicts to be processed out in

the open under the full glare of community discussion and judgment. In this way a rational and all-inclusive social conscience, with its universally accepted imperatives, asserts itself and the community shows a singleness of cultural aim and objective and consistency and co-ordination in its activities in various spheres.

Man lives in a complex, symbolical, social-cultural milieu. He has to achieve a stable adjustment not merely between the ego and the super-ego or conscience within himself, but also adjustment to his groups and to the entire society where also he has to handle and resolve emotional problems of the ego and group consciences. A consistently integrated and civilised social conscience is an index at once of his personality development, solidarity of society and effectiveness of the total aesthetic-expressive culture. Man's conscience, individual and social, obviously enables him to achieve a greater mastery over his new man-made and time-bridging cultural environment, now the scene of his adaptation and selection; his progress is associated with wider ranges and finer nuances of his individual conscience and of generalised social conscience in response to ever-changing patterns of social relations and events in his cultural universe that crosses the boundaries of time and space of his mere biological adjustment.

The Interchange between Individual and Social Conscience

Morality accordingly is the outcome of dual psychological mechanisms that operate both internally and externally as individual and social conscience, and that constantly impinge upon each other. So far as the conscience of the individual is concerned morality is characterised by three marked features. First, the aggressive impulses of the individual are hardly eradicated from man's mind that, like the human body, carries inside vestigial forms and func-

tions of the past. Morality is too often challenged by man's psychological regression to earlier mental states and stages of development, when he entirely throws off all restraints and behaves as an uncivilised brute. The mind of the individual from time to time discards its hard-won morality like a cloak, as Freud puts it. More often the primitive impulses are inhibited, get diverted to other objectives, blend and integrate, or to some extent are turned back upon their owner causing neurosis. Second, from the viewpoint of social living, morality is characterised by self-deception, prejudice, hypocrisy, rationalisation and other defensive and accommodative mechanisms of the individual mind that bridge the gulf between moral standard and moral behaviour, and give breathing-space to the mind for further transformation of the egoistic impulses in social culture. Third, morality is of different levels according to the levels of conscience of the individual. Conscience at the crude and superficial level often is the source of inner tensions and obscure and yet powerful sense of guilt and self-censure, that cause inefficiency, moral automatism and even mental breakdown, and that can be combated only by psychotherapy and elevated contemplation. Conscience is purest and most sensitive and reliable when all tensions are brought from the level of unconsciousness to consciousness, and all knots of the mind untied so that it can achieve the highest moral freedom and responsibility and does not depend on groups, the family, the church, the class, the profession and the community too often or too much for moral decisions.

In a static society it is easy to draw the boundaries of the spheres of individual and social conscience, but in a dynamic society where the trend of social changes and their consequences cannot be clearly discerned this is impossible. The average man cannot stand the strain of his inner tensions without the assistance of social conscience, of laws,

moral codes and conventions. But the gifted man of more than average wisdom, love and sympathy brings to bear his conscience upon moral and social progress and contributes towards building up and shaping the social conscience according to the changing circumstances and imperatives of the times. Morality is thus often elevated by the "inner light" in the deepest level of man's reflecting, symbolising mind, such as that of the gifted prophet, mystic, poet, artist and philanthropist. Man's thinking, judgment and valuation at this level utilise a considerable variety of resources only a few of which have as yet come to clear definition by psychology. Dashiell makes the following observation in respect of the thinking process: "When a person is thinking, his ideational activities are ways of symbolising or formulating generalisations of his past experiences (concepts) which, by furnishing more adequate ways of viewing the situation as a whole, further a more appropriate way of responding to it. His thinking is best understood as a direct outgrowth of his inter-communication with others and his soliloquies, only now he is stimulating and responding to himself in an implicit manner."¹ Such stimulation and response within himself are unique for the individual, giving rise to valuation and judgment in the moral sphere that have supreme, unchallengeable validity. For this indeed Socrates drank the hemlock and many martyrs through the centuries in different social cultures have sacrificed their lives. Neither the individual nor society can with impunity disobey this normal call of conscience at the deepest level. Here conscience is not social but uniquely individual, non-collectivisable. This is in truth the "germinal" conscience of men, embedded in the deepest recesses of their minds, the ultimate source of truth, goodness and love that they can neither disregard, nor manipulate at the behest of

¹ *Fundamentals of General Psychology*, p. 576.

the state and society. Often conscience accordingly is symbolised in myth and religion as "the still, small voice of God," "the ancient seer" (Muni), the cosmic, binding Truth and Order (Dharma), the deity (Deva) and the Universal Self (Atman).

The Structural Relations between Individual and Group Conscience

A functional ethics has to consider not only the expression, inhibition and fulfilment of the elemental impulses, interests and values in the group configuration leading to moral behaviour, but also the conditions that release the unconscious impulses from time to time for open aggression and rebellion against society. It has also to scrutinise the circumstances under which there is conflict between individual and group conscience, where groups, moral codes and institutions fail to rise up to the moral norms expected of them by the individual, or actually become the foci of rebellious urges of masses of individuals that are inhibited and repressed by the social environment, or again, where new codes and laws do not command the allegiance or 'sanction' from the motive force of the universal super-ego or social conscience.

The phenomenology of functional ethics comprises not only situations and problems of moral choice and consistency for the individual personality but also conflicts between several group norms and consciences in the cultural structure whose harmony or disharmony is introjected in some measure into the personality structure of the individuals. Many individuals achieve an easy conscience through conformity to the moral standard or conscience of groups that challenge the universal social conscience. Others experience inner maladjustment as they are asked to shift the full allegiance of the super-ego or conscience to the special groups.

Individual conscience and group conscience are organic-

ally, if ambivalently, united in their structures; while maladjustments and neuroses due to conflict-torn egos occur for the personality, for the entire society and for the total culture in an inextricably interwoven manner. Functional ethics has accordingly to find out with the aid of social psychology the limits and potentialities of adjustability of both individuals and groups in their ever-varying relations and reciprocal dynamic adjustive mechanisms. Only thus can ethics become a true functional science developing appropriate techniques of therapy for individuals, groups and cultures.

The Maturation of Conscience

Morality rests upon the primitive dualism and conflict in human nature, upon the psycho-biological need of balance between aggressive and social impulses and dispositions that is aided in maintenance or destruction by man's group milieu and culture. The code of morality is nothing more and nothing less than the projection, amplification and extension of the super-ego or conscience by crude or refined mechanisms of cultural repression and punishment supervening upon the infantile moral framework of guilt and repression. All customs, manners, conventions and moral code in society depend ultimately upon the sanction of the emotive force which the projected super-ego brings to bear upon the ego for conformity against its own impulses and dispositions. Just as in the infantile fantasy the parents' taboos and injunctions are unduly magnified, similarly many codes and manners in both primitive and civilised cultures exhibit over-elaborations and exaggerations, due to the people's protective reaction-mechanisms against their own dreaded, repressed wishes and fantasies. Group consciences no less than individual consciences have, to be sure, their oppressive, inconsistent and haphazard features. The individual has his own fantasies and symbolisations of unconscious

guilt and aggression, of self-censure and self-perfection. But he also introjects, mingles and integrates into these group fantasies, symbolisations, rationalisations, and sublimations of aggression and penalty, or of love and reparation largely in the foreground of consciousness.

Man's participation in various types of groups—the family, the village, the class, the community and the state—attaches notions of right and wrong to constantly new and more objects, ideals and symbols. In childhood he has been encouraged to appropriate the father, elder brother or any other relation as well as symbolic models from myths, legends and folk tales; his moral life clusters and thrives round these symbolic persons and ideals. As he grows and achieves membership of many groups and associations, the complex series of social rôles he is asked to play in the changing social-cultural milieu with their special moral standards lead to a consistent, inclusive conscience, a balanced, rational morality.

The mechanisms of symbolisation, integration and projection that constitute the ethical process constantly change their objectives, foster new ideas and sentiments of self-assertion, power and majesty, or of goodness, love and compassion as the mind grows and develops in the natural and social setting, and acquires new knowledge, attitude and experience in the expanding social world. Thus morality changes and expands with enlarged social participation, albeit organised around the primal tension-chords of guilt and repression that persist throughout life; society also gains as labels of morality, saturated with affective qualities, fix themselves to new social values and norms.

Man projects elements of his own conscience upon his social universe, creating devils and evil spirits of passion and authority and divinities and angels of beneficence and perfection which enter into his social routine and experience. His myth, art and religion facilitate, expand and refine the

tasks of morality, adjusting his developing mind to both the physical world and the social community in which it lives and moves. All through he builds up integrative attitudes, sentiments and symbols by fusing repression with expression, reason with impulse, custom with conscience and conscious and unconscious forces of 'mind, society and culture. All through the structure of social culture is fabricated into the structure of the individual mind. The individual mind, too, constantly seeks to reshape and manipulate social culture. Man's mental and moral life, as it matures, shows more and larger Gestalten—better integrated personalities, more consistent and inclusive consciences, more comprehensive and shared goals of life and less frustrating myths, codes and laws.

CHAPTER III

CONSCIENCE AND CULTURE: DUAL MECHANISM OF MORALS

The Significance of Spontaneous, "Higher" Level Gestalten in Ethics

Man is an impulsive, reflective, symbolising, purposing agent in the context of the group situation that as it fulfils or frustrates his goals and values, evolves also adjustive moral life-patterns and standards which both relieve inner tensions and conflicts and accommodate him externally to the habits and patterns of other men. The social evolutionary process has made the most fundamental and universal of these moral patterns and standards a part of the human child's hereditary equipment as the super-ego or conscience embedded in the structure of consciousness. Such device has been a late bio-psychological acquisition of man associated with his tentative and chequered gregarious living. It enables his social organisation to continue and progress in spite of the strength and persistence of his egoistic and aggressive impulses. These latter no doubt had survival value in a milieu of constant struggle with larger and more powerful carnivorous beasts of the forests as he came down from the trees in the early part of his career, but have certainly been outgrown in his present condition of existence. Round the hard core of man's sense of guilt and perfection and affective qualities of preference or repulsion, rightness or wrongness, embedded in the very structure of his self, his morality evolves as a psycho-biological mechanism that aids him in preventing

or overcoming chronic conflict in the social milieu. It facilitates smooth, habitual choice of goals and values and current and potential total integration or wholeness of behaviour within the group pattern that constantly exercises unconscious pressure and instils aspiration of the individual to move in the direction of conformity rather than deviance, rationality rather than irrationality and permanence rather than immediacy, towards more integrated Gestalten.

Society sets in motion both unconscious and conscious, irrational and rational mechanisms of moral obligation. Through both unconscious and conscious, compulsive psychological mechanisms man's primitive moral sense, super-ego or conscience accordingly operates. It exhibits a definite process of development as the child matures into the adolescent, and then into the adult in his group setting. Without these mechanisms he cannot construct those integrations, wholes or Gestalten that serving as his goals and values combine past and future in the unity of his consciousness and become an integral part of his mental development. In fact both his social impulse and intelligence aid him in his progressive adaptation, organisation and solidarity of life. In the course of his maturity, he constantly and intelligently conceives and achieves ever more comprehensive Gestalten, like values, moral norms and rights-and-duties, designed to give effect to both fuller and more extensive social integration and participation and greater freedom and self-realisation. Moral development proceeds on the plane of both the unconscious and the conscious, of blind conformity and social constraint of the individual and collective intelligence, sensibility and adventure.

Psychologists so far stress tensions and conflicts rather than high level integrative behaviour (involving spontaneity and harmony), which Darwin considered the major advantage of man over animal. Such behaviour

enables him to achieve smoother, more complex, numerous and integrated human relations under group and institutional pressures and standards, and are especially characteristic of the middle years of his life. From childhood and adolescence to middle age his mental and moral development is comprised mostly of the achievement of spontaneous, higher level Gestalten in his reactions, meanings, attitudes, values and behaviour that secure his harmony with fellowmen in his diverse social roles.¹ It is from the Gestalt point of view that we can discern not only his means-ends scheme but also the chain of his proximate, intermediate and remote ends or goals. Man's relations, rôles and goals, all look back to the past and forward to the future. He therefore defines and formulates the *ideas* of these, abstracting and systematising these from their concreteness, immediacy and fragmentariness. In the "higher" level Gestalten he fully understands and appreciates the meaning and worth of what is otherwise habitual, conforming behaviour, envisions and weighs alternative needs, goals and ways of action and establishes hierarchies of importance among them. This is achieved through his system of values, beliefs and ideals. His struggle, deliberation and choice are between values, beliefs and ideals, between the several Gestalten that he integrates out of his needs, ideas, goals and experiences of the past, present and future. He also links his values, attitudes and rôles and their immediate as well as distant consequences and possibilities more and more fully and intimately with those of fellowmen as he matures in a particular group milieu. The integration of personality involves not only the organisation of values, ideals and norms within the individual but also of orderly,

¹ See H. H. Anderson : Socially Integrative Behaviour in *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology*, 1946, pp. 379-384. Also M. Bentley: Life With and Without Institutional Guidance, *American Journal of Psychology*, 1946, pp. 382-400.

stable and harmonious social relations and loyalties. Man's feelings of self-esteem and self-status are intimately bound up with his rôles and positions in his group and institutional milieu. The normal process of maturation and socialization of the individual involves progressively higher social participation or communion; and this is accomplished through the development of new moral values, ideals and norms, guiding the progressive organisation of inner life, on the one hand, and of social bonds and relations on the other. The "level of aspiration" of the individual endlessly leading him onward, and the ideal of social justice, solidarity and love, ever-expanding with the development and multiplication of ego involvements and identifications in group situations, show a constant interchange. As he achieves a certain standard or norm and thereby a desired self-respect and self-status, his ever-ramifying, ever-deepening social relationships and rôles engender new moral insights and strivings, and call him towards higher levels of identification, mutuality and communion.

Thus his mental and moral evolution becomes a part of his stable, adjustive group and institutional rôles, habits and patterns. Through his social rôles and institutional routine and discipline, such virtues as honesty, reciprocity, love, compassion and respect for the worth and dignity of fellowmen become habitual, automatic and impersonal. Ethical and metaphysical theories and symbolisations now come into the picture, and add to their efficacy as much as the hope of reward and fear of punishment from society. Moral patterns are compounded and stylised as the results of individual trial and error, the weight of social habit, tradition and constraint, and of the individual's impingement on these of his own bold formulation of ideas and personal scale of values, ideologies and norms. There is no break nor discontinuity between these; often, indeed, what is a fragmentary impression, a momentary satisfac-

tion, a dull, meaningless routine germinates and sprouts forth as the rational adjustive attitude and way of fulfilment as the result of the processes of abstraction, clarification and intellectual construction of goals and consequences. Man is then deeply stirred by the goals, values and ideals with which he identifies himself, and in his stimulated will and effort for their achievement comes to recognise himself and enhance his self-esteem. His moral judgments, the perennial notions and imperatives of right and wrong in terms of which he judges himself, groups and institutions cannot be separated from a complex of external and social factors in the dynamic social situation; these are conditioned by it as these condition it.

From the same Gestalt viewpoint we can appreciate the true relation between rights and duties as well as the falsity of the doctrine of inalienable rights in their relation to social duties. C. R. Griffith points this out: "Rights without compelling duties are possible to a highly individualistic culture. They do not appear to be possible, however, to a society based on mechanisms of adjustment which cannot be separated from the field situations in which they occur. If it is true that a personality, instead of being an absolute status, is a status relative to the kinds of adjustive habits which occur in a given society, these adjustive habits cannot be readily separated from their consequences. Likewise, if patterns of adjustive habits are converted into institutional and social arrangements, and if these arrangements are kept functionally contingent on their authors, duties will accrue to them as well as to the authors".¹ Each social group conditions and sustains its own status-power scheme, morals and rights-and-duties that are interrelated with one another in a self-initiating and self-sufficient configuration. Even the group's biases and pre-

¹ *Principles of Systematic Psychology*, pp. 246.

judices, myths and fictions, in the background of which all moral decisions take place, perform the adjustive functions of releasing tensions, strengthening the solidarity of the group and processing out entrenched neuroses. It is only an integral social-psychological approach that can reveal the dynamics of moral imperatives in the setting of the whole group configuration—man's environmental "field" structure.

Ethics, then, is man's developmental mechanism of the mind by which as he gropes his way through various types of groupings, he seeks and realises those integrative, comprehensive emotions, attitudes and beliefs which can release his inner tension and burden of unconscious guilt, and bring about a most profound self-fulfilment through oneness or communion in society. It is accordingly the *deu ex machina* of his biological and social progress. Man's moral world is structured. His moral principles and norms are defined roughly as those created, selected and strengthened in a stable, progressively integrated structure of the group or groups he lives in.

Moral Norms as Emergent Socially Integrative Behaviour

In Gestalt ethics moral principles or categories may be accordingly viewed, like the processes involved in value-achievement and integration of personality, as emergents of the group configuration. Unfortunately the classification of groups in sociology has so far been not adequately scientific and functionally appropriate. Borrowing Max Weber's classificatory technique, we have suggested the division of human social groupings into four "ideal types" of moral quality: Crowd, Interest-group, Society or Community and abstract Commonalty, according to their level of social participation, morale or personal ethical responsibility of the individual, and inclusiveness and rational integration of the group conscience. Such classification of groups

according to the general structural pattern will aid towards the definition and characterisation of moral principles and norms inherent in each category of groups, and consequently of the nature of the group loyalty, morale and conscience. Further, the four abstracted types of groups and social relations comprise a functional series or phases of moral progress, embracing all possible kinds of associations and moral relations in human culture.

Empirical ethics would find in this general structural scheme the necessary socio-psychological basis for the classification, ordering and organisation of the phenomena of morals. Thus sociology or rather social psychology can give invaluable assistance to ethics as a phenomenological study. It is the level of social participation or the intimacy of social ties and loyalties as we ascend in the series of groupings that throws out the three fundamental, inherent, moral imperatives of Reciprocity, Justice, Sympathy or Love, defining the rôles and statuses of individuals so that these may sustain and fulfil themselves in social living. The different categories of group imperatives or standards are self-authenticating, mnemonic symbols, enabling individuals to hold on and to carry through behaviour that bears a specific relation to the group structure and the conditions of its maintenance and progress.

The Evolution of Moral Norms in the Dialectic of Social Connection

Communion or group participation is the medium of moral development. Reciprocity constitutes the beginning of society and morality. The law of reciprocity replaces the law of the jungle, and the right of might. Fair play is mutual give-and-take between men that is consummated in a satisfactory agreement of which the symbol is contract, and that excludes any inequality of exchange of goods or services. Force, deceit, guile or falsehood pre-

vent the creation or sustenance of human association. In the course of human communion, then, decent, honest or scrupulous persons are challenged by, and arrive at, the moral principles of Reciprocity or Fair Dealing. The consummation of Contract or Reciprocity gives stability, continuity and meaning to the interested group and to the worth of the moral principle of Fair Play, Honesty and Integrity. Fair play or Reciprocity is the way of social participation of men in their limited self and group-circumscribed economic rôles and services. Such an imperative, generalised and applied to all dealings of persons and groups, becomes Justice or Equity. Justice or Equity remains somewhat nebulous in the early stages of group participation or communion, but takes form as communion develops and finds its own fulfilment. This is the process of maturation from the Interest-group to Society or Community. The process of communion, mutuality, sharing, yet unfolds itself. Love or Solidarity is the final stage or acme of communion. Universal justice is based on a careful assessment of the interests and rights of all parties concerned, and directs their rights and counter-rights into channels that may permit their full social participation. But Justice does not involve sacrifice of personal interests that may be offered and claimed on the basis of human equality and solidarity cemented by Love. Love demands equal sharing, equality in personality and in rights. The social participation or communion is at its maximum as Love feeds, impels and constitutes the process of sharing, mutuality, in Commonalty.

Reciprocity, Justice and Love are virtues and imperatives that emerge, therefore, in the dialectic of the human grouping, and are constituted, known and appreciated through the very dialectic itself. Nobody can predict the consummation of the dialectic because of man's divergent and conflicting impulses, interests and ideals that stifle human solidarity

and fellow-feeling. But as human communion fulfils and unfolds itself like a drama on the social-cultural scene, new virtues and moral norms appear on the stage as ways of acting, making up in their totality the entire ethos of humanity. Love, Sharing or Service appear last in the moral drama. But Love or Sharing is not possible without accompanying Justice and Reciprocity. The ethical principle of the Interest-group, "Do as you would be done by," culminates in the universal principle of Justice as the basic condition of human communion, of all group life and participation. Justice adds equitable Liberty, Equality and Merit to Fairness and Consideration—the virtues of *quid pro quo* relations. But while Justice maintains equality of rights and duties for all, it does not look beyond the current status-power scheme, nor affirms humanity irrespective of man's merit, race, character or social status as Love does. Love posits an ideal equality for all. On the other hand, it is the law of Love that is the ultimate arbiter of conflicts of man's loyalties to various Interest-groups, such as the class, the state, the Community-group like the friend's circle, club or work-association, as well as to Commonalty-groups, such as the family and the church, and shows the way towards fulfilment and correction of the inadequacies and limitations of the social norms of Equity and Reciprocity.

The Revaluation of Moral Norms

Man is a member of many groups, and cultivates and cherishes many allegiances that often are in discord. The ethical issue, when moral norm is set against moral norm, is to choose according to the standard grounded on man's most profound solidarity or sharing which is immanent in all human relations in ideal and in fact. On the other hand, this also sets the norm of social development—the transformation of Interest-groups and Community-groups into Commonalty-groups that marks the enhance-

ment of "consciousness of kind," "belonging together" and "at homeness" in society. As long as such transformation in group structure and functions does not take place, the individual finds his moral security by adopting the prevailing scale of group norms, regulations and expectancies, binding himself to Reciprocity in his Interest-groups, and to Equity and Justice in his Community-groups, while Love or Sharing remains the great fundamental in his abstract Commonalties.

Thus the divergent moral principles and categories do not contradict one another, but become operative and valid in different social connections that are found in all societies and are necessary for human communion of various kinds and levels.

Both the stability and continuity of social life and the balance and integration of the personality rest on the individual's easy discernment of the preferential moral demand in his concrete group situation. But as the creative, evaluative, aspiring creature, he may affirm his own scale of preferences and ideals, and project these upon his groups, beginning a process of criticism, clarification and revaluation of imperatives which is the same as reorientation of human relations and groups. Or the revaluation of moral norms and, consequently, the reintegration of social connections may come from pressures of the social-cultural milieu. In a time of danger to the state, the nation becomes the all-inclusive, compelling group whose imperatives prevail over those of the family and the class. In a time of industrial insecurity or distress the class norms and obligations are similarly set over those of any other human associations.

Man's moral uncertainty as well as opportunity are the greatest when he faces the challenge of contradictory, uncertain or amorphous moral demands and expectancies. But ordinarily the norms and standards of the various groups, of which he is a member, stand him in good stead

in making his choice, not without inner tension but with a quiet conscience, giving an order and coherence to his behaviour and securing stability in his group relations and attachments. Yet it is only when in his moral insecurity he is left to the resources of his own deep, reflective self that he can form new valuations and judgments, which may enable him to disregard all social relations, except those that are the widest, and all moral principles and norms except those of the most extensive group of mankind. Therein lie the fullness of his being and the height of his moral stature.

The Dynamics of Moral Behaviour

Groups are episodes in man's adjustment to the environment that is both physical and social-cultural. Thus biological, economic and social-historical factors are all involved in the creation of moral values, norms, virtues and consciences that are ways of group communion. As man enters into the highest communion, Love, i.e. common insight, rapport and unity of meanings, purposes and ideals that become all-inclusive in an abstract Commonalty, Communalty or "Sobonost" (in Berdyaev's terminology), he arrives at the most elevated virtues and consciences and the summit of his own being. As he, on the contrary, forms exclusive groups, economic or political, territorial or functional, and separates himself from the broad mass of humanity, he loses his moral sensitiveness, chokes his conscience, and circumscribes some of his own consciousness and existence.

Group consciences, as we rise from the level of Crowd to Society and from Interest-group to abstract Commonalty, show greater depth, rational integration and inclusiveness. Obviously a group conscience in an Interest-association, dominated by the sentiment and norm of Fair Dealing or justice of exchange, is incomplete and exclusive

in character, and does not permit and promote the full realisation of a rich psychic life internally, and also the full social participation externally as does an abstract Commonalty-group. The latter develops and achieves the much maturer and more inclusive, sensitive and rational conscience of a universal brotherhood.

It is of concern to both the state and the community if groups and institutions widely and recurrently revert to the mentality of disorganised crowds or impulsive and violent mobs, and if dominant Interest-groups in their fight for privilege and power do not accept the verdict of public opinion and a universal social obligation. The progress of human culture is measured by the predominance of cultural organisations and institutions that can effectively protect society from the rivalry and struggle of contending Interest-groups, and at the same time engender common understanding, singleness of social purpose and an all-inclusive, sensitive community conscience. Only abstract Commonalty-groupings with their imperatives of sharing, solidarity and service can fulfil the highest moral potentialities of man, society and culture.

Moral attitudes, expectations, judgments and imperatives are all inherent in the group situation in all their concreteness and specificity. The Gestalt point of view in ethics would stress the derivation of the dynamics of moral life, processes and values from the relation of the individual to the concrete group situation, and, so far as internal forces are concerned, from the mutual relations of the various functional systems that make up the individual. This is described by Lewin, the exponent of topological psychology, as the Galilean as contrasted with the Aristotelian mode of thought.¹ The analysis of the dynamic group pattern

¹ The Conflict between Aristotelian and Galilean Modes of Thought in Contemporary Psychology, *Journal of Genetic Psychology*, 1931.

in which the moral principles and values emerge as its contained imperatives holds great promise for the future of empirical ethics.

Ethics, the Tool and Master of Evolution

Man's moral experience and development cannot be adequately appreciated without an analysis of the dual mechanisms that constantly impinge upon each other—on both conscious and unconscious levels—the internal mechanisms of the super-ego or social conscience and the id, proceeding from the pleasure principle, now in irreconcilable conflict, now in working compromise, now again in complete harmony; and the external group mechanisms of myths, values and morals that facilitate or hinder inner adjustment, poise and unity of direction of the mind and society's attitudes, emotions and aspirations. There is constant interaction between the internal and the social mechanisms of morality. The ethical process is a constant give-and-take between the individual psyche and its drives and experiences and the standards and values of society. The constant interchange of action and interaction between mind and society has resulted, as we have seen, in the establishment within the structure of self of a viable but complete mental framework of rightness and wrongness, and within the community of an external moral framework, both piling up a heavy charge of emotions, and operating through the crude mechanisms of repression and suppression as well as through reason, imagination and faith in the lower and higher levels of individual and social consciousness respectively. Man's mental evolution has made conscience and morality a part as much of his organic as of his social heritage. Thus his evolutionary advance is inseparably linked up with the development and refinement of his moral framework and mechanisms, both internally within the individual self and externally in social and institutional relations. We here realise the falsity

of T.H. Huxley's antithesis between evolution and ethics. Ethics begins as an episode in evolution, and then becomes its fated tool. Like every other tool of the human hand and mind, ethics constantly changes and evolves. But once it originates as a specialised equipment of individual and species adaptation in the complex developing life and mind of one of the highest products of evolution, it begins to take charge and direct the course of human development, if not the course of evolution.¹ In ethics are implicated the whole of man's environment as well as the whole of his genetic history, his biological fulfilment and material happiness in the world here and now as well as his transcendent knowledge and experience of love, goodness and beauty. Morality involves conflict as well as integration of native impulses and culturally fabricated values and strivings within the mind, interactive patterns with the social-cultural milieu and a constant accommodation between these in turn. Every item is variable in this total dynamic integration or equilibrium.

The Psycho-dynamic Balance of Instincts, Conscience and Culture

Man, his biological and spiritual values, conscience and morals, his forms of social control and myth-symbol patterns can neither be treated separately nor as static entities or systems. Society constantly acts upon individuals through the media of groups whose cohesion and integration determine the imperativeness, integralness and universality of the moral patterns. At the same time the universal moral patterns, with their associated myths and symbols, insistently lead to the highest and most extensive social participation. The configuration of groups contains

¹ See the discussions in Julian Huxley: *Touchstone for Ethics*, pp. 149-156, and *Science and Ethics* by C. H. Waddington and others.

its own moral potentialities, and indicates the ethical trend of social culture that is measured by both the intense solidarity of collective living and the moral grandeur of the human personality, reaching out to something beyond itself which includes and transcends the moral life.

From another viewpoint, moral progress is the increase in autonomy and individualisation of the personality as revealed by the pursuit and enhancement of the intrinsic values of life. On the one hand, these higher values can be realised by the personality only through the group structure and the developmental mechanism of the super-ego or social conscience, by which group norms and standards are introjected and gradually assimilated into the unconscious, releasing the mind for moral deliberation, creativeness and initiative in novel situations and crises in life. On the other hand, moral progress implies not only an automatic rejection or discipline of the ego-centric and aggressive instincts and acceptance of the moral standards of the community by the self, but also the conscious and rational sharing of intrinsic values with the group so that a larger and larger section of the community can enjoy these. The moral attitude of the individual as he matures comes gradually to be characterised by less of inhibition and repression of the primitive, harsh and tyrannical super-ego, and more of identification of duty and pleasure and rational blending and integration of various positive impulses and higher level Gestalten—the more comprehensive, abstract sentiments and values. All these, the Gestalt psychologists teach us, reflect the social configuration in which these appear, expressing their place or “membership character” in the entire social group or culture. Morals, abstract sentiments as well as ways of action are a more complex and articulate field structuring or integration of impulses, attitudes and values that has indeed commenced from early childhood months.

Man's morality obviously begins with the inchoate, unconscious core of the harsh, authoritarian super-ego, but soon starts on its track of development on the basis of the elemental impulses of love, goodness and construction, equally strong and primitive as those of hate, aggression and destruction, but especially selected and favoured by social culture for cultivation and development. Freudianism has hardly done justice to the latter phase. It is true that the capacity of children to interiorise the orders and prohibitions of the parents and parent substitutes, dependent upon the mechanism of identification, varies. The mechanism of identification is an inherited one, and is thus of permanent importance for building up the primitive super-ego differently in different children.¹ There also varies the severity of the punishing super-ego that, according to Freud, depends upon the intensity of the child's hostility and of self-aggression. But the judging and punishing super-ego which inherits part of the immobility and immutability of the instinctual drives is transformed by education and the social process. Flugel observes: "A more tolerant super-ego may in many ways permit a greater happiness, though a permanent and complete overthrow of the super-ego would be incompatible with social conduct and with the adaptation to social reality that civilisation demands." The two extreme conditions are discernible in the complementary disorders of mania where all inhibition seems to have been abandoned, and melancholia where inhibition, self-reproach and self-abasement are excessive.

As a result of years of training and cultural and institutional conditioning, there is a welding of aggressiveness and essential sociability, of inhibition and gratification that blend together to form the developed personality.

¹ J. Lampl De Groot: On the Development of the Ego and Super-ego in the *International Journal of Psycho-analysis*, Vol. 28, 1947, p. 10.

Ranyard West thus observes in respect of the development of the super-ego, "Set by early training and by the child's often fantastic interpretation of its social needs and how they are to be attained, the Freudian 'super-ego' goes with us through life as our personal setting of the balance between originally desirable selfishness and now acceptable selfishness, between the continued and repeated pull of individualist instinct to socially unworthy conduct and the counter-pull of social instinct to socially worthy conduct"¹. Man's evolutionary advance gives a premium to the development of intimacy and inclusiveness of his social bonds, and consequently on his moral, religious and aesthetic beliefs, sentiments and symbols that knit together man and man, group and group. Thus his evolutionary system includes the enrichment and refinement of his moral life and experience, involving moral standards and aspiration and the craving for perfection buttressed by a good conscience. Rules, conventions and symbols of goodness and justice, that are implicit in the very fact of his social life and embedded in his very consciousness and mental development, comprise an integral, fundamental and universal part of his cultural heritage that acts as an effective sieve of selection of genuine social impulses and relations, and elimination of egoistic, aggressive and anti-social impulses and relations. His obedience to moral imperatives becomes accordingly as much as inner necessity as it facilitates adjustment to the external social world. His conscience, waxing stronger in its rationality and freedom from external constraint, becomes dynamically rooted less in the interiorised echo of social rewards and sanctions and more in the sense of self-perfection and competence. A creative life of goodness, love and justice, in turn, strengthens and frees the rational conscience,

¹ A Psychological Theory of Law, *Interpretation of Modern Legal Philosophies*, p. 776.

and projects its values and images of perfection upon the external code of morals. Thus there begins a creative cycle of interchange of inner and outer moral imperatives and sanctions. On the one hand, man loves his neighbour and refrains from killing, injuring or hating him not because of external coercion and constraint of law and public opinion, nor of these internalised as his coercive tyrannical conscience, but because of conscious pursuit of his own image of self-perfection, and sense of self-approval and self-competence, characteristic of the creative, rational conscience. In the course of cultural development the child inherits not the harsh and admonishing but the creative and rational conscience with which he starts from the beginning of his life career, and which makes his social adjustment easy and productive. On the other hand, social and moral codes become less rigid and authoritative, and, fused with the external objects and symbols of the social milieu, as a result of cultural conditioning, canalisation and Gestaltic orientation from early childhood, regulate and direct the growth and integration of the creative social self.

The super-ego, of course, remains, but its values and standards are put on a more rational and critical basis. Consequently, there is less of frustration, anxiety and guilt. The ego strengthens itself at the expense of the super-ego, and takes moral responsibility for behaviour through intelligent preference and judgment, sublimation, and intellectual and aesthetic construction rather than through blind acceptance of the sadistic super-ego choices rooted in childhood experience. Between childhood acceptances and intolerances, having a deep emotional basis, and rational judgment and choice of values that are integrated with one another and find more and more socially acceptable modes of expression and fulfilment, there is established a wholesome interchange, and the war between ego and super-ego is set at rest; the ego superseding the super-ego or the

latter becoming concerned only with the day's routinized living and way of action.

There are progressively greater and more genuine compounding of individual and group values and imperatives, and a more orderly and inclusive structuration of ego within the environing social cultural system. The predominance of the highest types of social participation represented by Commonalty-groupings and contrasted with Interest-groupings and their group imperatives, myths and symbols achieves at once the fullest personal and collective realisation of the intrinsic values of knowledge, love and beauty as well as integration, consistency and singleness of collective purposes in the social culture.

The Development of Personality

The moral development of the individual is not a constant or stereotyped pattern, as academic psychology often makes it out. It is a diversely ramifying process—the outcome of variegated interaction between the dynamic structure of the mind and the dynamic group milieu in which the mind encounters primal tensions and conflicts of ambivalent desires, and resolves them along with the sense of guilt and repressed complexes through sublimation, idealisation, transference, phantasy, symbolisation, rationalisation and other processes with which psycho-analysis has made us familiar, or through the pursuit and achievement of intrinsic and instrumental values that the individual selects according to his emotional and intellectual development, his capacity for abstraction and symbolisation, and that his group integrates and fosters as his own goals. Man's super-ego accordingly becomes less stern, haphazard and "slapdash," shorn of the primitive aggressiveness and tension of guilt, and by assimilating many conscious and positive elements develops as the vehicle of what Freud calls the "ego-ideal," "the summons to pursue ever-increasing perfection." Though

the super-ego is the source of many cultural achievements, yet it is "the chief obstacle to mental health—a handicap to the progress of civilisation." Eder looks forward to "the disappearance of the control exercised by the super-ego over the *id* and the taking over of this control by the ego, as the more hopeful line of progress for the individual and the race."¹ Similarly Erich Fromm who distinguishes "humanistic" conscience—"the expression of man's self-interest and integrity"—from "authoritarian" conscience, identified by him with the Freudian super-ego, considers that the more "productively" man lives, and develops his mental and emotional qualities in the process, and the less authoritarian the society becomes, conscience will be stronger and at the same time freer of external sanctions and rewards. He agrees with Julian Huxley that the acquisition of the super-ego was a stage in the process of human evolution necessary before rationality and freedom had developed to an extent which made "humanistic" conscience possible. But he does not believe that with regard to the child, in a non-authoritarian society, the "authoritarian conscience or the super-ego has to exist as pre-condition for the formation of humanistic conscience but only the further development of mankind can prove or disprove the validity of this assumption."² The human personality as it grows in a mature, stable civilisation absorbs many strong positive values and satisfactions from various social groups, both instrumental values that are legion including wealth, power and social recognition and intrinsic values of knowledge, love and service, all these contributing towards the freedom, rationality and strength of conscience, the coherence and integrity of ego-organisation, and the ceaseless quest towards an ever-reced-

¹ Healy and Bonner: *Structure and Meaning of Psycho-analysis*, p. 55.

² Erich Fromm : *Man for Himself*, pp. 158-167.

ing perfection. The resulting emotional unity and poise are articulated, embodied and symbolised in moral principles and norms. These latter more or less permanently inhere in both the internal structure of the self and experience as well as in man's external relations and behaviour. Consequently these are valued and deliberately cultivated as moral purposes and ideals for the development both of the individual and of society or the entire human species.

Repressive versus Aesthetic-Expressive Control Mechanisms

Finally, these moral norms and ideals are invested with an absolute, categorical quality due to the infantile mental mechanisms of repression and projection, strengthened by later symbolisation, intellectual construction and emotional predisposition to security. Such are the psychological mechanisms by which moral categories become heavily loaded with a sense of certitude, universality and other-worldliness that modern ethics usually attributes to man's innate intuitions. Empirical ethics views an absolute framework of reference, a transcendental or "divine" scheme of values and meanings, embodied in mythical, artistic or religious symbols and images, as the basic ingredient in moral attitude, judgment and behaviour in the earlier stages of human culture. Like the organisation of child's personality, the organisation and integration of early societies and cultures are characterised by repressive control mechanisms strongly tinged with emotions. The maturation of morality implies that man can think, choose and plan less in terms of an absolute universal ideology or set of categorical norms and symbols, often inadequate, inconsistent and emotional in character, and more by all-inclusive, discriminative analysis and judgment. Similarly mature culture is operative through forms and modes of social control that are not arbitrary, repressive and forceful, but depend

largely upon aesthetic symbolism, persuasion and rational public discussion and judgment, undistorted by prejudice and propaganda, and aided, as circumstances would require, by the sifting analysis and integration of expert bodies of lawyers, statesmen, economists, teachers and technicians.

In this way moral imperatives in both individual and cultural levels show a similar trend towards achievement of freedom from dogmatism and rational functional analysis and processing out of the various conflicting and repressed elements. In both individual life and social culture the conflicts and repressions, the rebellious urges and the dogmatic defence mechanisms are, however, too many to permit often the cathartic understanding of the situation and appropriate therapy, perpetuating both the protective tyranny of the moral-principled super-ego or social conscience and the defensive over-emphasis, rigidity and arbitrariness of cultural compulsives and repressions.

It is social culture which moulds aesthetic-expressive human life symbols, symbolic processes and behaviour as well as patterns of myths, values and ideals and forms of social control, orienting and co-ordinating overt behaviour to the external and social world. The evolutionary advance of man rests as much on the acquisition of his new knowledge and technique as on the development and extension of new social bonds, ideals and modes of control through the symbolic structuring and generalising processes and patterns of myth, religion and art that transform his life into an adventure in communion, love and service.

CHAPTER IV

EVOLUTION AND ETHICS—THE SOCIAL DESTINY OF MAN

Stress of Solidarity of Life in Social Ecology

Man is a unique creature in the evolutionary process and society a distinctive achievement. Out of the give-and-take between man and society the good life springs and thrives, whose roots hark back to the pre-human world, and which carries man as a rational and moral creature into an ideal goodness that he alone can conceive and actualise in his evolution. In the course of organic evolution, it is man's tools, speech and traditions, perfected as these are by him alone among the animals, that have given him biological dominance. Man on account of the intelligent use of his two-fold tools, his hands and his voice, has built up a richer, more complex and more adaptive external social legacy than any social animal. This consists not merely of his tools, artefacts, stores and dwellings, his domesticated animals, methods of production and transport and so on, but also of intellectual, aesthetic and moral traditions and values that now lift his advance to a higher level and order. It is society's external registrations in the form of the various kinds of traditions, values and institutions that act as a sieve of selection, making for man's advance in love and goodwill, freedom and organisation, discrimination and control of the environment. Man's advance rests less on the constitution of the germ plasm, as in the case of the animal, and more on the structure of his extra-organismal heritage that acts in his case as the more effective agency of selection and advance. .

This external heritage of man, considered as the biological animal, corresponds to the complex system of linkages that interlock the lives of a single animal or species of animal, and subordinate these to the welfare of the species or the biotic community as a whole. Modern ecology in unravelling the multitudinous threads of the web of life finds that in the perspective of evolution the interrelations between plants and animals, between flowers and insects, between herbivores and carnivores of different sizes and ways of living, and between various other parts of the living world become more intricate, subtle and coherent. Variation and selection are always in relation to the web of life that surrounds, interpenetrates and over-reaches the lives of single organisms. It is in this intricate web of life that the great gains of the past are in some measure recorded and systematised. The correlation of organisms and solidarity of life in an ecological area come to direct evolutionary progress.

Man also is a part and parcel of the ramifying, subtle and fine chain of action and interaction that links his economic life, health and security to soil, vegetation and the animal kingdom, and in old areas of settlement often has brought ruin upon himself by snapping these threads. Human ecology now gives a warning to civilisation and a lesson for mankind to supersede a one-sided exploitation of soil, waters and trees by a more far-sighted and wide-minded co-operation with the bio-ecological forces, so that society may be more immune from perils and crises on the basis of a sound working relationship between its land-water culture and the heritage of the earth. The ecology of ancient civilisations that deals with the recurrent crises and downfalls of peoples, rooted as these are in the spend-thrift management or dissipation of their physical heritage, sounds an ethical note in so far as man's security and advance rest on the thought for the morrow, on his sacrifice

for unborn generations, as his shortsightedness, extravagance and selfishness in the use of resources in soil, vegetation and waters spell degeneration that brands the parasite.

In the case of animals the ecological interrelations are a matter of reciprocal physiological adaptation and adjustment of mutual habits and ways of living that make up a balanced, self-regulating organisation of the life-communities. In man social traditions, values and institutions establish his co-operative relationships with the ecological complex, and weed out habits, attitudes and ways of living that are 'ecological' misfits. The consideration of animal ecological interrelations suggests that evolutionary advance depends upon the care of offspring, division of labour and mutual co-operation, the raw materials, at least, of ethical life. Ethical principles dawn in organic evolution with symbiosis and co-operation, with the capacity of animals for sexual tenderness, brood care and subordination to the leader or the group for community welfare. With man such principles are extended and deepened for the good of the community; while the social community that encompasses man also gradually extends in range in space and time. Social ecology is the biological aspect of ethics or evolutionary ethics. The development of ecology in large measure dispels the apprehension of Huxley as regards the contradiction between the ethical and the cosmic process. Ecology definitely teaches man that it is by attuning himself to the social and environmental interrelations that he can best safeguard the continuity of his group and permanence of his species.¹

The Moral Aspect of the Use of Tools

Man's tool of language and tools created by his hand as well as traditions of social and economic co-operation that are responsible for his biological dominance have played

¹ See Mukerjee: *Social Ecology*, Chapter I.

a significant rôle in the development of morality. The tool of language built up through use is fundamental. Language focuses reflection on new situations and predicaments, and thus promotes practical adaptation and prevention. Only after words are in vogue for social situations and experiences can customs and traditions also operate. By linking emotions of praise and blame with conduct that are expressed in words, language develops moral habits and social conformities. To all expressions of value appreciation and experience in fellowmen man immediately gives his own emotional response. This underlies the process of valuation. Language in the case of man expresses not only emotions as in the case of animals, but also value-judgment and choice in respect of desirability and undesirability, truth or falsehood, beauty or ugliness, rightness or wrongness of emotions and behaviour. He can not only ponder over right and wrong but express his approval and disapproval for the same as no other animal can. He is thus the evaluating animal. Human values can only emerge through the medium of language and symbols that serve as channels of communication and rational discussion between members of a social group. He alone is capable of conceptual thinking and expression. The distinction between right and wrong in conduct has been indeed profoundly aided by his capacity of using words and signs expressive of goodness and evil, virtue and vice, self-esteem and humiliation. Further, such distinction refers to both the past and the future, while animal speech deals only with the present emotional or behavioural situation. Thus his language aids the development of moral values and traditions that may be transmitted to posterity, stimulating right appreciation, understanding and conduct as a selective agency disapproving and rejecting individuals who fail utterly to act up to these. In order that his biological impulses and needs can be crystallised and transformed into values there

must intervene, in the first place, the exercise of individual reason, judgment and will in respect of the desirability or undesirability of such values, and, secondly, collective discussion, judgment and communication that in fact largely determine individual choice and mode of fulfilment of values. All values are social products and as such these impel the activities of man, all of whose desires could be met only through the instrumentality of groups and institutions. All values are bearers of society's appreciation and judgment. Man's extra-organismal inheritance of judgments, ideals, signs and symbols not only represents a conscious formulation and choice of values, but also the goodness and wisdom of the race transmitted by one generation to another that may yet differ in its adoption of the scale of values. Human language, then, is the chief factor in giving a meaning and a conscious ethical direction to human evolution. Man's experience and judgment of values as recorded in his rich legacy of literature and of the arts, symbols and conventions lifts progress altogether to another level.

Like human symbols man's tools of his hand, traditions and sense of territory also invest his evolution with a unique ethical and spiritual significance. In spite of Benjamin Franklin, tool-making is not the prerogative of the human species. Man alone is not a tool-using animal. For many animals, from spider to ape, make and employ tools in a crude manner. Monkeys use stones, and crabs sea anemones for fighting. Many animals have their routine "industries." But man is the tool-changing animal. He can adjust his tools to his varying needs, values and ideals in a manner that no animal can. Human speech and traditions, and sense of ownership of territory lead to a far greater elaboration and variegation of man's tools, implements and techniques than is possible in the animal world. Swords can be converted into plough-shares and *vice versa*.

Tools used for the same objective also compete with one another and are selected according to their efficiency and flexibility of adaptation. As specialised tools are invented to cope with special tasks, and the tools themselves fit into one another in a smoothly working mechanical system, man's life and outlook are dominated by purposefulness and the sense of power. All tools, biologically speaking, are extensions or amplifications of the animal's body and its organs. In the case of animal tools their strength and elaboration are obviously limited by the physical condition of the animal. It is only in the case of the beaver-dam, the ant-nest, the bee-hive or the termitary that permanent social products are built up outliving and far eclipsing the tools of the individual animal. Such works however, belong particularly to those species of animals among whom the instinctive mechanisms of social co-operation are highly developed. Man's tools and implements have indefinite possibilities of extension and power, due to his mental development and the advantage of accumulation and transmission of skill and heritage through many generations. And this introduces a serious biological issue in which the future of *Homo sapiens* is implicated. For his evolution and use of tools have progressed much faster than his moral and social adaptation to the conditions of his milieu as refashioned by the tools. The misuse of his science and technology now threatens him with extinction. He has to show himself a more socialised animal to prevent his enslavement and annihilation by his own handworks—atomic science and technology. He has emulated the toil, devotion and enthusiasm of the worker bee and ant as they build their nests but not their co-operativeness. The question is essentially one of the scale of values for the use and direction of tools.

Ethical Significance of Human Evolution

The increase of man's dominance, freedom and control of the environment accompanies a progressive improvement of his tools, implements and skilled techniques. Simultaneously he projects a whole world of values to his instruments and intermediaries, ranging from sticks and stones to hammers and guns, swords and ploughshares and the most complicated useful or destructive machinery. The progressive specialisation and improvement of human tools, machinery and techniques implies, to some extent, a moral transformation. There is gain in his foresight and anticipation and tension of collective feeling and endeavour. There is also gain in interdependence of specialised jobs and tasks, systems of production, distribution and exchange, and of economic groups and social classes that all integrate themselves into a balanced pattern, bending a multitude of means towards common objectives, and regulated by laws of property and competition, rules of contract and exchange as well as common attitudes, interests and values. On the one hand, man deliberately selects and controls technology and the institutional pattern according to his collective scale of values and ideal that he redefines and reshapes from time to time. On the other hand, it is the technology and institutional pattern that sifts out variant or aberrant individuals who do not fit in with the prevailing social or economic system—autocracy or republic, capitalism or collectivism and the code of property and legal economic and social freedoms these postulate.¹

There is, in the first place, the hereditary element in man's pattern of values and moral code requiring but little conditioning in order to fix them. Secondly, there is social

¹ For an able discussion of the same issues see T.H. Huxley and Julian Huxley: *Touchstone for Ethics*, and Waddington's three articles in *World Review*, June, July and August, 1946.

conditioning of the individual in childhood by the scale of values adopted by society. Thirdly, the network of tools, institutions, symbols, habits and ways of living serves as a sieve eliminating undesirable mental traits and moral habits of individuals. Man's ethical life deepens and widens as the result of the interaction of these three aspects of social evolution and selection, aided also by his intellectual progress that emancipates him from an affective relationship to the environment. He can contemplate abstractly and dispassionately. He can ponder not merely over things, but also over his own emotional conflicts and experiences that animals cannot. Animals show an organic and mental harmony. Man who is not instinct-bound is beset with organic and mental disharmonies and conflicts. But his intellect, memory and imagination give him the wherewithal to resolve his conflicts, and fashion moral concepts and ideals. If some insects instinctively sacrifice their lives for the welfare of larvae yet unborn, man's imagination enables him to create and radiate goodwill that seeks to abolish the egoism and selfishness of his own species on the one hand, and the cruelty and destructiveness of the system of Nature, on the other.

The gifted individuals, the "makers and the shakers" of the world, play indeed a significant rôle in shaping the framework of the extra-organismal, institutional heritage of man that largely supersedes Nature's régime of cruel, haphazard sifting. The exhilaration and enthusiasm of love, sweetness and goodwill that the poet, the mystic or the artist discover in their detachment from society and their inner illumination and ecstasy are writ large in the social ideal, and subordinate the selfishness, the cruelty and the misery of the human struggle for existence. Man largely eliminates the methods of natural selection for himself. The operations of disease, hunger, seasonal hardship and war hardly account as effective and widespread methods of

human selection and survival. Man's individual life is invested with a biological and ethical significance unknown in the pre-human world. But the institutional framework that he fashions is slowly built up. It is not flexible and cannot be changed in form and functions quickly. In human as contrasted with animal societies, the proportion of post-mature individuals to the total population is much greater, and this increases with the advance of civilisation. The dominance of the old is a factor distinctly favouring social inertia and aversion for inventions and novelties. Thus all the while an outworn social heritage of institutions, traditions and symbols may be "conditioning" the individual, establishing his associated reflexes, states of consciousness and mental and moral habits. Nor can the legacy of institutions assume that rigidity, consistency and balance and smoothness of working characteristic of nature's mechanisms of control and selection. Individuals who are hereditary weaklings and defectives, who are tainted or diseased, whose habits are unwholesome and harmful, and who seek vice and aggression and organise themselves for achieving anti-social goals can live and thrive in society. Their inordinate multiplication frustrates the activities of the physician, the teacher and the philanthropist, and prevents the realisation of satisfactions and values of normal men to the detriment of their advance. Man's progress is further chequered by uncertainty in the realm of human goals and values. There is a veritable medley of values in society; individuals at cross-purposes and groups in search of anti-social values make his evolutionary advance a tardy, uncertain and chequered process.

Causes of Uncertainty and Conflict of Human Values

Such confusion and conflict of values are biologically rooted in the prolongation of human infancy and, in contrast to any other animal, the greater plasticity

of the human brain and consequently greater flexibility, modifiability and learning capacity of the human infant who is conditioned by divergent social and cultural influences. Thus although the basic urges, desires and interests are fixed and similar for the human species, man in the setting of his social and cultural milieu variegates, qualifies and extends both his desires and values and the manner of their satisfaction. Biologically and psychologically, in striking contrast with most other animals, individuation is more important to man than conformity to type. Thus the discord of individual preferences and of social codes is bound to emerge. Man's instincts are much less rigid and specialised than those of any other animal. He is torn normally, in a manner as no other animal is, by psychic conflicts, the stress and strain of which are minimised by certain automatic mechanisms, especially repression and sublimation. In the development of human mind, social taboos, prohibitions and norms that have been selected by social evolution, and that are painful and unpleasant to it, are largely transferred from consciousness to unconsciousness. These constitute what the Freudians call the blind, tyrannical super-ego, which has both conscious and unconscious parts, and which makes for the socialisation of man with minimum psychic conflict and distress through the automatic processes of repression. The super-ego or the voice of society would permit his sexual, aggressive and explosive urges to come to consciousness only in modified, disguised forms that do not seriously upset either his mental equilibrium or his social adjustment. The psychological mechanisms, such as sublimation, symbolisation, rationalisation and fantasy-making, with which psycho-analytical literature has made us familiar, change the levels of satisfactions and values and modes of their fulfilment and serve the important biological function of adapting the behaviour of the individual to the inevitable frustrations and repressions

in society without the development of psychoses. As man's basic urges are thwarted, blocked or repressed, his mental equipment and dynamism provide ample scope for large variations in emotional adaptability and for new reconciliations and integrations of urges, satisfactions and values that achieve his mental poise and harmonious maturity. Some factors in his genetic history are also perhaps responsible for variations in valuation viz., early man's mixed descent, his variability due to extraordinary mixtures within a single inbreeding species, and his wide range of migration and acclimatisation in new habitats; while the social conditioning by different cultures and groups also brings about significant differences in his attitudes, interests and scale of values that integrate themselves into divergent type-values of different peoples. In social evolution the development of speech, tradition and tools has permitted a wide divergence, and thus a variety of groups with a continuity of their own based on organised tradition and culture has emerged constituting the individual's immediate social milieu. Groups with values of their own exist as social integrates and superimpose upon man's genetic variability the even greater mental variability due to differences of conditioning and regional pressure.

There are, again, certain biological peculiarities concerning sex and reproduction that differentiate man from other animals and make behaviour problems chronic and difficult of solution from the very start of his evolutionary career. Among animals sexual interest and activity are confined to a fixed mating season governed by an automatic cycle of chemical, neural or hormonal regulation. Either a sexual season or a sexual cycle or both generally operate to restrict mating among the higher animals. Man, on the other hand, is continuously sexed. He has no fixed mating seasons but exhibits a perennial sex interest with his reproductive system functioning normally at any time. This

has several effects on his behaviour and morals. Gregariousness and social life were forced on early man after he descended on the *terra firma* due to his adoption of omnivorous food habit and continuous struggle with his more powerful carnivorous enemies, the small family group or horde, as of the present day great apes, consisting of an old hunter who was absent from home for a considerable part of the time and a band of females and a few weak or immature males and offspring. Zuckerman who has studied the mate life of apes and monkeys offers the valuable suggestion that without partial freedom from the internal chemical control exercised by the hormones in the body, the proto-men could hardly have undergone either the ecological change in food habit which ensured human survival or the first major social revolution of the human species, viz., the stabilisation of the family unit. "It is a safe assumption," according to him, "that the rhythm of sexual impulse was probably very much weaker in the first women of our species than it is in existing apes and monkeys or than it probably was in our ape-like forbears." An enduring association of the sexes that alone would ensure constant and careful nurture of the human offspring was only possible when human sexual life became continuous and not punctuated by the rhythm of the seasons. Any kind of neuter existence, as that of the higher mammals, would have endangered the survival of the human species in which both the child-bearing mother and the child are more helpless than in any animal species. It is thus a change in the sexual and reproductive system of the human animal that initiated the beginnings of the bi-parental family and of his social life. Yet the motivation provided by male sex hormones was not strong enough to prevent the forest men from abandoning at least overtly the full exercise of polygynous tendencies. With polygyny family life and care of offspring were haphazard and precarious. The stability of the family group or horde pos-

tulates that the other males do not encroach upon the sexual privileges of the leader in his absence or presence, and thus incest taboos comprise some of man's earliest code of morals. Rules regulating endogamy and exogamy and prohibitions of adultery and mating within certain degrees of relationship are met with in all societies, savage or civilised, and these are as often challenged as are implicitly obeyed. If man has won partial emancipation from a pre-determined and hormone-determined framework of social relationships, he has to pay the penalty through the shifting and individual character of human relationships. Furthermore, it is because the contact between the sexes is not hormone-determined or seasonal, but may be durable and hence intimate in the human species that disharmonies arise between social and sexual interest and activity. These are inevitable in the human social evolution as the kindred comprise a group of males and females who live together in the same or contiguous dwelling or territory, establishing a division of labour and close association between the sexes that improve with social integration.¹

Sexuality versus Altruism

Further, one of the peculiarities of human sex life is the dissociation between sex functioning and reproduction, with an emphasis of the play element in sex that is responsible for the excesses and aberrations of human sexuality, so rarely found in animal life, and so disruptive of the patterns of collective living. The postponement of marriage, celibacy, spinsterhood, disruption of the family, homo-sexuality and control and reduction of births, all raise behaviour problems that become acute as man seeks sex sport outside the marital connection more than ever in modern society. Finally, due to man's hyper-sexuality it is difficult for him

¹ See Mukerjee and Sen Gupta : *Sex and Culture* (unpublished).

to obtain a suitable adjustment of population to food supply and resources. Insect societies, where the risks of over-population are as great and recurrent as in human societies, maintain an optimum population through both physiological and structural specialisation (polymorphism) and the influence of instinctive mechanisms, bringing about an automatic and far-sighted subordination of individual functions and interests to the social welfare and a machine-like smoothness of adjustment of numbers to external conditions. The development of monogyny and neuter castes in the beehive, ant-hill or termitary is not incompatible with racial survival, due to an elaborate protective system which enables a single female or queen to overcome most dangers and vicissitudes. In the more primitive wasps all the members of the colony are capable of reproduction like humans, but their fertility is low and the dangers of over-population are counteracted by frequent swarming or massacre. Several social insects can control the sex of the offspring by appropriate feeding of the larvæ, produce the missing sex in the colony and increase or decrease its numbers in close adjustment to weather and food supply.¹

There is a profound incompatibility in the human species between his fertility and reproduction and the optimum size of his family, as the result of which he oscillates between excessive multiplication that lowers his health and living standards, and excessive limitation that leads to the suicide of races, classes and groups. Man's equipment of instincts and desires, his traditions and culture fail to offer him adequate guidance in his right choice of values in respect of family raising and standard of living or in understanding and fulfilling the basic conditions of his survival. His sexual desires are too ego-centric, explosive and continuous to be easily subordinated to the interests and well-

¹ See Mukerjee : *The Political Economy of Population*, Chapter VI.

being of the family and society as shown by the recurring instances of sex abnormality and orgy and of racial decadence and suicide through the ages. No doubt if the population be excessively reduced the possibility of the occurrence of favourable mutations is very much curtailed. This jeopardises progress. On the other hand, excessive population and economic pressure greatly limit the opportunities of survival for all new types. Especially in the human community the fitness of the new type has to be judged not by success in competition in a crowded society but by general contribution to its welfare.¹ The stability of human societies by adequate, quick or automatic adjustment of numbers to resources would have been possible through the specialised deployment of man's sexual urge and the evolution of human neuter castes of soldiers and workers. This might have led to the predominance of other-regarding impulses and activities over the egoistic in the human species. But all this is incompatible with man's evolutionary advance, since sex is implicated in some of his highest aspirations and creative efforts and achievements. Thus he pays the penalty of the flexibility and adaptability of his psychic make-up by the anomalies and contradictions of his mental life, especially in respect of sex and reproduction, which mark him out as the chronic victim of conflicts of behaviour and values.

Haldane observes that we must not expect that in the human species altruistic impulses will ever predominate. This can only occur, according to him, when neuter castes of soldiers or workers exist in man's social organisation. Altruism has to be inculcated by education and the appropriate social milieu; it cannot be implanted once and for all by heredity. Yet there is no doubt that man is endowed with a large fund of altruism and tenderness due to cer-

¹ See Morgan : *The Scientific Basis of Evolution*, p. 217; also S. J. Holmes : *Life and Morals*, Chapters IV to VI.

tain biological conditions. The altruism found in his emotional make-up is due to several evolutionary factors and circumstances. Among these are the long period of infancy of the human offspring that is born helpless and must be tended and protected for years in order that it may grow up; the close-spaced births over the woman's reproductive period of about thirty years; the durable association between man and woman that freed from the dichotomy of a neuter and sexual state alters human nature in the directions of mildness, kindliness and sacrifice; and gregarious existence that was made biologically imperative for a puny, defenceless creature by the presence of his carnivorous enemies in the dawn of his evolution. Neither a carnivore like the tiger or kite that does not live gregariously, nor an animal like the lizard or fish with no parental responsibility, nor even a gregarious mammal like the horse or bison with no durable mate life can develop strong altruistic instincts characteristic of man, not to speak of his highly developed and integrated mental organisation that altruistic dispositions and activities must presuppose. Physiological psychologists who have studied the evolution of the brain point out that the cerebral cortex with its ten thousand million nerve cells, each of which is connected with a hundred other cells by means of nerve fibres of inconceivable complexity, shows an extremely orderly mechanism. This is intimately connected with man's capacity for regulatory control of behaviour based on an anticipation of probable consequences. The neurological basis of his moral responsibility begins as soon as social factors enter into the intelligent analysis of situations, his purpose and freedom blending with his social feelings and emotions for the regulation of behaviour so as to provide for both personal and social satisfactions. Further, the functional patterns of interconnection among the nervous elements are associated with the development of greater

sensitiveness to the feelings and attitudes of fellow creatures. The evolution of human sociality is writ large on the structure and functions of the brain and the nervous system.

Man's hereditary equipment no doubt tends towards increase of gentleness, compassion and usefulness, but his hereditary improvement is exceedingly tardy. On the whole, his endowments of fear, greed and pugnacity that were undoubtedly needed in the milleniums of his struggle with the forests and beasts of prey in his early evolutionary history must now be considered too liberal, and these have now become handicaps to his progress. A precarious life in small fighting clans or hordes has indelibly stamped upon human nature the ingrained, seemingly contradictory traits of mutual sympathy and group pugnacity, egoism and altruism. A young biologist has rightly observed: "Mentally, man has raced ahead of his genes." Even if the human mind has reached the stage when man knows from his science that love, altruism and goodness are not only products of biological evolution, but are also conducive to the maintenance and enhancement of life both of the individual and society at the highest level, he is thwarted at each step by impulses of fear, aggression and domination that were so securely fixed in his mental equipment by the hyper-sexuality of the species and the forces of natural selection. With a large fraction of his nature a source of weakness and maladjustment, man has to rely upon the social legacy of the other-regarding ideal, symbols and institutions and appropriate education for the stimulation of altruism and elimination of egoism, for his preference of love, goodness and sacrifice to hate, evil and aggression in the next steps of his evolutionary progress.

The Unconscious Mechanisms of Social Evolution

There is another peculiarity of human as compared with animal sexual life that has also a profound influence upon

man's attitude and social behaviour. Freud stresses the influence of the ambivalent instincts of life and death, love and destruction that possess man in the depths of his unconsciousness, rooted as these are in the break and "disynchronous onset" in the human individual's sexuality and affective life that are subjected to severe frustration and repression during the age of from about five to twelve years. At the end of this period infant sexuality is completely repressed, and the individual becomes consciously asexual, bearing in his unconscious life the oral, anal and early genital fixations. With the advent of puberty there is a re-arousal of conscious sexual interest, the directions of which are largely determined by infantile repressions and frustrations.

Thus the need of reconciling the ambivalent contending forces of love and hate, of masochistic-sympathetic and sadistic-aggressive tendencies in the depths of self is connected with the peculiar features of evolution of human sexual life. The psycho-analytic school, following Freud's remarkable findings, emphasises that man's sense of goodness, wholeness and beauty, manifest in his moral and aesthetic apprehension, is ultimately rooted in his imperative need of reconciling his incompatible instincts of life and death, love and hate. Such fusion or compromise is the very essence of his success in adaptation. His sadistic or destructive impulses and phantasies in his love life are characteristically accompanied by the compensatory phantasies of "restitution" or "reparation," as these are called by Melanie Klein and John Rickman respectively. There is a genetic connection between the pain due to destructive impulses and the paramount need to create lasting goodness and wholeness from what had been in phantasy injured and rendered bad. As the preservation and enhancement of the objects of attachment is the great concern of the libido, restitution or reparation should be con-

sidered as libidinal manifestation in spite of the fact it owes its origin to the presence of destructive impulses. The urge to reparation is, according to Rickman, owing to the strange nature of human development, probably an integral part of creative activity, the horror of the 'ugly' and the wish to change it is that '*vis-a-tergo*' which thrusts us into constructive work in art, in science and even in the humble tasks of our daily round.¹ Man can unburden himself of his load of anxiety and guilt, his agony that overwhelms him when he finds his loved ones threatened by his own destructive impulses fused with his libido, as he fulfils the compensatory urge to reparation. This principle of reparation which arises from the depths of his being accordingly underlies all his strivings after truth, goodness and beauty. This is the chief reason why in romantic love, artistic expression and mystical experience we find manifestations of exaltation and abasement, tenderness and cruelty so strangely blended. Love, goodness or wholeness, working through the principle of reparation, re-establishes the integrity and wholeness of his life, and makes it triumph over mutilation and death which he associates with ugliness or evil. Goodness is thus the preservation, reparation or recreation of those original objects of his love which are endangered by his own hatred and have been injured by his own aggression. Evil becomes his own dangerous hatred and aggression. Constructive or creative feelings that are felt in the unconscious as "good" become a part of the self as the super-ego or conscience.

The human mind in the course of its development in society assimilates society's notions of love, goodness and

¹ Melanie Klein: Infantile Anxiety Situation Reflected in a Work of Art and in the Creative Impulses: *International Journal of Psychoanalysis*, Vol. X, 436, part 2. See also John Rickman: Nature of Ugliness and the Creative Impulses, the same *Journal*, Vol. XXI, 294, described as a marginal note to the former paper by the writer.

wholeness, and its prohibitions of hate, evil and ugliness into a part of the self as the super-ego. The super-ego is concerned with goodness and morality, with remorse and with feeling of guilt. It is the voice of civilised propriety imposed on the ego in its process of maturation as it struggles with the id which is the source of the psychological impulses of life and death, love and hatred, creation and destruction. Paradoxically enough, certain portion of the id is taken over by the super-ego. Man's impulsive tendencies of life, love and creation derived from the id as well as society's commandments not to hate, kill or destroy, but to love and save from death or destruction make the components of the super-ego that evolves with the process of civilisation. Thus the ethical pattern becomes rooted in his conscious as well as unconscious life, and his love and co-operativeness, creative and constructive activities obtain the drive and impetus of the unconscious.¹

Mind in the course of evolution in its social setting elaborates and develops a two-fold, interdependent mechanism that directs social progress: (a) repression that keeps the unsocial impulses wholly out of the consciousness, and permits them to return to consciousness only in various disguised forms that are economical to the total organism in that the early psychic conflicts and frustrations are minimised; (b) creation and construction that utilise and elaborate the social impulses and the unconscious urges of life and love, found ambivalent with destruction and hate, fulfilling man's moral and social demands from the depths of the unconscious.

Genetic and Social Basis of Personality Types

If the Freudian contribution helps us to relate the urges to love, goodness and wholeness to the trend of man's

¹ See Mukerjee : *The Social Function of Art*, Chapter III.

mental and social evolution, it is also fundamental in the analysis of the psycho-genetic factors contributing to the growth of various personality types and contrasted rôles, attitudes and values. Various types of personality are met with: aggressive and submissive, egoistic and altruistic, apathetic-isolated and sympathetic-social. These are also described as extrovert and introvert, schizoid and cyclothymic. Each of these types represents distinct behavioural tendencies rooted in the individual's unique genetic and sexual history that are "processed" into patterns of habits and rôles by the social milieu.¹ Each type is given a label or epithet. Speech, symbols, traditions and tools, we have seen, are *sine qua non* of culture, reshaping man and his dispositions, habits and behaviour. An epithet, sign or appellation arouses "social expectancy" in respect of what the aggressive-persistent or submissive-helpless child is and does, and this determines his rôle and status as the leader (perhaps) of his gang, or the quiet good boy of his school form respectively. Pugnacity and egoism, mildness or altruism that are primarily organically derived are fashioned into different types of socially and culturally recognised behaviour by the expectations of the gang, the neighbourhood and the school, and win self-esteem as well as social approbation by securing status or position for the individual. No doubt the anger and pugnacity of early man, necessary in a world full of woods, carnivorous beasts and hostile tribes, have become misfits in civilisation. But civilisation fits the hunter and the fighter into the rôles of the wicked boy of the town, the aggressive labour leader and the bullying politician that express the needs of the hereditary dispositions and behaviour patterns, and at the same time subserve some socially approved or recognised interests and

¹A Synthetic View of the "Social Individual, *American Sociological Review*, October 1943; also Flugel : *Man, Morals and Society*, Chapter VI.

values in keeping with the particular status and the total social situation. Even so, such behaviour patterns and rôles are sources of weakness to society that has set to itself the task of taming and socialising the aggressive-persistent type of individuals in obedience to the needs of the changing social and economic order. Such transformation of human nature is not impossible in the long run, for has not man succeeded by selection and training to produce the mild and tender domestic cat from its fierce ancestor?

Recent psychological investigations have shown that the traditional dichotomies of human dispositions between egoism and altruism, aggressive and sympathetic behaviour, and competition and co-operation have to be given up in favour of the view that in the process of socialisation seemingly antagonistic tendencies develop together. Thus the most competitive children are also found the most co-operative. Further, it is the cultural background and pressure with the stress of both competition and co-operation that condition the development of either aggressive or sympathetic attitudes and type of behaviour. It appears that the pressures exercised by children of the same age or level are stronger in moulding behaviour than those exerted by older individuals such as nurses and teachers. In Soviet Russia the conditioning process, through which such values as collective responsibility and co-operativeness supersede the virtues of the capitalist-industrial society viz., assertiveness, acquisitiveness, thrift and exclusive devotion to family and dependants, begins early in infancy and is carried systematically through in creches, kindergartens, schools and children's and boys' and girls' clubs and in initiations into collective life, labour and recreations. No doubt one of the insuperable obstacles in the way of ushering in a new social order with a stronger sense of human equality and social solidarity is that in family up-bringing and education individuals today are subjected to processing by the ethical standards and

attitudes of the class-ridden industrial society. Ethics cannot be divorced from social life and action. Revaluation and remaking of society go together. There are as many ethical systems as there are possibilities of the social order. Revaluation can best be brought about through the conditioning process by which every human being in his formative years internally and unconsciously acquires social and moral attitudes and feelings. The new social values that now struggle to become dominant will have to be not only implemented in the system of education and leisure-time pursuits from the early years of habit formation, but also reinforced in the scheme of status so that these might supersede the old set of values and symbols that obtained social approbation in the past.¹

Status and Personality

The assignment of a certain generic status, laying down the basis for habit patterns and specific goals within the restrictions and freedoms of the limited environment that regulate behaviour continues the same "processing" and "conditioning" of the individual. Status-seeking and recognition are of the essence of personality adjustment and development. Man's rôles and statuses respond to appropriate and meaningful social experiences that have come to represent social values. Conceptual thought that is his monopoly presents a constellation of satisfactions and attitudes as abstract ethical "values" are focalised or narrowed down as specific "goals" that are deliberately sought within the framework of normative conditions and freedoms and inhibitions of society. The division of labour in animal societies evolves into the differentiation of rôles and functions and scheme of status in human social evolution. Status is begotten by

¹ See Gardner Murphy : *Personality*, Chapters 11 and 12; also *Readings in Social Psychology*, Chapter III.

ecology and nurtured by culture at the human level, and converts an individual into a person, his position or rôle into a wished-for pattern of social behaviour, and his endeavour to live up to the social expectancy of his position into an ethical striving. Status-position provides each individual with incentives as well as "tools" and opportunities to rise in the social scale in order that he may attain security, recognition, privilege and self-competence, and expresses at the same time an integral system of social attitudes and values and the ethical scale of the community. Man's innate dispositions and temperaments cannot be classified into a set of pigeon-holes, nor can all the links in the process of mutual interaction between the innate factors and the total environmental situation be traced. But the above analysis clearly illustrates that the endless divergence of his dispositions, behaviour and values in society is rooted in his psycho-genetic endowments, moulded and reshaped as these are by society from the very dawn of his development from the apes. These express themselves in society in socially approved or conventional forms, although the repressions and frustrations of the personality and the formation of groups and associations with anti-social goals equally illustrate the chronic conflict between man's milieu and his hereditary equipment. Finally, there are persons in every society who are more suggestible or submissive and whose powers of deliberate choice of values are limited, and who participate in many segments of a fractionalised culture without an adequate integration of values or code of behaviour. They are "all things to all men," an attitude that may serve them best to secure specific goals as well as "mere social goodwill."

The Good Personality, the End-product of Evolution

Society is as full of inhibitions and repressions of the human personality as of its fulfilments and expressions.

Through the status-position scheme in each society, through the privileges and opportunities society provides individuals and groups to use "tools," property and freedoms for their specific "goals," and through the "traditions" and "symbols" that create appropriate patterns of behaviour for their different rôles, society provides the stimulating fields for the appropriation of values by individuals of various temperaments and capacities and the myriad manifestations of the human personality. The human personality, then, is the end-product of evolution. Ethics appears among psycho-analytic phenomena as the effort of human personality to achieve mental (and spiritual) poise, sanity and freedom that are identical with 'good,' and eliminate neurosis and psychosis that are identical with 'evil.' The latter thwart the evolutionary process that has already led up to human personalities as its most important products.

Psycho-analytically speaking, the "good" personality exhibits relatively integrated, free and reality-adapted behaviour; the "bad" personality reverts to infantilism, automatism, megalomania unadapted to reality. In most individuals the ego, the super-ego and the id are not integrated into a single entity; but the super-ego, which is largely irrational and represents the taboos, prohibitions and repressions in early childhood that are "internalised," becomes tyrannical and divides or disintegrates the self. Thus there are great loss of mental energy due to conflict and repression of the libidinal tendencies and emotional insecurity, and thus the responses to fellowmen are characterised by fear, intolerance and rage. The "good" personality does not suffer from undue frustration of the libido, but rather reduces the number of "complexes" and repressions of childhood. It utilises the unconscious libidinal and aggressive tendencies in sublimated satisfactions, whose range and variety enable many such tendencies that cannot bear the light of consciousness and adult social experience

to be adequately satisfied. By reason, thought and imagination, the blind and irrational regulation by the super-ego system gives place so far as possible to conscious and rational self-regulation by the ego that becomes less dependent upon the super-ego, enlarges its field of perception, and becomes now creative and fruitful, liberating love, kindness and generosity. The arbitrariness and blindness of the super-ego, derived from various rational or irrational compulsions in the child's family circle, largely disappear, on the one hand, and on the other the unconscious prohibitions and phantasies of the early formative years include within their range various forms of conduct now deemed unethical or irrational, according to experience in later years, from the larger point of view of man's social and evolutionary advance. Adaptation here, again, is the test of maturation of the personality that meets in a more conscious manner the wider demands of society and evolutionary progress, or incorporates these latter into the features of the super-ego from the parents and nurses in childhood. Thus the ethical and social experience of adult life may be communicated and deeply assimilated into the infantile unconscious.

Such adaptation is, however, rendered peculiarly difficult, of course, by a family and social milieu full of insecurity, distortion and frustration. In an unjust and insecure society with its frustrated parents, the undesirable repressions and distortions of one generation are transmitted to the next, and thus the vicious circle of a cramped and pathological emotional structure expands and perpetuates itself. A hard and ugly industrial milieu with its sharp social cleavage and its fear, anxiety and insecurity of the mass of the population, in fact, so distorts the emotional development of the children that there is little possibility of an increase in love, tenderness, sympathy and compassion in place of self-assertion, cunning and fierceness. On the other hand, it may be possible that in a society, with far greater social equality, justice

and solidarity than at present achieved, human egoism, cunning, chicanery, sadism, war or lust may be so discouraged that the child may develop the same abhorrence of these in his super-ego or conscience as he has developed against lying, incest, adultery or murder, and carry it on in his unconscious into adult life. No doubt the social progress of mankind brings with it a profound change in the emotional and intellectual content of the super-ego or conscience.

Good Personality and Good Society

Recent writers on psycho-pathology stress that maladjusted personalities can be restored to their normal organisation and development through the encouragement of self-expression in wholesome creative activity, restoration of status and friendly social contacts.¹ Howard observes, "As a psychological term, adjustment usually refers to the quality of a person's behaviour in terms of social effectiveness. True adjustment includes more than orientation in the externals of human contacts. Hence the inner aspect of adjustment is essentially a process of integration. From the point of view of mental hygiene, wholesome and effective growth in personality is achieved by striving to know oneself *and others* by accepting and being oneself, and intelligently working towards self-improvement." Self-esteem is rooted in personal integration, and self-esteem comes from group expectancy and appreciation that disclose new opportunities and ambitions in life. But the group itself may be anti-social, as for instance, a gang which provides a mental climate that becomes the source of anti-social habits and ways of living. Here reform rests on giving the gang new socially useful tasks. In the treatment of juvenile offenders a re-definition of the social rôle of the group has been found exceedingly valuable in building up a new life-organisation for them. Thus the enlighten-

¹ See L. K. Frank : *Society as the Patient*.

ment and adjustment of the group with its stimulative and regulative pressures are utilised in several social experiments for the reform of waywards and delinquents.¹

Personality maladjustments and conflicts are largely, then, the products of social and institutional misfits and unbalances. Thus a "bad" personality with its frustrations, tensions and conflicts is often the product of the bad society. Mental adjustment and reality-adapted behaviour consist in one's knowledge of his own nature and of the character of fellowmen as a preliminary to successful social behaviour. A schizoid, self-centred, melancholy personality suffering from faulty perception, especially in respect of social interactions and relations, and a cycloid personality, falling an easy victim to the process of mass suggestion and propaganda, are both failures in adaptation. Neither can develop towards an 'occupation' or 'status' personality, associated with success in economic and social adjustment, whence they can select their life-goals and relate them to the social milieu. It is the occupation and status personality which leads up to the integration and development of man's spiritual personality. The latter rests on the cultivation of the ideal values of truth, power and goodness. "The way to the real is through the ideal." The development of insight or knowledge is the only cure of "wrong perception" and of failure to comprehend all the relevant features of the situation characteristic of the neurotic. Occupation therapy has been adopted in every mental hospital as a programme of restoring the psychotic to normalcy. Interest and success in productive enterprise in one's job, occupation or profession in close association with fellowmen are safeguards against any menace to mental poise and sanity; for such work elicits the appreciation, support and co-opera-

¹ "Social Therapy" is now a recognised trend in the work of social scientists. See the *Journal of Sociometry*.

tion of others and assures the individual his rôle, status and prestige. Man's intelligent and imaginative sympathy and the development of human kindness are, finally, the best proofs against over-weening pride, self-delusion or suspiciousness that are so common, marring normal friendly social intercourse and impeding social adjustment everywhere. Many people are found to be micro-paranoiacs, more or less maladjusted personalities. We thus see that the key to combating mental stress and disorder and developing the integrated "good personality" lies in the cultivation of those values of truth, power and goodness on which ethics always insists for the development of personal character. As Gillespie, a distinguished psychiatrist, observes, "Psycho-pathology, social science and moral philosophy agree in asserting that the harmony of human relationships is the highest good." So far as the evolution of the good personality is concerned, it consists, then, in rescuing the mind from all kinds of faulty perception, delusion, anxiety, hate or aggressiveness, and in harnessing the unconscious by appropriate mental dynamisms. On the positive side, the good personality is one that is fully integrated within and deliberately works towards such integration in inner life and in relationship with fellowmen that become the vehicles of the highest values, understandings and creative endeavours. Much depends upon the proper external milieu. A wholesome social environment giving opportunities for saner, freer and more socialised living can alone stimulate the progressive harmony and development of personal life. Thus can man reach higher and more complex integrations of self that may become the sources of new insights, loves and sacrifices. It is in the world of social actions, relations and values that he achieves the full enrichment of his personal life, at the same time contributing toward the enhancement of the life of society.

The Human Meaning of Evolution

Man directs his experience of progress not only upon himself, but upon the entire biological and social evolution in order to give it a forward direction. Fully conscious of himself as a personality with a long course of evolution behind him, of which he has now become the crown and climax, he can control and direct evolution by substituting quicker, less wasteful and more humane methods for those of natural selection that regulate the life and evolution of the lower organisms, and begins even to apply these both to his body and mind and to his own all-round progress. This is effected through the improvement of his breed and instinctive equipment—Eugenics, education and morals; through the improvement of his social environment—Euthenics; and through the all-sided improvement of his functional efficiency, occupations and technology—Eutechnics. The course of organic evolution shows indeed many blind alleys and lapses, many trends that are irrelevant to progressive change or are even opposed to it in direction or are inherently limited specialisations.¹ Man alone can escape, if he wishes, from the backslidings, pitfalls and short-cuts innumerable, and can speed up his progress in the correct direction to the maximum. By conscious reasoning and deliberate choice, he decides which makes for unlimited and which for limited human progress, and also imposes upon progress that appears to be restricted to his own species his own scale of values. He does not accept the goal of mere survival and adaptation to the immediate environment as is operative in pre-human evolution, though survival and adaptation have, to be sure, a far-reaching moral significance for his progress. For the probability of survival for individuals, groups and species in the organic realm increases with greater harmony

¹ Julian Huxley: *Evolution: the Modern Synthesis*.

of the living creatures within themselves in their internal organisation, with one another, and with their environment. In the depths of his own self man now suffers from discord and conflict. There is disharmony between one part of his social structure and another, between his science and technology on one side and his ethical notion and system of human relations on the other, between the social system and morality of one part of his territory, urbanised, highly integrated and parasitical, and another, rural, inchoate and victimised. There is also a strong resistance to the natural increase of size of the human society to an international co-operative community that yet remains man's distant evolutionary dream. In all these respects man finds himself today at variance not only with the main principles that are at work in biological and social evolution but also with his system of moral values. Further, his scale of values reaches out to a freedom, knowledge and goodness unknown in the pre-human kingdom. All these categories viz., freedom, knowledge and goodness find their true meaning only when evolution reaches the human level. Thus man consciously directs his evolution according to the spiritual values that he imports into it. The increased efficiency of his adaptation and his increased freedom and mastery over environment are no doubt material bases for his higher values; but these are judged only with reference to the latter. Human progress becomes no longer an uncertain by-product of haphazard cosmic forces, but is saturated with ideals. The really significant freedom and mastery that he seeks are those of the intellect that in mystic contemplation over-reaches the boundaries of time and space and encompasses the totality of existence. His really significant adaptation is represented by the intensification of feeling that inundates the world with love, goodness and joy, and binds him with all sentient creatures in service and sacrifice.

Mind and Morality in Evolution

Such expansive collective intuitions and feelings come from art and religion which must be put in the service of evolution. Man as a spiritual creature is the offspring of the community mind, from which he derives his scale of values and his frame of symbolical reference, even as he derives his physical being and continuity from his family and the social community. It is the mind of the community which provides him with the voice of the super-ego or conscience demanding from him self-subordination and sacrifice, even the sacrifice of life itself at its own will. The identity of man's feelings and wishes with the group life and mind, indeed, marks the deepening of the self that is the fount of all his spiritual values and ideals, differentiating civilisation from biology, progress from evolution. Step by step there is the onward development of the mind from inhibition and conflict to expression and reason, from fear, anxiety and obsession to freedom and joy, from ego-centricity and aggression to sociability, universality and transcendence.

Psycho-analysts now aver that most forms of aggression, sadism, crime and anxiety together with thirst for power and self-display are products of sexual inhibition both in its infantile and later sexual and social aspects. Freedom from excessive repression and from the taboo on tenderness as well as encouragement of mother love are stressed as contributing towards a great improvement of peaceable and tolerant as contrasted with predatory and aggressive social attitudes both of whole societies and of the individuals composing them.¹ Freedom from irrational anxiety which is the common feature of all forms of neurosis is, according to Ernest Jones, the best single criterion of normality. Individuals who

¹ Money-Kyrle, Suttie, Reich, West and Flugel all have taken up this general viewpoint.

have in large measure achieved this condition are happy and adapted.¹ On the other hand, maladjusted or 'bad' personalities are victims of much fear and anxiety arising indirectly from the successive introjections and projections of aggressiveness. As a satisfactory harmony is established between the super-ego and the primitive id impulses, the sense of guilt and sin, anxiety and need for punishment are diminished. Aggression, that is largely a reaction to inhibition and anxiety, is simultaneously combated. With less of inhibition, not only are aggressiveness, anger or hate reduced, but there is a general transition to insight, tolerance or love, and in fact the instincts can express themselves more smoothly and freely in satisfactory integration with social and cultural norms. All this contributes towards improved individual adaptation as well as social integration. In the total pattern of behaviour the ambivalence of love and hate, creation and destruction is gradually superseded by the predominance of love, tolerance and creation. It is a fundamental psycho-analytic notion that in the more developed attitudes and forms of conduct there is less of ambivalence than in the primitive or atavistic ones. Not only are stresses and conflicts minimized, but these are dealt with rationally and consciously, making for more differentiated and harmonious behaviour and mentality. The exaggeration of sin and guilt in the repressive moral code and convention of society as well as the inhibitory influence of the super-ego accompany unhealthy reactions of excess of aggression and sex obsession, and constitute the principal roots of social unrest and mass aggression and crime. The less there are inhibition, frustration and conflict, and the less the super-ego retains its tyrannical,

¹ Ernest Jones, The Concept of a Normal Mind, *International Journal of Psycho-analysis*, (1942), 23, 1. Flugel in his *Man, Morals and Society*, Chapter XVI, analyses general trends of moral development from the psycho-analytic viewpoint.

fantastic character, the more can the ego adapt itself to reality at the superior level of reason and conscious choice and symbolic behaviour rather than at the inferior one of habit, routine and the unconscious with their cruder and clumsier methods of adjustment. Simultaneously man's wider social attitudes and feelings develop with the gradual diffusion of the ambivalent attitudes of love and hate and the supercession of the primitive, simpler and restricted forms of object-love. The self on the upward path of development asserts the supremacy of its social or universal over its narrow, ego-centric or restricted aspects, and finally reaches out to the poise and majesty of the all-pervasive mind of the universe, over-reaching but including human mind and morality. Man's morality becomes a phase of his symbolic identification with the not-self; it achieves a supreme detachment, transcendence and impulsion. His body is the victim of disease, decay and death, but he lives on eternally through the effects of his thought, feeling and action on the social community. He can confer immortality on himself, independent of his personal survival after death, through each new contribution to truth, moral and aesthetic insight and zeal for goodness and service to the enduring and expanding value configuration of humanity. The individual's perennial understanding and infinite sensibility and love confer immortality on his social and cultural order in which these take forms, and which is transmitted as an enduring external legacy from generation to generation. The social culture—the heir of the past and the promise of the future—in which the immortal values of life are focussed and pooled is the acme and crown of evolution, its universal, permanent product that crosses the boundaries of its scene and the limitations of its frame. Man's internalised heritage of symbols at its highest and noblest becomes identified with the cosmic group mind,

which like the god of personal religion reveals, to be sure, the full possibilities and implications of the goal of evolution—a collective myth of the species calling for its highest love, intelligence and adventure. As man's conception of evolution enlarges itself, his group mind or deity is also enlarged in order to inspire grander moral relations and direct him to unknown vistas of progress.

Evolution is integrative, co-ordinating and harmonising; it discards ugliness, incompetence and inconsistency from every nook and corner of life. It is a vast and intricate web with its warp and woof penetrating and interlocking the lives of plants, animals and humans in subtle, unsuspected ways, as science sees it. Human evolution expands and amplifies this grand symbiosis and wholeness of nature in order to fulfil man's vision of an all-embracing cosmic unity in truth, beauty and goodness, as the human personality apprehends it. The meaning and symbolism of truth, beauty and goodness are derived by the human personality from the spiritual world. Neither the processes of life nor of society can reveal the supreme and ultimate values towards which these must ascend. As the evolution of life, mind and society searches for the highest good and the highest value, it becomes the symbol of Being. Thus there is always a mysterious, prophetic element imported to the evolution and destiny of *Homo socius*.

CHAPTER V

A SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY OF MORAL CONFIGURATION

Psychology and Objective Axiology

The endeavour during the last few decades to make sociology 'value-free' has over-shot its mark. In the anxiety lest his personal valuation distorts the social reality, the sociologist leaves human values out of account, unexplored and unanalysed. The consequence is that certain established values are often tacitly accepted though concealed in the methods of analysis of social relations and institutions. Indifference or neutrality in the matter of valuations stands for traditionalism or opportunism. Or there is indifference to the sweat, blood and tears of the work-a-day world, values being regarded as belonging to a remote spiritual realm. In any case the desire to abjure altogether the realm of values stands in the way of full understanding and scrutiny of the social relations and institutions themselves, shaped, moulded and impelled as these are by human valuations. Such oversimplification, due to self-imposed limitation of the methods of study, has virtually amounted to stultification of this branch of knowledge. Nietzsche once observed: "The removal of God from the world deprives the idea of justice of all meaning." The eschewing of values from social relations and action similarly deprives human culture and welfare of all significance. Sociology can best attain its goal if, instead of eschewing values that are implied in all social facts and relations or adopting a superficial empiricism that seeks to determine social goals and policies in particular social situations without regard for the ultimate issues involved, it takes

into consideration in the process of analysis given social values as data or as hypotheses or tentative generalizations, requiring confirmation in terms of the needs and experience in the objective institutional situation. Its basis objectively will be the desires, ends and values that men actually seek in their dynamic interplay with the environment, physical and social. It will deal with a system or systems of values that can be reduced from institutions and behaviour patterns of society that fit into one another and to man's scales of values, harmoniously providing him easy and effective guidance in his adaptation to the rest of the universe in which he lives. At the same time it will recognise changes in the criteria of valuation that embody themselves in new institutions and behaviour patterns in an imperfect, "immoral" society, all the while regarding values not as absolute and final, but as hypotheses that have to be tested out in the concrete social situations in the same manner as the positive sciences today formulate one or more hypotheses, and test these in the light of as many groups of data or phenomena of nature as possible. Thus sociology will deal with values and groups or institutions both as changing patterns, and, on the basis of alternative scales of valuation or value judgments that serve as measuring rods of what is described, present alternative social policies in consonance with new social situations and experiences and new wishes and ideals of men. As a science of human relationships, groups, institutions and values, sociology will have its positive, analytical, descriptive aspect; as a science of judgment of human relationships, groups and institutions, it will have its normative aspect.¹

In the adoption of such a programme sociology may be very definitely aided by the movement in contemporary

¹ For a full discussion see Mukerjee : *The Social Structure of Values*, Chapter I.

psychology just as the older hedonic and associational psychology gave a wrong start first to economics, and then to the other social sciences. Gestalt psychology gives today a picture in which man's perception and action organise themselves into specific patterns as a result of the valence of goal objects. His reaction or conduct is a total process which as a functional whole is the response to the whole situation, objects acting as means or obstacles to the goal. His environment is considered as both biological and cultural, and his organic drives and interests as well as group standards and patterns taken as the basis of the interpretation of behaviour that is conceived to be a unitary response to the total situation. Such an approach makes it possible to treat his instincts and drives, his reflection and judgment and the dominant social norms and symbols as equally important factors in valuation, regarded as a process of complex dynamic interaction between man and milieu, neither depreciating the primitive instincts and impulses nor denying his judgment and choice.

Scarcely less important is the Freudian view of human nature in which social values and standards come to be assimilated with the ego in its process of maturation. Man's moral standards are now found to constitute the components of the super-ego that evolves with the socialisation of the individual, and obtain impulsion from both the conscious and unconscious forces of the mind. He is thus concerned with values in both deliberation and day-dream, in the devotion and thrill of a courageous adventure or the delusion and hallucination of a frustrated career. Psycho-analysis throws a flood of light on the question of the absoluteness and relativism of values. Man, who is a chronic victim of inner conflicts, resolves these through the mechanisms of repression and development of the super-ego. In the process of maturation of the super-ego, beauty, goodness and wholeness represent the unconscious tendencies

of love, reparation and creation by which the ambivalent tendencies of hate, aggression and destruction are inhibited and overcome. These, therefore, are generalised and internalised as emotional certitudes. Without such assurance the dangerous, intolerant, infantile tendencies of aggression and hatred could not have been repressed. Thus the sense of justice and wrong, beauty and ugliness, goodness and evil arises with conscience or self-censure, all being rooted in the unconscious. Man's predisposition to regard justice, beauty and goodness as absolute values may be regarded as the attempt of the self to achieve poise and balance by investing them with a blind compulsive character. Without compulsive submission to these values through the repression of their opposite tendencies into the unconscious, his psychic energy would indeed have been greatly wasted due to inner antagonisms that are habitual with him. Julian Huxley throws out the brilliant suggestion that the crude and clumsy methods of resolution of man's normal and habitual inner stresses and conflicts by his blind, tyrannical and fantastic super-ego are of great biological advantage. Such all-or-none mechanisms minimise the effects of conflicts and strains in the case of a mentally developed animal like man, and resemble functionally the mechanisms on a lower level represented by the interactions of antagonistic muscles and competing reflexes. These are of the greatest importance in man's early childhood before adequate experience is accumulated to enable conflicts to be dealt with empirically and rationally.¹ For no animal is such a chronic victim of psychic conflicts and strains as man; and in man himself no period of life is so full of constraints and repressions as his childhood and adolescence in order that he may be regimented early and fitted smoothly into the social milieu of his adulthood. Of course

¹ Compare the able discussions in Waddington and others: *Science and Ethics*.

his evolutionary advance implies the development of reason and discrimination and substitution of the blind and primitive super-ego by a more delicate adaptation to reality. But the sense of absoluteness of values becomes innate in the human consciousness as a result of maturation and socialisation of the infantile self and the need for infantile repression. Yet if the values be conceived and felt in absolute terms, human experience shows the necessity of moulding and modifying them to different social conditions and situations. Accordingly man's imperative needs of adjustment in both his inner life and external social experience make ethical values apparently absolute in principle, on the one hand having a blind intolerant and irrational character about them, and changing with reference to particular personal and social situations, on the other. Psycho-analysis also shows the disguises, distortions and disturbances produced in his valuations due to the bafflement and repression of imperative urges as a result of environmental conditions and social pressures. Cultural anthropology has revealed many unique and bizarre valuations, including moral judgments of man, while psycho-analysis has laid bare the rôle of his primordial impulses of which he is not aware or which he refuses to recognise in civilised society. The interchange between his desires and interest pattern on one hand and the needs of life, economy and the pattern of culture on the other in the various stages of social evolution is now brought to light by several studies such as social anthropology, psycho-analysis and social psychology, all of which stress his group orientation and socially derived conditions and norms of his success and well-being.

Drawbacks of Present Psychological and Ethical Approaches

Contemporary social psychology in particular shows the social nature of human nature, and the society trans-

forming and moulding man's organic drives, desires and ends into social goals and values. But due to the behaviouristic trend and the traditional fear of importing any kind of value-judgment into the study, it connects desires and interests with valuations not as empirical facts and processes arising out of the interchange between the human mind and social culture, but as rigid, unexamined, absolute ends that have no relation to life and society and their requirements and possibilities. Its analysis and description of institutions that exercise stimulating and constraining influences upon individuals, thus operating as features of the environment, have often taken the existing social values as fixed, unalterable and sacrosanct, thereby introducing dogmatism into the theory of social causation, and even proving an obstacle in struggles towards new values and improved social conditions. On the one hand, modern psychology, in its emphasis of almost exclusively environmental conditions originating group patterns of conduct and of individual motives and ends, minimises the social development and structure of the self and the presence of the social ends and norms in the individual consciousness as the super-ego or conscience. On the other hand, ethics though it now stresses the development of personality and the discipline and enlightenment of man's instincts and desires does not profit at all from the new psychology. Man's social evolution has so socialised his impulses and desires that he eschews those as "wrong" that like aggression, lust, hate and cruelty do not expand nor harmonise and integrate with other impulses and desires, and those goals or values he considers "right" that bind him to fellowman as a social creature. He builds up a table of values within the structure of his own self according to which he subordinates ego-centric, isolated and disruptive interests and ends to those that are expansive and harmonious, and that integrate with and fit into the social system of interests and

goals in which his behaviour is anticipated. This is because the interests and satisfactions of the self can be fulfilled only through the mediation of society, and accordingly the self as a social creature, and as conditioned by the social process, seeks within and without a social harmony and integration of impulses and satisfactions.

Morality thus becomes a phase of the social configuration, an episode in the social process in which are converged all the evolutionary forces of life, mind and spirit. All values are essentially social values in which man shares his experiences with fellowmen. And such social values are embodied not only in the code of ethics, but also in the entire structure of laws, customs, symbols and institutions. Yet man faces conflict between his own immediate impulses and desires and social norms and institutional standards and between the different social goals and norms in his own experience. It is the function of the personality, then, to so readjust his conduct as to integrate all present as well as anticipated interests and values involved in the social situation. That is the essence of right or good behaviour in a moral situation, enabling the personality to formulate, on the one hand, a line of action better fitted into the social situation as anticipated and, on the other, to come out of this conflict with a more integrated self. In the course of the interchange between social values and individual intelligence, preference and reflection, a large portion of the former has now become deeply embedded in the unconscious as conscience or the super-ego, that serves as a sure guide in achieving the supremacy of the social and the universal over the ego-centric and temporary desires, impulses and interests. Such guidance by an emotion deeply rooted in the unconscious forces of the mind is biologically necessary for an easy resolution of man's constant inner conflicts. On the other hand, the personality constantly rationally clarifies, criticises and redefines values and recurrently changes society by pro-

ducing his own scheme of ideals that arises out of conflicting value-situations, examined, selected and ordered with reference to their potentialities, that deeply satisfies the self, and at the same time presents a moral hypothesis or plan of behaviour for the community to accept or reject.¹

Due largely to the influence of behaviourism, man, however, is sometimes considered as a gregarious, suggestible, class-conscious animal, a power-holding and power-seeking creature, even as a beast of prey. It is often forgotten that he is also a rational animal. Psycho-analysis makes it out that the libido is blind and irresistible in its impulsion and direction of behaviour. The influence of familial and cultural conditioning and socialisation of the individual is set at naught. Man's reason is also regarded as 'rationalisation' and his processes of thought as spontaneous ebullitions of the unconscious forces of the mind. Values are treated as whims and preferences rooted only in instincts and impulses. That social habits, traditions, institutions and education supply their forms, occasions and objects is largely missed. Marxist sociology emphasises economic drives, mass feelings and irrational elements that are considered as sources of intellectual beliefs and judgments, moral notions and faiths, as levers of social action and progress. All such assumptions and analyses detract from the real nature of man as a creative, evaluative, purposive being. His sense of values and creative intelligence and his initiative in importing values into his relationships and actions in society are largely by-passed by modern psychologists, ethicists, and even philosophers. In the background of their minds there is installed the crude Darwinian fetish of natural selection that still guides social thinking, identifying justice with the biological law of efficiency in the struggle for existence. Man's social order is considered as

¹ Compare Dewey: *Problems of Men*, pp 233-235.

an outcome of economic necessity or utilitarian advantage, and his moral order of collective approval or disapproval of useful, transitory sanctions and prohibitions. The 19th century concept of a blind mechanical progress without any purpose or creative endeavour still persists.

Inter-play of Self, Morals and Society

An adequate socio-psychological theory of values and morals has to base itself on a theory of human motivation that divests itself of the physiological, behaviouristic emphasis, comprehends the true social structure of the self and values, and sees in value experience the integration and transformation of both self and society. In the communication and interchange between self and society three distinct phases of the value-experience and situation are to be distinguished:

1. There are concrete specific goods, satisfactions or values realised by the individual within the limited setting of his group relationship and experience. Now social groups show differences in social participation, cohesion and valuation and may be classified into the basic categories of Crowd, Interest-association, Society and Commonalty. In the crowd, mob or mass, values are at their minimum. Emotions and attitudes such as those of fear, anger, hunger and aggression multiply and repeat themselves in a crowd or mass but along a single track. There is neither variety, nor specification, nor integration of emotions and attitudes which may lead to their stability, expansion and mutual reinforcement. Integralness, stability and self-sufficiency are essential to value consciousness, and these are lacking in crowd experience which is partial, ephemeral and shifting. As we rise from Crowd to Interest-association and Society, the group situation fosters differentiation, integration and stability of desires and emotions and sharing of values and satisfactions. The order of social relationships provides

channels of fulfilment of both instrumental or specific and intrinsic or shared ends and values that gain in stability, strength and self-sufficiency. Groups and the values embodied or acquired by them both accordingly tend towards richness, self-sufficiency and endurance. Values are at their maximum in Commonalty where there is the largest interpenetration of consciousness and behaviour. Interest-associations and Social Groups seek and achieve largely instrumental values that are divisible, partial and competitive, and cannot be shared by the rest of the community. In Commonalty the values stressed are intrinsic and indivisible values, the moral values of personal association, of personality, of truth, beauty and goodness and so on that can be shared without limit with other persons. Such values rise to the symbolic or ideal and moral plane, awaken various other attitudes and values, and hence expand and enrich themselves indefinitely, and at the same time lead to the highest mutuality in ways of living and achievement. The experience of members of a Commonalty has a maximum of value, for the unity rests on the largest variety, freedom and participation. Thus the group situation in which values are sought and achieved in the concrete determines the quality, dimension or range of the values. Each group contains its own moral potentialities, and calls for moral creativeness and new imperatives for the individual to fulfil his total developed nature on the basis of integral interests, ideal values and projected satisfactions. The group or value situation for the individual is evolutionary, and also indicates the trend towards which morals are moving.

2. Groups transform themselves into institutions as the pattern of values becomes stable, continuous and integral. Institutions are enduring ways of living of groups in which men are associated in certain orderly relations for the fulfilment of basic and stable interests and values. Thus values embody themselves in domestic, social, industrial and political

institutions, in the system of status, laws, moral codes and religious observances. Social culture depends for its continuity and identity on the system of institutional values. Institutional values are relatively fixed habitudes of ideas, feelings and sentiments. There is here a lapse of positive value experience. Yet there is a negative value experience in the sense that though the external shell of an institution may offer small direct satisfaction, and lose in that measure its significance for the individual, its abolition or abandonment leads to strain and opposition due to the interests and values being left unfulfilled, and to which conscious attention is now directed. Institutional values change as social situations call for new ways of living. But on the whole institutional values are maintained by custom and social habit and irresistible social pressure that often thwart the creative moral freedom of the individual. Yet unless the institutional values are assimilated and become a part of the self, these cannot be regarded as true values. For moral initiative is the critical condition of the value criterion. In valuation man has to struggle with his own inhibition, lack of insight and moral inertia so that his more profound moral aspirations identify themselves with the potentialities of his own nature as well as with, and so add to, the institutional values or remould them in order to make them more complete and satisfactory.

3. Through the full interplay of moral creativeness and freedom within the conscience of the individual and social intelligence, imagination and enthusiasm in the moral life of society, values become autonomous and all-inclusive, so that these can hardly be distinguished from the particular forms in which these are embodied in the social interactions and relationships, institutions and symbols. Such values are those of goodness, justice, love or solidarity that come to lend the final meaning to any action and relationship in society. Their imperatives are universal for all men; but their contents vary from man to man, and from

social situation to social situation. These are normative ideals or norms into which man focusses both the consummation of his concrete specific values of the moment and the bafflement of his long-cherished dreams and aspirations. These arise often from stresses and conflicts that his social self must experience as it cannot reconcile the ideals, loyalties and virtues of the different groups among which it is distributed. In situations of discord between his preferences and society's standards, his reflective thought, imagination and experience create universal ideals or norms that record his aspirations to transcend groups and institutions, constantly seeking to mould him according to their needs and standards and exerting pressures upon the more creative and profound levels of the self. Yet the depth, enlightenment and sensitiveness of the human personality, on which universal norms rest, are only possible because the conformity to institutional standards and values makes his life easy and smooth in the lower levels of group relations, where moral decisions are automatic and involve scarcely any mental effort. As the result of idealisation and symbolisation, norms assume a super-personal and super-social character, rising far above personal impulses and emotional conditions and the loose, current moral practices of social experience. These approximate in man's ethical contemplation to the directive principles that introduce order and purpose into the universe. His universal norms, truth, goodness, justice and love, derive accordingly their imperativeness from the order and purpose in nature that he comprehends as something essential to his own nature as a rational and social being.

Universal ideals or norms shine like bright fixed stars that guide him in the uncharted waters between the scylla of environmental obstacles and the charybdis of fluctuating social ends and subjective preferences. It is as a communion of universal ideals or norms directing him into ways of sharing, service and solidarity that Society develops into

Commonalty. Man has both a biological and social self. The latter is distributed between groups and institutions, laws and liberties, religion, morality and public opinion. As the social self man often finds himself in disharmony with his social milieu, and rejects into it values, ideals and norms composed out of portions of his self that do not find adequate fulfilment in the existing social environment. He inevitably superimposes upon society an ideal order of norms made up of moral relationships and social processes which he does not realise fully and entirely in his immediate social situation, but in which he embodies all his desires, aims and aspirations. According to G.H. Mead, the self as social is never confined to its own meanings and verifications; as social the self is never restricted to a set of values not shared with others. "The axiologist has over-generalized the sphere of the personal as the epistemologist has the sphere of the private and mental. While values, like given meanings and knowledge, have an individual aspect, there is common experience and common value to the degree that the act is social—and it must be remembered that for Mead the social act is the matrix of the individual act."¹ Between groups and values, between institutions and values, there are continuous reciprocity and diffusion.

Man's Self-transcending Ideal Social Order

The need of man's social self to transcend the social order is best embodied in art and religion in which he builds up a perfect, symbolic social order and transforms the present society so that the ideal relationship may be set up here and now, conserved and maximised. Art, morality and religion, all fulfil his imperative desire to realise those values which belong to him as part and parcel of a vaster social configuration or commonalty to which he belongs,

¹ Mead: *The Philosophy of the Act*, Introduction, LXIX.

and which he can never adequately realise in any existing society. Without the creation, conservation and maximisation of values he cannot, indeed, find himself in harmony with society. For it is by means of his value insight and experience that he can establish himself in peace with his concrete environment that constantly distresses him by thwarting his desires and feelings of what men and social relations and institutions ought to be. In the history of social development he gradually learns to regulate his desires and impulses in terms of social procedures and requirements, and to accept social values and attitudes as his own, assimilating these even to his unconscious as the super-ego or conscience. Thus he can direct the organised attitudes and values of the community as represented by custom and law, rights and duties, morality and institution both towards himself and towards his fellowmen. The same process by which he becomes socialised and enters into communion with society enables him to construct an ideal social order from the viewpoint of generalisation of social ideals and norms. As the rational, symbolising and evaluating social being, he develops an entirely ideal world of values, which is as necessary for his adaptation as his discreet or scientific attitude towards the physical environment. Science, with its hypotheses and laws, enables him to obtain certain selected, divisible satisfactions and instrumental values out of his physical environment. His contemplative and ideal experience, with its hypotheses and laws of indivisible, ultimate values, similarly enables him to adjust himself to and transform his total environment in order to attain maximum values, including those of which the fulfilment is excluded due to individual inadequacy and environmental limitation. It is thus that science and art, morality and religion co-operate so that man can be most "at home" with his environment in terms of both his concrete and imaginary experience. Such co-operation also implies the in-

terpenetration of the empirical and the absolute, instrumental and transcendental values as part of his social living and experience.

There is experimental evidence of the reality of even such universal, ideal values or norms as truth, power, freedom, justice and beauty appealing to men, if not as abstract notions, but at least manifest in various kinds of cultural products. The nature of such appeals varies among different individuals and groups, as shown by the Allport-Vernon, Folsom or Thurstone tests for the study of values. Such inductive studies yield a more authoritative scale of values beyond the uncertainty of personal opinion and speculation, and will contribute to establish greater unity between theory and practice in all the social sciences. Values as socially accepted and measured data should, in other words, be treated in the same manner as scientifically observed and measured social phenomena. Such procedure will in time bring about the much needed integration between the mechanistic and teleological standpoints in the social sciences.

Morals as Values in Social Action

The social structure and dynamics of values require to be analysed and clarified. The individual is as much necessary for society as society is necessary for the individual. Society is a group of individuals in reciprocal interaction that is value. It is not something apart from the functioning individual, while it is value that gives meaning to both the individual and the social. Interaction or relationship between person and person in its various stages and levels has to be maintained and transmitted; it becomes the seat of essential moral values that have got to be cherished. Such interaction that is the essence of education and the maintenance of the social order begins in early childhood. The maturation of the child's personality is based on his taking the rôles, relations and values of others

as his own. Just as by integrating the various specific rôles and relations of other individuals within his own action and thought he develops both morality and sense of individuality, so does he also internalise social meanings and values in his own experience. He lives accordingly in an expanding world of common meanings, values and norms.

Valuation is a part of man's social living, the essence of his adaptation to the environment and fellowmen. Values are of various classes and categories whose range and duration correspond to the levels of human adaptation, biological, economic and spiritual. From the psychological viewpoint, it is from man's desires and their various combinations and integrations into interests aided by his imagination, judgment and experience that values are derived. In such derivation of values, rooted as these are in his interests and satisfactions in different levels of adjustment, society plays the dominant rôle in moulding and reshaping the individual desires and interests into approved patterns. All desires and interests that express the full life of the individual are taken into account as far as possible in the values concerned—even the eschewed desires are defined and stated in terms of the approved values. Such recognition and definition, involving clear thinking that is, of course, aided by group and institutional life, are essential to good and just human relationship and behaviour. In fact morals are values in social action, made up of both individual and social responses and attitudes. All values are social products and are sought in the network of human relationship, social interaction and intercourse. The individual cannot live and develop without seeking values many of which serve as enduring moral ties, binding him to other individuals in society through whose mediation alone can such values be fulfilled. On the other hand, society cannot exist nor renew itself without at the same time creating

values and morals. The social configuration in its dynamic phase as embodying an anticipated frame of reference, an ideal-real situation, is the moral configuration.

"Society itself," as Durkheim aptly observes, "is a set of values and ideas." All human relationships are themselves seats of values, meanings and morals that keep society as a going concern. Groups and institutions are frameworks within which values and morals live and thrive. Rights and duties are conditions for the acquisition and augmentation of values. Laws, codes and manners protect, appraise and grade them; while religion acts as the supernatural mentor and guardian of values, and intensifies, conserves and distributes them equally among all. Man's external, social and cultural frameworks of avowed common meanings, understandings and values are the best guarantors of social harmony and enlargement or fulfilment of personality. Max Scheler rightly insists that society is a pool of values, and that the emphasis of man's search for and achievement of individual values is itself an outcome of the older metaphysical individualism and his distrust of fellowman. Society as an ethical concept, the moral configuration or the true kingdom of ends, is, as Scheler puts it, a closely knit organic whole. As the contribution of each organ affects the character of the organism, thus influencing and partly determining the contributions of the rest, so in social institutions—family, church, state, industry, culture—mutual responsibility is not confined to specific contracts or promises, but implies some responsibility of each for all who participate in the undertaking. On the principle of solidarity, values are pooled, and men share in the achievement or failure of others. If values are objectives, it is irrelevant who realises them. The exclusive attention to the agent, who is directed to seek "his own good," is characteristic of the modern tendency to subjectify them, which results from man's resentment towards, and mistrust of, his fellows.

Mankind as it shows a greater integration of interests and activities through functional social differentiation also attains a more harmonious unity of values and standards that are assimilated into the mature, socialised man's consciousness as his moral insight and conscience. "Ethical personalism," observes Clarke following Scheler, "does not imply sociological individualism. Though personality is the supreme moral value, this does not mean that it is the psychological cause or the necessary instrument of progress."¹

The Building of Cultures by Values and Ideals

As an outcome of the interchange between the moral initiative and creativeness of the personality and the value pattern of the social group there arises the 'ideal.' The ideal is evolved in a situation of conflict when man's values cannot fit into the socially current value configuration. The emergence and principle of the ideal, hitherto groped after uncertainly or envisioned but dimly, mark a transvaluation of the existing values, a new integration and co-ordination, a further step in his moral and social progress. The history of civilisation records the waxing and waning of values and ideals; the change in the value-orientations is reflected in the status-power system, in the institutional set-up or in the transformation of the contents of law, rights and duties, myths and rituals. And yet out of the richness and variety of valuations in civilisation, a relatively absolute hierarchy of values can be discerned. From the mass of historical valuations, at first "resembling the confusion of colours on a palette from a row of over-turned pots," there emerges the picture of humanity coming gradually into possession of a realm of values as independent of its emotions and desires as the stars in their courses, once believed to have a direct relation to human fate, are now known to be inde-

¹ Clarke: A Phenomenological System of Ethics, *Journal of Philosophy*, Vol. VIII, p 163.

pendent of man and his destiny¹. Values and ideals build up cultures, and thus a study of valuation is as important for the understanding and interpretation of cultures as the study of uniformities in the relations between natural phenomena for the positive sciences. The notions of values and morals in sociology are on a par with those of gravitation, heat and light in the natural sciences. Given a knowledge of values, of their order and hierarchy in a particular society, it is possible to predict with a high degree of certainty the conduct of average men and groups in most situations. The notion of values is, indeed, a most efficient tool for the organisation, classification and comparison of data on the interests, attitudes and moral behaviour of man in different countries and epochs.

Dis-value and Immorality

In the field of natural phenomena we do not encounter any departures from the laws of nature. In man's social life we, however, meet with social adaptation and equilibrium, or its reverse, social crisis, disorganisation or disequilibrium with contrasted values and dis-values. Dis-values and deviations from norms and standards enter into patterns of social disintegration and individual degeneracy. The chaos, disintegration, falsification and perversion of values are illustrated in the process of disorganisation that ranges from an increase of mobility and casual impersonal relationship, frustration and revolt of the individual to cultural lag, inflexibility of the status-power system, breakdown of traditional controls and revolutionary economic and political upheaval. A society in chaos or disorganisation exhibits a whole constellation of individual and social neuroses, crimes, immoralities, and other pathological features that fit into one another into a system, cumulatively aggravat-

¹ Scheler: *Des Formalismus in der Ethik*, p. 306.

ing the unadaptability of the individual, the inadequacy of social values and norms and the instability of society. Thus valuation phenomena are significant for the understanding of individual behaviour in both normal and pathological aspects.

Man's status, we have shown elsewhere, is the primary datum of sociology. It celebrates the fulfilment of social expectation in value-seeking as well as self-esteem or personal self-realization. An individual is evaluated for his achievements according to the particular values and standards found in the culture or group nearest to him. Self-esteem is thus founded on certain life-goals and ends which the individual selects from the surrounding culture, and with which he identifies himself. If such values be not sustained, he loses respect for both himself and others, and becomes a disintegrated personality. The decline or loss of status or 'caste' implies the loss of self-respect, prestige or security that define his participation in the group pattern, and is fraught with risks of personal maladjustment and disorganisation. His own judgment of himself, to be sure, depends upon his social expectancy; consequently his lowering in the eyes of others contributes towards the break-down of his own accepted life-goals and imperatives and traditional social controls. He quickly descends the slippery path of deterioration and deviant behaviour as his self-assurance, honour, shame and sense of guilt are no longer there as watch-dogs of his conduct. In this way his moral striving and achievement, the development of his personality are implied in status-gaining and status assignment. Thus sociology as it focuses its attention to values becomes concerned with the primary social process or inter-personal relationship which is itself a process of valuation.¹

¹ See my *Social Ecology*, Chapters VII and VIII.

Need of Clarification of the Moral Configuration or Order

The sociology of values is also of great practical import, especially in this age when the industrial system and technology have proved incapable of placing the values characteristic of civilisation within the reach of the major section of the population, and also have brought about a chronic conflict and perversion of values through the encouragement of secondary groups and associations and the pecuniary measure of valuation. The revolt against modern industrial institutions is nothing but a revaluation, a mass struggle for a new scale of values. It is the task of sociology to formulate a workable conception of values and progress, and of the relationship between various kinds of values, all in connection with some issue or other in particular social valuations. The meaning of all values is grounded in the achievement of social progress fighting against false valuation, idolatry and social change in wrong directions. Unfortunately sociology has not even given an adequate definition of progress and of its optima that may be universally acceptable. Without these all discussion of values and norms, morality and law, economy and religion will merely support traditionalism and absolutism. As a matter of fact sociology now treats an entire system of social and institutional traditions and values, supported by unreasonable taboos, prohibitions and injunctions, as sacrosanct and unalterable. Both ethics and sociology should keep an open mind towards values that need not be blindly defended, but should be tested in the light of existential situations and tensions. Thus these studies should be dominated by the notions of social planning and direction. On the other hand, man's moral and spiritual energies could be harnessed for human social progress, instead of being placed, as at present, at the disposal of outworn institutions and creeds. All values, indeed, look beyond the present indicating a potentiality or ideality, an

aspiration for the future rather than present fulfilment. Thus a clarification of the system of values i.e., the moral configuration or order is clearly a phenomenon of moral progress, on the one hand, and of the lag between development in different sectors of society and of their accepted norms, standards and institutions, on the other. Undoubtedly in the present crisis of civilisation we are in the midst of a great and bitter battle of values.

The alternative social policies and ideals such as individualism *versus* collectivism, democracy *versus* totalitarianism, equalitarianism *versus* libertarianism, with which is implicated the whole future of modern civilisation, can be rightly judged with reference to the stress of dominant values that are or will be sought. The social and political sciences are no doubt concerned with these rival alternatives or ideologies, as these are called, but these are presented as final, logically unsupported judgments of value, with unproved premises and assumptions that contribute to greater conflict and uncertainty in this era of social crisis. Much confusion could be avoided if we recognise the presence of values in the divergent social structures, rights, freedoms and laws in the same way as the social sciences acknowledged values in the past in their notions of natural rights and natural law of justice and the greatest happiness of the greatest number. Man is now in a changing climate of values and opinions, and disregarding the defect of methodology and lack of philosophical insight in the social sciences, falls back upon the ultimate values, and considers empirically different alternative social and political policies according to his institutional set-up and tradition. As a matter of fact the different ethos of different social cultures express and conserve different type-values embodied in their characteristic group organisation and status system, their unique codes, norms and symbols. Social planning requires initially a clear understanding of the scale of values and virtues that is to domi-

nate the particular culture system. If there is to be social control and direction, the necessity of a fresh social valuation is obvious. Otherwise the collective purpose may be interpreted in the interests of the *elite* without free and rational discussion as in authoritarian planning, or become short-sighted and irrational as in democratic planning, in which the masses are apt to judge all institutions exclusively from the level of biological and economic values. The Report on Recent Social Trends in the U.S.A. stressed the need of social revaluation a few years back as follows: "The clarification of human values and their reformulation in order to give expression to them in terms of today's life and opportunities is a major task of social thinking. The progressive confusion created in men's minds by the bewildering sweep of events revealed in our recent social trends must find its counterpart in the progressive clarification of men's thinking and feeling, in their reorientation to the meaning of the new trends."

The Planning of Values

In a planned society values have to be planned. But this planning of values is a matter less of economics and politics, and more of art, education, ethics and religion, values being rooted in man's unconscious. Even where economics and politics might aid in value planning, it would be because these might be saturated with a new ethos or faith in the common man, a new moral idealism stressing the sharing of the values of life. Man may not be able to achieve and establish values, but he can strive for them, and thus may contribute towards solving the social and moral conflicts of today. A clear distinction between instrumental values and intrinsic values, between instrumental progress and intrinsic progress in the moral configuration is the master key to planning. Social policy consists largely in the enhancement and enlargement of the sphere of

intrinsic values. Intrinsic values can be realised most completely only in conjunction with one another. On the other hand, the bafflement of one impoverishes others. The conjunction of values is as necessary as the specification of values. The division of labour must be there in every society to enable it to benefit from the special aptitudes, training and experience of groups and individuals. Specific values enrich the conduct and experience of society and add to its legacy of values and achievements. But at the same time society must have before it the ideal that the layman and the specialist should participate in their mutual ends, aspirations and achievements, collectively enhancing the great values of social culture that belong to every man and woman as a matter of right. The rise of Society to Commonalty which is also an ideal implies the stress of those higher, final or intrinsic values, that unlike most instrumental values are not competitive in nature nor divisible i.e., depending upon the quantity and variety of goods, but on the other hand rest on reciprocal fellowship, understanding and appreciation of persons as vehicles of the supreme good. Man's recognition of the infinite values of the human personality and rejection of the use of any fellow human being as a means in any endeavour is the test of the good or moral society in the ideal or complete sense. A human relationship based on the use of a fellow-individual as a means by another becomes a dis-value and is intrinsically unethical, and ought to be reduced to a minimum as the basic ideal in social planning. Positively speaking, social planning ought to aim at the promotion of institutions that are grounded on the ideal human relationship, of which the basis is the reciprocal recognition of the infinite worth of individuals qua individuals, and the creation of ideal individuals. All institutions, familial, economic or political, all laws, rights, morals and conventions have to be examined as to how these assure the permanence and

perfection of those intrinsic values recognised as giving the progressive direction to a social culture.

Man apparently lives in two worlds, the institutional and the ideal. In his inner self and behaviour he is one. He makes and remakes his ideal values in his inner ecstasy and profound detachment from his fellowmen and from the environment. But he embodies these in his external social relations and framework, his group organisation, laws, morals, symbols, institutions and social controls. Both the ideal values and this external framework are equally the products of his own mind. There is also a give-and-take between them in his conscience, insight and faith. Society is constantly renewed by this give-and-take in the invisible world, whence is derived the impulsion that ideal values must penetrate into all human relations and activities in order that these may be of any meaning and worth for man.

Process Thinking in Ethics

Social relations and ideal values, to be sure, blend with one another and are reciprocally interdependent. But the degree of such blending differs in various groups and societies and under different social situations and circumstances. There is such a thing as social routine or customary behaviour in a culture, which though it expresses and conserves moral values produces a mental climate in which the individual conforms to the standardised moral patterns on the instinctive level. The individual here in his moral inertia does not participate at all in the creation of moral values. For him society exists only without; he merely records and reflects, and not creates and expresses values. A slavish obedience to society's decrees, codes and regulations often smothers individuality and moral initiative, although it is by no means true that even in primitive or less advanced society slavish, fascinated conformity is the rule. On the other hand, society at the time of a ferment or revolution may show

greater moral creativeness and aspiration than the individual, who may be bound down by social habits and traditions, and lead him to an enhanced and enriched moral life. Or, again, such habits and inner pressures may be so strongly entrenched that these may not be able to awaken the deeper selves of the individual. A poet, mystic, hero or prophet, inspired with the vision of nobler personal values than are socially current, shake and make the society. Such gifted individuals through their own moral insight or profiting from the criticism of their social group or class may offer their unique valuation to a social situation independent of existing norms and symbols, and thus save the community from the misapplication of the latter, giving it guidance in the pursuit of values far different from that of authority and tradition. Rightly understood, the individual's moral initiative does not imply here any denial of moral values but rather a new insight into these, so far as these have reference to him alone or to his particular situation. It is his contacts with an actual synthetic group mind that convert Society into Commonalty and social rôles, relations and activities into foci and revelations of the supreme values. Commonalty is a fundamental condition for the development of the highest personal values. On the other hand, the richer the personality the larger are his gifts in the forms of new values of social activities, new moral relations.

Man and society and the values they create are not separate from one another. These can be explained only in terms of the other. Man and society form a unity in the world of values that has an inner system of reality as represented by man's motivations, reason, faith and conscience, and an outer system of reality as represented by society's traditions, institutions, symbols, myths and morals. It is better not to endeavour to analyse man, society and values separately, but rather regard them as interdependent processes in a whole configuration; of men's ways of living, of groups

bringing men together in co-operation or conflict, of institutions, laws, morals and symbols forming and reforming for the fulfilment, enhancement and gradation of values, and of value-striving, value-gaining and value-changing. This will subsume all social and moral relations and phenomena, in a system of functional ethics in terms of dynamic processes, not of fixed entities. Such change in the angle of vision towards 'process thinking' is manifest in recent developments in physics and biology and has become imperative in ethics in the present era of far-reaching moral transformations and crises. 'Process thinking' will break down the long-established barriers between ethics and the various compartmentalised social sciences, clarify the analysis of individual conformity and deviance and of forms of social control, and facilitate the direction of social action and policy by emerging moral values and ideals.

CHAPTER VI

BRIDGING INDIVIDUAL AND SOCIAL ETHICS

Causes of the Cleavage between Individual and Social Ethics

Ethics refers to both individual and social morality, to man's inner obligation to himself as a moral agent and to his obligation to groups and institutions as a social person. In the age-old, famous discussions on the virtuous person and the good society in the *Republic* of Plato and the *Nicomachean Ethics* of Aristotle in Greece, the *Analects* of Confucius in China and the *Bhagavad Gita* in India, ethics was concerned with the criteria of right and wrong from the viewpoints of both the individual and his society. But in the twentieth century ethics confines itself to the conduct of the individual, and either disregards social morality or leaves the latter to be decided by current law, tradition and custom. There is now a yawning gap between formal or individual ethics and 'social' ethics. The former deals with certain personal virtues of the individual, who as the moral agent conforms to certain universal principles of right deduced from metaphysics; while the latter is concerned with the norms and standards largely derived from the established social order that demand unquestioning conformity from a supposedly inert human nature.

Such a division rests on the nineteenth century separation between hedonistic or naturalistic psychology and philosophic absolutism, itself rooted in the older Cartesian dualism between mind and matter. The then Darwinism, which looked upon morals as antagonistic to the elemental instincts of man and to the entire evolutionary process—

an antithesis that T. H. Huxley discerned with a troubled conscience—also encouraged the cleavage and sharpened the body-mind opposition. While orthodox, analytical psychology has stressed the rôle of the innate biological drives of man and in the main regarded society as a later accretion due to his chronic mutual conflicts, ethics has pitted against such impulses and troubles of the human animal the abstract eternal principles or essences. This dualism has dominated the methods and outlook of all the social sciences in their formative stages. Psychology, in the first instance, has neglected the study of the development and maturation of social and moral motives and emotions; while ethics in its turn has abstracted the individual from his social-cultural milieu, looking upon social duties and obligations as belonging to an ideal or transcendental sphere outside of individual consciousness or social experience. In the past moral philosophers have been psychologists and have discussed moral norms and imperatives in their relations to the values of life—self-realisation, happiness or welfare. But psychology as it has become experimental and clinical in its methods and materials, and stressed instincts and unconscious desires of man gives a segmental, distorted picture of his behaviour in society and of his rational, aspiring, evaluating personality. The divorce between psychology and ethics has become complete, much against the time-honoured humanistic ethical tradition. Correspondingly the social sciences have striven to become 'value-free,' leaned on the side of ethical relativism and neglected the formative influences of ideals and norms on groups and institutions. Neither ethics can be divorced from psychology nor the social sciences from ethics.

Philosophical idealism, metaphysical individualism and social biologism of the nineteenth century, all have contributed separately and collectively to break up the real unity between the social and the individual in both social

and moral theory and practice. The essential social nature of the human being and the rôle of social culture and group integration in defining, co-ordinating and reshaping human goals, values and ideals have been completely overlooked. Meanwhile comparative and historical sociology has risen to prominence and formulated on the basis of genetic studies significant, broad laws of historical development of religion, law, art, morals, family and economic and other institutions. But such evolutionary laws are hardly taken into cognisance by ethics, which even if it recognises the social nature of man misses the dynamism of moral values in the development of social codes, institutions and group patterns. It assumes a static group and institutional milieu and seeks to find out the relations of conscience and the duties and obligations of the individual to the existing social environment. Social morality here becomes either a matter of the application of an enlightened individual conscience to the demands of concrete moral situations or passive self-surrender to the dictates of economics and politics.

The Diminished Range and Rigidity of Ethical Theory

Thus at present there is a good deal of confusion and uncertainty in ethical theories, moral philosophers preferring a particular ethical principle or a set of principles such as self or group-preservation, happiness, perfection of self and love to the neglect or exclusion of others. Traditional ethics narrows its range of forces which it derives exclusively from metaphysics—human dispositions, will and conscience on one side, and categorical imperatives and absolute moral values on the other; while it also reduces its province by confining itself exclusively to the study of right and wrong in the individual's conduct in his relations to fellow-individuals. The dynamic interchange of self, society and morals and the transformation of the ethos

of peoples by fundamental economic and social changes are completely ignored.

Contemporary sociology discards the older ethnocentrism and finds morals divergent and contingent in different social cultures and stages of social evolution. It requires us to see the relativity of human attitudes, interests and values in social culture. Morals shade off into folkways, conventions and manners which are sometimes described as the 'minima of morality.' These define proper and right behaviour in every society. Right behaviour is seen to rest less on a pre-conceived, ordered hierarchy of springs of actions and more upon man's specialised rôles, positions and functions in his larger group and institutional setting. Yet in the broad social anthropologists and sociologists find a consistency and permanence of the major moral values underlying the seemingly confusing mass of social codes, laws, institutions and folk-ways. The evolutionary moral world comprises a system, not systems of moral values and experiences.

But the older psychology of feelings and desires at the lower level still supports relativism and unstability of values, and increases the gulf between the study of social facts and relations and the study of norms and values, on the one hand, and the older individualistic tradition and subjective idealism, on the other. Such cleavage all the more leads to the neglect or misinterpretation of norms and values and their opposition at different levels of life and in different sectors of society where different sets of values are considered to rule in their separate autonomous jurisdictions. The chronic conflict of desires and goals of individuals as well as the struggle between ideals met with in the development of every society are pushed aside as irrelevant due to the leaning on deductive reasoning.¹

¹ See my *Social Structure of Values*, Chapter I.

The application of historical and comparative methods to religion, myth, law, art and morals is now pretty old and well-established, and has yielded certain general stages and 'laws' of moral and cultural progress. The conclusion has also emerged that in different types of social culture and stages of cultural development each of these cultural implements plays a different rôle in the whole process of socialisation or collective regulation, valuation and guidance. A whole division of sociology now deals with the problem of social control, investigating the various agencies, forms and techniques of control and also their mutual relations and hierarchy according to the problems sought to be dealt with in a given society. Neither 'ethical relativity' nor the manifold, fluctuating character of the normative agency, as discussed by sociology, has affected much the methods of ethics that still remains individual-oriented in the definition and interpretation of the universal rules and standards of right conduct common to all mankind.

The Opposition between Moral Man and Immoral Society

On the other hand, such is the all-pervasive pressure of mechanisation and institutionalisation of the modern age that some moral philosophers reconcile themselves to a complete cleavage between man's personal morals, which take into account his "super-temporal destiny," and his social and political morals, which they call "realistic" or "natural" aimed at the good of economic and political life and civilisation. Thus personal morals are neglected or disparaged, treated as of little account in man's evolutionary advance. "Socio-political ethics" takes for granted the "natural" opposition between moral man and immoral society. Ethics not only narrows its ambit, but becomes a handmaid of technology, positivism and science. Or, again, the very uncertainty and confusion of personal goals and ideals as well as stan-

dardisation and depersonalisation of contemporary life foster an exaggerated emphasis of subjectivism, marking a revolt against mechanism, economism and stateism or the cult of the Leviathan. Private morals work within the limits of positivism, technological culture and the Great Society, and overlook the trans-social order from which the supreme values proceed. The full richness and depth of personal values cannot be attained without the achievement of profound intimacy or communion with supra-social commonalty. Man is mentally and socially so constituted that his profoundest self is the most extended and intimate community. Orthodox ethics ignores that the supreme values of personality and the society-directed values of love, compassion and sacrifice are expressions of the same movement of mind and ethos. Many social and intellectual trends, sometimes even contradictory, are accordingly responsible for the divorce between individual and socio-political ethics, between moral action and action in the spheres of industry, business, profession and politics in practical life.

Ineptness of the Moral Ideal

Let us now obtain the testimony of two distinguished contemporary philosophers in respect of the consequences of this unfortunate dualism in contemporary ethics. John Dewey, after referring to the deeply entrenched and fortified habit of treating economic affairs, industry, trade and business as having no intimate connection with ultimate ends which are moral, thus succinctly stresses the result: "What pass for moral ideals in the most important form of social practices are so "ideal" as to be utopian. They are treated as matter of personal exhortation supplemented with use and threats of use of force in reward and punishment. Separation of the "materialistic" and the ideal deprives the latter of leverage and impetus and pre-

vents the things to which the former name is applied from rendering the human service of which they are capable.”¹ Again, “The idealist sets up as the ideal not fullness of meaning of the present, but a remote goal. Hence the present is evacuated of meaning. Meanwhile the practical man wants something definite, tangible and presumably attainable, for which to work. He empties present activity of meaning by making it a mere instrumentality.”² Similarly, Benedetto Croce especially alludes to the dualism that is set up between political and moral action. “A consequence of the dualism,” Croce observes, “is the common opinion that politics is a sad necessity (a common opinion which some philosophers have elevated to the highest realm of their speculation, making of politics and of the State a temporary expedient and a transitory condition of mankind). Another consequence is the series of illogical maxims that it is necessary to do evil in order to be of service to good, that private ethics are different from public ethics; that it is impossible to take part in politics and keep one’s hands clean, and that in the interest of the state one must, if necessary, break a promise or commit murder. These maxims are illogical because our human conscience cries out to us that in no case is it permissible to break a promise or commit murders; that there is not one set of ethics in the home and another in the public square; that one cannot do evil in order to attain good, as though evil and good were merchandise to be exchanged; that our hands must be kept clean; that the quality of the means must not conflict with the quality of the end.”³ Yet a very large body of men in contemporary civilisation act upon the maxim that morality has nothing to do with the field of politics, which on the other hand trespasses on wider and wider fields of morality.

¹ *Problems of Men*, p. 18.

² *Human Nature and Conduct*, p. 274.

³ *Politics and Morals*, pp. 2-3.

Collectivisation of Conscience and Values

The reasons are not far to seek. In modern complex industrial communities the power of the state has considerably and continuously increased. Due to economic monopoly, technology, disintegration of small functional and territorial groups and development of large impersonal social organisations, responsible decisions are reached at ever higher levels until these are found in state laws. A. M. MacIver aptly observes with special reference to the experience in Nazi Germany that three articles of the modern creed have emerged: viz. "Nothing can be done except through politics"; "by politics anything can be done"; and finally, "in politics any means are justified for achieving desirable ends." The above articles, of course, do not command the unqualified assent of any state. But the danger of placing one's whole trust in politics is that expediency replaces moral principles. "The only effective political action being collective action, all political activity involves the abandonment by the individual of his own ideals."¹ The German Nazi programme demanded the complete regimentation and repression of large numbers of people who had to work the destructive machines ruthlessly. The results were not only the unspeakable brutalities at the concentration camps but also the familiar symptoms of psychic segregation, dissociation and even schizophrenia of their perpetrators. Such is the grave danger of substituting political obligations for traditional moral values and obligations. The Nazi and Fascist experiments obviously are extreme examples of entire peoples being reduced into drill squads and action-crowds with vacant minds and consciences and readily absorbing the sugges-

¹ See an able discussion of this point in A.M. MacIver: *Towards a New Moral Philosophy, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society*, 1945-46, pp. 198-200.

tions of the leader through party propaganda and mass demonstration.

But fortunately for man and for his groups as well as for his state, his ultimate inner life, his conscience, faith and values cannot be bound or collectivised even by mass terrorism and propagandism of the most calculated kind. Hocking puts this point best: "To the slogan, 'Outside the State there is nothing,' we must rejoin that, 'If so, the State is nothing;' for outside the state is the source of the state itself. Man, the breeder of idea and feeling and of the state idea, is outside the State. Man whose thought comprehends other men, his groups, who spontaneously puts himself in loco Dei towards them; this imaginative and responsible inclusiveness is the thing in the psyche of the "political animal" which perennially gives life to political forms."¹

A social insect with its specialisation of physiological structures and functions and its pre-ordained equipment for being a mere worker, soldier or reproducer is an incomplete, regimented creature. Every man is on the contrary a complete man, thinking, feeling, evaluating, aspiring and planning. As the responsible thinker and moral agent, he works his ideas, feelings and values into all his affairs, groups and institutions. Any divorce between his moral values, habits and sentiments and his practical ways of action, whether in industry or profession or in politics, becomes incompatible with his irrepressible creativeness and freedom. The dualism between moral action and action in the field of politics, business and industry is symptomatic of the deeper division and unbalance in contemporary culture between technological advance and lag in the orientation of social relations that constitute a grave crisis in man's history.

¹ *The Lasting Elements of Individualism*, p. 137.

Man's Remote and Integrated Goals and Symbolic Behaviour

The lop-sidedness and inadequacy of current ethics are challenged today by the remarkable advances in psychology and sociology. According to modern psychology the social adaptation of the organism to the environment is a biological process, but it becomes the pursuit of goals and values in human culture. Man alone desires, chooses his goals and values and plans the future, his language providing him with symbols by which not only to conceive goals and values distant in time and place but also to transmit judgments in respect of courses of action for their achievement. Gordon W. Allport has recently stressed that man "stands alone," and in all that is distinctive of his species is a creature of intentions and purposes. He rejects scientific models and designs, addicted to machines, rats or infants, that overplay those features of human behaviour that are peripheral, signal-oriented or genetic. Correspondingly these cause us to underplay those features of human behaviour that are central, future-oriented and symbolic.¹ The German thinker, Cassirer, has shown that the symbolic system creates a wholly new dimension of reality for man. "Man," he observes, "has so enveloped himself in linguistic forms, in artistic images, in mythical symbols or religious rites, that he cannot see or know anything except by the interposition of this artificial medium." Man, unlike the machine, the rat or the infant, does not adjust himself directly to things themselves, or to their variable signs or signals but to their mnemonic symbols, replicas and surrogates. There is accordingly slight similarity between the rat's and the infant's psychological drives and needs and man's intentions, goals and

¹ Allport: Scientific Models and Human Morals, *Psychological Review*, July 1947.

values. Valuation or moral behaviour depends essentially upon the use of symbolism. Further, valuation which is peculiar to man involves the response of the whole organism to the whole situation, physical, vital and social. The significant factors in the total value-situation are biological and social-cultural. On the one hand, valuation is rooted in man's dispositions, strivings and interests without his often being aware of them; while there are conscious trends in valuation, which he introspectively discovers, reflects upon, clarifies and theoretically integrates and schematises by a comparison with similar or divergent trends of others. On the other hand, value experience is a phase of a larger process of social adaptation, appreciation and control that condition and elicit certain appropriate adjustive attitudes, sentiments and habits of the individual. These mental patterns are responsive to the past and present actualities as well as the potentialities of each value situation and selected by social intelligence and experience, largely modifying and re-shaping the individual's primitive dispositions and needs and modes of satisfaction or valuations.

Man accordingly fulfils his own interests, goals and values in, through, and with, those of fellowmen and the group. Out of this blending and interpenetration social and moral standards and ideals emerge that add a new quality and context to individual tendencies, satisfactions and values which gain an impulsion by social interstimulation as well as social direction and co-ordination. The social configuration of man's universe defines, integrates and guides his pursuit of values and morals. It also supplies him with words, images, symbols and myths without which he can neither remove his inner tensions, nor plan for his future, nor, again, hold fast those schemata in mind that make possible consistency in his moral judgment and behaviour. The older structural and rational psychology treated the social motives and standards of man as separate

and far removed from his biologic impulses and desires. It also presupposed an innate human faculty to reach out to norms, truths, beauties and goodnesses outside the human milieu for guidance in conduct rather than an experimental fabrication of appropriate principles, standards and symbols emerging out of the daily routine of group living and adjustment.

The New Outlook in Value Theory—the Emphasis of Social and Symbolic Patterns

The perspective of valuation is thus seen in new light as much as its biological and cultural dynamisms that form a continuum from the regulative tendencies of the unconscious to habit, folk-way, ideal law and morality and symbolic behaviour. Social psychology, under the influence of Dewey, Meade, Cooley, Marcel Mauss, Piaget and others, has stressed the social nature of human nature and found self and society as “twin-born,” moral experience tending to illustrate the total social pattern in which symbolic goals and values introduce a new order and dimension to individual urgings and satisfactions. The antithesis in the nineteenth century psychology between individual consciousness and a transcendental social consciousness (Durkheim) and in ethics between egoism and altruism has now faded. Laboratory experiments in psychology also reveal egoistic and altruistic, competitive and co-operative impulses fused together in various combinations, the moral crux being what the group elicits and fosters. Thus the focus of attention in moral life shifts from the self to the group. It is found that group habits, attitudes, values and symbols that shape the personality are far more significant for moral improvement than the discipline and reform of human character.

Value is a unit of activity and not of content, and implies consequences in a social context. Such consequences embody reflections on experiences of the past and are

directed towards the future and symbolic. Individuals seek certain interests and values, but these are relative to what other individuals seek and strive for in the group or institution demanding certain types of rôles or services. Status, including self-status or ego-esteem, rests on the proper fulfilment or achievement of certain interests and values that the group or institution promotes, conserves and communicates. The failure to achieve certain major values accompanies not only loss of status, prestige and power in society but also shame, loss of personal honour and ego-disorganisation. Through both success and failure in the fulfilment of values the individual becomes reflective and learns to transfer his value situation and experience, connected with the existence of "alter-egos" into his own "self." His relation to the "alter-ego" becomes at the same time a relation within the "self." The group, Interest-association, Society or Commonalty, represents the more or less complete fusion of the "selves," and this establishes itself in each self, where, indeed, society is felt and lived, where society is always present. Consciousness is a flowing stream in which the distinction of the categories of "self," "alter-ego" and "group" is irrelevant; in the stream blend and intermingle undifferentiatedly the values and experiences of self and "alter-egos." Sometime eddies form themselves in this flowing stream of experiences and then we can isolate from it individual contributory or creative elements. The "self" expands its range and variety of values and experiences according to its own adaptive dispositions, capacities and resources, always aided or limited by the "alter-egos" and the group. Each fulfilment or frustration leads the "self" towards reflection. The "self" in its deeper levels or strata clarifies, criticises and renovates values, and these are then added to the total configuration of values. Values then, being sought by the "self," "alter-egos" and the group, simultaneously shape not only the personality

traits, abilities and virtues of the individual but also determine the creation and maintenance of group and institutional arrangements compatible with them.

The Individual-in-Society and Society-in-the Individual

After the above analysis one can easily understand why the older nineteenth century dualism between individual and collective consciousness is now being superseded by a unified individual-social point of reference that more or less dissolves the extreme either-or option. Mead, Dewey, Cooley, Max Scheler, Litt and Mauss have all contributed towards a better understanding of mind and consciousness as a process of participation of "self" and "alter-egos" in the social (especially through language and various symbolic patterns and devices and *vice versa*). According to Dewey, "both words, individual and social, are hopelessly ambiguous, an ambiguity which will never cease as long as we think in terms of an antithesis. Such an "antithesis" disregards the fact that an individual as a member of different groups may be divided within himself and in a true sense have conflicting selves."¹ Similarly Mead observes that the "self and the others are relative to the perspective of society just as society is relative to the perspective of the self." "Neither the individual nor the society can be explained in terms of the other, except as the other is explained by it."² This is also the explicit formulation of Max Scheler who observes that "in each individual sociality is always present and that not only is the human individual a part of society but that society is also an integral part of the individual."³ Gustav E. Mueller observes in the same strain, "man's relation to an external other, becomes at the same time a relation with-

¹ *The Public and its Problems*, pp. 186-191.

² *Mind, Self and Society*, p. 7; *The Philosophy of the Act*, pp. 152-153.

³ Scheler's Theory of Inter-subjectivity, in *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*, 1941-42, p. 329.

in himself. Man splits himself into contending parts and also establishes himself as the judge of his own parts. He thus becomes a society in himself, the only place where society is lived, where society is existential. Social tendencies being also my tendencies are loved and feared as my own possibilities and temptations. Success or defeat with reference to these are also my own success and defeat and *vice versa*.”¹

The recent trends of psychology are characterised by the endeavours to see the total consciousness and a concrete whole without the antithesis of the dual categories of individual and collective mentality stressed by the extreme individualism and intellectualism of the more analytical and abstractive types of psychology. The sociologist Marcel Mauss stresses that “the psychology of the total man and the psychology of the society taken in its totality” are phases of the same psychology. Freud points out that while “it is true that Individual Psychology is concerned with the individual man and explores the paths by which he seeks to find satisfaction for his instincts; only rarely and under certain exceptional conditions is Individual Psychology in a position to disregard the relations of this individual to others. In the individual’s mental life some one else is invariably involved, as a model, as an object, as a helper, as an opponent, and so from the very first Individual Psychology is at the same time Social Psychology as well—in this extended but entirely justifiable sense of the words.”² In anthropology and sociology as well as in character studies the social foundations of personality receive fresh and abundant emphasis. Modern social-psychological research no longer speaks of the individual *versus* his socio-cultural milieu, but rather the individual in and as part of his

¹ What is Man?, *The Philosophical Review*, 1944, p. 453.

² *Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego*, pp. 1, 2.

socio-cultural milieu. This is largely the result of the Gestalt psychological movement which stresses that the value of any perception, feeling or behaviour depends upon its place in the whole context or situation. Gestalt psychology has during the last few years given new direction to the study of man's rôles, status and morals that make up his social configuration. The study of personality has also been given a new tilt, its nature and development being now considered as in considerable degree defined by his group participation. Gardner Murphy observes: "Personalities are not independent building stones of society; they are interdependent. Their interaction makes the social world and the social world acting on the young makes new personalities."¹ In sociology, education and ethics there has been a marked change in perspective. It is now discerned that if the individual is to be moulded to the needs and demands of society, society must also be moulded to the needs and demands of human nature. Equal in importance to the problem of deviance or abnormal behaviour of the individual is that of revising culture and ethical and moral ideas and norms so as to avoid or mitigate individual deviations. L.K. Frank focusses attention to the notion of society as the patient. Conscience or super-ego is the culture that has been incorporated into the very personality of the individual. But, he observes, when the culture no longer provides for a super-ego that is integrated and wholesome, by its many conflicts and ambiguities it makes the super-ego socially ineffective, if not self-destructive, and "produces distorted personalities who are not only wrecking themselves but ruining all others."² The onus of responsibility accordingly shifts to constructing a new culture with less of frustrations and deprivations and with moral norms and sanc-

¹ Gardner Murphy: *Personality*, p. 767.

² L.K. Frank: *Society as the Patient*, pp. 7-8.

tions based on more enduring human values. The entire bio-social approach to the study of abnormal behaviour is also being altered. Brown stresses that the human personality develops and differentiates through the process of social frustration. Man's first physical goal (taking nourishment) is practically indistinguishable from his first social goal (love for his mother). The blocked-goal situation is the basic situation in which personality has its genesis, and the goals are both physical and social in nature. It is through the social frustrations of interpersonal relationships that the individual becomes civilised and a member of society at all. Brown's reorientation of the theory of psychoanalysis has been in consonance with contemporary movements in ethnology and sociology as represented in the works, for instance, of Malinowski, Mead, Kardiner, Lewin and Horney for finding out the relative weight of psycho-biological and cultural factors in determining personality change and development. As a result of the cross fertilisation of psychoanalytic, ethnological and sociological theory there has been a fundamental modification of conceptions in respect both of human nature and personality on the one hand and of social group and culture on the other; while the basic common problem that has emerged in the social sciences is just how human personality may be transformed with changes in group, institution and culture, and how far group, institution and culture may be changed without seriously complicating social adjustment because of socio-biological considerations.¹

Self, Morals and Group in the Dynamic Setting

Though psychology exhibits a decisive change in its frame of reference, yet neither ethics nor sociology, dominated by the metaphysical individualism and subjective idealism

¹ Brown: *The Psycho-dynamics of Abnormal Behaviour*, pp. 148, 150, 265-266.

of the past, has made appreciable progress towards the correction of the weakness of the bare individual point of reference. From Baldwin, Dewey, Boodin, Piaget, Murphy and others, and from the entire psychoanalytic movement of Freud, Jung, Adler and Horney has emerged the conception of the social genesis and orientation of personality. But this has hardly changed the methods and materials of individualistic ethics. Human values have been treated very largely from the metaphysical and philosophical viewpoints. The social-psychological approach to changing value patterns has not been elaborated; neither ethics nor sociology has come into grips with the dynamic conditions surrounding the development of moral values and cultural patterns. This might have bridged the gulf between the individual and social points of reference in ethics. Man's moral values, as we have explained, are always relative to what the *alter-egos* and the group desire, and his own standards as well as those of the group and society constantly blend and interpenetrate. His love, sympathy and compassion and other essentially altruistic sentiments are sufficient to establish the scheme of reference of society as "existential" in his own consciousness. From the observation of gestures, expressions and other signs of the *alter-egos* he learns by inference or by a process of 'empathy' their meanings, values and experiences in which, therefore, he lives and moves rather than in his own individual Robinson Crusoe sphere. Each sphere is, therefore, interwoven in a nexus of meanings and values of the *alter-egos* and the group.

There are constant tensions and conflicts between the self, *alter-ego* and group in their different levels of depth. The fundamental group categories in human culture—Interest-group, Society and Commonalty—represent different degrees of depth of the self, content of values and intensity of social cohesion. This is, however, a simple, vertical picture of the individual-social consciousness and values.

Often there is opposition between different layers of the self within the individual consciousness and between the superficial immediate selves and the more profound rational or mediated unity of group consciousness. Thus conflicts of norms and standards in individual experience are the rule rather than the exception as group and institutional patterns and values, according to which men conduct themselves, are also at war with one another and with individual wishes and values in their various depth-levels.

Human personality exhibits different levels of existence and hence the moral standards would vary in so far as man drifts purposelessly in his irrational, immediate existence, or organises his life by inwardness and reflection and rises above the claims of shifting environmental and social situations. Conscience, though retaining its inner core of consistency and dissatisfaction with immediacy and superficiality, cannot escape from the general social or moral standards of the group that may infect the individual with its passions and assure him in his irrationality.

The sociological genesis, integration and expression of the human personality clarifies in ethical theory what is a matter of surprise in actual life—the juxtaposition of noble and ignoble dispositions and behaviour that may alternate or interpolate. Nor is man's conscience a perfectly safe mentor and guide, as the nineteenth century ethics imagines. It is sometimes haphazard and capricious, always dogmatic and unbending. Often it habitually and smoothly conforms to the social and moral norms of the group.

Depth-levels of Self and of Morality

Social psychology, Freudian depth-psychology and psychiatry now show that conscience is not a special God-given human faculty that automatically and immediately gives its decision, irrespective of circumstances and consequences. Conscience, super-ego, or the moral call of

the individual is embedded in both inner psychic life and social consciousness and experience. The stern daughter, "the still, small voice of God," is installed into the innermost recess of the personality structure by the imperative demands of group living. Pope said, "Our consciences are like our watches. None go just alike, yet each believes his own." The watch is tuned to the norm of the group. Both man's social nature and everyday social routine make it essential that his watch may not fail him in his orientations. The contents of the super-ego are partly taken from the social-cultural milieu, and hence considerably influenced by the family and later on by the actual social, economic and political circumstances. As far as they are taken from inside, "they are precipitates of former super-ego formations and therefore represent residues of earlier periods and former cultures."¹ The maturation of super-ego or conscience, accompanied with a sense of guilt, shame and perfection, is a psycho-social dynamism that includes in its sphere of operations not only the sub-conscious realm where conscience or super-ego is tyrannical and dogmatic causing an internal tension, but also another realm where the immediate, superficial ego, with little of conscious intervention, smoothly and automatically obeys the norms and standards of society, and yet another realm where the deeper, moral-principled and creative ego identifies his own 'ought' with the 'ought' of society and culture and criticises, clarifies, reevaluates and remakes it.

As the result of social conditioning and of repression continuing, consolidating and magnifying since childhood, man develops a sense of absoluteness of the moral standard inherent in the multi-layered structure of his consciousness. Social psychology and psychiatry with their central concept of levels or strata of man's consciousness as levels or strata

¹ J. Lampl De Groot: On the Development of the Ego and Super-ego, *International Journal of Psycho-analysis*, Vol. XXVIII, 1947.

of morality give the major clue to both ethical processes in his inner life and the operation of his inescapable moral and situational demands with their different degrees of imperativeness. These have laid bare the inadequacy of European ethics of the nineteenth and the twentieth centuries that has found the meaning of moral life solely either in the innate intuitions of the individual or in social norms and standards, looking upon society as the only source of moral values, and ignoring the variability in depth and intensity of the moral consciousness of the individual. The moral experience of the deeper, deliberative self is free from social pressure and grounds itself in spiritual life, participating in its detachment, purity and impersonality, whence he brings all his 'ought' and judges the moral valuations and distinctions of both society and himself.

It is here that the human conscience is creative, integral, infallible, far different from the oppressive, fitful and superficial conscience of the neurotic, suffering from an abnormal load of guilt and self-torture due to certain critical childhood experience. Ethics has to include in its range the entire field of personality adjustment from the pronouncement of the forbidding, tyrannical super-ego and the conforming morality of an easy, complacent ego to the rebellious, inconsistent morality dictated by the repression and magnified aggressive reaction of a neurotic or delinquent and the critical, creative morality proceeding from the insight and faith of a poet, prophet or mystic. Not before ethics recognises the significance of different levels of individual-social consciousness and values and degrees of moral imperativeness can it provide an adequate theory of conduct for either the individual or the society. This calls for a recasting of the methods and frame of reference in a dynamic individual-social system of ethics grounded on the psychological recognition that man finds the integral balance and functioning of his total capacities only in and through his common life with fellowmen.

CHAPTER VII

THE SOCIOLOGICAL FOUNDATIONS OF FUNCTIONAL ETHICS

Group Participation as the Medium of Moral Experience

Traditional ethics, deriving certain absolute universal principles of right and wrong from metaphysics, hardly distinguishes between degrees of imperativeness of man's moral demands in society. Moral calls sometimes have a humdrum, routine character, sometimes arouse the emotions and stir the will and imagination profoundly. It is the ideal, creative and evaluative elements of man's deeper, self-conscious and reflective self and of community consciousness in a struggle or crisis that constitute his most spontaneous and intensive moral demands. No less than the rare individual, challenging the society by his purer and nobler conscience and finer moral discrimination, society passing through an intellectual, religious and social ferment sometimes throws up a more sensitive conscience, a higher collective moral call that sway individuals and elicit their devotions and sacrifices for a 'cause'. From both ends, therefore, man's moral strivings and aspirations are stimulated—the conscience of individuals and the social conscience. Man's moral advance consists in leaving to his conscience and habit the moral routine. Moral progress implies that conscience becomes less oppressive, arbitrary and inconsistent, and that habit assimilates the prevalent rules and standards of society; while the deeper creative self, stirred to moral reflection and criticism by the imperfections of the social world, fashions new norms and ideals and obtains their approval through the co-operation and judgment of

many minds. Such ideal creativeness and moral initiative are indeed the *sine qua non* of a complete personality and enhanced morale.

The medium of this elevated moral experience is the integrated group that embodies universal and enduring rather than limited and unstable values and interests. Man is the creator and creature of many groups, each with its distinctive and inherent moral claims and potentialities. It is the basic group bonds and relations that are foci of the realisation of specific, instrumental and relative, and of universal, intrinsic and absolute values and the production of specific or limited and universal or moral demands. Moral principles and imperatives are emergents of group situations. Not merely do these emerge in the process of group participation but these are defined, clarified and appreciated only through this process. Virtues, moral norms and ideals are intelligible only through the process of social participation and communion that embodies distinct stages or phases—a dialectic that traces the entire moral development of humanity. Communion is based on the fact that there are common human interests, meanings and values. But communion is a process of development; each stage of this development, each level of communion, mutuality, participation and expansion throws off its inherent moral principles and norms that are created and realised in the course of fulfilment of communion. Moral norms are not eternal essences nor metaphysical categories but derive their worth and meaning from the nature and consummation of the group process itself. It is in the final stage of human communion (Commonalty in the abstract, non-local sense) as constituted by Love, where the universality of common human values and purposes is fully revealed and man's highest moral principles experienced and established. In the dialectic of human grouping man meets the challenge of the supreme moral norms and ideals as he reaches the acme of communion.

Successive Moral Norms as Imperatives of Group Consummation

We have divided human groups according to certain ideal qualitative types (in Max Weber's sense) on the basis of the degree of social participation, and hence of inclusion, loyalty or consciousness of group unity, each type of group showing a norm inherent in its factual relations and moral experiences. Ethics requires the designation and characterisation of some basic group patterns of moral description, not restricted to a particular culture or age, but which can provide the schema for the analysis of moral principles and imperatives of all societies, and for the elucidation of the general course of moral development of humanity. These fundamental structural categories would, to be sure, enable the moral philosopher to bring the phenomena of morals into a systematic order and organisation.¹ Crowd, Interest-group, Society or Community and Abstract Commonalty are the four qualitatively different, abstracted ideal types of human associations. There is a continuity and development in the content of moral situations and experiences in the group series or phases that include all possible kinds of social relations.

Since the adaptation and evolution of man and society have covered millions of years, certain intertwined group and moral structures have been fabricated with more or less success into the very nature of human life, mind and society themselves. Thus the moral laws and imperatives

¹ Cassirer in his 'Essay on Man' stresses the need of designation of a general structural scheme like the above by which to classify, order and organise various activities and forms of culture, and refers with approval to Wolfflin's famous use of the categories of the "classic" and "baroque" in the history of art. The categories were not used as names for definite historical phases, but indicate general structural patterns that aid towards the characterisation of the art of different epochs and of individual artists. (See a discussion of the problem, pp. 69-70, 119-121).

are *functional* in their very essence, emergent and selective in the long, further-adaptive evolution of forms and qualities of human association—Crowd or Mass, Interest-group, Society and Abstract Commonalty. Human life, mind and society equally obey the situational, constitutional imperatives of integration, interpenetration and solidarity that are at once biological, psychological and moral laws. These govern the development towards higher moral values, deeper and richer personalities and more intimate social ties and bonds.

Such *functional* approach in ethics is couched in terms of the moral needs, potentialities, limitations or norms of the human persons and their milieu—Crowd, Interest-group, Society and Commonalty, the ideal qualitative group types, “configurations” or phases in social-cultural evolution. Each “configuration,” organic integration or type of grouping contains its inherent appropriate attitude, moral value or imperative due to the individual’s own immediate interests and limitations and the group’s distinctive structures, functions and possibilities. Accordingly the functional ethical theory will rid itself of the moralists’ and philosophers’ beliefs, presuppositions and *a priori* principles in respect of ethical conduct. Yet there is judgment involved with reference to the functional appropriateness of the group’s situational imperative that has to be related to the total on-going processes and patterns of integration of personality and society in cultural development.

The Frame and Centres of Reference in Functional Ethics

The frame of reference in morals is

| | | |
|---------------------------|---|-------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Personality—Moral Values— | { | Crowd Interest-group Society or Community Abstract Commonalty. |
|---------------------------|---|-------------------------------------------------------------------------|

The above represents the unity of a fundamental pattern or structure in which the self, morals and group living are integrally linked together in a moving whole with their limitations and possibilities as well as needs and actualities. Such a scheme enables the moral philosopher to locate and identify the moral values, and indicate what these are by referring them to the unity of a fundamental structure that encompasses both men and their environments, and that in its universal dynamic context is implied in every fact and relation of human life in all societies. Neither man with his "dispositions" and "capacities," nor moral values with their "ideals" and "norms," nor the functional group environment with its range of "potentialities" can be treated separately; these comprise a system in their togetherness. Moral principles are there — a system of permanences and necessities that have to be searched for in the unity of the definite group pattern, whose inherent relations have to be carefully respected in the particular context of social development. Moral norms are what they are within this group structure in which the individual chooses, evaluates and aspires, and which governs his actual as well as potential moral values and experience, with consequential transformation of the group milieu from Interest-group to Society or Community and to Abstract Commonalty.

Ethics may usefully borrow from other fields of knowledge such terms as "frame of reference," "functional field," "mental climate" or "space" and "configurational point" or "centre of reference" for the purpose of analysis of the self-morals-group scheme and the articulation of perfect accommodation in terms of the reciprocal interactions of these three basic constituents of man's moral world. It is thus that ethics can be liberated from the pressure of abstract *a priori* principles of individual moral perfection on the one hand and idealistic standards of social morality on the other. A.M. MacIver has recently well observed that "moral philo-

sophy must become more empirical or perish.”¹ Neither an ego-oriented individual ethics nor a society-oriented sociology of morality can do justice to the interpretation of the moral life or to the crisis in contemporary culture.

Of the configurational centres of reference in functional moral analysis, the Crowd, of course, is a fleeting, impulsive type of grouping; it is a disturbance of the normal routine of social living. It exhibits no characteristic pattern or functions and has no morality nor conscience, nor can there be any social norm for its continuance. Crowd behaviour is on the contrary a serious menace to ordered social and moral development, and is dealt with by law, education and other means of social control. But from the Interest-group, Society and Commonalty, characterised by a progressive improvement of intimacy, friendship or solidarity, emerge three fundamental categories of moral ideals and norms—Reciprocity, Justice and Love. The study of morality in any social culture can be best undertaken in the background of these three basic universal categories of human connections, whence proceed its concrete and inherent moral standards, attitudes and emotions as well as patterns of rights and duties and virtues.

Each group situation is characterised by moral autonomy, presenting to each member-individual a definite pattern of ethos for concrete realisation. It is this striving for completeness in the group situation which is the essence of moral aspiration; the complete man finding his realisation in the complete or ideal situation that is unique in its moral claims and potentialities for him. As the levels of self and association belong to different depths, the intensity, creativeness and possibility of moral experience are also divergent. On the other hand, the sociological classification of human connections or groups is such that the group has

¹ Towards a New Moral Philosophy, *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society*, 1945-46, Vol. XLVI, p. 206.

stages, its consummation being relative to the earlier of them; and that as one group develops or approximates to the other there is a qualitative improvement of its ethical status, moral responsibility and social conscience. From Crowd and Interest-group to Commonalty there is the progression towards the total man, spontaneously responding to the supreme moral ideals in the completed group situation. In this sense social progress implying the integration of human bonds, or the approach towards man's total developed nature which certain groups elicit, reflects the ethical reality. Civilisation plans its group orientation and interfunctioning in such manner as to call forth the highest moral potentiality, ideal creativeness and uniqueness of the individual.

The sociological approach makes ethics concrete and functional by founding it on the reality of the fundamental human bonds and group patterns with their inherent imperatives. These latter comprise the major moral values prized by humanity through the ages: reciprocity, freedom and fair play; justice and equity; love, sympathy and solidarity. Such approach also closes the gap between individual and social morality by relating the ethical process to the dual principles of enhancement of social order and harmony, and the enrichment of the individual personality. Ethics can now more readily deal with the pressing value conflicts of the age instead of being concerned with conflicts of moral principles and precepts derived from the divergent preferences of moral philosophers. For its norms become less formal, uncertain and controversial, and its prescription of attitudes and sentiments consonant with the trend of man's group milieu towards perfection. Only reference to the group situation within which the categories of the right and the standard emerge and function can furnish the basis for the estimation of their value and import.¹

¹ See Dewey's discussion of the logical conditions of a 'scientific' treatment of morality in his *Problems of Men*, pp. 233-35.

Differentiation, Integration and Schematisation of Values

As ethics is regarded as a branch of knowledge, subsumed under the general theory of values, and devotes its attention to the total values of the group pattern in the setting of which moral values are conceived and sought rather than in the abstract, the objective conditions necessary for their fulfilment and enhancement come more fully into the picture. Moral values have to be distinguished from biological, economic, social and religious values. The distinction between moral and economic values rests on the constant limitation set by the physical environment and the social group on the fulfilment of certain needs and satisfactions that the individual shares with his fellowmen. According to Croce, there are two practical values, utility and moral goodness and two theoretical values, beauty and truth. Utility is the basis of all practical values i.e., all human activities possess the value of utility. The useful action can either remain merely individual or progress to the action that is universal-individual, moral-useful. Economic activity is useful, though it may not be moral. "To be good is to possess a higher value in addition to the value of utility." This higher value of moral action is attributed by Croce to its "universal" end, and the identification of individual interest with the supreme interest. In Croce there is no contrast between virtue and happiness that according to him is derived from the rigoristic or ascetic ideal of Christianity. Morality has its reality and concreteness in pleasure (economicity)¹. In the distinction between moral and political values we turn our attention to those universal needs and interests connected with authority and obedience, constraint and freedom in the community for its peace, security and continuity that are pre-conditions for the fulfilment of most values in life. Moral values are distinct from social values in so far as man's behaviour is

¹ Croce: *Philosophy of the Practical*, pp. 359-60.

linked with certain ultimate ideals and norms with accompanying responsive emotions or attitudes. The same moral values cease to be so and become religious or mystical when these ultimate norms are grounded in the absolute and transcendental rather than in the concrete and the social. Religious values, again, easily slip into theological values where the gap between fact and value, reality and ideal is so large that it can be bridged only by magical and supernatural rather than by human and rational means and agencies. Often therefore under intolerable political and economic misfortunes people appeal to theological sanctions for the maintenance and improvement of morale. Theology makes man, the value-seeking creature of this world, a seeker after other-worldly values of the next.

Such differences are of course matters of degree; for in the concrete routine of social life, the economic, social, moral and religious values commingle, integrate, overlap, interpolate or even become identical. Croce remarks: "There is no moral life unless economic and political life is first established; as the ancients used to say, first the "living" and then "good living." But on the other hand, there can be no moral life that is not both economic and political life, just as there can be no soul without a body."¹ In the actual social situation the integration of values is the rule rather than the exception. The distinction between instrumental and intrinsic values is important in this context. Instrumental values arise out of the basic biological and economic needs and interests. Hardly is there any conflict or disagreement in respect of such instrumental values as food, sex, home-making, wealth and so on, which all men seek, and which form the basis of other socially generalised and idealised instrumental values, such as economic adequacy and security, social recognition, power and prestige. Man's uncertainty, success or failure of

¹ *Politics and Morals*, p. 24.

achievement of instrumental values in a common struggle against the limited resources and possibilities of the environment make value fulfilment always a lure, and sometimes a snare and a delusion. Society, however, intervenes through its manners, conventions, laws, rights and duties in order to bring about a general sharing of the major, common instrumental values among all individuals and social classes.

In cultural evolution conflict and disagreement usually arise in respect of the demands of final or intrinsic values, such as justice, goodness and solidarity in actual social relations and situations. All societies establish, however, some sort of a working scale of values, economic, social and spiritual, and condition and educate people in such manner that they pursue instrumental values largely through appropriate manners, habits, folkways and conventions. The latter become more or less compulsive and hardly involve any moral reflection or choice. Such social mechanisms bring about smoothness and effectiveness of adaptation in the daily routine of life with the maximum of economy of energy. In this way instrumental values obtain the status of intrinsic values; these become self-validated. Even more. When men eat, take exercises, raise families and work for their living as matters of custom and habit, the consciousness of the basic and original instrumental values recedes in the background, and there often emerge new aesthetic meanings, interests and value experiences. Thus the preparation and elaboration of meals, exercises, home-making, courtship and love become etiquette, ritual and manners, pursued with meticulous devotion. Community participation in ritualised meal and exercise and the rearing and education of families also introduces moral and religious meanings and values into the situations. In this manner instrumental values are transformed into secondary and tertiary values, the integration and synthesis being largely unplanned and habitual. Social culture by the use of symbols and myths introduces into

the everyday routine of living and patterns of human relations and behaviour many aesthetic, moral or religious meanings, values and ideals interlocked together. By the cultivation and fostering of habits and manners, etiquette and ceremonials, man often bridges the gulf between instrumental and intrinsic values, between realities and ideals, and enlarges and enhances his appreciable world without even knowing it. Finally, the individual criticises, clarifies, disapproves and synthetises values i.e., grades and schematises the values that are given in the total social situation, and at the same time discovers new values, enriching his own mind and deepening and widening his social participation. Enhanced values and morale and widened and deepened social integration go together.

Relations between Moral and Other Values of Life

The major moral values can be sought and attained only on the basis of satisfaction of the fundamental instrumental, biological and economic values. The frustration of sex and love warps the development of character, and has far-reaching consequences on the pursuit of goals and values other than merely familial. It reacts upon the entire range of man's relations with fellowmen. Morals cannot, again, thrive in a social climate of poverty and destitution. With the primary economic values unfulfilled or unchanged at the mere subsistence level no new morality can arise. Such is the situation in large parts of East Asia where the indoctrination of new social values and habits by the intelligentsia hardly changes the traditional value system, but leaves the masses of people cold, if it does not lead to their withdrawal or even resistance. On the other hand, where new technical conditions, tools and luxuries create and foster new values in the Asian cities and industrial towns, adult morals are in some measure transformed or renovated. In the history of social development whenever man finds release from the ancient familial,

occupational and political moorings, and the established economic ways are refashioned, rather than obliterated or substituted, as the result of industrial change, trade, migration or conquest, new moral values emerge and redefine the moral course of life. Such reorientation of the moral structure and value system of the community often implies a bitter struggle of moral standards and values.

The solution of moral and social conflicts is ultimately found in a proper ranking or ordering of values, which is a religious value itself. Religious values are the most supreme and integrated among the ideal values. On the one hand, these rest and thrive largely on moral notions and experiences. As Hoffding observes, "Values must be discerned and produced in the world of experience before they can be conceived or assumed to exist in a higher world." On the other hand, religion is the supreme mentor, arbiter and guide of all ideal values. It is religion which sustains, grades and schematises ideal values through all the vicissitudes of life, and is thus the real solvent of grave social and moral crises. Religion abolishes the cleavage between the empirical and the absolute, the concrete and the transcendental, and invests the familial moral values like devotion, tenderness, fidelity, chastity, compassion and service with an infinite trans-social quality, purpose and impulsion. Thus religion in many cultures, like those of India and China, builds up a universalist moral code through its intellectual and moral apprehension of the relation of the human person to the infinite. Such an ethical system can easily set at rest the struggle between personal and group loyalties that beset other moral systems, apart from giving a new direction to the major values of life. Yet one of the major value conflicts of the present mechanical-industrial age is concerned with the idea of man's social purpose and consummation in this world, and of his supernatural destiny in another world. Sometimes the latter notion is distracted man's

attempt to evade moral issues and belie responsibility by transferring it to the shoulders of unknowable and unattached gods of a far-off heaven or the rarefied metaphysical absolutes of nihilism.

Moral values and their influence and fruition, accordingly, have to be treated in the comprehensive background of the structure and function of all values of life, biological, economic, social and spiritual. This is not possible without the development of a special division of sociology viz., social axiology. This is another name of ethics embracing the study of the relations of moral values to all kinds of values, and of the structure and dynamisms of social valuation and control in general.

Social Intelligence and Marxist Morality

Moral problems in a highly dynamic and complex society demand for their solution as much moral enthusiasm as social intelligence and participation, grounded on an adequate scientific analysis of the social situation that sociology alone can provide. The contrasted values of individualism or freedom of personality development and expression *versus* collectivism or the order, harmony and solidarity of society cannot in themselves enable the contemporary world to choose between the capitalistic and the socialistic economy. Economics and sociology should help, and are indeed helping it, towards a precise estimate of the consequences of the contrasted economic systems on the productivity and incentives of labour, on the amount of leisure and its use, and on technological inventions and progress as well as those of the maintenance or curtailment of certain kinds of freedom on the general tenor of personal and social life and culture. Without a full examination of various social and economic facts and calculation of immediate and distant consequences of the alternative policies, undistorted of course by any bias or narrowness in the moral conscious-

ness, the demand for distributive justice, though insistent, cannot become compelling. In the totalitarian state the moral claims to work for "economic liberty" and security, in order to be brought to fruition, lead to the reduction or extinction of many other moral claims, such as those of freedom of association, movement, collective bargaining and expression of opinion. The moral scaling in respect of the emphasis or abridgment of certain rights, underlying contemporary society's adaptation of means to certain selected ends and goals and assistance to each citizen in appropriating them, can be facilitated by an objective study of classes and professions, groups and institutions. The latter often safeguard the individual against the invasion by the state of the personal life, and at the same time ensure effective organisation of many of the abstract or formal rights of the individuals.

It would be futile for ethics to offer a formula for the proper scaling of values and rights without such inductive investigations in sociology providing some qualitative measure of immediate and deferred human satisfactions and their relative importance for the totality of life or experience. This is the chief reason why Karl Marx's supercession of "utopian" by "scientific" ethics has not yet borne fruit. Marx hardly gave any consideration to the moral issues of the economic transformation. According to him socialism was good and just since it was inevitable in the dialectic movement of history. Both Marx and Engels dismissed all ideas of justice and human rights and Christian charity, goodwill and neighbourliness as useful class superstition and repudiated all ethical principles as "class morality." Engels wrote: "Certainly that morality which contains the greatest number of elements that are going to last is the one which, within the present time, represents the overthrow of the present time; it is the one which represents the future; it is the proletarian morality. According to this conception,

the ultimate causes of all social changes and political revolutions are not increasing insight into justice; they are to be sought not in the philosophy but in the economics of the epoch concerned. The growing realisation that existing social institutions are irrational and unjust is only a symptom." Lenin similarly said: "We repudiate all morality derived from non-human and non-class concepts. We say that it is a deception, a fraud, a befogging of the minds of the workers and peasants in the interests of landlords and capitalists. Our morality is derived from the interests of the class struggle of the proletariat." The recognition that goodness and justice derive their meaning and impulsion from the existing class structure or demand for a new one, and that moral claims are rooted in the demand that the working class as a whole will control and administer the productive forces better in the interests of the community as a whole is the striking contribution of Marxist ethics to modern thought.¹ Marxist ethics is sound in its emphasis that in the classless, integrated society the individual's wishes and duties, his impulses and social obligations coincide, and that the advent of such a society ushers in the brotherhood of the human race. In the classless community ethics becomes natural and spontaneous, and ceases to be a philosophical speculation.

But Marxist ethics has its grave limitations, springing largely from the social circumstances of its derivation and the trappings of the Hegelian dialectic. Apart from the fact that human perfection is comprehended only in mere economic terms, and that no attempt is made to grade values and ideals in the blind, lop-sided analysis of economic values, processes and institutions, Marxist "scientific" ethics is a by-product of the nineteenth century materialism

¹ Marx: *A Criticism of the Hegelian Philosophy of Right*, pp. 32 ff.

and empirical philosophy with its democratic Benthamite formulation of identity between natural and moral goods. The moral valuation here has emerged from the objective and technological conditions of economic life, and the peculiar economic stratification of the early phases of capitalistic industrialism and democratic movement in Western Europe. Along with this historical limitation, Marxist thought is also governed by the nineteenth century belief in progress as a universal law. Bertrand Russell aptly observes: "It is only because of the belief in the inevitability of progress that Marx thought it possible to dispense with ethical considerations. If Socialism was coming, it must be an improvement."¹ For the advent of Socialism no education nor moral persuasion is required. The lever of social development is class struggle.

Marxism was committed from the very beginning in practice to 'power politics' and to the unethical doctrine of a 'master class.' It no doubt laid the foundations of empirical ethics by grounding it on group needs and interests, the founders of Socialism having insisted that the morality of the class could be thrown out and focussed only by the members belonging to it. But sociological realism cannot be blind to the existence and maintenance of other social groupings, besides the economic classes, each type of social grouping constituting, as we have seen, in the process of integration its distinctive moral principles and categories. The driving force in Marxist ethics is, however, the tactics of struggle and power of the master class; as the overshadowing social reality is the economic cleavage of classes. Thus in the actual course of economic and political development, long before the classless society emerges on the scene, society becomes the victim of irreconcilable ideologies, crowd aggressions, civil wars and dictatorships. The later Marxian develop-

¹ See *History of Western Philosophy*, pp. 816-818.

ment has hardly been neutral, morally speaking. It has actually been associated with organised greed, envy, unscrupulousness and aggressiveness of political parties and institutions. On the other hand, the socialistic ideal of guaranteeing economic freedom and security for all as a precondition of the good life and the good society has been accepted by modern humanism. Socialism as a moral protest and revulsion against the inequity of capitalism and the make-belief and hypocrisy of the classes that thrive on it has indeed now become a widely accepted faith. But Marxism in so far as it grounds its belief in the classless society not on moral grounds but on the law of social development, on historical necessity, is an amoral doctrine that is peculiarly susceptible to manipulation in the hands of a selfish and aggressive proletariat majority. The ways of revolution and political action are devious. The political set-up in modern collectivism is such that the desire for status, power and prestige is concentrated in the bureaucracy or dictatorship of the proletariat, unhindered by any independent groups and associations. Power corrupts individuals as well as groups and institutions, and nullifies freedom and equality in rights—values cherished in liberal democratic society with its large variety of informal but vital organised groups and association. Bertrand Russell observes: "In a totalitarian state such events as the rise of Buddhism or Christianity are scarcely possible, and not even by the greatest heroism can a moral reformer acquire any influence whatever. This is a new fact in human history, brought about by the much increased control over individuals which the modern technique of government has made possible. It is a very grave fact, and one which shows how fatal a totalitarian regime must be to every kind of moral progress." Political pluralism, folk regionalism and rural communalism make values safer for the world than collectivism. For free, active and criss-crossing regional and

functional groups keep alive old values as well as moral alertness.

Morals and Intelligence in a Revolutionary Society

The sociological analysis necessary to indicate which moral values and standards gain or should gain ascendancy in a period of social revolt and crisis must include studies of human goals and satisfactions under alternative social programmes, and of the mass psychology of the people and of the social groupings as determined by the current systems of education, propaganda and public opinion, and also the beliefs and attitudes of the governing class and the elite. Often the ideology of the directive class and the planners reflects an outworn ethical code, rooted in the class stratification and economic and technic conditions of the past; or it records the confusion and conflict of moral values and norms characteristic of the rest of the community. Thus the legal and religious norms often lag behind moral norms. Moral values are more forward-looking and quick-moving than law, and modify and reshape the latter. There are, however, social situations in which good law initiated by the intelligentsia breaks down obsolete customs, institutions and practices, embodies a more sensitive social conscience and initiates moral transformation, even outstripping the moral values that gave birth to it. Social distance and stratification and difference of ideology between different sections of the community increase the distance between law and morals, which is a symptom of social instability.

In a dynamic or revolutionary social situation various grades of key values are produced that bitterly struggle for social recognition and dominance, and different economic, political and legal norms operate together in open clash. Apart from the clarification of what is the distinctive normal element in social experience, the interrelation bet-

ween the various classes of norms in a highly complex dynamic society has to be precisely defined in order that the moral ideals and norms may be implemented in concrete situations. The relation between legal and moral norms is critical in the context of a revolutionary society. This cannot be discerned without full knowledge of past and present trends of legal and social development, the economic interests and goals of the classes and the masses, and the techniques and instruments of political control, education and propaganda. Inductive researches in group dynamics can alone provide the background for collective judgment and planning with a view to mould legal and institutional norms in the light of emerging moral values and ideals. Kurt Lewin's designs for social change experiment and for retraining attitudes indicate the enormous possibilities of practical socio-psychological research.¹

In the broad there is urgent need of departure from the traditional individualistic approach to ethics and emphasis of certain personal categories of morality based on preferences of philosophers and moralists. A comprehensive objective analysis of the fluctuating group situations in which each is impinged upon and influenced by divergent moral norms, idealizing divergent economic and social interests and purposes, is essential. Each alternative group situation has its own moral standards and potentialities. Each works on its definite means-ends or instrumental-intrinsic-values chain. The individual finds it very difficult to choose and plan his life, since he is not confronted with ready-made alternatives in which ends and values arrange themselves in a hierarchy to be picked out by automatic judgment. More often he is swayed by the fluctuating passions of the Crowd or Mass or the limited, sectional interests and sentiments of the Interest-

¹ See his *Resolving Social Conflicts*, Chapter XIII.

group. The shift in valuation of established Commonalty groups, such as the family and the church, engenders profound moral insecurity and anxiety, and brings into play primitive aggressive tendencies that have been so far kept in check by symbolisations and sublimations. It is the task of functional ethics grounded in sociology to discover and analyse the alternative means-and-ends in their full, rational integration and completeness in the new social setting.

Moral Advance in an Ordered, Integrated Community

The wisdom of society decrees that moral advance lies, in the first place, in the progressive abolition of certain disvalues such as ignorance, apathy, egotism, callousness, aggressiveness, insecurity and injustice. Secondly, moral improvement consists in the progression of consciousness of unity in the group as the locus of moral values and experience. The dominance of Masses or Crowds and Interest-groups in society is as much a menace to morality as coerciveness, unscrupulousness and inequity. Modern urban industrial culture is crowd-minded and class-ridden, and its values and norms, focalising class interest, aggression and economic power differ strikingly from those of stable social cultures. Edwards Nicol in his *Situational Psychology* has referred to permanent and transitory vital situations which have their profound effects upon man's attitudes, habits and dispositions. Economic situations are according to him transitory, because effectively lived as such with their harmful complexes arising from economic conditions, inferiority and monopoly. Haste leads man to pass through situations without being properly in them, thus weakening the articulations of life. His psychological experience is diminished as a result, giving rise to inadequate responses and errors which surprise may or may not correct. Crowds and economic situations are false situations in which men live in ignorance, even an

ignorance ignorant of itself, preventing improvement of life qualitatively. Man in Crowd and Class-society cannot seek enduring and elevated values. Yet crowd emotionalism and class aggressiveness will persist so long as the social and institutional set-up does not free the individual from fear and anxiety, insecurity and compulsion, nor dissolves chronic economic antagonisms by some orderly, rational, equitable methods. Class exclusiveness and coerciveness will be dissipated as soon as these become unnecessary for release of tension or integration of the exploited mass and supplanted by those idealizations and verbalizations of concrete community feeling and brotherhood, rooted in common economic interests, which more than social constraint and pressure are the springs of higher positive morality. Only the realities of group reciprocity, justice and solidarity can sustain the ideal of brotherhood or Commonalty. Otherwise this will remain as a pleasant, futile moral myth and fiction and actually contribute to set up new, equally irrational counter-myths and fictions.

Thirdly, the essence of morality is to judge the appropriateness of means and instrumental values for the attainment of specific ends and intrinsic values. The strategy of moral advance consists in the maintenance of the same level and intensity of moral consciousness in the choice of means and instrumental values as in that of ends and intrinsic values.

Ethics and Social Engineering

Herein lies the need of co-operation between ethics and the physical and social sciences. The latter draw up a full picture of the physical and objective factors and conditions of both moral living and persistence of disvalues of life, of the various alternative means and procedures available for groups with their full consequences, and also of the various proximate and remote conditions and conse-

quences of group and institutional behaviour seeking current as well as new goals, values and ideals. Psychology, education, sociology and political science help in the determination not only of social values, goals and ideals by rational scientific procedures, but also of techniques for manipulating men's motives, moral patterns and behaviour functionally appropriate to the former. These now discern with greater objectivity and insight than before the causes and controls of social disvalues—aggressiveness, unscrupulousness and apathy of individuals and masses of men that are lethal to the social culture. In Lewin's social "action research," apathy or enthusiasm, vacillation or tenacity, obscurity or clarity in respect of goals and values are essential features of group conflicts and inter-personal reunions that can be successfully resolved by the application of psychological considerations.¹ New psychological, political and social practices and techniques give an insight into typical, normal as well as diseased group habits, "consciences" and ways of action, and can improve methods and conditions of deliberation, persuasion and education of a democratically organised community. These can also lead to a wider sharing of the values of life—income, security, insight and status—that is the only effective safeguard against anti-social impulses and practices, and undertake accordingly the same rôle with reference to social well-being as physiological science has accomplished in respect of public health. These constitute what are today called 'social engineering' and 'political technology'—the planned social employment of the resources of nature and of knowledge of the physical and social sciences for the improvement of conditions of living of the common man. 'Social engineering' is also something more than establishing social and economic democracy. For it envisages the utilization

¹ *Resolving Social Conflicts.*

of psychological methods and observations along with other scientific procedures for bringing about a general participation of the common man in the making of influential community decisions (somewhat on the lines, for instance, of the recent T. V. A. Organisation) and also for combating indifference, aggressiveness or hate and their social expressions by reducing anxieties, inhibitions and frustrations as far as possible. A long perspective in moral and cultural progress, as cultural anthropology provides, also demands that planners should go slow with their goals and ideals. In social and moral transformation the anthropological data on points of cultural interdependence should be taken into account. Social change should not be too quick and sudden so that the altered individuals reacting with altered folkways and institutions can maintain the directions originally projected. On the other hand, change of institutions and ways of living need not wholly wait for a new generation of children who are the hope and the promise for the future. For adults can also be re-educated in some measure and learn new ways of living on the basis of the old. Within the present generation adult life can partially be transformed on the basis of precise knowledge of the texture of social life and habits and the moral climate of individuals of both the past and the present. Social plans of the future should not also be so minutely drawn as to coerce the present. Margaret Mead aptly remarks: "Only by devoting ourselves to a direction, not a fixed goal, to a process, not a static system, to the development of human being who will choose and think the choice all-important and be strong, healthy and wise in choosing can we escape the dilemma" between future ideals and present claims.

Ethics and Psycho-pathology

Contemporary psychology, psychoanalysis and psychiatry are throwing a flood of light on the individual's major

tensions, conflicts and frustrations that determine neuroses, psychoses, crimoses, sexual perversions or character disorders—deficient or maladjustive moral behaviour patterns. The disbalance or disintegration of personality in the child and the mature adult reflects as much inner maladjustment as group disorganisation or conflict and chaos in the external social-cultural milieu. The development of psycho-pathology and medical psychology and sociology will provide both methods and materials for the ethics of the future. At present our knowledge of the defects, inadequacies and abnormalities in character and moral behaviour is not altogether precise and definite. Brown observes in this connection, "We do not know in advance of the sickness, why one individual becomes perverse and another neurotic, or why one individual becomes psychotic and another develops character disorders. After a complete psychoanalysis, it is often possible to reconstruct the sequence of events leading to the definite sickness. Undoubtedly, constitutional factors play an important rôle here, and we may expect considerable advance in the problem of precise etiology through the collaboration of internists, psychologists, and psychoanalysts."¹

A sound functional ethics cannot evolve unless the psychological sciences give it a clear lead in respect of the issue how much in human conduct is sociologically and culturally determined, and how much genetically and psychologically. Some distinguished scientists like Freud and Haldane are convinced that man's excessive endowment of aggressive impulses makes any sort of progress towards altruism and the new social order impossible. On the other hand, other thinkers like Horney, Faris, Kardiner and Marxist psychologists assert that it is man's group and institutional life and standards that determine so much

¹ *Psycho-dynamics of Abnormal Behaviour*, p. 428; see also Meninger: *Psychiatry: Its Evolution and Present Status*.

in the individual psychology that his future moral progress depends very largely upon a revolutionary change of the environing social-cultural milieu. Ethics waits for the precise knowledge that psychoanalysis, characterology, psycho-pathology, both theoretical and experimental, may yield in respect of the major problem as regards the relative potency of man's internal needs and dispositions and the imposed cultural expectancies and preferred satisfactions of the social universe for his moral behaviour and development.

How much of the group and the cultural environment can be internalised in his behavioural equipment requires systematic analysis through laboratory techniques and investigations. What dose of frustration or bafflement leads to the diversification and integration of the personality at a higher level and expression of *id* impulses in the sublimations of art, science or religion, or on the contrary produces mental abnormality, character disorder and socially unacceptable behaviour in the case of the average or the superior individual cannot now be ascertained. Psychoanalytic studies have to be correlated with the investigations of body-builds, temperaments and psychological types before we can have any indications of the relative effects of frustration on the different types of personality. Without these modern psycho-pathology can be of little help in dealing with the present cultural and moral crisis or in guiding the reconstruction of the future society. The deprivation of biological values no doubt leads to the most universal and stubborn regressions, fixations, perversities and destructive behaviours. But there are no theoretical limits to the possibilities of substitution, transference or sublimation, and of manipulation of social goals to their full satisfaction through social conditioning and the educative process. All social cultures show to a greater or less degree processes and mechanism, of achieving a working balance between satisfaction and frustration through com-

partmentalisation, rationalisation, reaction-formation, severe repression and sublimation of some sort or other.

Whole societies and cultures sometimes show idiosyncratic psychic phobias, anxieties and compulsions, and the individual finds his adjustive way of living and morale in his social deviation or rebellion. The psychological sciences have to postulate with the help of comparative sociology a consistent cultural system or framework for the personality to work out its adaptations. J. W. Woodward attributes modern increase in neuroticism and personality maladjustment to rapid cultural transition in the present epoch (or in metropolitan or transitional ecological areas), due to which there are several cultural frames of reference, making internal adjustment both difficult and insecure, especially for the marginal man. "The marginal man's internal organisation," he observes, "has been worked out to fit a culture other than the one to which he must now adjust, even more so of the person of high social (or intellectual) mobility who was reared in one matrix and has to work adaptations to several others successively or even simultaneously and still not get thrown out of internal adjustment."¹ On the one hand, the cultural system and the status scheme may have reached a rigid and final form; the habits and behaviour patterns of the individuals might be equally inflexible, on the other.

The Scope of Adjustibility of both Human Nature and Culture

Two conditions are the *sine qua non* of the development of moral behaviour: the social culture should be variable enough to elicit the entire gamut of the individual's needs, impulses, values and capacities, constituting the optimal milieu for human mental and social performances;

¹ Article on Social Psychology in *Twentieth Century Sociology*, p. 260.

and the individual retains, in spite of schooling, conditioning and repression, maximum mental plasticity, freedom and rationality for utilisation of the mental and spiritual resources of the total personality—the fulfilment of the highest values in a rich psychic life. Every social culture or age moulds its pattern of social norms, values and institutions out of man's major urges and impulses under the most diverse cumulative influences of environment and tradition. But it formulates its own theory and norm of human nature and with the firmest conviction asserts that its norms and standards are categorically determined by certain fundamental qualities, fixed and unalterable.¹ Thus the individual is made to bend his own nature to these, giving rise sometimes to acute and chronic behavioural problems. For after all he is a striving, purposive, evaluative creature in the social milieu—which now fulfils and favours, now frustrates and thwarts his impulses and goals.

Obviously in the actual social-cultural situation in which the individual is placed the adjustment limits and possibilities of the individual personality and the social group are interwoven. The crux of moral development, accordingly, is the complete adjustment or rather continuing adjustability between the individual and his social group and culture, both being conceived not as given constants, but as dynamic, organically related configurations. The aim of the psychological sciences and ethics, including psycho-therapy, mental hygiene, education and religion, is to achieve the maximum intelligent adjustability for both personality and society in their dynamic, complex and interwoven relationships for value-seeking and value-realisation. All values, including moral values, are derived from human creatures. No values, no pattern of ideology and institutions should be postulated as a fixed, unalterable,

¹ Ratner: *Patterns of Culture in History, Philosophy of Science*, 1939.

chosen scheme for them to live by and adapt to without question. Genuine adjustability in the dynamics of human conduct indeed springs from the endeavour to look beyond a definite pattern of values and ideals to the nature of human nature itself. Ethics must draw not only on the psychological sciences, but also on anthropology, sociology, law, the arts and the humanities in order to understand fully the totality of man's nature and its expressions and repressions, and his moral standards and habits of adjustment to fellow-men varying, as these do, in different social cultures. Broadly speaking, the future of morality and of the human species lies in the creation, through the educative process, myth, religion and social pressure, of richer and more inclusive and integrated personalities.

Ethics and Collective Insight and Morale

Contemporary psychology and the science of education show new relations between value fulfilment and self and social status, between functional insight and constructive activity. Man's new knowledge of the formation and modification of mental and moral sets, of the manner in which groups and institutions can be remoulded so as to fit into new moral patterns and produce better balanced and individualised personalities, and of the techniques of education, evocation and control for producing a common ethos, will and faith can doubtlessly aid in giving hands and feet to morality.

Man is today group-bound and institution-ridden. The locus of new moral values is the system and the institution rather than the individual. Institutional morale is more important than individual morale. This is largely the result of machine technology and vast impersonal, heterogeneous, secondary groups, and the habits, interests and values associated with these, with exaggerated emphasis on the quantitative and mechanical in both personal

and social ideology and values. The vastness and inflexibility of modern organisation on which the very existence of large populations depends, the excessive centralisation and the pervasiveness of formal, quantitative standards stamp out personal initiatives and scales of values. The group and the institution make of man either a slave or a tyrant, and his life an alternation between boredom and aggressiveness. Man's supreme values are revealed to him as and when he stands alone in his profound detachment from self and from his groups and institutions—before his real, universal self or God. But he is overpowered today by a standardised crowd or mass mentality and the strident voice of the state, class or any other institution. He gradually convinces himself that what is worth while is what he can achieve with the help of some vast organisation, and minimises or feels too little for what he can do in isolation and loneliness in the realm of the spirit. Individualistic ethics overlooks these two broad social trends, viz. institutionalization and standardization of thought, activity and culture, and the rise and proliferation of secondary groups, whose morals and values now obliterate or suppress the norms of the essential primary groups of mankind, such as families, neighbourhoods, professions and religious communities. It still labours under the old assumptions of the autonomy and uniqueness of personal conduct of the individual on one side, and the moral supremacy of the various ancient primary modes of association that are now eclipsed entirely by the secondary interest-groups and the state on the other. Man's moral decisions in contemporary culture have no doubt largely shifted from himself to the impersonal systems, machines and institutions. The crux of the moral situation today is the interpenetration of the imperatives of depersonalised organizations and personalities.

Mankind in the small primary-group world, concerned

largely with personal relations, was aided in the choice of alternative goals and values by intimate face-to-face groups; the moral issues were, to be sure, precise, personal and urgent. But in the composite and extensive secondary-group world of today goals are generalised and remote, and institutions that largely govern behaviours are impersonal, amorphous and elusive. Moral issues are not only clouded and misrepresented by the trade-union, the class, the party and the state, but in their names men can bring grave injury to other groups, states and peoples without even being cognisant of it. Or, again, men assign the blame for the wrongs to social and institutional systems and circumstances, and indeed, personal responsibility has very much diminished in the new institutional set-up.

The disbalance between those parts of human life and nature that have been rationalized by the machine and the impersonal system, and those parts that lie outside their scope is regarded by Karl Mannheim as the gravest peril of the modern age. In moral life this has resulted in the focalization on a particular feature or phase of moral experience, connected with biological survival and economic power, as if these were sole or prime essentials of the good, dominating all man's ethical appraisals. Social ecology and ethics alike call for a balanced poise and co-ordination and intercommunion between the different parts of man's present cultural heritage, between science and technique on the one hand and human values on the other; between reason, intelligence and power on the one hand and love, sympathy and solidarity in human relations on the other.¹

Walter Cannon has very recently made out an able case for social reorientation, symbiosis and co-ordination. To satisfy this urgent ecological and cultural need of com-

¹ See my *Social Ecology*, pp. 332-334; also Lewis Mumford in Anshen; *Science and Man*, p. 356.

bating the unbalanced development of human faculties, motivation and values both ideological and moral transformation as well as skill and precision of social engineering are imperative; and their incentives must come from groups and institutions in order that the substitution of new ideology, values and ways of action may be rational, purposeful and orderly. To-day there is great danger of masses of individuals with their common repressions, fears and anxieties reacting against the social situation with unreason and violence at the herd or crowd level. The contemporary moral crisis, indeed, pertains more to groups and institutions than to individuals. Thus the problem is, first, to reorient groups and group relations, attitudes and values, and to renovate the moral consciousness of institutions, and, secondly, to evocate and harness co-operative moral insight, faith and goodwill. Collective moral alertness and inspiration, will and effort are playing in the modern age a much more significant rôle in moral progress than the initiative and creativeness of rare and gifted individuals.

Perhaps the question in morals as to what are the universal moral values and standards is less significant than the fact that the current moral values clash and are undergoing momentous transformation. Theories of morals based on the first principles or basic norms or on the methods of dialectical analysis are less valuable than those based on factual relations and valuations in the group situation, which, as the moral situation, can be approached empirically through the investigation of change, substitution or new integration of moral standards. It seems that in a time of social transition or revolution such a method would be more appropriate than the endeavour to find out the basic and ultimate ethical principles. Even the highest and most universal of them work inadequately and imperfectly in human institutions and concrete social

relations. The different social sciences will be able to help ethics materially through their analysis of groups, institutions, situations and values, and the manner in which moral patterns and norms can be changed, directed, and predicted by social and institutional planning, education and propaganda. Thus sociology will be an adjunct of ethics in moral guidance and prophesying and melioristic control of the environment.

Human life, mind and society converge their forces of adaptation and control in morality. Ethics accordingly unifies and utilises the lessons of all branches of knowledge in respect of man, and the conditions of his living and progress, and is genuinely more significant than any other department of human intelligence. But ethics is no mere branch of knowledge or philosophy. In so far as it never accepts the actual but treats the potential as if it were the actual, ethics introduces hypothetical and prophetic elements into man's values, beliefs and behaviour. Ethics is a part and parcel of human strivings and aspirations. It gives man insight and impulsion as he seeks to reshape the imperfect social world into an utopia, and courage and fortitude as he faces defeats and disillusionments.

CHAPTER VIII

THE TRIPLE GRADE OF IMPERATIVE—VALUE, IDEAL, NORM

The “Requiredness” of Values in the World of Social Facts

Values may be called “ideological conformities of co-existence and sequence.” These show a “conformity,” “requiredness” or “imperativeness” in the context of social facts, analogous to that of natural laws of the physical world. It is the “conformity,” “requiredness” or “imperativeness” of values that is the basis of unity of any social group, just as the uniformity of the physical laws underlies the existence of networks of relations in any stable system of the natural world. By plunging into the current of individual thought, feeling and action, and into social tradition and experience, values stimulate, thwart, deflect and direct activities of men and groups in a regular and, in some measure, predictable manner that can be proved by induction and specific case investigations. Here the certitude, derived from induction, statistics, analysis and inference, is however less than in the natural sciences, due to the impossibility of controlling and even identifying all the causes, factors and processes. Like the laws of nature, values are the causes or determinants of facts of the universe, in this case of mental and social relations, processes and events. Due to the nature of the mental and social facts, the certitude of laws in the social, as in the biological sciences, is of the character of statistical probability and inference as contrasted with demonstrability in mathematics or astronomy, and experimental demonstrability in general physics and chemistry. The “laws” of the various sciences

differ in degrees of proof according to the nature of the data and the scientific tools and methods available for each. In sociology the concept of values as ideological conformities that can rise to the level of statistical generalization and rational plausibility through the use of inductive and statistical methods, analysis and inference will be of immense aid to systematic theory-building. As the "laws" of nature govern events in the physical world, the system of stability, conformity or necessity inherent in values regulates, though less inflexibly than in the physical world, the conduct of individuals and groups and social happenings in the world of man. Illegal, immoral, improper or dishonourable behaviour that challenges law, public opinion, honour and conscience is akin to illogical and unco-ordinated reasoning, fixation, mania and obsession in mental life, and to asymmetrical or disharmonious forms, sounds and colours in art construction.

The control of all events and relations in the universe cannot be reduced to the laws of the physical world. Man's social universe or the world of human events and relations comprises processes and phenomena in which uniformities of sequence can be discerned only from within, from the viewpoints of the artist, the literateur, the moral agent and the mystic. A disbalance or asymmetry of forms and colours in painting 'requires' that certain forms be changed or removed, and certain colours altered or new ones introduced. It is also found that many people without previous art training choose what experts regard as the better designs among many pairs presented before them. In the test developed in this connection by Maitland Graves the twenty pairs of designs do not resemble in appearance any concrete objects, and hence are free from pleasant or unpleasant associations which might influence one's decision, quite apart from the designs themselves. Such fundamental consistency and agreement among persons in the

appreciation of design and colour show that there is some "requiredness," "imperativeness" or "necessity" in human sensitiveness in this field of visual choice. Discord in music 'requires' that the key in which a certain musical composition is begun should be continued and that certain notes should not be juxtaposed. Beethoven once remarked, "There is no rule you cannot deny, if by this we achieve greater victory." The great musical genius broke old rules or canons only to find new possibilities of musical expression. He built up new rules comprising a new musical language. There is similar "requiredness," "imperativeness" or "necessity" imposed on the processes of reasoning and inference, on the forms of literary composition, especially poetry and drama, and even on propaganda techniques, so that contrary ideas, emotions and moods might not be simultaneously aroused. Similarly there are "necessities" in social and moral ideas, processes and relations, as represented by the moral values. Religious experience has also its inherent "requiredness" or laws of development, comprising selection and control of ideas, attitudes and values and their canalization along certain definite modes of contemplation that are discerned only by the mystics, irrespective of their religious tradition and social context. Such "requiredness" or "necessity" cannot be reduced to physiological elements and factors nor accounted for by purely physical laws.

The Gestalt Principles of Closure, Pragnanz and Ausprachniveau in Society

Man's mind, in so far as it is free and autonomous and is at the same time moulded and transformed by the group of which he is a part and parcel, obeys certain "necessities" having some parallel in the physical world, but discernible not here but within the mind itself and its extension and enrichment—the social community. As Koehler

would put it, the value situation falls under the *Gestalt* category—the interrelation of subject and object in a context of requiredness—and the ethical, aesthetic and religious values have a logical place in the world of facts.¹ Further, the fundamental Gestalt principles of “closure” and “pragmananz” embody the objective foundations of the gradation of values. From the Crowd and Interest-group to Society and abstract Commonalty man advances from segregated and imperfect wholes towards complete or closed forms. This implies the expansion and deepening of the self, the enrichment and intercommunion of the values that are satisfied with nothing more and nothing less than the establishment of a Commonalty of the universe as the final good Gestalt. It is the outcome of the persistent effort of man to introduce order and harmony into what is at present full of chaos, confusion and discord in his concrete total social situation. There is an ethical “requiredness” or “imperativeness” about the supersession of the instrumental by the intrinsic values, and the subordination of the biological and economic by the intellectual, aesthetic and moral values. In all scaling of values, status and rôles in the social universe there is the urge towards better articulation, integration and intercommunion—towards solidarity and interdependence which, according to the Gestalt theory, are the goals of all integrative and organising forces found in nature.

Are not, therefore, the laws of value in moral and social life essentially the same as those that govern the structure and the data of perception and reaction? Does not, again, the Gestalt principle of *auspruchniveau* imply man and society’s urge to embody and operate the supreme values in concrete social relations and institutions instead of envisioning these in utopias? Social experience every-

¹ See his *The Place of Values in the World of Facts*.

where establishes that too high human goals and ideals lead to apathy, cynicism and a dual standard with a separation of praise and actual practice, just as too low goals and ideals foster injustice and unfair play in human relations. The supreme ideals and norms are in fact represented and operative in each present social relation and interaction. Man's activities are always directed to a limited range of circumstances apart from which goals, ideals and norms remain abstract, distant and futile. At the same time, as Whitehead observes, "the vigour of civilised societies is preserved by the widespread sense that high aims are worth while. Vigorous societies harbour a certain extravagance of objectives, so that men wander beyond the safe provision of personal gratifications. Such personal gratification arises from aim beyond personality."¹ Society succeeds in the measure it can make the most enduring and the most comprehensive values accessible in man's circumscribed social relationships and interactions of the present.

Methods of Analysis and Appraisal of Values

But values as conformities in social relations and interaction have to be methodically approached in a different manner from the laws of nature governing the relations between material objects and energies. The subject matter of human ideas, beliefs and values imposes this demand upon the social scientists. First, like the social scientist having his own desires and values of life, and choosing and acting according to his preferences, man himself is a value-appraiser and value-solver. Sociology posits the intersubjectivity of thought and action of men, and will have to depend upon phenomenological philosophy and psychology for defining and clarifying the assump-

¹ *Adventures of Ideas*, p. 371.

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But values as conformities in social relations and interaction have to be methodically approached in a different manner from the laws of nature governing the relations between material objects and energies. The subject matter of human ideas, beliefs and values imposes this demand upon the social scientists. First, like the social scientist having his own desires and values of life, and choosing and acting according to his preferences, man himself is a value-appraiser and value-solver. Sociology posits the intersubjectivity of thought and action of men, and will have to depend upon phenomenological philosophy and psychology for defining and clarifying the assump-

¹ *Adventures of Ideas*, p. 371.

tions in respect of the unity of human meanings, values and ideals, embedded in a certain structure of consciousness, a certain articulation of interpreted meanings, values and experiences built up by sedimentation within man's conscious life. Man, the subject matter of social sciences, has his own "subjectivity"—his meanings, attitudes and values in the context of society, the investigator's exclusion of which in the name of objectivity means the exclusion of the more considerable part of his social facts. The social sciences have accordingly to refine methods and tools of objective observation and analysis of social facts in their true meaningful and valuational context, if they have to get beyond piles of meaningless facts and doubtful, unanalysed, personal meanings and values. Both society and man constantly present problems of value to each other in the on-going process of social living, and both appraise and solve these, each from a particular angle. This characteristic is vital for both description and interpretation of facts and values in social sciences and analysis of their significance for social causes and consequences. Values have to be investigated, like scientific and philosophical knowledge, mythology, religion, morality, law, literature and the fine arts, as data of personal observation and introspection, and of social intelligence and emotion, communication and experimentation. Thus can one properly understand, experience and test the "requiredness" of values in the thought and conduct of men who conform to, as well as share in, and modify values. .

Secondly, the social investigator's causal and processual analysis and inference should concentrate upon society's myth-making or symbolisation. Values, like scientific laws, are expressed in and communicated by commonly understood social symbols and myths that define and govern all human relationships and interactions in society and culture. Sociology should develop techniques and methods

for the objective study of symbols and symbol devices, verbal and non-verbal, with their associated meanings, attitudes and values, just as it investigates social processes, groups and institutions. This cannot, however, be accomplished unless the orthodox view that symbols and symbolic behaviour are something totally different from natural objects and processes is abandoned.

Thirdly, the empirical situation in the world of man shows another peculiarity. The participant in social events constantly shifts the value and meaning of his action relationship, status, or rôle as a personality as also its relevance to the objective social situation made up of objects, persons and happenings or behaviours as investigated by the scientific observer.¹

Man's participation in 'value-creation' depends upon the depth-level of the self. Often does man accept the standards and rules of society as given, taken for granted or sacrosanct. Each community in fact pre-supposes a commonly accepted scale of values that underlies the stability of its moral and cultural order. But each man has his unique life-history and circumstances, and ever faces novel situations and possibilities; sometimes he feels strains and tensions in his acceptance of the dominant and central values. Such unpredictable situations of tension throw out *ideals* that become the foci of a new value-pattern. The value-pattern is clarified, criticised and classified in the formulation of the ideal. No time-honoured values are discarded nor attenuated, but each finds its due place, in perhaps a new orientation of the higher and the lower, the greater and the lesser, the intrinsic and the instrumental values—all discriminated, refined, modified and fulfilled in the matrix of the moral and cultural order. By criticism, reflection

¹ See Myrdal : *An American Dilemma*, Appendix 2; also Knight: Fact and Value in Social Science in Anshen (Ed), *Science and Man*.

and intellectual reconstruction of the value-pattern provided for him by the community, man creates ideals, symbols and myths in a real sense. Such ideals and symbols, the outcome of his moral initiative and adventure, in order to be established and validated, are submitted to collective discussion, reflection and appraisal in the same manner as any scientific propositions and theories. Ideals which emerge only in situations of conflict, scrutiny and systematic development of values involve a deeper layer of individual consciousness and experience as well as a more intimate interchange and communion between the individual and society. Implying as these do a re-definition, synthesis and new structural equilibrium of values, these produce completeness and self-fulfilment and deeply stimulate the will and govern the direction and character of behaviour. By rationally integrating and organising conflicting values and strivings into one harmonious whole, ideals give a new moral tone not only to the total movement of a life's plan but also to society's dominant and common purposes and endeavours amidst a multiplicity of values of different grade and urgency. The knowledge and realisation of the ideal mark both the conscious fulfilment of the total self of the individual and the parallel integration and moral progress of the community.¹ The final arbiter, in the case at least of moral values and ideals, is of course not society, but the creative, critical, society-transcending self. All moral and aesthetic values and ideals, as socially recognised true propositions, share the validity of "truth" that is itself one of the supreme values. Moral values and ideals are of course most significant in the social process and interaction, embodying themselves, as these always do, in changes of group organisation, institutional pattern and social relationship. These are appraised from

¹ See my *The Social Structure of Values*, Chapter IV.

the viewpoint of personal realisation and social cohesion—dual aspects of the same movement and organisation. Man's inner motivation, conscience and faith as well as his external social framework move in the same required direction of values and ideals. The frame of reference in sociological analysis includes the human person's own participation in the "requiredness" of laws, values or ideals, both with reference to self-development and to its complementary process, social integration.

The Supreme "Requiredness" of Norms

The "requiredness" of values and ideals or "something being demanded" beyond mere facts, as in the scientific method, goes in the human situation deep into the highest integrations of personality and into communions in social living. The world of morals is a dynamic world of man's ideals, adventures and reciprocities that evolve in more and more complex, often co-existent and interdependent systems. Morality involves an ever-widening total context, including the human experience of generations of tribes, peoples, civilizations and mankind. A laboratory worker's new discovery in science and technology that brings groups and peoples into more intimate association, the intellectual clarity brought into a moral issue in a great work of fiction or drama, the exaltation of love and communion of a religious mystic or the heroic endurance and self-sacrifice of a philanthropist,—all these add to the value-facts and the common value-configuration of humanity as well as to the scope of man's "requiredness" or ought, determining, as Butler says, "what course of life is correspondent to the whole ascertained nature of man." All values, ideals and virtues are connected with man's sensitiveness to his ever-expansive, total environment that is enhanced not only by institutions, morals and laws, but also by religion and the fine arts that unfold the true, the

good and the beautiful. The linkages of man's "requiredness" in ethics include his external codes, laws and institutions as well as his own unique conceptions of the good, the just and the beautiful. The latter are indissolubly linked with the former, and also with man's mental and moral progress. His visions of goodness, justice and solidarity accordingly extend the domain of "requiredness." With the improvement of social integration and deepening and enlargement of self, his yet nobler visions that arise enlarge the scope of the "requiredness" or ought in society. Any conflicts of "requiredness" or ought are also decided in the total context of a more stable and universal Gestalt of wholeness or solidarity in human experience. Each great civilization or epoch promotes certain values and ideals that are adequate and "required" for it; but with an appreciation and understanding of wider social and moral facts and relations these have to be abandoned in favour of more completely stable or comprehensive systems. Are there not permanent universal values and ideals true to the "whole nature of man," and endorsed by the experience of whole peoples and civilizations that may provide a surer basis of both integration of society and deepening of self than an abstract enquiry into morals? Such values and ideals that man discovers as belonging to the nature of existence or reality or as eternal goals of the cosmic process, including human history, are normative ideals or *norms*. Norms belong to the highest category of "requiredness" or "imperativeness" that can be conceived by the human mind.

Scientific Procedure in the Study of Values and Ideals

Values, ideals and norms successively give the true meaning and moral directive not merely to the self or person as a social being but also to groups, institutions and culture. The primary objects of sociological investigation—

society and man's "social selves" oriented towards a variety of imperatives in different cultures—can be dealt with adequately only through the nexus of the concept of values, ideals and norms that are as constitutive of human personality as they are of human culture. There is, therefore, need of a dual clarification of scientific procedure in the social and moral sciences. First, since values are "not up in the air" but manifest in the basic social relationships and institutions, constituting the principles of "conformity" or "requiredness" in the social world, scientific treatment demands an explanation of the conditions of fulfilment, conflict or bafflement of values in every field of social relations. Such study should recognise the dynamic interplay between values, ideals and norms and concrete social structures and processes, so that society could refashion the latter if these do not create or foster the values of life attributed to them, or define the status of rising value-patterns for institutional expression and conservation as these make themselves felt in the social consciousness. Without a constant scrutiny of values and ideals and of social processes and institutions in their reciprocal interchange, there is great danger everywhere that institutions become sacrosanct and immoral, or the values and ideals removed far from existence or social reality, i.e. from persons in their concrete interpersonal relations. The fluidity of institutions, laws and customs respecting new ideals of right and wrong, and of such ideals fitting into new technic and economic conditions or current social needs, attitudes and values is essential equally for social harmony and moral progress.

Secondly, instead of an abstract analysis of the concepts of truth, beauty and goodness, the social sciences should enter into an examination of what in concrete individual and social relations and institutions are posited and recognised as true, beautiful and good among men and

groups of different ages and outlooks. Values have both an "ideal" and an "operational" or social structure. Such abstract values as love, justice, goodness and truth can be understood only in the context of the whole social situation. In other words, in order to appreciate that a man is loving, just, good and truthful, we have to understand the group, the institution, the laws, rights and duties and the systems of economy and social culture in which he evaluates, plans and acts.

Man lives today largely in the secondary group and institutional world. Organised groups and institutions are the foci of judgments, moral valuations and decisions. Though all kinds of individual attitudes and opinions impinge upon them, the conflicting interests and ends come to a conclusive issue only in group and institutional policies and ways of action. Thus the "ought" or "requiredness" of groups, institutions and systems should approximate to those of the individual. For individual inadequacy and deviance today we blame individuals less and institutions and systems more. It is the task of social sciences to establish such "scientific" social and institutional procedures and interactions that institutions, which more and more mould morals and values as life becomes more organised, rationalised and impersonalised, respond easily and quickly like individuals as moral agents. Thus alone can we solve the dilemma of modern industrial and political society—the problems focussed in Niebuhr's pregnant phrase, "moral man in immoral society." Without a better organisation, articulation and co-ordination of group and institutional life, improvement of values and morals is now hardly possible.

Accordingly, the progress of scientific procedures and techniques in social and institutional relations will materially contribute towards the progress of morals and values. The morality of groups and institutions essentially rests

on their taking up the burden of the moral routine left to the individual's conscience and sense of honour. Big business and industry, organised labour, institutionalised professions and organised public opinion must conscientiously and intelligently evaluate and determine how their goals can integrate with the larger values of the community and humanity before the present chaos and disintegration of values can be arrested. This is much more important than individual enlightenment, choice and valuation. The ethics of today should devote itself more to group and institutional valuation than to individual valuation, as the strategy of law and politics should comprise the art of reconciling the conflicting interests and goals of social and economic classes and institutions through a proper scaling of the values and ideals of life. The scope of ethics and of the sciences accordingly overlaps, ethics becoming more and more social and scientific, the social sciences becoming more and more ethical.

The Ethics of the Universal Community

The social sciences in the modern world increasingly find morality as a function of the social and institutional situation. Due to the spread of education by means of the press, the cinema and the radio that cross the barriers of language and race, and the economic interdependence of peoples and regions, the group situation in which man finds himself today continually expands. The systems of ethics of the family, the village, the class and the nation, formerly autonomous and self-sufficient, no longer meet the needs of modern group and institutional life with its proliferation to distant peoples and regions. Man's abstract moral principles and values have now to be re-oriented to the new social setting—to the invisible and impersonal relations of the international community. Thus the subordinate ethical systems of the family, the class and the nation have to be related to the

ethics of the universal community, and to the principles of moral development of individuals in the present unique global situation. Man now participates in an expanded, enhanced globe. The social structure of values shows a marked change with the development of horde and tribe into nation and the U.N.O. or, again, of mass and Interest-group into Society and Commonalty. Society, values, cultural traits and individual character and temperament, all interact on one another in the world's vast background of changing regional, economic and technic conditions and pressures. These are responsible for complex and divergent tables of values among' different cultures that are yet rooted in the universal primary urges of human nature. A broad survey of social and cultural types with their characteristic value and status systems and patterns of virtues is possible on the basis of the classification of ideal types (in Max Weber's sense) in the social sciences. A scientific classification of social cultures can only lead up to synthesis and generalisation in respect of fundamental values, imperatives and social functions and processes common to all societies.

Grades of Universality and Requiredness of Laws and Values

Just as in the physical sciences Ptolemaic, Copernican or Newtonian principles still hold good within certain limited fields of phenomena and observation, similarly in the social sciences the standards and norms of living hold good and true within particular social cultures, stages or epochs. And yet as in the physical sciences we constantly extend the sphere of our observations and approximate to one truth, one completely stable system within which other stable systems are comprehended, so in the social sciences we search for the eternal and the universal values in the experience and progress of civilisation that test and validate

these through the passing epochs. Such universal values characterised by their coherent rationality, unity, harmony and "naturalness" are called normative ideals or norms such as truth, justice, goodness and love.

Are not these universalised values or norms analogous to the comprehensive laws of general physics, wave theory or quantum mechanics? Do not the goals and situational imperatives of groups and individuals, comprising the intermediate generalisations applicable to concrete social situations, correspond to the intermediate, dependent principles of heat, light, electricity and magnetism that hold good in concrete fields of natural phenomena? Thus the general value system of a society, with its tangled web of traditions, laws, myths and morals, embodies and enforces the universal values and norms in concrete individual and social relations and situations.

It is noteworthy that such universal norms as truth, goodness and beauty are linked together among themselves by the function they have in common in contributing to one commonalty or all-inclusive system of associated life. In the physical world laws that are true in the limited fields are "untrue" in fields beyond the observations that these were originally framed to explain. In the social world, value-claims similarly spring from limited social facts and experiences, and thus are often in discord, bringing groups and peoples into chronic and even bloody struggles. But value-claims rise from the specific and the particular to "true" and universal values or norms, having the effect of making the individuals and groups who acknowledge or apply them as agents of an all-inclusive universal community. Like the laws of the physical world, values also are of different grades of universality and requiredness, and grow with the expansion of their fields and materials. Boutroux said, "According to the results of science itself there is nothing to guarantee the absolute stability of even the most general laws that

man has been able to discover. Nature evolves, perhaps even fundamentally." Similarly man's moral values and standards may be regarded as approximations to goodness and justice nearer than those reached in the past but later modified by the growing wisdom, love and reverence of the race.

Natural Laws, Values and Life

There is an interpenetration of natural laws and values of life that ought not be missed. For the laws of the physical world cannot be completely and permanently isolated from human values and ways of living, just as scientific activity cannot be artificially separated from other social activities of man. Human value is the mother of the sciences. Natural sciences owe their origin and development to human needs, interests and goals. The progress of the sciences is obviously connected with control and manipulation of the environment and prediction of happenings in which the entire scale of human goals and values is implicated. Since values embrace the whole of life, the pursuit of scientific research cannot escape from the all-embracing set of values and ideals. Social scientific research in particular should indicate methods of improvement of social relations and interaction in the light of the fulfilment of the highest values of life, and also the processes, conditions and factors that block such fulfilment. Science has concentrated largely, if not exclusively, on those aspects of experience that are measurable, and that can be explained in terms of antecedent causes rather than values. Such procedure has enabled science to achieve an increasing control over the environment. "But," as Aldous Huxley observes, "power is not the same thing as insight and, as a representation of reality, the scientific picture of the world is inadequate, for the simple reason that science does not even profess to deal with experience as a whole,

but only with certain aspects of it in certain contexts.”¹ Unfortunately many votaries of science accept the world picture implicit in its manifold theories as a complete and exhaustive account of reality. So far as human life and phenomena are concerned, there is a more or less tacit assumption in the scientific outlook that human beings are nothing but bodies, animals and machines, and that values are nothing but illusions that have got themselves mixed with their experiences of the world. Modern science has, therefore, engendered a wide-spread indifference to the values of human personality and human life. As a matter of fact, applied science has accepted certain human standards and values, but uncritically and dogmatically. All applications of the sciences are guided by human ends that are instrumental values, and that may be divergent in different societies and economic systems, such as efficiency for war or peace, profit and accumulation of wealth and power, improvement of leisure, health and standard of living of the masses and so on. These involve value judgments that can only be provided by society’s scheme of culture, social myths and social sciences. In both physical and social sciences value considerations cannot obviously be permanently dissociated from factual studies, except of course as a logical ‘fiction’ for the purpose of economy and convenience of thought, due to the interdependence of physical and social phenomena and events and the integral character of social activity.

The pursuit of any branch of knowledge as an artificially isolated system has obviously its risks. As the pursuit of knowledge for its own sake, science subscribes to the belief in the supreme value of truth. The universal and non-competitive character of the pursuit of pure science serves as an ideal and focus for the development of a world-community. Pure science also extends

¹ Aldous Huxley: *Science, Liberty and Peace*, p. 28-29. See also Northrop: *The Logic of the Sciences and the Humanities*, Chapter XXII.

the range of human sympathies and leads to the recognition of value claims and interests so far overlooked or disregarded. It may be neutral and detached, but this very characteristic enables it to weld together races and peoples of different countries and epochs into a universal brotherhood of the intellect, and thus to add to the total value-pool of mankind. Science reveals the relations of means and processes to goals and values and of goals and values to means and processes. It supplies the tools and methods by which in an ordered world values, means and processes may be rationally integrated with the minimum of waste and maximum of efficiency for mankind.¹ Finally, science like philosophy may rise to grand heights of theoretical speculations but always prepares itself to come back to the field of practice and application. For its manifold applications in the creation of values or dis-values that the mastery of the physical environment assures man, science depends upon the value judgment of society for their creation, sustenance and proper sharing. Accordingly the applications of physical laws and values equally have to submit to the final judgment of social culture that regards normative ideals or norms as the constitutive and regulative "laws" of the entire order of the universe, whether investigated by the physical and the social sciences or understood by the intuitive methods of art and religion.

The Operational Plane of Norms and Values

Norms or normative ideals represent the highest grade of universality and "imperativeness" among values. These are completely stable, autonomous and all-inclusive values—not restricted to persons, groups and institutions acknowledging them. These are far different from many values that are dependent and specific. These have "truth" and

¹ See the papers of Sorokin and Leighton in *Learning and World Peace*.

moral "requiredness" or "imperativeness" for all men in all relations and situations, and resolve all possible conflicts of value-claims in a process of developing harmony and synthesis. In so far as these move men and societies in all ages, these may be considered truly prior to human culture. On these human culture, laws, institutions and morals have been and are being constructed. These not only shape and direct human destiny but are indeed the regulative goals of the entire cosmic process. Norms grounded in the eternal, ideological nature of the cosmos stimulate man and society to their noblest moral endeavours, reach out to goodness, justice and love greater than are yet realised. Norms constitute the essence of the highest mystical morality, and of the final freedom and adventure of man.

For individuals and groups with limited social relations and experience, values that are appropriated and fulfilled are restricted, specific. Even for them the restraints and injunctions of society develop, however, a sort of solidarity or communion—the final and fundamental source of social values—however narrow may be its range. Whether it is in the setting of the family, the village, the class, the nation or the commonwealth of peoples, loyalty, friendship, chivalry, fair play, justice and love are similarly experienced intense sentiments and prized virtues that make the individual one with a social community. It is a mistake of the social sciences to look for values only in the freedom, conscience and moral faith of the individual. In the human experiment with values carried out in the laboratory of world's history, that judges both the eternity and universality of values and the selection and survival of peoples and civilizations, the division between values as subjective, and social codes, laws and institutions as external and objective is unsound. If sociology goes back to the history of social development, it will find that values, though rooted in man's essential urges and interests, are fundamentally

derived from groups and institutions rather than from individual preferences. It is social culture that orders, integrates and regulates man's ego-centric desires and interests, and transforms them into values. It shapes and reshapes values as green signals in all directions for the guidance of individuals, and for its own progress as it understands and consciously directs itself. On the other hand, values in so far as these embody themselves in, and are recognised, appreciated and experienced by, groups and institutions transform the latter. Values are not transcendent, nor isolated from the struggle and concourse of life, mind and society. These are emergents of the social process, express themselves and are specified in all human relations and interactions in myths, morals and laws. Society operates, experiences, tests and validates values, and in the process is also profoundly modified and remade by values. The operational plane of values is represented by man's manifold social relations, structures and processes, historical cultures and social types. But though values are contained in all social relations, structures and processes, and can be tested and validated only in these, these are not exhausted by, but over-reach these. It is from the trans-social and trans-personal aspect of values (i. e. normative ideals or norms) that these derive their impulsion in transforming the behaviour of men, groups and social cultures, eradicating all what is dysteleological, ugly, untrue and unrighteous in human relations and interactions. The trans-human imperatives raise man's moral life beyond society and nature, and impart to it an infinite quality and mystery inaccessible to human normative ethics. Neither values nor ideals, but norms symbolise the final mystery and destiny of man. On this dual functional relationship of values, ideals and norms to life, mind and society the basic analyses of both sociology and ethics should be grounded.

CHAPTER IX

A FIELD THEORY OF ETHICS

The Foundation of Ethics on the Methods of "Field" or "Group-space" Analysis

The prime essential of an empirically grounded ethics, focussing attention on the basic social relations and contained imperatives, as the legitimate isolate of theoretical analysis, is a "frame of reference" which is condensedly represented in the Table on the next page.

We envisage the "frame of reference" for human relations and morals as follows: corresponding to the Organism—Function—Environment frame of reference in general biology, the Community—Culture—Region in *Regional Sociology* and the Individual—Occupation—Class scheme in *Social Ecology*, the frame of reference in sociology and ethics is Personality—Value—Group, the whole system being comprehended within the institutional set-up.

In human ecology which is the quantitative aspect of sociology, we conceive of a give-and-take between man and the region, of a mutuality of adaptations that are endless and shifting, giving us the picture of the total situation as a Gestalt. Yet the environment is not the mere stimulus of human adaptative responses; it is saturated with human meanings and values, suffused with myths and symbols. These latter undergo transformation although the environment may be the same. Each such transformation or the reshaping of the environment puts fresh demands upon man in his rôle as the economic user, the moral agent or the aesthetic participant. Thus man himself also changes in his modes of utilisation or value-seeking and achievement, in his dispositions, capacities and scales of values. This changing

pattern of man-environment relations in a dynamic Gestalt is the field of human ecology.

We may now define the "frame of reference" in sociology and empirical ethics from the "ecological", "situational", "field" or "life or group space" viewpoint. The

THE SOCIAL CONFIGURATION OF MORALS

| Personality Level | Value | Group |
|-----------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| | Stage of Valuation. | (A) Structure: |
| 1. Superficial, egoistic, unstable self. | 1. Definition of goal. | 1. Interest-group. |
| 2. Deeper, stabler and more socialised self. | 2. Formation of ideal. | 2. Society or Community. |
| 3. Deepest, most integrated, creative and universal self. | 3. Prescription of norm. | 3. Commonalty. |
| | | (B) Functions: Status-prestige-power; Rôle, Position, Service. |
| Means of Evocation. | Moral Imperative. | (C) Means of Control: |
| 1. Education. | 1. Reciprocity and fair-play. | 1. Physical and social coercion, fear and security. |
| 2. Art. | 2. Justice and equity. | 2. Shame, honour and social expectancy. |
| 3. Religion. | 3. Love, sympathy and solidarity. | 3. Conscience, self-censure, self-knowledge and faith in values-ideals-norms. |

"field" theory was originally developed in physics by Faraday and others in order to observe, co-ordinate and explain certain physical phenomena. Then the "field" concept was introduced into biology by Gurwitsch, Spemann and others. John Dewey, who considers all scientific enquiry as problem-solving in situations, compares situations to physical "fields." He observes: "There is always a *field* in which observations of *this* or *that* object or event occur. Observation of the latter is made for the sake of finding out what that *field* is with reference to some active adaptive response to be made in carrying forward a *course* of behaviour."¹ In the process of a wider application the "field" concept has undergone significant changes. Robert S. Hartman observes: "It is used today not only in the sense in which it was originally proposed, as descriptive of concretely observable bi-polar phenomena occurring in space and time—such as magnetic and gravitational fields in physics or, in a later extension, "situations" in sociology, but also in a more abstract methodological sense, as denoting an ordering concept applied to any manifold of phenomena, whether actually observable or not."²

The present writer's concept of the "region" as developed in his *Regional Sociology* introduced into sociology the notion of the ecological area or "field" for the classification, ordering and interpretation of social phenomena. The "region" as the focus of social-ecological investigation is a dynamic "field" or pattern, a "configuration like the Gestalt of Wertheimer, Koehler and Koffka, produced by vast ecological processes shifting the life-balance now in favour of man, now against him." The success or failure of social culture is rooted in this regional

¹ Dewey: *Logic: The Theory of Enquiry*, p. 67.

² The Moral Situation, *The Journal of Philosophy*, Vol. XLV, p. 292.

balance or unbalance.¹ The concepts of psychological and social "field" and "life space" that have come recently into psychology and the social sciences from physics in the hands of Lewin, Brown, Murphy, Dodd, Lundberg and others, and that all regard the individual-in-environment as the primary datum of experience are similar to the present author's concepts of the "region" and of "ecological, social and moral space".² The uniqueness of the individual personality is rooted in "personal ecological space and time" from which he appropriates his quota of satisfactions and values. Man's "moral space" in which judgment of status and mobility takes place is defined and circumscribed as his mental, social and ecological space is limited. The "boundaries" of the latter help him in resisting the pressures of myriad groups with goals entirely different from his own, and chalking out his own "field" of goals and achievements from the distraction of disharmonious wishes and interests. Thus does he achieve his relative "status" and develop his distinctive personality in his limited ecological, social and moral space.³ According to Brown the "boundary" which acts as a kind of barrier to mental "locomotion" to a higher social status (what is called mobility in social ecology) is quasi-physical, quasi-social and quasi-conceptual. In many societies "the bourgeoisie is to be ordered to a field of high degree of freedom of social locomotion, the petty bourgeoisie to a field of medium degree of freedom, and the proletariat to a field of low degree".⁴ A man finds much more difficulty in entering into certain social fields or

¹ The Regional Balance of Man: *American Journal of Sociology*, Nov. 1930; also book with the same title, pp. 6 and 16.

² See Lundberg: *Foundations of Sociology*, p. 104; Bentley: *Sociology and Mathematics*, *The Sociological Review*, October 1931.

³ *Social Ecology*, Chapter VIII on Man's Social and Moral Boundaries, pp. 176-177.

⁴ Brown; *Psychology and the Social Order*, pp. 53-58.

spaces than in entering others. The concept of "vector" is also applicable, implying that there are definable forces and directions involved in locomotion in psychological and social life-space. In my *Social Ecology* a systematic analysis has been made of social processes in terms of social status, mobility, distance and social and moral "boundaries." The drawbacks of certain American ecologists who treat ecological and social interaction separately have been, as Lundberg points out, that the regional, structural and spatial relationships of groups and communities have been considered without their relevance to human meanings, values and symbolic behaviours. Thus a different and incompatible framework in super-organic and cultural terms had to be conceived. Suffice it to indicate that in our conception ecological relationships and cultural patterns are parts of one dynamic "region," "field," "social and moral space" or configuration.

We may usefully employ the social-ecological constructs in a functionally inflected psychology and ethics. Much laboratory work in psychology has been accomplished whose results point to the significance of this kind of approach in the analysis of moral principles and standards.¹ The feeling of belonging to certain groups has been found to be a crucial factor for the feeling of security. The tendency to enter a certain group and to keep certain children in and other children out of that group plays a great rôle in the behaviour of the nursery school child. This tendency is important for the children's gang. Juveniles in the reformatory who have not fully accepted their belonging to the criminals have a tendency to name as their best friends persons outside the reformatory. Most social goals

¹ For an able summary see Lewin's Chapter on Behaviour and Development as a Function of the Total Situation, in Carmichael (Ed): *Manual of Child Psychology* which has been freely used, and his *Resolving Social Conflicts*. See also *Social Ecology*, Preface and Chapter VIII.

can be characterised, as Lewin points out, as wishes to belong or not to belong to a certain group. Belonging or not belonging to the group is equivalent to having a position inside or outside the group. "This position determines the rights and duties of the individual and is decisive for the ideology of the individual." The myth complex, as we have already pointed out, provides the frame of reference for the ideals, goals, expectations or the claims on a person's future achievement. There is "tension" between the myth complex, morals or ideology comprising the basic assumptions, concepts and values and the concrete action in the social group "field." The moral situation is a "bi-polar field," subjected to the tension between certain group expectations and imperatives and the subjectivity of individual choice, experience and behaviour. To follow his "conscience" is the same as to follow the perceived inherent requirements of the group in which he feels belongingness or solidarity. The effect of the various groups, particularly whether or not the individual is ruled by the ideology and values of the one or the other, depends on the relative potency of these groups at that time. The influence of public or private morale is different at home and in the church. In school children the tendency to cheat changes with the social setting. Adaptation of an individual to the group depends upon the avoidance of too great a conflict between his own goals and the goals and values which exist for him as a group member. Many psychologists attribute inner tensions and conflicts to marginality. Children who stand on the boundary between two groups are chronic sufferers. Emotional tension is high in inmates of reformatory schools as a result of the marginal position of these children between the criminal and the honest citizen. Emotional tension diminishes when the child accepts his belonging to a definite group. A decrease in emotionality is observed in those inmates who accept

their belonging to the criminal class. Many studies in juvenile delinquency have shown the influence of residence in marginal ecological districts of a city on criminality.

Several psychologists have made important experiments in respect of success or failure of an individual in meeting the aspiration level. In these experiments they have not been concerned with aspiration in any ethical sense. Social situations or praise facilitate the rise of an aspiration and encourage performance as well as the ability to withstand failure. In a situation of competition aspiration might be increased. The knowledge of group standards may affect the level of aspiration. For instance, the discrepancy between aspiration and performance increases towards a higher level of aspiration, if the person learns that his performance is below the standard of his own group or of a group which he considers to be lower. The discrepancy decreases if the opposite conditions obtain.

More significant in this context are the effects on individual conduct of the spatial position, status, rôle or power of another individual. Lewin and other psychologists call this the strength of the "power field" of one person on another which differs for different areas. Where there is greater group participation, inclusion and solidarity not merely are goals and values more easily "induced" but the effectiveness of the "power field" for creating induced forces is greater. Lewin observes: "The individual accepts the new system of values and beliefs by accepting belongingness to a group. A feeling of complete freedom and a heightened group identification are frequently more important at a particular stage of re-education than learning not to break specific rules."¹ Group identification introduces a new dimension, level or quality to the behaviour of the individual. The appropriateness of behaviour in a specific group "field" is abstracted, intellectualised and symbolised

¹ Lewin: *Resolving Social Conflicts*, pp. 67-68.

into aspiration, expectancy, judgment and imperative. Thus the "frame of reference" constantly becomes richer and more complex through logical introspection, valuation and symbolization. The level of aspiration and performance, morale, we-feeling and ethical principle are all stereotyped and fitted into this "group existential field." The feeling of group belongingness (as expressed, for instance, by the use of the term "We" instead of "I") is stronger in democratic than in autocratic associations. In the autocratic atmosphere the larger group is actually composed of a number of sub-groups containing the leader and one child each, whereas in the democratic group the group as a whole has a greater potency. This is one of the reasons why children in these autocracies are more likely to be aggressive against their fellows although submissive to the leader. The degree of co-operation between children in a day camp increases after their adult leaders have been retrained from autocratic to democratic leadership techniques. It is also found that the amount of work output in an autocratic group atmosphere drops very decisively within a few minutes when the leader left the room. This is in contrast to a democratic group atmosphere, where the work has been chosen and planned by the group itself, and where the work output is unchanged when the leader left.

Status and mobility, authority and freedom, autocratic and democratic leadership that are fundamental social forces are found to be significant factors in governing aggressive or co-operative behaviour, readiness or conflict in the acceptance of induced goals and values as well as the level of aspiration and performance. We thus find that the difference between the degrees of group participation, inclusion and cohesion is basic not only for all value-seeking activities but also for the problem of frustration and fulfilment. In Lewin's phraseology, it is difference of "being inside and outside the life-space." Seeking a certain

goal or value is equivalent to a tendency to enter a "field" outside of which one is located.

Bogardus, Lippitt, Moreno, Chapin and others have developed techniques and methods for the determination of group structure, group belongingness or social participation under certain situations. Moreno regards "tele" as the group binder, increasing in quantity and intensity with the solidity and permanence of social relations. "Transference" is not a reality produced but a delusional relation—the group "disintegrator." The longer group relationship lasts, it becomes dominated by "tele" and not by "transference." Aesthetic relations are "empathy" phenomena. The three phenomena—tele, transference and empathy—that are dormant and inherent in Mesmer's "animal fluid" are identified as independent functions and shown in combined operation in human relationships. Both tele and transference are amenable to a sociometric type of quantification.¹

Such techniques along with the employment of topological constructs, on the lines of Lewin and Brown or the categories of symbolic logic, will be invaluable in empirical ethics, grounded on the methods of "field" or "group-space-situation" analysis.² The unit of empirical moral analysis will be the group configuration in which ecological, social and moral parts or aspects are reciprocally interdependent. The sociological classification of "ideal typical" groups of moral quality viz. Crowd, Interest-group, Society or Community and abstract Commonalty with their contrasted constitutional moral expectancies and standards provides the foundation of empirical ethics. Moral standard and behaviour are discerned as

¹ Moreno: Contributions of Sociometry to Research Methodology in Sociology, *American Sociological Review*, June 1947.

² See Lewin: *Principles of Topological Psychology*; my *Social Ecology*, Chapter on Man's Social and Moral Boundaries.

emergents of the group "field" or "space." Each type of group "field" comprises an ideal-real situation or frame of reference, both concrete as well as potential, eliciting appropriate or fitting modes of behaviour that are abstracted, standardised and idealised into moral expectancies, principles and imperatives. Thus goodness, justice or love obtain their validity in the ideal-typical "group" fields or frames of reference and assume different forms in the dialectic movement of human grouping and man's communion with fellowman. At the same time moral behaviour inherent in a certain group "field" alters the "field" to the same extent and in the same manner as change in any ecological factor alters it. Thus the units as well as the constellation of forces have to find again a new equilibrium. In this new equilibrium where a new system of values and moral categories is accepted through the re-educative process, what is important to remember is that the greater the human communion or higher the group identification, as in the progress from Interest-group through Community to abstract Commonalty, the more does the system of values correspond to the individual's super-ego. The atmosphere of complete freedom of will and conscience can be created only by the abstract in-group in which he feels the profoundest intimacy and expansiveness. There is not only the most considerable locomotion of the individual in his "life-space," as the expansive, abstract in-group furnishes no barriers nor boundaries, but due to resolution of inner tensions and conflicts and integration and poise of personality, there is also a movement of life-space to the highest levels or degrees of reality. The "reality-adapted" behaviour of the mature, morally conscious, striving personality is dominated neither by inner anxieties, phobias and delusions nor by external mass suggestions and emotions. Mind here frees itself from all kinds of faulty perception

and irreal processes, but harnesses the unconscious by appropriate dynamisms for the realisation of the higher goals and values of life in the group field. There are full freedom and responsibility of the creative conscience and intelligent and efficacious adjustment to the social-moral situations in life that elicit higher and more complex integrations of self, asserting themselves at once in new insights, affections and sacrifices and in more socialised and shared ways of living with fellowmen.¹ Thus does the field theory of ethics embrace both the conscious and unconscious mental dynamisms.²

Morality, a Phase of Dynamic Equilibrium with the Physical-Symbolical Environment

In sociology and ethics we are concerned with the environmental complex and the cultural and institutional super-structure as a complex, highly organised Gestalt in which meanings and values in their sense-expressions of language, symbol and communication are subtly and inextricably interwoven with the process by which the balance of man and region is maintained or shifted. Man's nervous organisation and mind, like his sense organs, muscles, tissues and glands, are the means through which his responses to the physical environment take place. But due to the endowment of mind he adds to these means not merely the tools of his hand—artefacts, implements, machines, houses and his entire economic and technological apparatus—but also the tools of his mind—language, symbol, myth and morals. Thus does man's environment to which he adjusts himself become both a physical and symbolical, natural and derivative "field."

Man has always to seek a total adaptation. In the

¹ See Chapter IV.

² Lewin neglects the rôle of the unconscious in his dynamic field theory.

course of such adaptation to both the physical environment and to fellowmen he has become a symbolising, learning, evaluating, planning, responsible, social creature. His dispositions, ideas, habits, values and techniques are guides in his adjustive ways of action. In a similar manner his groups and institutions, social and moral norms—integrated and composite products of the symbolising mind in its social milieu—are equally significant instigators to his adjustive performances. There is also a give-and-take between the contents of man's mind and its external social products, values and ideals, symbols, institutions and culture. The subjective self with its items of ideas, desires, attitudes and experiences is as a result transformed into a highly rational, moral, value-seeking and aspiring self. Man's self or personality is a dynamic purposive and aspiring system set in a group milieu of possible aids and hinderances to the fulfilment of values, and impressing itself constantly and insistently upon both values and fellowmen through the medium of group relations and interactions. Due to this interchange society is kept plastic and ongoing; while the individual also resolves his inner tensions and conflicts and develops habits, incentives and values that adjust him smoothly to fellowmen, yet in some unique fashion.

In any group "field" the individual is confronted with a variety of incentives, expectancies and controls, such as (a) authoritarian myths, symbols, values and imperatives; (b) appraisals, expectancies and pressures from members of the group in respect of participation in common goals and values; (c) self-regarding impulses of security, recognition and prestige in respect of his reactions to rôle and status differences; (d) shame, honour and call of the super-ego or conscience in respect of his reactions to sources of authority. All the above incentives impinge upon the social "field" resulting in a sense of general direction, aim or purpose. Ethical choice consists in find-

ing the direction fully and specifically in the context of present and past experience and the ideal future anticipated, and is associated with a sense of competence, fittingness and integrity that spurs quick action. This is due to the integration and liberation of the conflicting dispositions, motives and habits.

Man's deliberation and moral choice largely depend upon the depth-level of both self and group consciousness and communication, the latter in its turn being determined by the kind of group of which he is a member—Crowd, Interest-group, Community or abstract Commonalty, whose attitudes, expectations and judgments serve as instigators to his decision. For the average individual the moral situation is the restricted, sectional Interest-group and Community "field" in which the moral expectancies and standards, though selective and appropriate for, and harmonious with, the type of group participation and social bonds, are fundamentally different from those of the abstract Commonalty. The moral experience of the individual is the highest in the Commonalty group when both human communion or mutuality and depth-level of self reach their final phases. Just as the abstract Commonalty embraces the universe or the earth-community as the moral "field", it establishes and validates the supreme ethical principles and norms of Love, Compassion and Solidarity. In the case of the ordinary man the ethical "field" represents only a small fragment of humanity; his moral values in a "closed" society, in the Bergsonian sense, do not represent his total developed nature and full potentialities. Yet the limited specific group as the ideal-real "field" reflects the ethical reality—the moral principles and norms that are defined, selected and stylised by and fitted into the social framework. Conversely, inequity, injustice and evil do not fit in specifically and adequately into the group context, the fitness or unfitness being deter-

mined by the whole potentiality or ideality of the group "field". The supremely unethical is what is most disparate or disharmonious with "final existential field," in Dewey's sense of the word. The supremely ethical is what constitutes the final consummation of the group process, and the corresponding full development of human nature and the totality of its capacities realised only in man's solidarity with fellowman and with the rest of the universe.

It is only in a perplexing social "field" that the individual rises to his full moral stature, experiences and establishes supreme moral principles and norms, for he no longer passively accepts within his intellectual and emotional equipment the group values and standards, but clarifies, criticises and reevaluates conflicting goals and sentiments by appealing to the supreme verdict of his rational, creative conscience. Thus, does man's "still, small voice" enable him to ascend to, and strive after, ideals and norms that give his behaviour a new tone and dimension and his group a new context and extension. Conscience allies itself with higher moral attitudes, ideals and norms through relations, especially conflicts, among social groupings, and enables him to rise above private, evanescent goals and values in his rôles in life. On the other hand, man's psychological membership and rôles in various dissimilar and even conflicting groups are aids to the development and expression of his highly complex, intellectualised, moral personality.

His appeal to his own conscience and faith, as a form of strategy, is as justified to strengthen his resources of adaptation as the group's manipulation of his habits and motivations by education, propaganda, law and cultural pressure. The essence of morality consists in his capacity to understand, control and predict by taking account of all expectancies and judgments in the social "field" configuration. The ethical "field" of the highest poten-

tiality is identical with Commonalty or the unlimited earth-community. From the viewpoint of a functionally inflected psychology, morality, alternating between freedom and authority, conscience and convention, rebellion and law, represents a dynamic phase of man's equilibrium in relation to his environment that is also as plastic and fluent. It is not god-given, nor innate, nor is it imposed on human nature externally by society and nature. It is derived from the net outcome of all the expectancies, controls and predictions that are emergents in the group "field", taking into account comparable behaviour of individuals in the aggregate and its consequences as well as the continuity of group relations under which the adjustment is to be effected. Moral principles and norms are selected and ordered with reference to actualisation of all the purposes or potentialities of the group "field" as can be anticipated i.e., of what the group "ought to be" with the individual as an aspiring, venturesome, creative, moral agent transforming the group "field" into the "ideal" future of his mental prediction.

Man's Total Adaptation, Physical and Symbolical

When groups and institutions, customs and culture are no longer regarded as fixed and changeless to which human nature must somehow conform, but conceived as forming a constituent and coherent part of the dynamic environment, changes in morals can be brought about only in a dual manner. First, man's mental growth and evolution, the formation of his habits, attitudes and values are culturally conditioned and manipulated in childhood. Secondly, customs, traditions and institutions that surround his life largely define and determine his moral principles and standards. Social planning and planning the mental set of the individual are to be correlated for successful adjustment. Man lives as much by his values, ideals and norms as by the objects and happenings in his external, total behavioural

"field"; while there is interpenetration between these depending upon the depth-level of the self. The contents of mind may be powerfully operated on by education, propaganda and cultural and institutional pressure. But there is a limit to the manipulation of the growth and maturation of human habits and motives, since inner conflicts and tensions may frustrate all adjustment to the preferred patterns. It is thus essential that the technique, through which society may be remodelled, comprises the evocation by education and propaganda of richer, more harmonious and more complete motivations, values and ideals that strengthen the individual's resources of adjustment, on the one hand, and the reorganisation of social traditions, institutions and moral norms to meet changing conditions, on the other.

Man behaves in his environment in moral and cultural rather than in biological ways, while his total environment is both physical and social-cultural. The environment of man not only constitutes the forces, limitations and possibilities of physical nature, but also the ever-changing products of individual as well as social intelligence, valuation and action, tools, symbols, norms, institutions and culture. These latter are appropriated by him and integrated into a coherent part of personal equipment to enable him to adjust himself both to his natural and cultural environment as well as to his singular, subjective preference and experience. It is largely the subjective valuation and experience that constitute the medium for criticism of, and deviation from, social and moral norms and institutions through which society constantly transforms and renews itself. According to Dewey, subjectivity of mind represents an intermediate stage in which new ways of action are projected in imagination as possible social norms, not yet accepted by society. But man, psychologically constituted as he is, can find happiness not in his detachment or escape from the environment but in obtaining society's adoption of his own ideas, faiths and values as its own. Society's novel steps

towards a fuller and more harmonious total adaptation are first conceived and patternised in the mind of individuals.

Human institutions together with the tools, language, symbols and signs of communal living are social realities now added to sunshine and rainfall, soil and vegetation, mountain and stream. Social symbols and myths enable man to respond to the total environment comprising fellow-men as well as the physical environment, including himself and his ideas, beliefs, values and moral standards forming parts of the same social universe. A psychologist has recently observed: "Institutional and cultural objects or situations, of course, can be as readily apprehended, comprehended, remembered and thought about as is the natural environment. This is the case because of the mnemonic functions of nervous tissue. In other words, some of the most important of the bodily resources used by an organism are intrinsically changed by their own biography. The inference is that the psychological functions themselves may be changed while in the act of contributing to performance. In their contributions to performance the psychological functions are contingent upon the kinds of material available in the behavioural environment, and many of the most significant members of this environment are contingent on acts of learning within a given culture."¹ Man's physical adaptation and collective, symbolic or institutional behaviour are one integral whole, just as the region and culture are inseparable parts of one total configuration. In social ethics we deal with adaptation in terms of the total value "field", and in the framework of groups, institutions and symbolic behaviour that however still reflect within certain limits the geographical and ecological imperatives and patternings.

¹ C.R. Griffith: *Principles of Systematic Psychology*, pp. 648--49.

Levels of Social Causation and Values

The "frame", "field" or setting is decisive for social behaviour and for most of its characteristics. For convenience of analysis the "frame" or "field" could be distinguished into three orders or levels: ecological, economic and teleological. The "frame" includes, first, ecological and economic forces, ideas and goals that often dominate the entire trend of values, groups and institutions. Factors and features of the physical environment, such as the recurrence of droughts, earthquakes and diseases, determine moral attitudes and habits of peoples. Similarly the proportion of the sexes at birth, excessive or sparse population, severe economic pressure or economic abundance govern moral outlook and sentiments. Equally important are the cumulative effects of race, region and dietary, and of climate, such as the combination of enervating heat and humidity or of bracing cold and variable temperature and pressure, upon contrasted mental and emotional dispositions of peoples, as studied by Huntington, Buxton, Thomson and others. A land-locked tropical territory, an evergreen rain-forest region, a riverine stretch of land or an indented sea-coast develop distinctive mental and moral traits of peoples. Thus the accumulated force of environment, stock and social tradition and history contribute towards the differentiation of ethos. The recurrence of catastrophes such as hurricanes and earthquakes, famines and devastating epidemics in particular affect moral attitudes, although the effects naturally vary according to the level of technique and civilization of peoples. Each natural or economic region nourishes its characteristic scale of values, group organisation, economic stratification and the institutions of law and property. Fundamental changes in economic life and structure introduce new social relations and ethical standards. Throughout India and China, for instance, as agriculture is transformed by the excessive pressure on the land, fractionalisation of holdings

and multiplication of the landless class that supersedes the peasant proprietors, the morality of families, castes, clans and communities is eclipsed. Absentee landlordism and emphasis of contractual transactions by the landlord's agent, the money-lender and grain-dealer gradually replace the ties of kinship and neighbourhood. If the traditional family loyalties and obligations and feudal or neighbourhood attachments that dominated the ethos of the previous era of rural communalism languish or disappear, the wholesale exodus of peasant families and their employment and destitution in the rising industrial towns introduce novel conceptions of law and justice. The new economic legislation and industrial conscience of the entrepreneur gradually replace the protection offered to farmers and villagers by clans, castes, guilds and village communities and safeguard the values of life for the masses of industrial workers. Economic factors and circumstances play here the dominant rôle in moral transformation, characterised by the change over from family, clan and caste ethics to the ethics of the impersonal urban-industrial régime. Wherever such social and moral adaptation has not been easy and quick, injustice and inequity have reigned in the East, in spite of the strength of the old guilds, co-operatives, castes and panchayats with their immemorial loyalties and obligations. Such is the importance of economic factors, Max Weber has pointed out, that in a similar social and economic transition in Western Europe, the development of modern capitalism was largely due to peculiar religious ideas associated with Protestantism. Protestantism might have facilitated the advent of new social values and morals, but the dominating circumstance was the change in the social and economic structure as represented by the increase in population, migration and breakdown of medieval corporatism and feudalism. In the modern industrial world it is a well-known experience that economic prosperity is

favourable for social mobility and justice, abridgement of social distance and human fellowship. On the other hand, in a period of slump or crisis, social mobility is diminished, class cleavages and antagonisms are accentuated; while the subordination of the lower to the higher values of life, built up and consolidated in the normal process of social development, is challenged.

The "frame" of social behaviour no doubt includes social ideology and values selected through long processes of social evolution. Now, sudden technical, industrial and economic changes may put undue strain upon this ideological and evaluative pattern. Thus industrial capitalism with its developments of imperfect competition, combination and monopoly or, again, managerial revolution sets at nought the human and social values of early Liberalism associated with the 19th century social norm—freedom of competition and enterprise. Such phenomena are often characterised as "cultural lag" or disequilibrium. The notion of equilibrium or coherence starting from the ecologic and economic bonds to the harmony of groups, values and institutions in the cultural-ethical level is indispensable for the analysis of social causation, meanings and values in the cultural "total situation". For sociological understanding and interpretation, the coherence of the pattern of social life and culture as a whole is basic.

Values as the Most Inclusive Wholes in Gestalt Sociology

This emphasis of the "whole situation" is as old as Rousseau, Robert Owen and Marx and is increasingly evident in the approaches in the various social sciences. It is discernible in the regional method in sociology worked out by Le Play, Geddes, Branford and the present writer, interpreting the region, occupational functions and social institutions as interlaced wholes. The functional school in

anthropology led by Kroeber, Malinowski and Margaret Mead, the school of sociological jurisprudence of Koehler and Pound, the institutional theory of law in France in the hands of Hariou and Renard, the institutional theory of economics of Commons and the present writer, and the theory of political pluralism developed by Laski, Folett, MacIver and the present writer are among the significant movements illustrating the many-sided appreciation of the whole frame, setting or situation and configurational analysis.¹ Clarence M. Case first used the phrase "Gestalt Sociology" in labelling and defining the ecological movement in sociology. Commenting on social ecology in which the preoccupation with spatially flavoured notions might be expected to lead the sociologist into an abstracting, analysing dissection of the physical forms of community existence, he nevertheless finds that "the whole tendency from Brunhes through Mackenzie to Mukerjee has been quite the reverse of atomistic. On the contrary it has aimed at an intensive study of concrete wholes of human life with much of that attention to the "total situation" which may be called Gestalt Sociology."

First, any change in an external, ecologic or economic factor induces a series of changes in man's values, groups and institutions. Secondly, there is a second series of interrelations between the human individuals and the groups, values and institutions of which they form parts. For man, his legacy of values, tools and symbols is surely part of his life and activity, and is comprised in the unity and coherence of the social-cultural process. A shift in values alters the character of the individual and the group and *vice versa*. Social life represents a triadic balance of community, culture and region, and of personality, values and groups. None

¹ The whole movement towards a Gestalt outlook in the social sciences is discussed in Chapter XV in my *Institutional Theory of Economics*. See also Chapter XV in my *Social Ecology*.

can be understood except with reference to the others and to the whole situation. This is the basic position of the Gestalt theory. The Gestalt psychologists point out that the reasons for this lie in the very nature of man's thought and action processes, whereas ecologists, human geographers, anthropologists and Marxists had to content themselves with a more limited description of the relations they discerned. As a matter of fact, as G. W. Hartmann shrewdly observes, "from a classificatory point of view the configurations discerned by the social sciences are, if anything, more "fundamental" than those isolated by the laboratory psychologist in the sense that they constitute larger and more inclusive realities."¹ The interpretation of social life and change from the evaluative, total situational viewpoint is at once the most fundamental and all-embracing. For the system of values embodies the most comprehensive wholes or realities which can be understood or appreciated by man, and upon which is dependent the entire behaviour of men, groups, institutions and cultures. Such a comprehensive interpretation of social life and phenomena from an objective, evaluative viewpoint may be characterised as a Gestalt normative sociology that will be similar in mode of thought to the Gestalt view in psychology, the "field" theory in astronomy and physics and the organismic biology in the life sciences.

The Rôle of Social Myth and Symbol Pattern as the Basic Frame of Reference

In Gestalt sociology, it is social myth or ideology which defines the entire value situation in the group and institutional milieu and accounts for appropriate patterns and standards of human behaviour and the corresponding personality types. Man as a value-seeking creature, co-operating

¹ G.W. Hartmann: The Gestalt view of the Process of Institutional Transformation, *Psychological Review*, 1946.

and competing with fellowmen needs and operates on a basic frame of reference. This is the sign and symbol configuration that defines and organises the system of value-seeking and fulfilment for which men form themselves into groups. This "definition of the situation" that is supported by a whole host of symbols, myths, fictions, faiths and sanctions fully integrated into a system serves the important purpose of orienting human values, goals and behaviour and human qualities and achievements along certain definite channels favoured in the group, culture or region. Lewin observes: "Only by anchoring his own conduct in something as large, substantial and super-individual as the culture of a group can the individual stabilise his new beliefs sufficiently to keep them immune from the day-by-day fluctuations of moods and influences to which he, as an individual, is subject."¹ The total value situation in the group and institutional context cannot be understood without reference to the social symbol and myth pattern that embodies the structural generalisation of values and goals for the pursuit of which society is organised. In all societies, primitive or civilised, social symbols and myths comprise legends, anecdotes, maxims, models and ideals embodying valuations. Symbols and myths abbreviate, consolidate and transmit meanings and values by attaching these to social realities, persons, objects or social situations, the links of attachment being sensuous and emotional experience. Through gradual accretions, assimilations and adjustments, the symbol and myth pattern becomes a unified organic frame of reference for perceptions, insights, preferences and standards of behaviour, and guides man's safe and sure unconscious orientation. MacIver observes: "All social relations, the very texture of human society are myth-born and myth-sustained. The myth mediates between man

¹ *Resolving Social Conflicts*, p. 59.

and nature. From the shelter of his myth he perceives and experiences the world. Inside the myth he is at home in his world."

The Origin and Rôle of Ideals and Norms

Man in his group and institutional milieu experiences an enhancement of value appreciation through awareness of, and sympathy with, similar experience of values by fellowmen that is communicated to him by language, myth and symbol, expressing as well as communicating qualitative meanings and values in various degrees of extension, depth and intensity. Communion enriches the value consciousness of the individual who can compare, clarify and integrate his present values with those belonging to his own past experiences and the attitudes, sentiments and value experiences of fellowmen as communicated to him by speech, ritual and other symbolic devices of his groups. The result is that not only does he appreciate and relate values in a new and richer manner, i.e., he abstracts and generalises, and formulates ideal values or *ideals*, but he also enters into the ideas and feelings of fellowmen more understandingly and constructively, i.e., he also experiences greater social participation. The deepening of social participation, on the other hand, contributes to the range and richness of his personality, further enriches the common pool of values and ideals, and expands his loyalties, devotions and sacrifices. Thus the creative cycle of enlargement of value configuration for the individual repeats itself in social and moral life.

The major characteristic of the ideal is that it emerges out of a criticism, clarification and reflection of given values, and is hence not only more generalised and abstract but is also more inclusive than values. The ideal is in fact rational and universal. It moves not only individuals but also masses, peoples and nations. Because of its inclusive-

ness the ideal has an intensity, impulsion or motor-power that value hardly possesses, 'gripping the whole soul and drawing it onward', as Plato would say. The deliberative, critical and selective elements in the constitution of an ideal invest it with certain other features. First, an ideal is based on authentic, stable and universal, and not on counterfeit, ephemeral and narrow interests and values from both individual and social points of view. The chief merit of the ideal lies in its permanence and broad scope or inclusiveness. Second, the ideal has its hand and feet on the ground. It is not remote and dim, but is set up with a full knowledge of the present and past actualities and potentialities and is thus certain of realisation. The ideal is not a distant "star that dwells apart" nor is it "a light that never was on sea and land." It wallows in the mud and grovels on the dust in order that it can renew the earth. It imports the infinite and the permanent into man's limited and unstable activities and interrelations. Even in his defeats and bafflements he can, therefore, enjoy the full experience of the universal and permanent values of life. Third, the ideal stands for the whole, complete and perfect that can be apprehended by human insight and practised in human relations. Every ideal contributes to the coherent functioning of experience as a unity, and therefore commands loyalties and reverences that are socially expressed and transmitted through a variety of signs, symbols and myths. It transmutes the common tasks of life into supra-personal activities like sacraments and rites—symbolic performances characteristic of a martyr for his "cause", of a responsible moral personality in his fullness and richness. Finally, the ideal rests on careful scrutiny and estimation of the means to achieve it. Moral reflection abjures unworthy means to realise the ideal. Thus does the ideal introduce a new dimension and context into human values and their fulfilment. The mature judgment on the alternative means in view intro-

duces truth and moral consistency into both the making and achievement of the ideal. The ideal is uncompromising in its rejection of both compromise and consequences. Max Weber contrasts "ethics of conscience or faith" with "ethics of responsibility." "Anchored in absolute belief, the truth of the former is not impaired, even if action leads to the most harmful consequences." Hinduism, Buddhism and Christianity, all gave sublime expressions to the moral ideal that would not show any concern with its consequences. John Dewey has recently taken the attitude that a compromise does not imply an evil and that there is need for viewing consequences broadly in order to reach a genuine moral judgment. Often also certain fixed ends are assumed, resting on a misconception and failing to take account of the infinite flux of conditions and situations. "Variety of competing tendencies", Dewey observes, "enlarges the world. It brings a diversity of considerations before the mind, and enables action to take place finally in view of an object generously conceived and delicately refined, composed by a long process of selections and combinations."¹

Ideals not only contribute towards a better discrimination and organisation of values, but also by stimulating will, effort and devotion for a "cause" lead towards achievement. Society aids not merely in the discrimination between fleeting and stable, narrow and universal, instrumental and final values and ideals, and brings them into some systematic order or hierarchy, but also supplies the irresistible impulsion that makes their realisation certain in actual life. The fulfilment of an ideal means its embodiment in stable human relations and ways of social action i.e., in durable institutions, when the original intensity of feeling and sentiment behind the ideal is blunted or lapses. There then

¹ See his *Human Nature and Conduct*, p. 197. See *Conflicts of Power in Modern Culture*, pp. 23-28 for a discussion on postulational ethics.

begins another cycle of interchange between human interests, strivings and values and the institutional milieu out of which new values and ideals again emerge on the scene.

Man's social and ideal values or ideals cannot, however, emerge without the fulfilment of his biological and psychological needs—food, sex, security, self-expression and social recognition or status. On the one hand, these remain the essential basis of any value system. On the other, these cannot be fulfilled by themselves but blend in various combinations with the social and ideal values. How these blend, integrate or conflict with one another depends entirely upon the social culture i.e., the various groups, institutions and integrated framework of symbol, myth and ideology with which it surrounds, conditions and directs the life of man. It is from the matrix of social culture that all urgings, needs and interests spring as goals and values, transmuted by some kind of alchemy. There are competition, compromise, integration and synthesis of desires, goals and values. The individual finds the achievement of a certain goal or value showing new vistas for the achievement of others, or a whole world of goals and values completely excluded in the pursuit. Thus the values arrange themselves in individual and social experience as a system or configuration, the attitudes and ways of action of the individual being oriented to certain dominant or central values, while others remain in subordination or in the periphery. But the values that are subordinated or frustrated leave their indelible impress within the sub-conscious, and determine in some measure the modes of fulfilment of the dominant values in the sequence of their maturation. The valuing configuration always comprises, besides the dominant, central or coercive values, elements of the less potent, marginal and baffled desires and goals. It also includes ideals that are formulated as the result of criticism, co-ordination, validation and appreciation of desires and goals.

Finally, it also comprises certain universal and imperative "master" ideals or norms that show an "ought" that goals and even ideals do not possess.

Both society and man's conscious and unconscious life achieve such social definition and expression of values and ideals that the individual feels least balked or thwarted, as there is incompatibility or conflict of fundamental desires, interests and goals. Often, however, childhood conflicts and frustrations of instinctual cravings lead up to a neurosis that blocks the way to a normal integration and balanced emphasis of goals and values. Biologically speaking, the individual neurosis is an adjustive way of fulfilment of values, though its limited and vicious repetitive pattern does not permit inclusion of a wide range of interests and values. Alike in normal and neurotic behaviour of the individual, it is not the conflict or integration of desires in the raw, but the conflict or integration of secondary or derived satisfactions and values in the social and cultural milieu that canalises these desires upon certain definite objects and situations, which provide the basis of growth and maturation of the personality.

By studying differences in the value patterns of individuals in similar social situations, but under different social cultures, we can envisage the efficacy of traditions, institutions and other means of social control that socialise the personality, and define his goals as well as the ways of their satisfaction in his particular rôle or station in life. Such a study of social psychology is accordingly interlinked with the study of personality that exhibits different traits, mental and moral sets in different cultures defining and articulating for the individual divergent value systems. The great bulk of personality traits owe their internal consistency and balanced emphasis to the conforming attitudes, values and behaviours demanded by the cultural milieu. The concept of values is, indeed, fundamental in the under-

standing of human personality and ways of action.

On the other hand, different societies and cultures can be best interpreted and compared in terms of their dominant sets of values and ideals and the ways in which these organise and patternise other values in their group and institutional set-ups. The comparison becomes easier if the value tendencies are distinguished in terms of concrete limited goals, goods and situations instead of being envisaged and labelled abstractly as self-assertion, social recognition, power, competition or co-operation. Man's ego-esteem or sense of shame and guilt is associated with the achievement or failure to reach concrete goods and satisfactions in the actual rôles and positions in life. In this way the ideals and norms of culture are "internalised" as conscience, the moral call or super-ego, and enter into the very structure of the personality as its maturation accompanies greater sensitiveness to self-status and value of the ego in the eyes of fellowmen. Freud as he speaks of the origin of "the ideal ego or super-ego" refers to both the ambivalent dispositions of love and hate and the emotional process of "identification" between the child and the father by which the former acquires the qualities of his object of love—the father. Later on the "identification" spreads to the older school-mate or friend, teacher, gang leader, political hero or model who all stir the child's asexual passion. The interweaving of social status with man's conscience, his deep-seated self-esteem or self-evaluation makes personality development and social integration logically inseparable functions of the same movement.

Evolution and Imperativeness of "Master" Ideals or Norms

The values and ideals of the creative human personality and those of groups and society constantly act and react upon one another in the total cultural configuration. So-

cial development also implies a constant shift in both individual interests, values and judgments, and hence in personality structures, as well as in collective moral standards that are before long interiorised and incorporated within the changing personalities. Can we discern any universal trends in the progress of individual and social morality? Are there any coercive or "master" ideals or norms that harmonise particular values and codes of morality and underlie all collective and individual standards and actualities? The specific values and ideals of groups and individuals are obviously selected among a large number competing among themselves for dominance by the social culture. The value patterns progress in a definite manner towards a dual purpose viz., first, the full control of, and balance and harmony with, the environment, and, second, the completeness and uniqueness of the human personality. Thus arise the "master" ideals or norms of every human community, viz., first, knowledge (truth), art (beauty) and religion (wholeness or holiness) in respect of man's cosmic relations; and, second, justice, goodness, sympathy and love (communion) in his interpersonal relations.

Whitehead calls these two principles the generality of harmony or 'order' and the importance of the individual or 'love'. "Between the two", Whitehead remarks, "there is a suggestion of opposition. For 'order' is impersonal; and 'love' above all things is personal. The antithesis is solved by rating types of 'order' in relative importance according to their success in magnifying the individual actualities i.e., in providing strength of experience. Also in rating the individual on the double basis, partly on the intrinsic strength of its own experience and partly on its influence in the promotion of a high-grade type of 'order'. The two grounds in part coalesce. For a weak individual exerts a weak influence. The individual whose strength of experience is founded upon this ultimate intuition thereby

extends the influence of the source of all order."¹ 'Knowledge', 'art' and 'religion' on one side, and 'justice', 'goodness', 'love' and 'sympathy', on the other comprise universal norms underlying all human institutions and codes of morality. These are the stable, imperative ideals of individuals, groups and peoples in all ages and regions, and insistently seek embodiment in laws, freedoms, rights and duties and institutions. These are indeed universal definitions of human worth and perfection that constitute the enduring rock of all ages amidst the eddies and cross-currents, the ebbs and tides of social experience. The wisdom of both society and individuals has found these essential to the very structure of social action and the experience of the worthy, the good and the complete in all human relations. The order of preference and articulation of these "master" ideals or norms in various patterns in human institutions, laws and moral codes promote the evolution of the social milieu towards its proper completeness and perfection. There are competition and struggle between value patterns in social cultures as there are in individual moral experience. "The paths of life" of the Jivanmukta, of the Bodhisattva, of Dionysius, of Prometheus or of Apollonius are chosen as the result of the give-and-take between man's ideal creativeness and the myths, morals and norms of particular cultures, both stimulated in different degrees by social, economic and ideological changes. Sometimes the individual, sometimes the matrix of culture becomes the focus of new values and moral aspirations that insinuate themselves into the entire social structure and relations of the community through the free working of social intelligence and communication.

A Frame of Reference for Empirical Ethics

The concepts that are necessary for an integrated sociological and ethical analysis from an empirical viewpoint

¹ *Adventures of Ideas*, pp. 376-377.

include the following: the hierarchy of values; the categories of groups that stereotype and patternise social values, relationships and interactions; moral principles as expectancies and imperatives of the group "field"; the principles of the status-prestige-power system; the forms and categories of social control; the levels of value experience—goal, ideal and norm; rights and duties; the social symbol, myth, ethos and virtues; and the "master norms" and codes of morality in human progress. All these make up the institutional and normative pattern of behaviour. The major values, groups, social relations, controls and institutions can be usefully studied in their "appropriate" frame of reference.

There is close correspondence between the categories of groups, representing degrees of social participation, stages of value experience, social and moral norms and strata or depth-levels of the personality. 1, 2, 3 under the various heads in the Table on p. 223 show a general homologous development. Every head, however, shows differences in degree; transitions and continuous movements. The classification should not be taken too rigidly, since the very development of self and social consciousness implies the progress from one category of social participation and moral relation to another; while regression comprises the reverse movement. Men strive collectively towards achieving values; goals, ideals and norms are stages in their understanding and appreciation of the value situation. All goals and their modes of fulfilment or social behaviour are cultural products or symbols normatively determined. Thus both values and satisfactions in society are far different from the biologically determined desires and satisfactions on which these are indeed based. The objects of satisfaction achieved and the environment situation controlled in the process of value fulfilment are also integrated into new patterns in the vital process of human adaptation in the social environment. Out of society's reflection, criticism and judgment on the

various competing and conflicting goals and values of groups and individuals and on the instrumental and the intrinsic values emerge ideals. The formulation of ideals orders and stabilises value-seeking and achievement and makes possible the fulfilment of a whole world of values, balanced and reconciled with one another. Out of the community's scrutiny and differential preference also comes the scaling or a more or less stable hierarchy of values. This supplies groups and institutions with their principle of organisation and individuals with the principle of personality integration. It underlies the codes of laws and morals, mores and manners and also the system of stratification in a society. The gradation of values and ideals in a social culture puts certain "master" ideals or norms at the top—the imperative ideals of life, mind and society that have a detachment and universality to the highest degree man can contemplate. Norms are related to the inner order of the universe, self and the eternal movement of history. These are the supreme expressions of man's evaluating, symbolising, aspiring consciousness.

Man's adaptation or value fulfilment takes place in a restricted frame of reference, in limited ecological and social space or "field". This is provided for every individual by the status-prestige scheme that is a reflection of the society's table of values or social ethos. The status-prestige-power scheme comprises various rôles, positions and statuses allotted to individuals according to their personal traits and capacities as well as normative expectancies, rights and duties and opportunities for education and acquisition of special skills and aptitudes. Men seek their limited goals in life within this scheme, and their success or failure in value achievement accompanies gain or loss of social status and self-status, so important for ego-development or disorganisation. Shame, honour and social expectancy as well as self-esteem and conscience make men live properly and

fully up to their rôles, positions and niches in society. Outside the restricted field of jobs, occupations and professions that educate and regiment the "occupation" and "status" personality, assimilating the rules, conventions and standards of the class and the profession, are the generalised sanctions of good behaviour in the total society—the broader moral field in which his goals and behaviour are selected and ordered with reference to the development of the "total" personality. Such sanctions or moral norms are different according to the stratum or depth-level of social consciousness and of self-consciousness, aspects of the same organisation of human nature. It is through symbolisation or myth-making as efficacious means of social communication that society instils its dominant beliefs, meanings and norms into institutional relationships and goals and individual and moral habits and conscience, and brings about the interpenetration between self-consciousness and social consciousness, between personal preferences and social purposes and ideals. Means of control at the deepest level of individual and social consciousness become spontaneous. Conscience here identifies itself with the supreme faith in human completeness and perfection that the individual and society can comprehend. The social myth, faith and ideology pattern and the resources of communion that society has at its disposal in the form of the fine arts, education and religion introject its "master" norms or supreme definitions of perfection into man's moral routine and conscience, and transform his every day living into symbolic rôle or ritual.

It will thus appear that the generalised frame of reference, which is sketched barely and baldly on p. 223, comprises the outline of the structural categories of social integration and of human personality and of their functional interdependence in the ethical process. The phases or levels of values—goal, ideal and norm—provide certain fixed points

of the character, structure, and the pattern of the social bonds or behaviour, of moral standards and social control. The development of human personality, its freedom and moral creativeness build up typical groups and social selves as well as their appropriate inherent or constitutional moral principles and forms and degrees of social control, the appropriateness being determined by the potentiality or purpose of the particular group "field". The adoption of a set of "stereotypes" indicating how the individual perceives "reality", his conformity to a pattern of values, moral expectancies and standards and his control over his physical and social movements are different aspects of the same process. His acceptance of a new set of values, beliefs and moral norms and of a new super-ego is linked with his involvement with a specific group, rôle or status, a definite source of approval or disapproval as a new "frame" or "field" of reference. The status of values is the fundamental nexus in this integrative analysis, which sees values, groups, social selves and super-egos as different expressions of a total movement of the progressive organisation and adaptation of life.

The essential tasks of sociology and ethics are to investigate the ongoing processes of valuation, morality, social integration and control and self-realisation as facets of the same movement, and so guide and direct the latter as to lead to a qualitative advance, as judged by the same constitutional "laws" of integration, interpenetration and solidarity that are applicable equally to mind, values, morals and society. It is these inherent laws of integration, solidarity and interpenetration that show the way towards higher values, richer personalities, more intimate social bonds, more extensive and integrated groups and institutions, more spontaneous forms of social control and higher moral categories and standards. This is man's social and spiritual destiny as discerned by sociology and ethics.

CHAPTER X

ETHICS OF THE GROUP—FROM CROWD TO COMMONALTY

The Self as an Ethical Concept

Modern social psychology dismisses the assumption of man being by nature an intractable ego-centric animal, who has to be tamed into social behaviour against his instincts, and also the familiar notion, grounded on the former, in respect of the inevitable opposition between egoism and altruism, individual desire and social utility, individualism and collectivism, freedom and authority. It is erroneous to isolate the attitude and experience of the individual from the social and cultural background: such isolation—a relic of the older metaphysical individualism—supports the orthodox conceptions that individual motivation is the real source of values, and that folkways, laws, morals and institutions are chains and fetters, external hinderances to the expression and fulfilment of values. Social psychology insists, on the contrary, that man's consciousness of self emerges out of his social relations, as the self plays the rôles of others in society, moves out of its own biological boundaries for the resolution of conflict and the relief of tension; seeks goals and values common to others successfully or unsuccessfully with opposite effects upon self-status, and becomes itself a part of the genuine give-and-take in social intercourse. Thus the self is, as Sorokin aptly observes, the smallest culture area. From another angle, we can speak of the self as an ethical, cultural, sociological and legal concept. Obviously, the sense of morality, goodness and justice is bound up with the very essence of consciousness. As the child's consciousness matures and becomes inte-

grated, the norms of propriety and manners, rightness and goodness of his social milieu are introjected into it as his conscience, emotionally charged with the sense of guilt, and anxiety and the sense of goodness or perfection that are derived from the group. Man's moral imperatives underlie the very fact of his social existence.

It is in the invisible workshop of man's mind that there originate his consciousness of self as well as of his social selves, rôles and positions, his goals, values and ideals as well as his faith in, and loyalty to, folkways, laws and institutions that rule life in society. But the self is not an organisation in which things are merely given. Man projects what he completely and insistently is upon his environment, his society. Through the medium of social relations, his conscience and faith impose upon the culture his own scales of values, judgments and expectations. Just as his self and behaviour represent a unity, so his conscience, reason and love as well as the cultural and legal order are accordingly tied to one another as an integral whole—the world of values that enmeshes and over-reaches him and his surroundings. Conscience is as much sustained by laws, folkways and institutions as the latter are nourished by conscience. The ideal values and the entire framework of social relations and institutions, laws, moralities and manners are inseparable and continuous. It is in the invisible world of meanings and values that conscience, honour, law, morals and folkways mingle and mutually judge and interpenetrate one another, safeguarding both the full and complete expression of the human personality and rightness of social relations, freedoms and laws.

The normalcy of man's social relations based on love and goodness, instead of authority and power; the goodness or justness of the pattern of group organization and institutions that may not thwart but adequately fulfil and

enhance the major values of life; and the resolution of opposition between inviolable and auxiliary rights and duties, or between laws and public policies that embody the interests of different pressure groups in society—all these are achieved or lost in the realm of ideal values, where the self is most profoundly conscious of the non-self, such consciousness comprising the inner order and harmony of both the universe and social culture. The scaling principle cannot be furnished by any technique, tool, or device discovered by organised economics or politics; the scaling of values is a value in itself, and proceeds from the moral consciousness of the individual and the social culture at their highest and noblest.

The Group as an Autonomous System of Morality

The scaling principle cannot be considered in too abstract or partial terms, but is related to individuals as valuers or moral agents participating through group actions in the creation, criticism and realisation of values in concrete situations of life. Modern ethical theory defines moral actions in terms not of any metaphysical or natural objects but in those of group expectations and obligations, rights and duties, statuses and achievements that grow out of the social relations of reciprocity and interdependence fundamental in human life. With G. E. Moore, Ross, Dewey and Tufts, ethics has its own special field and method, and the conceptions of right, duty and good are no longer derived from metaphysics, biology or psychology. Dewey observes: "Moral conceptions and processes grow out of the very conditions of human life. The fundamental conceptions of morals are, therefore, neither arbitrary nor artificial. Particular aspects of morals are transient, they are often, in their actual manifestations, defective and perverted. But the framework of moral conceptions is as permanent as human life itself."

To present the same issue from another angle, it is the degree of group participation, and hence of inclusion and attachment as represented by the successive states of Crowd, Interest-group, Society or Community and abstract Commonalty that determines the rightness or wrongness in personal relationships, the kinds of sanctions of good behaviour as well as what the individual can make out of the group pattern and its basic rights-and-duties, loyalties and virtues and system of moral norms and codes. As we rise from a Crowd through an Interest-group to Community and abstract Commonalty, the individual's self is considerably more deeply involved in group life and activity; not fluctuating fragments of the self but his total self is engaged in and belongs to these; and his loyalty and devotion are more ardent as the group is also more stable and permanent. The individuals organised in an abstract Commonalty show higher morale and greater personal moral responsibility or more sensitive as well as universal conscience for their actions than those belonging to Community groupings. Men associated in Interest-groups show even lower morale and less personal responsibility or sense of duty than members of Community groupings. The Commonalty by virtue of its permanence, rooted not in economic interests but in abstractions, idealisations and symbolisations, exhibits an enhanced sense of duty, self-control and internal consistency in its culture. Within a total myth and ideology the Commonalty grouping invests itself with a moral and spiritual mission of its own to fulfil. Thus does the Commonalty acquire for the individual the pervading organic coherence and unity, which causes it to be regarded as an entity with the same reality as the human being. At the same time his moral insight and autonomy are nowhere greater than in the abstract Commonalty group, implying his unique rôle in remaking the group and its values and norms.

The depth of personality, the content of values, the degree of group inclusion and attachment, the moral responsibility and morale of the individual and the unity and stability of the group as a self-regulating, self-initiating autonomous system of morality—all these are enhanced as we start with Interest-group and rise to Community, and thence to Commonalty group in society. This is the consummation of the dialectic of the human association, at each phase of which a specific moral norm is created corresponding to the specific social connection or level of group participation of individuals. The four basic types of group relations—Mass or Crowd, Interest-group, Society or Community and abstract Commonalty—are obviously qualitatively different, embodying different social bonds and valuations and eliciting divergent social behaviour, experience and moral principles. It is not the external form of the association but its basic relation and attitude which give the real clue to the whole social process and moral experience.

The Lapse of Morality in the Mass or Crowd

The term 'mass' (which the demagogue employs so facilely and frequently) is an abstraction. Men live their separate, independent lives and become often indignant as they are labelled collectively as 'mass'. The wrong and often indefensible opinions that the 'mass' entertains, and the impulsive, senseless manner in which it behaves excite ridicule. Yet most men belong to the mass, if not all the time, at least on occasions. They comprise a 'mass' when their minds become peculiarly responsive to the impulses, opinions and behaviour of fellowmen, when they shed the privacies of their personalities to participate in the thoughts, attitudes and emotions of their immediate social milieu, in what Levy-Bruhl calls 'collective representations'. The mass-mind as a unified psychological reality

which can be appealed to and exploited does not exist as a fact of nature. It is created and activated as the result of certain transformations of individual minds. The Crowd is mass in its emotional and motor aspects; its feelings and behaviour are in large measure unpredictable. The Indian Pānchatantra gives us the following maxim: "Beware the populace enraged; A crowd's a fearsome thing: The ants devoured the giant snake for all his quivering." The Crowd, as distinct from a well-ordered gathering, exhibits violent emotions, hallucinations and impulsive behaviours. It is peculiarly susceptible to the influence of catch phrases, simple formulae, myths, rumours and stereotyped actions. It is not essential that crowd-psychosis should pervade a gathering in a particular space. It may spread over a whole city, region or country even when people do not or cannot meet together. Crowd personality is nurtured on the artificial diet of certain economic, moral, religious or political ideas and beliefs of indefinite import induced by suggestions usually carrying with them elemental feelings and emotions. Slogans, stereotypes, delusions and highly emotional behaviour are its necessary expressions. The mind of the Crowd perpetually sways on the unstable foundations of the primal instincts and emotions and simple, crude and often illogical suggestions.

The plane of mind characteristic of the mass or crowd is easily induced by inciters or leaders with charismatic or spiritual pretensions. Men lay down their critical faculty and revert to child consciousness. The leader is the father surrogate, and is often actually called the Father. The followers lapse into a submissive and receptive attitude characteristic of both children and religious devotees. Such pattern of mind is sustained by certain low-level symbolic behaviour such as a special mode of salute and shouting of certain epithets and slogans. These and other low-level, stereotyped actions serve to translate the mind to a less differentiated plane of experience and behaviour. The

plane of mass or crowd consciousness is further maintained by creating a common scapegoat or enemy against which the entire group must pitch itself. And as a further measure the leader manages to disseminate various messages, pregnant with many possible meanings which may constantly focus attention to the suggestions and associated images of marked vividness as well as to the influences of the specific group milieu. Lastly, the successful exploiter of the mass or crowd creates through his utterances a ring of nebulous and less orthodox opinions around the avowed principles for which the crowd situation is created.

Propagation of rank emotions, pictorial representation of ideas in terms of eidetic imagery and tendency to impulsive behaviour, all indicate the lapse of experience from the plane of intellectual discrimination to that of emotions and impulses, from the complex cortical level to the diffuse and primitive thalamic level, characteristic of a less developed order of mind. The primitive personality finds itself most at home with relatively simple opinions and stereotyped acts. Mind on this plane ceases to possess well-fashioned ideas, habits and canalised attitudes but deep-lying emotions emerge as instigators to mass action. Catch-words and symbols release tremendous energies through activities that do not seek definite goals. The Crowd may thus be easily swayed from one view to its opposite. It becomes a ready machine for the leader to operate. The halo of mystery, sanctity and charisma created round the leader's personality invests the Crowd with supreme confidence in him. His contradictions, failures and even lapses are ignored or explained away. The Crowd can easily be played upon by the leader's feelings and sentiments. It behaves in a silly or sublime, cowardly or courageous manner at his behest.

Men under normal social conditions deliberate, evaluate and plan. Their goals, values and behaviour reflect

their character and individuality. The mass-man or crowd-man on the contrary perpetually extends his mental antennae for catching his leader's opinions, values and faiths and his fellowmen's perceptions, emotions and attitudes. His own perceptions, ideas and feelings are, thus, less specified and possess uncertain boundaries. The individual in the mass or crowd becomes a chameleon. While the assembling of a mass of individuals promotes emotional release, inhibition of rational ideas and routinised habits and readiness to act, the leaders or demagogues supply myths of unity, solidarity and emotional security and manipulate their passions for the "cause" that provides vicarious security and enjoyment. Thus vast masses of men with whom the sense of personal insecurity and social loneliness as well as worthlessness is strong are raised to a high pitch of collective excitement, irrationality and suggestibility.¹ Kimball Young observes: "A transitory and emotional or irrational quality makes his (the mass-man's) attitudes and values different from the more stable and rational ones assumed in traditional social life. Old moral codes appear outworn, personal loyalties of the past mean little or nothing; there is a certain disintegration of life organisation. This may reflect the breakdown of society's moral order."²

Even the very gregariousness of the people, freed from the moulds of routinised behaviour, folkways and institutions, serves to energise the crowd. In most cases the energy finds outlet in destruction, since the crowd exhibits a low level of mental organisation characterised by man's most primitive emotions, hallucinations and impulsive actions. Anger, hate, aggressiveness and cruelty, which

¹ Vide Mukerjee and Sen Gupta: *Introduction to Social Psychology*, Chapters XVI and XVII. Sen Gupta has helped me with a few new suggestions.

² *Handbook of Social Psychology*, p. 409.

the social culture systematically and drastically endeavours to suppress, are now released in their full destructive fury, the fury being all the greater, the greater the cultural habituation and suppression. Accordingly mass or crowd behaviour represents the greatest menace to ordered, civilized and moral existence. Yet the crowd is a morbid, pathological expression of the same primeval, undifferentiated impulse of sociability—the herd impulse—which it has been the task of civilization to regulate, refine and elevate in specialised groups and institutions for the improvement of his social and moral relations and experience. Therein lies the peculiar social and moral danger of the crowd.

There may be street, railway, cinema and holiday crowds that are not harmful to the established order of society. Due to excessive regimentation in modern civilization men wish to obtain release from the trammels of routine life and organization. A holiday, a market day and a festive occasion upset the established routine and men and women form crowds spontaneously in the joy of escape from discipline and regimentation. Storms, earthquakes, bank failures, fires and street accidents, all of which interrupt the smooth tenor of daily life and engender among people a feeling of insecurity and fear, also stimulate crowd formation. Civilized habits, reserves of wisdom and experience and institutions, that hold fast man's ideas, faiths and routines of behaviour, counteract the tendencies towards the crowd formation and the swift domination of casual, sudden impulses. Crowd mentality manifests the sudden lapse of habits, values and standards which social control, education and discipline have taken years to build up. It is only when an Interest-group suddenly becomes aware of the solidarity of its particular interests and is aroused by collective passions and stereotypes that it exhibits the irresponsibility, aggression and unstability of the Crowd.

The Minimum Morality of Interest-group

As a group configuration, Mass or Crowd is qualitatively far different from the Interest-group. A Crowd is the most ephemeral of all social groups, and shows no definite configuration controlling the relations of the individuals. A quickly formed, sullen or angry crowd of discharged workers is subject to sudden emotional outbursts. It seeks revenge against the employer by vociferous demonstration, strike or direct action until it is dispersed by the police. Neither propriety nor good manners nor folkways can prevent the Crowd from behaving fitfully, aggressively, violently. The Crowd produces no moral claims before the community, but on the contrary is disruptive of many values such as those of justice, peace and order it prizes. The Crowd is amoral or immoral. But the same body of rebellious workers may be pacified, "brought to their senses" and induced by a leader, who appears on the scene, to sit down as members of a trade-union, an Interest-group, clarify their grievances by sober discussion and present these collectively before the employer. The latter also obtains an opportunity to explain his own side of the case as the whole social situation now favours a dispassionate examination of the issues involved. The union eventually comes to an agreement with the employer who assures them stability of employment or an increment of wages in lieu of discipline, regular attendance and average output. The moral principles of propriety, reciprocity, fairness and proportion are emergents of an Interest-group situation. Reciprocity, integrity, fair play and consideration are the minimum expectancies and claims, without which group formation of any kind cannot stabilise or maintain itself.

Again, the trade-union may eventually develop into Society or Community, through common understanding, feeling and sentiment with the employer as the result of

friendly co-operation and participation in work, management and recreational interests. Now the moral principles are elevated to those of equity and justice, which may obtain social approval and even legal recognition as the social and economic rights of workers, such as those of security of job, freedom of collective bargaining and minimum wage. Equity and justice are generalised, abstract, impersonal categories built up by social intelligence out of the structure of relationships of *quid pro quo*, reciprocity and fair play that constitute rudimentary social participation and moral experience. Equity and justice imply an enterprise-in-common; while the reciprocity system implies the equivalence of enterprises that have, however, to be mutually accommodated for the sustenance or aggrandisement of each. The focus of the former is upon the duties and obligations that nurture the commonness of the enterprise, its shared satisfactions and values. The focus of the latter is upon the specific, limited satisfactions and values apportioned for each private enterprise. It must be pointed out that the distinction is not rigid; the two "ideal types" merge in each other. Organised unionism in different countries now aspires to weld together the working classes of all continents and races into a commonalty of world labour. Industrial workers of different countries as they unite and form the I. L. O. constitute a partial but strengthening Interest-group of world workers. The ideal of equalisation of standards of living among the proletariat of the world through reciprocal sharing of opportunities is, however, still a distant dream of the international labour movement. Thus neither the I. L. O. nor the World Federation of Labour can rise to a Commonalty which may transcend the rational and calculable connections of Interest-groups and whose norms of levelling, service and solidarity may supervene over those of justice.

The Successive "Natural" Imperatives of Group Situations

Out of man's living in the Interest-group, Community or abstract Commonalty emerge different social expectancies, moral demands and sentiments. The sources of moral obligation are many, flexible and shifting due to the different levels of self and group consciousness. The lack of adequate recognition of different strata of self- and collective consciousness is largely responsible for the various controversies in respect of moral obligation. Moral obligation is, to be sure, manifold. It emerges out of group living and fundamentally rests on the inherent necessities of group life and continuity. Men have fundamental obligations as they have fundamental values such as food, sex, security, social fellowship and recognition that can be satisfied only in, with, and through, other fellowmen with whom they form groups and institutions. Moral obligations arise out of social connections; these are group "field" imperatives. These begin with folkways, customs and manners that constitute the group pattern and represent minimum reciprocal expectancy or claim and hence the minimum of morality. Through social expectancy man rises from the immediate and irrational to the stable, calculable and rational self that can integrate and order his casual, immediate contacts and responses with fellowmen into a system or configuration without which group living cannot be maintained. This configuration of "requiredness" or imperative is the order of moral norms. Social connection and expectancy, in respect of the pursuit of common interests and values, arouse emotions, but these are gradually relegated into the background. Habits, manners and folkways crystallise and supersede the emotional bonds of individuals that cannot, indeed, provide the basis of enduring social connections or pre-determined configuration of the group. Moral principles

are no respecters of persons; these have an impersonality, "disinterestedness" and "requiredness" that govern the relations and actions of individuals as typical members of a definite configuration of grouping, and that act as binders over and above personal attachments and loyalties. These introduce a clear limitation and definition of man's social connections, establish the group above the fluctuations of individual whim or caprice, anger or fear, and begin as well as end all abstract rationality.

Man's promise to fulfil a contract, his conformity to the standards of fair play, justice and proportion and his duties and obligations for the family, the community and the state not merely create and perennially safeguard the social-cultural system against the uniqueness and incalculableness of human relations and experiences, but also give the true meaning and worth to his life. These order, organise and unify his experiences, and themselves live as he carries, and stands for, them. His value and aspiration, likemindedness and sympathy, rationality and calculation converge and culminate in his moral principles and norms. Moral principles and norms in their turn are inert and irrational without them.

The norms of reciprocity, fair play, equity and justice are not "metaphysical", categorical imperatives but "natural", "situational" imperatives of groups in which individuals are aware of their social bonds and wish to maintain and perpetuate them as essential phases of adjustment and achievement of unity and wholeness through practical organisation. In group living what are significant are rights and duties rather than abstract, absolute imperatives; the essential values of life rather than the ethical, metaphysical categories of truth, beauty and goodness; and social expectations and appraisals of statuses, rôles and services that give meaning and worth both to the social process and the individual life rather than transcendental ethical principles.

The Maximum of Morality in Commonalty

Man in his group milieu finds himself in co-operation, competition and struggle with fellowmen in his pursuit of values. Such social experience results in his measurement of self-status and self-esteem in terms of social status and social recognition, and transference of his value situation and experience connected with the practical existence of "alter-egos" into his own self. His installation of society into the citadel of his self involves the rise of conscience with associated emotions of the sense of guilt, fear of punishment and perfection derived from his social-cultural milieu. But conscience is not mere dynamic feeling and tension arising from anxiety due to social disapprobation or dread of punishment, as the Freudians have told us. Conscience also involves consciousness of rights and duties, rôles and services in the social network. In the human mind as it becomes reflective through success and failure with reference to fellowmen that are judged as success and failure of the self, conscience, faith and reason constantly impinge upon, judge and interpenetrate with folkways, conventions and codes of rights and duties. Morality gradually becomes more explicitly deliberative, involving the activity of the stable, evaluative, rational self, that protects both against the immediacy and irrationality of self and the constraint and coercion of existing laws, codes and folkways. Thus it may lift itself to its highest potentialities and disregard every social connection except the best and the most extensive. At the highest or ideal level of morality the self leaps into transcendence, and imports moral imperatives from the order and harmony of the abstract Commonalty, the group of all groups or the cosmic group mind, and actualises them in concrete group relations and satisfactions.

If animals have their traditions and values, unlike man they have no sense of these. Man is not only cons-

cious of values, but is also a "critic, creator and worshipper" of values, and thus transcends both nature and society. Through his relationship to the directive, creative cosmic group mind, through his moral obligation to respond to its imperatives, he gains full stature of moral autonomy and mastery of the environment. But this is not true except of the more gifted personalities, who alone can bring the full impact of the absolute, unconditional values or "categorical imperatives" upon social expectancies, claims and judgments, and may even sacrifice their lives in passional and holy ardour for them. It is the cosmic group mind that, indeed, comprises and reveals the pure and undefiled moral norms and laws, freed from the taint of the social-historical context and the wishfulness of individuals and their little groups and systems. Thus the claims of moral imperatives assume universality, impersonality and metaphysical absoluteness that are trans-social or trans-human, teleological. There are as many levels of morality and moral obligation as there are levels of self. Morality ascends from its minimum in etiquette, manners and folkways to its maximum in the universal, eternal and absolute normative ideals that the self realises as purposes of the cosmic mind, as goals of the cosmic process but working wherever human persons live.

The Consummation of Groups and Morals

The level of morality rises with the intimacy of social bonds, the increase of group cohesion, as Crowd develops into Interest-group and Interest-group into Society or Community and Society into abstract Commonalty or earth-community. Social cohesion is the least, most impulsive, temporary and superficial in the Crowd. Cohesion here depends on external coercion and pressure, fear and insecurity. There is no morality of the Crowd. But when morals come into the cognizance of the Crowd, it reacts

most violently, as in mob lynching, pogrom, religious or racial riot, where men collectively experience an outburst of moral feeling and indignation that seeks to right a wrong, however brutally. That the Crowd enforces an ethic in its own haphazard, savage manner represents obviously a distinctive failure of the state or the community to maintain laws or community mores, whether in the frontiers or in the heart of civilization. The Interest-group represents stabler social interrelation and, based as it is on reciprocity and calculableness of divisible economic goods and services, develops clearly the moral principles of fair play and proportion for the adjudication of claims and counter-claims. More than coercion and constraint, integration rests here on reciprocal expectancy that underlies the feeling of shame and honour. These are hardly differentiated from the moral and juridical obligations of contract and fair, honest and scrupulous dealing that underlie the rational solidarity and continuity of the Interest-group. But the norms of justice obtain the greatest clarity and force in Society or Community that transforms the self-and-group-circumscribed rules of fair play and reciprocity into generalised principles of equity. These apply uniformly to all relations and transactions among individuals and groups. The conception of justice carries over the notions of liberty, equality and exchange, fairness and proportion in reciprocity relations into as wide a field of human connections as possible, taking into account all the possible factors and their claims in the whole social situation. Justice accordingly establishes a more comprehensive social integration than reciprocity or fair dealing does. But the principle of justice is also not self-sufficient. As Dewey and Tufts observe: "That human nature should have justice done it under all circumstances is an infinitely complicated and difficult requirement; and only a vision of the capacities and accomplishments of human beings rooted in affection and sympathy

can perceive and execute justly.”¹ Love, sympathy and compassion fulfil and transcend the claims of human equality and dignity that justice sets up. Love, solidarity and sharing, stressing a morality not based primarily upon claims and counter-claims but upon service and counter-service, build up the whole, which we call abstract or ideal Commonalty. It is necessary to point out that it is only in a society permeated by love, reciprocal service and goodwill that the demands of justice can in practice be carried out satisfactorily, while of course there is the concentration towards positive enrichment of the common good or the good of others through sharing.

Commonalty Morale in Europe and Asia

Commonalty represents the stage of profoundest union, and is therefore the least dependent on external constraint and social pressure and most on conscience and spontaneous love. Communion here is the most spontaneous and perfect. The self-transcending communion or love in Commonalty is a complete fusion or solidarity of one's consciousness with that of other persons. The morality of Commonalty springs from plumbing of the depths of self by intuition, leading to the most intensive and extensive possible consciousness. This interpenetration and expansion of consciousness have been thus explained by Guyau as the kernel of morality: “There is a certain generosity inseparable from life, and without which one dies, one dries up inside. One must flourish; morality, disinterest is the flower of human life. Consciousness has dissolving force, so it is necessary to find a principle that will unify consciousness with the spontaneity of the unconscious instinct. In fact, one can imagine much more

¹ See *Ethics*, p. 416; also Lamont : *Principles of Moral Judgment*, p. 171.

subtle and direct means of communication and sympathy than exist today between different individuals. The science of the nervous and cerebral systems has only just begun; as yet we only know the unhealthy exaltations of this system, the sympathies and suggestions of hypnotism; but we already foresee a whole world of phenomena in which a communication of consciences tends to produce itself, and even, when the mutual wills consent to it, a sort of absorption of personalities one within the other."¹ Bergson also speaks often of the interpenetration of personalities: "If the mind is attached to the body only by a part of itself, we may conjecture that for the other part of the mind there is a reciprocal encroachment. Between different minds there may continually be taking place changes analogous to the phenomena of endosmosis."²

In the Orient morality is considered as a matter of inner spiritual discipline and meditation rather than of external social norm and regulation. Both philosophy and ethics lay down confidently the principle, so little in keeping with everyday experience, of an equal participation of all men in a higher essence. Such a principle is, however, supported by an unending band of sages through the centuries who embrace all humanity in one simple indivisible, inexhaustible love and compassion. Man's duties, obligations and virtues are in the Orient more spiritual than moral in their essence; these spring spontaneously from love, interpenetration and solidarity that recognise no spiritual boundaries in the universe.

In Chinese ethics the propriety of conduct (Li), so much stressed by Confucius, is conformity to the order and harmony of the "Great Whole" (Tao). Confucius

¹ J. M. Guyau, *L'Irreligion de l'avenir*, p. 470 quoted in *Roots of Bergson's Philosophy*, pp. 112-114.

² Presidential Address before the English Society for Psychical Research, 1913.

observes: "The power of spiritual forces in the Universe—how active is everywhere. Invisible to the eyes and impalpable to the senses, it is inherent in all things and nothing can escape its operation." From this arises Jen which is the Chinese equivalent of love, goodwill or altruism. As Mencius says, "a sense of fellow-feeling is the bud of Jen." Infinite fellow-feeling or love (Jen) and justice or righteousness (Wi) are the twin cardinal virtues in Chinese culture. Now unselfishness impregnated with fellow-feeling or altruism implies justice. Thus the people of China are enjoined first to comprehend fellow-feeling or Jen. Man is to achieve his oneness with the "Great Whole" intellectually and emotionally.

There is no ethics in the whole world that has analysed the stages of man's cultivation of the most extensive communion or Commonalty in such profound manner as Hindu and Buddhist ethics. In the Bhagavad Gita the man of meditation is divided into four categories according to the level of his communion: (1) one who realises the Supreme Self in all sentient creatures; (2) one who realises all sentient creatures in the Supreme Self; (3) one who realises the indwelling Supreme Self everywhere; and (4) one who realises every thing and everybody in the indwelling Supreme Self.¹ The progress of meditation is from the comprehension of the universe by self-knowledge and identification of self and non-self to transcendence, where both self and non-self disappear in the bliss of unitive consciousness or love. Love is the sequel of the merging of the incomplete self in one comprehensive, Supreme Self; it is the experience of the Supreme Self or deity in every sentient being that follows the transcendence of self-knowledge. Thus as

¹ *The Bhagavad Gita*, VI 29-33. The counterpart of this in Mahayana Buddhism is the Avatamsaka, chapter 39, that similarly stresses that the human mind is the universe itself and that in Enlightenment everything interpenetrates and is mutually conditioned. Buddhas and Bodhisattvas are the means to help all to discern the universal mind. The Bodhidharma is the Great Compassion.

Eckhart says, "what a man takes in by contemplation that he passes out in love."

The Mahasudarsana Sutta, inspired by Mahayana Buddhism, describes the stages among the later Buddhists of the cultivation of altruism by practising the meditation on the "four infinite sentiments"—Love, Compassion, Joy and Serenity. Man concentrates successively in the thoughts of Love, Compassion, Joy and Serenity, increasing these sentiments in his own heart "incessantly and immeasurably," and then "envelops the entire world with these to its furthest limits." Thus mankind's pain and anguish are not only assuaged, but it also inclines towards humaneness and goodwill. This is the noble task of the Bodhisattva in whom the Heart of Wisdom (Bodhichitta) is fully unfolded. The Bodhisattva does not accept the ideal of final release, sensitive as he is to the sorrow of the world, but makes this pious resolve, in the words of the Avatamsaka Sutra, "For as much as there is the will that all sentient beings should be altogether made free, I will not forsake my fellow creatures." Or, again, in the words of the Lankavatara Sutra, "the Bodhisattva is alive to his original vow flowing out of the all-embracing love that is in his heart. He does not enter into Nirvana (as a stage separate from the world of Becoming), he knows that the visible world is nothing but a manifestation of Mind itself." Thus the visible world is neither abjured nor Nirvana preferred. In the illumination of supreme knowledge, there is neither bondage nor deliverance. Such is the final contemplation (dhyana) of the Bodhisattva. After the first awakening of the heart of wisdom in the warmth of compassion (karuna) and the light of divine knowledge (prajna), the Bodhisattva has to pass through the following "ten stages" or "stations"¹ viz., those of Joy, Purity, Effulgence, Burning, Hard To Achieve,

¹ *The Dasabhumika*, one of the Mahayana Sutras, translation by Rahder.

Showing The Face, Going Afar Off, Not Moving To and Fro, Good Intelligence and Dharma-cloud. On the tenth stage that is one of approximation to the Buddhas, the Bodhisattva receives the "Rain of the True Law," and becomes himself the "Cloud of the Law", sending upon creatures the good rain which lays the dust of the passions and causes the growth of the harvest of merits. In his course of service to all sentient creatures, the Bodhisattva does not forsake the world and its riches and pleasures, but these are transmuted into divine offerings. The Bodhisattva whose life is intended exclusively for the sake of delivering all sentient beings is particularly enjoined to seek out the wicked, the outcaste and the unfortunate in society. The Surangama Sutra mentions:—"You (the Bodhisattva) should make use of all manner of transformations, such as disciples, laymen, kings, lords, ministers, virgins, boy eunuchs, and even harlots, widows, adulterers, thieves, butchers, pedlers etc. so as to be able to mingle with all kinds of people and to make known the true emancipation of Buddhism and the following peace of Samadhi."¹ Mahayana ethics is not beset by any sense of guilt and self-censure, but superbly combines detachment with fullness, knowledge with compassion and serenity with adventure.

The Mahayana Buddhist moral ideal has magnificently contributed towards the inculcation of habits of humaneness, kindness and compassion, and kept alive the springs of personal and institutional charity through the centuries in the Far East by laying special stress on the realisation of Supreme Wisdom or the awakening of Great Compassion called the Buddha nature through the exercise of altruistic virtues. The well-known Buddhist scholar, Anesaki, points out that while this is an extension of the fundamental virtue of love or sympathy, the emphasis of this point gave rise to another

¹ Lin Yu Tang: The Surangama Sutra, *The Wisdom of China and India*, p. 540.

important notion, viz. the dedication (pranidhana) of all merits and works for the sake of others in order to lead them to the same Enlightenment. The transfer or turning over of ethical merit (parinamana) to the advantage of fellowmen, Coomarswamy rightly points out, is akin to the Christian doctrine of vicarious atonement. It is based on the Mahayana insistence on the interpenetration and even the identity of all life. "If the suffering of the many", writes the Mahayana ethicist Santideva, "is to cease by the suffering of a single one, the latter must invite it out of compassion for others and for himself." Such a doctrine makes it possible for all men to help one another on the way to salvation and to realise the communion of spiritual fellowship. Now the Bodhichitta is identical in all beings, and as this is awakened the moral life of the individual needs less and less exertion, and so much more partakes in the communion of the saints. Anesaki observes, "Morality in this condition consists in actions—bodily, oral and mental—but they are no *operata* but *inoperata* so to speak." Chi-Hsu, in his commentary on the Brahmajala, puts this point as follows: "The entity (of sila, i.e. the chitta) manifests itself as the essence (bodhi) and the principles of good and bad manifest themselves in practice, the realisation of the essence is induced by practice, and the perfection of practice is derived from the essence, these two being in reality one."¹ Commonalty in Hindu meditation is the realisation of the indwelling Supreme Self in every creature as love or communion that transcends existence. In Buddhist jhana Commonalty is founded on the ultimate matrix or the fundamental Buddha-nature common to all. "Compassion is Tathagata; Tathagata is compassion." Where there is the highest wisdom, morality is effortless and spontaneous.

¹ See Anesaki's article on Buddhist Ethics and Morality in *Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics*; also Suzuki: *Outlines of Mahayana Buddhism*.

CHAPTER XI

THE SOCIAL PATTERNING OF VIRTUE AND MORALE

The Social Import and Gradation of Virtues

For ages mankind has set its heart on certain principles of right conduct that are often called "cardinal virtues". These are mentioned as prudence, courage, temperance and justice in Western ethics. Medieval Christianity added to these certain theological virtues viz., faith, hope and charity. There have been as many ethical controversies as there have been lists of virtues. Certain virtues prescribed are not specifically distinct and overlap. The tabulation of virtues is sometimes as arbitrary as the selection of metaphysical essences and categories on which moral principles and laws are grounded. Virtues also are varied and contrary and sometimes the virtues of one social culture become the vices of another. There is need of a sociological theory of virtues based on the growth and development of human grouping, which as it issues to its fulfilment throws off the major virtues that humanity has prized through the ages. Group emotions and sentiments fix these in memory as these have their survival value in the chequered history of groups and institutions and in the course of social relations. Social intelligence and verbalization then refine, elevate and schematise the patterns of virtues. These become compulsive with their derivations from divine or legendary law-givers and their promises of rewards and threats of punishment, whether on the earth or in heaven and hell.

Virtues enable man to intervene in the cosmic process, and are not eternal or absolute objects and essences to be adored, but are ways of human behaviour, standardised,

made meaningful and idealised in the processes of group participation of individuals and recognised and appreciated only in and through these. Virtues have their unique group import. These are also oriented and "structured" in the group "field" as a constellation. Virtues do not appear as isolated traits and ways of action, but cluster together and aid one another in the character structure of individuals in each type or stage of group participation. Modern characterology that has developed out of the impetus of the psychoanalytic movement now predicates the character structure of normal and abnormal persons with their virtues and "vices" that can be understood only in the context of the total character in which these are embedded. Our Table on p. 283 gives a rough schedule of the development of virtues as human communion matures into its consummation. No attempt is made to chart a complete schedule of virtues which is an impossible task. Man's principal virtues will, however, be recognised here, sustaining his vigorous dynamic social integration, their distinctive quality, objectivity and validity emerging in the peculiar communion of man with man as man. With the march of the dialectic of communion, virtues constituted and known in this process grade themselves in order or hierarchy. The cultivation of the noblest values and virtues and of a refined, diversified moral life rests on the minimum elementary virtues of honesty, uprightness and justice that are "pioneers" among the system of virtues. Group legacy, discipline and pattern of signs and symbols so canalise the direction of human values and virtues that these serve the enduring welfare of the individual and the good of the community.

From level to level of group participation, the transformation of desires and interests into values, virtues and rights-and-duties takes place, the highest moral values, virtues and rights-and-duties being developed where the human communion is the most profound and extensive.

At the apex of the constellation of virtues stand active pity, benevolence and compassion and also yōga wisdom in the conviction of identity of self and non-self. Such is the scheme at least of the Orient where the moral ideal is the Enlightened, the Emancipated and the Compassionate Man. In Brahmanical culture the Sage (Muni) or the Emancipated One (Jivanmukta) lives in profound detachment in the world, true to his vocation and compassionate to all. In later Mahayana Buddhism that gives a greater stress on altruism, the ideal man seeks enlightenment for the sake of the salvation of creatures and strives to reach this, first, by infinite compassion for the creatures and, secondly, by mystical contemplation that gives him the supreme understanding of the unreality of self, non-self and all phenomena. Life and mind are focussed towards fervent charity and goodness that facilitate the mystical insight. All the other "perfect virtues" (paramitas) take care of themselves. Here the moral ideal, as stated in the Bodhicharyavatara (The Path of Light), is:

"I desire to be a protector to those who need protection,
A guide to those who wander in the desert,
And a ship, a landing stage and a bridge
To those who see the shore,
A lamp to those who need a lamp,
A couch to those who need a couch,
A slave to all beings who need a slave."¹

Compassion, pity or benevolence in Mahayana Buddhism is practised without any belief in the substantial reality of the "mendicant", the "alms" and the "donor". The three elements of thought, deed and object completely disappear with the recognition of the nothingness of the ego (triko-tiparisuddha maitrī). Just as in Hindu Yoga wisdom

¹ The *Bodhicharyavatara* is a most remarkable poem regarded by Barth as the Buddhist counterpart to *The Imitation of Christ*.

emerges after the total merging and disappearance of subject, object and knowledge relation in a transcendental consciousness, in Mahayana jhana it is the outcome of the same merging and disappearance of servitor, object and service in the non-dual Buddha essence. Yet the Bodhisattva harnesses all his spiritual resources for keeping his body and mind ever alert for service to creatures (virya). For this reason in particular the detailed analysis of the "ten perfect virtues" (paramitas), and of the psychological background of their practice in the activist career of the Bodhisattva marked by ten distinct stages (bhūmis, each of which is characterised by the maturation of a set of ten moral attitudes), as described in Mahayanist texts, deserves attention of Western ethicists.¹

The hierarchy of virtues is constituted in and through the dynamic phases of human intimacy and identity and is nourished for their sustenance by experience of self and of the group to which the individual owes his basic patterning of thought and feeling, tradition and education. Man's "loss" of selfhood coincides with his widest social participation, his least preoccupation with the immediate or momentary interest and conflicts of life and with the cultivation of the highest virtues. The noblest virtues flow spontaneously from the deepest insights of yoga. Lao Tzu, the Chinese philosopher-mystic, expresses the wisdom of the ages when he says that all concepts of virtue are artificial, self-conscious and dangerous and that man's perfection consists in the achievement of the same supreme simplicity, the non-assertive naturalness as that of the "Tao", translated variously as "Reason", "Law", "Logos" or the inner order of the universe. From this viewpoint Tao or Wisdom is spontaneous, unexerted virtue, the acme of morality. "The consciousness of virtue

¹ Especially the Dasabhumika, Siksha Samuchchaya, Bodhicharyavatara, Śraddhotpada Sutra and Jatakamala.

is the beginning of un-virtue" and propriety or ritual occupies the lowest position in the hierarchy of virtues.

"The superior virtue is not conscious of itself as a virtue;
Therefore it has virtue.

The inferior virtue never lets off virtue;

Therefore it has no virtue.

The superior virtue seems inactive, and yet there is nothing that it does not do.

The inferior virtue acts, and yet in the end leaves things undone.

The superior benevolence acts without a motive.

The superior righteousness acts with a motive.

The superior ritual acts but at first no one responds to it;

Gradually people raise their arms and follow it;

Therefore when Tao is lost, virtue follows.

When virtue is lost, benevolence follows.

When righteousness is lost, ritual (or propriety) follows.

Ritual, therefore, is the attenuation (or husk) of loyalty and faith (promise-keeping) and the onset of confusion (brawling).

Fore-knowledge is the flower of Tao and the beginning of folly.

Therefore the truly great man keeps to the solid and not to the tenuous;

Keeps to the fruit and not to the flower;

Thus he rejects the latter and takes the former."¹

Man's flight from the alone to the Alone in solitary contemplation without practical moral deeds is not perfection; while morality without insight into the depth of reality is empty and insecure. We read in the *Srimala-sihanada*, "The Bodhisattva's mother, it is said, is wisdom, his father tactfulness, his kinsmen all beings, his dwelling the vacuity, his wife joy, his daughter compassion, his son truth-

¹ From *Tao Tse Ching* translated by Ch'u Ta-Kao, p. 50. For Lao Tzu the basis of ethics is "Wei Wu Wei" i.e. "act non-act", as translated by E. D. Thomas.

fulness and yet his household life makes him not attached to existence." Here is the kernel of the 'jhana or yoga system of morality.

THE DIALECTIC OF HUMAN COMMUNION AND VIRTUES

| Type of Group. | Social Bond. | Form of Behaviour. | Moral Principle. | Constellation of Cardinal Virtues. |
|----------------------------|----------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| I. Crowd | Impulsive, hallucinatory, charismatic. | Emotional, irrational, single-tracked, stereotyped. | No moral principle or norm. | Not virtues but their opposites: impulsiveness, irrationality, egoism, aggressiveness, anger, hate, cruelty. |
| II. Interest-group. | Contractual-abstract. | Impersonal, fractional, casual. | Reciprocity or "rules of the game", fair play and consideration. | Propriety, honesty, integrity, truthfulness, fairness, fidelity. |
| III. Society or Community. | Affective-rational. | Personal, integral, enduring, social. | Justice and equity. | Uprightness, rectitude, impartiality, respect for human dignity and personality, respect for fellowman's body, life, merit, property, social status, reputation or honour. |
| IV. Commonalty. | Affective-rational-mystical. | Personal-symbolical. Integral-cosmic, timeless, beyond-social. | Love, equity and solidarity. | Wisdom, universal love, pity, compassion, charity, "radiant virtuc." |

Commonalty, the Focus and Acme of Virtues

There are other virtues like endurance, courage, bravery, faith, self-discipline, humility and wisdom that are recognised by ethicists and that help or spur man to higher moral choice and the cultivation of the nobler forms of human communion that is itself man's supreme, incomplete moral venture. Such virtues indeed feed the major virtues of man in his chequered, unfulfilled social enterprise. What Aristotle calls the "virtues of social intercourse" should also be mentioned here as their cultivation smooths human communion in every field.¹ It is in Commonalty that man's entire constellation of virtues is focussed and experienced through the challenge of the most extensive and deepest communion that he can establish, extending to all mankind and even to all life.

It ought to be pointed out, however, that the scale of virtues is constituted by the dominant groups and institutions in particular social cultures, and that the content or meaning of the major virtues, such as honesty, justice and love, differs in different cultures. But in advanced social cultures a hierarchy of virtues often articulates itself with compassion, love, generosity and non-violence standing as a sort of crown to fidelity, uprightness and justice. Man, bound to fellowmen by affective-mystical ties, neither suffers from moral inertia or pessimism, nor is limited in his action and outlook by material goals and values, but is spurred to ceaseless moral ventures, participating in the creation of the social universe through his self-transcending, boundless love, charity and compassion. It is just such virtues that exhibit his true moral stature. For the moral life now moves with foresight and determination to a new dimension, not circumscribed by the existing communion in the social group, but towards a communion or solidarity that

¹ See Hartmann: *Ethics*, Vol. 2, pp. 304-307.

is imperfect, unrealised, yet dormant in human life. Without a limited experience of solidarity, without at least a moral recognition of continuity of the present generation with the generations yet unborn, man's group pattern only caters to immediate interests and values, and the continuity of social culture is broken. This is the general drawback of political and economic policies that are hardly oriented to long-period goals and ideals due to the preoccupation of classes and political parties with temporary issues.

Group life in all spheres inherits the moral and spiritual legacy of the past, and men, groups and institutions must bear the moral responsibility of being conscious transmitters of this legacy so that the children of the future may not be harmed but rather benefit from the actions of the present generation. Benjamin Kidd stressed that without religion providing "the ultra-rational sanction", the subordination of the interests of the present generation to those that are far away is not possible, since rationalism is individualistic and limited in its perspective of human and social development.¹ Human culture, the cultivation of knowledge and of the sciences and arts of mankind, is a partnership of the past, present and future through generations of man's quest, discovery and inspiration. Human progress is not possible unless both man as well as group or institution pledge a fellowship with mer, groups and institutions that come after them in the vistas of time. Solidarity is the indispensable moral principle for the conscious direction of man's evolution.

Commonalty which is the acme of solidarity is a moral and social dream and aspiration. Eternally man is driven onward towards the more complete and inclusive group, the ideal of Commonalty. Here love, sharing and solidarity with their ideal of service and counter-service dominate over

¹ See his *Principles of Western Civilisation and Social Evolution*.

the idea of justice concerned with the balance of claims and counter-claims. Niebuhr aptly observes: "The law of love is involved in all approximations of justice, not only as the source of the norms of justice, but as an ultimate perspective by which their limitations are discovered." To the extent as other-regarding ends prevail over self-regarding ends, and duties over rights, Commonalty loses its bare judicial character. In Commonalty the communion or brotherhood represents the most extensive sociality and creates and maintains the noblest values and virtues of man. It is often indistinguishable from his highest emotional religious fervour—love, compassion and identification superimposed upon the obligations of justice, equity and fair play. The Mahayana Buddhist ethical system that concentrates on altruism mentions the following ten major virtues of perfection (paramis or paramitas): compassion, self-discipline, renunciation, truthfulness, forbearance, resolution, energy, equanimity, mystical ecstasy and wisdom. Compassion is extolled as the cardinal principle in the career of the Bodhisattva in Mahayana Buddhism. Compassion expresses itself in sharing the joy and sorrow of others and is man's great resource in the sense that it atones for all the faults a man may have. Compassion, though the humblest of virtues, is nevertheless the most important. Pity is the only virtue to which he must apply himself. The others will follow of themselves.¹ The idea of paramitas is central in both Hinayana and Mahayana Buddhism,² with slight variations of the excellences, as they both accepted the Vinaya rules of discipline at the beginning. But in the latter the virtues connected with sharing (dana) or compassion (karuna, kripa) receive greater stress in order that the Bodhi-

¹ Vallée-Poussin: article on Bodhisattva in *Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics*; Kern: *Manual of Indian Buddhism*, pp. 65-68; also Grousset: *In the Footsteps of the Buddha*, Ch. XVIII.

² See the Chapter on Paramita in B. C. Law: *Concepts of Buddhism*.

sattva may obtain enlightenment. Meditation may be abandoned in order to practise charity; a Bodhisattva in his compassion for a woman may even violate the monk's vow of continence. The virtues of the Bodhisattva, the perfectly Enlightened One, are thus extolled in the *Saddharmapundarika*: "Having reached the shore myself, I carry other creatures to the shore; being free, I make free; being comforted, I comfort; being perfectly at rest, I lead others to rest. I refresh all beings whose bodies are withered, who are clogged to the triple world. I bring felicity to those that are pining away with toils, give them pleasures and final rest. The strength of charity or compassion is my abode; the apparel of forbearance is my rôle; and voidness or complete abstraction is my seat." Such is the moral fervour of jhanic communion at its best.

The sanctuaries of law, religion and morality guard the sacred flame of Commonalty, which equity and justice, fair play and reciprocity constantly feed with their separate oblations. The virtues of compassion, charity and sharing in Commonalty are man's highest imperatives, grounded as these are on the profoundest communion of the self with the non-self. All other moral categories and virtues are judged subordinate to the visions of sharing and solidarity that, though restricted to a few mystics, artists and prophets or limited religious and academic brotherhoods, are most intensive and pervasive in their influence on the entire moral life of man.

At homeness and Morale

A group can rise to Commonalty only through a most profound union, love or solidarity that rest on the recognition of the supreme worth of the human person as person, overreaching the unstable, immediate interests and values of individuals and groups. So far as morality is concerned, mutual responsibility is not confined here to specific contracts or processes and particular claims and

obligations but implies the total responsibility of "each for all" who participate in the group. Such total responsibility carries with it a mutual sharing of the rewards and hazards of life and an exalted morale and feeling of completeness and expansion of the personality. On the principle of solidarity, Max Scheler observes, values are pooled and men share in the achievement or failure of others. Max Scheler stresses that it is in the religious quest that man finds love as implicit in the final structure of the universe, and that if he obtains that realisation he feels "at home in the world".

The notion of "at homeness" in the world has also been significantly used by Heidegger. "At homeness" implies high morale of the individual ever seeking to master and identify himself with his personal world. In Commonalty where the individual feels most "at home" in the world, his personal morale is deepest and most secure. An apposite illustration of heightened morale may be adduced from the Mahayana system of spiritual discipline in the East in which the Bodhisattva or the Enlightened Man feels a legitimate pride in respect of three things:—pride that for him alone is the task of alleviation of the world's sorrow, that as the son of Buddha, the Conqueror, he will not be a victim to passions, and that he ever holds himself in readiness for any task that may come and thus gains divine energy. The Bodhisattva has indeed the competence and pride of Nietzsche's Superman.¹ Morale is highest where the identification between the personal world and the group, in this case the entire community of sentient beings, is the most complete. The conception of morale stresses activity, while that of "at homeness" stresses affective disposition and attitude. Both conceptions are fundamental for any value theory which is personalistic in orientation and also

¹ See Santideva: *The Bodhicaryavatara*, translation by Barnett.

for any theory of social groups and institutions which is evaluative in character¹. The integration of personality through the approximation of its experience in the concrete social situation to projected goal and ideal measures the depth and security of personal morale. This accompanies personal happiness or fulfilment and solidarity of the group and institutional process. Heightened morale accordingly also signifies the enhancement of both personal loyalty and group contentment. In Commonalty the identification between individual and collective attitude, goal and experience, between desire and duty, and between fulfilment and commitment is complete.

Morale in the Crowd and Interest-group is something very different from that in Commonalty. Crowds or masses engaged in raids or fighting wars in primitive society are maintained in high morale by magical rites, war dances and other ceremonials that dispel fear and bring about an atmosphere of rapport of individual and social impulses and interests. Large organised masses in modern armies also require various kinds of propaganda and symbolic devices for the sustenance of their morale. The special training of the high command and of officers and the expert knowledge of psychiatrists are utilised to combat fear, indecision, obsession and other symptoms of mental maladjustment or disorganisation of the rank and file on the front. Interest-groups similarly have their own symbolic patterns expressing their economic goals and methods and sustaining hopes during a bitter economic struggle for the building and maintenance of morale. The proletarian myth of the Revolution and the Marxian notion of the dialectical movement in history, the symbolical hunger-strike or the mammoth procession of the workers and leaders displaying flags and pictures, and shouting slogans keep

¹ See R. F. Creegan: *The Phenomenology of Morale, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*, 1942-43.

alive the solidarity and morale of trade-union groups, when strike or direct action fails and the working class hope and faith languish. Mass laughter, ridicule or satire of hostile but dominant enemies, groups or institutions sometimes enable defeated groups to overcome paralysing despair and save the situation. Often, however, the crowd-minded multitude alternates between the dangerous expression of mob fury and revolt and indifference or despair.

The building up of morale for Commonalty is, however, most difficult, and rests largely on the capacity of individuals for moral idealisation, aesthetic symbolisation and intellectual self-transcendence. Here there is much scope of religious and artistic myths and symbols—perhaps seen at their best in Mahayana literature and art—focalising the brotherhood of mankind which might preserve the morale of the aspiring group in the midst of defeat, bafflement and even persecution. Unfortunately in modern civilization most of these expressional symbolic patterns have become empty of metaphysical notions and faiths, and do not arouse enthusiasm or loyalty.

Moral Development of Early Genetic Communities

Mankind obtained its earliest moral values from the family, the kindred, the tribe and other small, genetic, homogeneous, face-to-face primary groups. Such small, homogeneous primary groups usually develop into totally inclusive, integral and cultural communities, and are contrasted with large, mixed, "demotic", partially inclusive, depersonalised secondary groups. These two ideal types of group configuration in human social development present many contrasted ethical and sociological features.¹ The former nurture not only early man's brood and kin care, foresight and

¹ In my *Social Ecology* I have developed the key concepts of "ecological" and "cultural" groups and behaviour corresponding to Cooley's primary and secondary groups and Tonnies' *Gemeinschaft* and *Gesellschaft* group organisations.

sociability, but also gradually extend, as man civilises himself, love, sympathy, equality and compassion much beyond the boundaries of kinship groups. Primary ethnic groups, modified by adoption and other fictions, provide the basis of social integration and an integral individual behaviour, dominated by affective relations of the whole-person and complete moral living.

Early in social evolution these come to be distinguished from heterogeneous, depersonalised social groupings, based on economic interest or locality with kinship as a subordinate principle of group formation. The primary group configuration that includes not a fraction but practically the whole of the individual's personality produces the dominant moral values and virtues of love, goodness and sharing, which constantly enlarge their boundaries, such intrinsic moral values being indivisible and infinite. These supreme familistic values still send forth their tender tendrils to remote invisible spheres of attachment and brotherliness, weaving the social ideal of Commonalty that yet remains man's moral dream. The spontaneous loves, sympathies and affections of small, genetic primary groups are intellectualised and traditionalised into generic virtues and moral ideals that bring about the assimilation and cohesion of congeries of folks and tribes into a people, culture or nation. Inside the social culture these evolve an authoritative status-prestige hierarchy that is maintained by folkways, customs and face-to-face pressures, largely defined in terms of kinship, status and personal loyalties. Along with a uniform and effective cultural conditioning and pressure on the individual, the sense of honour or shame is strongly developed, effectively bringing about conforming behaviour and aversion to change or even social expression of personal scales of values. Art and religion are dominated by the supernatural and ethno-centric motifs and symbols that effectively diffuse social norms based on the

subjective feelings, affective or traditional, of "belonging together" and "togetherness".

Contrasted Morals of Later Composite Communities

The contrasted "ideal type", the large, composite and depersonalised grouping, rooted predominantly in economic interests and values, was perhaps somewhat less old in the history of social development; but it also yielded cultural forms and moral imperatives that played no less significant a part in the definition and regulation of individual goals and moral values and in social integration. It must be pointed out that we are referring here to the logical category, the "ideal type", abstracted from the concrete and specific forms or stages in cultural evolution. From ancient, open, heterogeneous, impersonal, secondary or economic Interest-groups, such as the hunting band, the shepherding party, the garden association or the trading community, mankind obtained its first recognition and regulation of the divisible, instrumental economic values and goods, and of the moral principles of reciprocity and fair dealing, implemented through weights and measures, promises and contracts in exchange and distribution of material goods and services. Every economic enterprise in primitive culture, from the construction of houses or canoes to the hunting of large and dangerous animals, requires the separate contribution of each member of the community. The task of everybody is regulated by definite customs and traditions that also embrace even the carrying out of magical ritual observance and joint deliberation. Similarly in primitive forms of trade or ceremonial exchange in early market places or in activities of communal labour, Malinowski points out that there are definite rules defining measure, value and form in service or artefact or raw material that leave little room for abuse, meanness and cheating. The general importance of reciprocity and equity is embodied according

to him in the fact that "no virtue is rated higher in primitive communities than that of generosity."¹ As both primary and secondary groups and institutions become permanent and integrated in the socio-cultural framework, the moral ideals of justice and equity emerge and supplement in-group loyalty, brotherliness and mutual aid.

Assimilation and Conflict of the Contrasted Moral Values

For centuries, of course, as the efficacy of informal social control at the hands of primary groups and customs waned, loyalties and interests clashed, and coercion became the only alternative. Large, heterogeneous communities were often welded together by the sword. The unchallengeable authority of conquerors, rulers, chiefs and landlords, however, stabilised conquest and expropriation of land by linking the authority-deference relationship with reciprocity in the ubiquitous forms of feudalism, serfdom and class hierarchy. A transitional result was the super-imposition of the feudal order upon the long-established republican village communities, the latter being subjected to various compulsory services, dues and vexatious interferences by the feudal nobles, chiefs and kings. The ownership and distribution of land illustrate the juxtaposition of the contrasted moral principles and imperatives of social grouping: viz.(a) in-group loyalty, neighbourly aid and co-operation underlying the autonomous village communal type of agrarian organisation; and (b) exchange of protection by kings and territorial lords and nobles for the obligations of agricultural and military services of vassals and serfs underlying the authoritative, feudal type. Migration, conquest and expropriation, as these tended to establish and stereotype the large, congregate, mixed communities (the ideal typical secondary groups), worked havoc with the

¹ B. Malinowski: *Freedom and Civilization*, p. 194.

organisation, mores and virtues of the primary-group world.

It took many centuries after the primary-group controls and spontaneous mutual allegiances broke down in the ethno-centric village communities to reorient and stabilise agricultural and community life on the *quid pro quo* latifundian or feudal principles. In many countries due to the social cleavage brought about by coercion, centralisation and individualism, the communalism of the primary-group world has been completely obliterated, leading to impoverishment and malformation of community life.

Outside land ownership and distribution, in both trade and industry, formal and impersonal rather than ethnic, intimate and primary groupings everywhere asserted themselves more quickly, effectively and smoothly. In the towns and cities, both peasants and herdsmen bring their commodities for sale, and the scribe, the trader and money-lender exert vast influence. It is here that writing is also discovered and legalism and contract are first manifest, as contrasted with the word of mouth and oath of loyalty in the small, genetic, face-to-face communities of both the mobile shepherds and the sedentary farmers. Under the influence of exchange and money economy face-to-face loyalties of the primary-group world tend to be replaced by stark individualism, and coercion of rulers is supplanted by the authority of rules. There is a necessary elaboration of formal and legal codes and usages, defining the rights and obligations of property, of industry, of craftsmanship, of debtors and creditors, of employers and labourers. The heterogeneous, depersonalised groupings develop highly formal mechanisms of social control, along with the professions, expert lawgivers and legalists who fill the valuable social rôles of adjusting individual and group differences in needs, capacities and rewards. Thus impersonal criteria of justice and proportion that emerge in the new social situation, characterised by the dominance of large, complex, delicately

balanced, depersonalised secondary groups, gradually assert themselves in the collective consciousness instead of personal choices and loyalties as imperatives of good conduct. Those standards of justice and proportion which are best recognised obtain the sanction of the state as "rights" defined in terms of equality and freedom instead of authority and status.

Human communities took, to be sure, centuries of evolution and consolidation of large, open, heterogeneous, impersonal groups and institutions for the establishment of the moral principles of reciprocity, justice and equality side by side with those of in-group loyalty, friendship and status of the more ancient familistic groups. At some stage or other of cultural evolution a large, depersonalised social community, dominated by interest-groups, based on a rational calculation of individual interests and advantages, obviously found unable to maintain itself by the spontaneous loyalties and sympathies that can rule effectively only in small, isolated genetic groups. Status, with its differential power and privilege, was more and more questioned by the individual. There was more insistent demand for independent ways of action, for freedom and levelling, for the introduction of rational, impersonal criteria in the determination of rôle, position and power. A depersonalised, mobile social culture, with a high degree of specialization of jobs, occupations and interests, and with superficial, abstract contacts of individuals, gradually built up new moral structures. The moral principles of deliberate agreement or contract rather than consensus, a viable rather than traditionalised status, rôle or position of the individual, a flexible scheme of rights and privileges rather than a rigid code of expectancies and duties, an emphasis of segmented interests and rights rather than of integral interests and duties, freedom and individuality in man's action, status and life-pattern rather than the persistence and continuity

of his collective rôle and heritage, all these assert themselves simultaneously in the collective experience and come to direct social progress.

The Morale of Congregate, Depersonalised Interest-groups

Rational agreement or contract, gradually woven into the texture of a market system and a price economy in modern communities, rests on the formal, impersonal categories of fair dealing, proportion, workability or "equity" and legal definitions of property, competition, service and remuneration based on the former. Formal mechanisms of social control elaborate and multiply for safeguarding mutual convenience and balance or combination of needs and interests of heterogeneous individuals, who must adhere together as dovetailed parts in the anonymous, depersonalised Great Society. The field of authoritative, informal control by customs, traditions and folkways, defined largely in terms of status and individual and group filiations and attachments, greatly shrinks. With this, however, wane many moral obligations and virtues of the familistic group-world, such as obedience, filial piety, faithfulness, brotherliness and humaneness, many moral values and standards of personal and cultural self-realisation and also personal morale. Outside the range of moral values the régime of congregate, impersonal, "emancipated" interest-groups sharpens and focalises many antagonisms in the basic economic relations that are depersonalised and segregated from social relations and processes. Such depersonalisation or abstraction of human contacts speeds up the social transition from "status" to "contract", "individualism" and mobility, aided by the adoption of a formal, objective, universal, pecuniary standard which fits well into the machine technology, the rapid tempo of life and the specialisation and interdependence of economic activities.

The complex and interdependent Great Society in which man now lives requires not only an appropriate mechanism of communication, organisation and production but also an appropriate value mechanism which may express and measure the widest range of human values. But the money token used in measuring and energising various individual and social goals ends in subordinating to itself the intrinsic and cultural values. Money is associated with man's health, comfort and leisure and gives access to many cultural, personal and intrinsic values. There is in modern life an intermingling of economic with aesthetic and moral values. But as pecuniary value enlarges its scope, society slides into the acceptance of the principle that everything has its price. Pecuniary value becomes a real end rather than a means, and is used to manipulate a great number of social activities and values which should be outside the pecuniary domain.¹ Thus the hegemony that belongs to the intrinsic, underivative values ends. The cult of the hedonic and the useful supersedes the ancient adoration of love, holiness and goodness.

Art and religion, no doubt, still teach people love, holiness and reverence, and in so doing indeed, extend the bonds of familial love, compassion and humaneness of the small, genetic, primary groups that were the ancient, cherished acquisitions. But mankind has not yet been able to build up large accessible groups and institutions on the ideals of universal harmony, peace and love rooted in the familistic values and imperatives. On the contrary, the vast, heterogeneous, depersonalised secondary interest-associations have corroded the ancient moral structures and virtues of the familistic group world. Technology, ramification and supremacy of industrial and financial groups and institutions and accumulation of wealth have

¹ See my *Social Ecology*, p. 220.

brought about class cleavage and economic insecurity on a scale unknown in previous epochs with accompanying moral deterioration. All-pervasive economic conflicts now breed political struggles and wars, and cross the boundaries of nations and periodically destroy through their barbarisms the effect of age-old moral disciplines and evocations of virtues and ideals. The widespread economic and political fears and anxieties and supremacy of Interest-groups generate both exaggerated mass or crowd emotionalism and violent behaviour and excessive moral demands and power of the State. Often also Interest-groups acquiring economic power and privilege destroy the freedom of the individual, one of the most cherished values won in the 18th century by the abolition of monarchy, feudalism, serfdom and corporatism. Bertrand Russell states that "while freedom may not be the highest good, it is the highest political good." Such freedom is being abolished by modern political institutions in many countries, where most of the essential and vital functional groups and obligations, the nurseries of many old values, loyalties and virtues, succumb to centralisation and bureaucratic management.

Backgrounds of Crowd Formation and Behaviour

No doubt the lapse of group,*local and occupational initiative and freedom and the replacement of many old functional and territorial groups by an amorphous mass lead to widespread loss of personal morale, insecurity and exaggerated sense of vague solidarity and identification in reaction that all stimulate crowd formation. Gordon W. Allport observes: "Most of our citizens spin as cogs in many systems without engaging their own egos even in those activities of most vital concern to them. When the ego is not effectively engaged, the individual becomes reactive. He lives a life of ugly protest, finding outlets in complaints, strikes, above all in scape-goating; in this condition he is ripe prey

for a demagogue whose whole purpose is to focus and exploit the aggressive outbursts of non-participating egos.”¹ Diminution of freedom, loss of personal morale and security, feverish activity without participation and security, psychic conflict, demagoguery, strike and direct action of crowds and state power comprise a vicious circle in many countries of the modern world. Chronic class-antagonism and recurrent unemployment and insecurity on a nationwide scale, and periodic threat of war on a global scale condition vast masses of peoples in different continents for elemental herd or crowd reactions and behaviour.

It is not easy to maintain the morale of vast, congregate, depersonalized interest-groups, since these are always in danger of relapsing into action crowds with emotional outbursts of hate, anger, fear or aggressiveness. Leaders seek rescue from these dangerous potentialities of man's most elemental motives and emotions by turning them furiously against some “scape-goats”, who are held responsible for all social frustration and failure, or against the whole economic system and political set-up. Organised Jew and alien-baiting, lynching and pogrom canalise the social expressions of such elemental drives as safety, preservation and domination, and maintain vast aggregations of men in such an intense pitch of emotional excitement that they override all social injunctions and prohibitions, and abandon all what are regarded as moral feelings and attitudes in normal group situations. Regular state or party parades, processions and demonstrations also serve to keep alive the crowd emotionalism.

The Age of Crowd Neurosis

The moral consciousness of both individuals and the general public, rooted in logical reflection and judg-

¹ Psychology of Participation, *The Psychological Review*, 1945.

ment, becomes moribund as crowd situations multiply, and society is exposed to frequent onslaughts of crowd passions and hysteria. As a matter of fact the insidious infection of the entire population with crowd neurosis is even more dangerous in its effects than those of crowd or mass action itself. For the individual becomes gradually accustomed to immediacy and alertness, full of anxiety, alarm and fascination. Jung observes: "Man in the crowd is unconsciously lowered to an inferior moral and intellectual level, to that level which is always there, below the threshold of consciousness, ready to break forth, as soon as it is stimulated through the formation of a crowd."¹ Casual social contacts, elemental emotions, unstable values and explosive behaviours, far different from those associated with the habits, education and discipline of genuinely civilised society, are becoming characteristic of larger and larger sections of the population. Crowd hysteria by multiplying and aggregating has now, indeed, entered into the bones and marrows of modern industrial civilization. This has been very aptly pointed out by Gustav E. Mueller: "It is an ironical outcome of the rationalistic trust in mechanisms, machines and machine production that large masses have lost their anchors in moral and cultural orders of life and are set adrift. The machine age has created conditions favourable to the multiplication of cohesive and infectious incoherences. Its own defective vision of humanity as a rationalistic and calculable arrangement of 'human resources' has brought about its own formidable opposite. The prevalent interest in all contemporary arts and many sciences in the 'primitive' testifies to the immense strength and resurgence of irrational immediacy."² Industrial civilization as it makes a tour all round the world leads to the

¹ *Essays on Contemporary Events*, p. 77.

² *What is Man?*, *The Philosophical Review*, 1944, p. 452.

displacement of increasing masses of men from agriculture and the village, and swells the ranks of industrial workers who find themselves more and more leading uncreative, valueless, superficial and lonely lives in the vast beehive urban agglomerations. The frustration of fundamental interests and values, such as those of family, property, security and social recognition, the overflow of physical or psychic energies, and the individual's loss of morale and security in a world of material expansion constitute the universal background of crowd neurosis which has infected even old agricultural civilizations now on the road to industrial civilization. Dewey observes: "China and Japan exhibit crowd psychology more frequently than do Western democratic countries. Not in my judgment because of any essentially Oriental psychology, but because of a nearer background of rigid and solid customs conjoined with the phenomena of a period of transition. The introduction of many novel stimuli creates occasions where habits afford no ballast. Hence great waves of emotion easily sweep through masses. Sometimes they are waves of enthusiasm for the new; sometimes of violent reaction against it—both equally indiscriminating. The war (the first world war) left behind it a somewhat similar situation in Western countries." The social and economic transition in Asia has been so quick and masses of men wrenched from their traditional moral and cultural moorings so drastically that social foresight and planned gradualism are absent. This largely accounts for the persistence of crowd-actions such as strikes, riots and revolutions especially in the new industrial centres. In the modern technological age mankind everywhere encounters the unpredictable, irrational and infective crowds and sleeps on volcanoes, though the instability and violence of classes and the rise of stateism or totalitarianism account perhaps for more chronic and widespread reversion to the primitive,

explosive mentality of crowds and masses in Europe than elsewhere.

Counteracting Crowd Irrationality and Violence

What Le Bon prophesied long ago has come to pass: "The age into which we enter will be truly the age of the crowds." The haste, irrationality and exaggerated notion of the everpresent and the outbreak of impulsive behaviour of crowds and masses of various kinds and degrees should be considerably reduced in order that civilisation might regain poise and sanity. The crux of the moral situation is to canalise mass motivation and reaction along peaceful and constructive channels so that the casual, emotional outbursts, as evidenced in revolutions, riots, organised crimes, unauthorised strikes and forms of direct action, might be minimised.

The transformation of casual, coercive and violent crowds into peaceful and organised publics is possible in the modern community in several ways. First, the strength and proliferation of voluntary groups that might fulfil the major interests and values of the common man and improve his personal morale and security are the major antidotes to crowd neurosis. Such self-conscious groups give the masses opportunities for active, democratic participation in the affairs of the Great Society so that they might no longer deem themselves powerless and valueless, but constitute themselves into active intelligent publics in the body politic. Katz distinguishes between the "interest" public and the "identification" public. The U.S.A. are a nation of "interest" publics with many groups of people having common economic and cultural motives and interests. "Identification" publics comprise groups of individuals who ally themselves with a leader or symbol to enjoy vicariously a success denied in their own lives.¹ A healthy

¹ *Fields of Psychology*, p. 112.

nation would not have such "identification" publics, because it would not deny opportunities to most people to live the type of life they would like to live. "Identification" publics easily relapse into "fanatic" publics and manifest crowd emotionalism and behaviour. Individuals must be actively involved in at least one or two representative areas of their lives, besides their familial and occupational interests, in order that they may have healthy, balanced and whole living and be not dominated by stereotypes and myths, by delusional as contrasted with reality-produced relations.

Secondly, men are inoculated against delusion and exploitation when they do not belong to the same group but are distributed among several groups, vocational, social, intellectual or religious, with their distinct planes of experience. A variety of areas of social participation and experience implies special appeals, suggestions and propaganda addressed to each separately. This prevents the sentiments and impulses of a particular group from spreading to other groups, and the pattern of the mind of the individual lapsing easily into the lower level of emotional reaction, irrationality and symbolic behaviour. A mass-society operates by what neurologists term the "all or none principle." It is either incited to a pitch of enthusiasm for some cause or other, or remains apathetic and inert. Mass-action also proceeds only in a single direction, along only one mental channel. A people given to varied types of public interest or activity, economic pursuit, religious worship, athletics, aesthetic enjoyment or political action, may not easily lapse into the single-track mind of the mass. The mass-inciter always identifies himself with one single or a dominant set of goals, with his emotion-evoking myths, phantasies and stereotypes, and postpones all other goals and values in order that the mind of the mass may be canalised along a single line of conduct. This is the reason again why a democracy insists that all the routine activities

should proceed normally even in war time. Panic and excitement may otherwise transform an intelligent public into an unstable emotional mass, and even translate a victory in the battle-field into a defeat on the home front. Man is tied to fellowman by his social heritage of traditions and values. He is also linked to his species by his organic heritage of instincts, emotions and unconscious trends. He carries within the structure of his unconscious, as Jung suggests, vestiges of by-gone stages of culture entirely outside the horizon even of his imagination. The masses are created by appeals that revive the traces of these lost ties and forgotten planes of life. They are exploited by the deployment of myths, symbols and phantasies that recall to man his remote ancestry. The best security against mass exploitation lies in stressing the immediate setting of life and not the shadowy backgrounds, the rational and direct goals of life and not distant ideals, in short, a sense of realism as contrasted with romantic fervour, the living present rather than the dim past or the dazzling future.

Thirdly, the Great Society may find new ways of compensation, rationalisation, sublimation and social expression of the impulses of aggression, hate and destruction. One of the primary tasks of education should be to abolish anachronistic taboos and injunctions of early childhood that were useful in mankind's primitive stage of social development, but now nurture unreal guilts and anxieties in the unconscious, and are potent sources of aggressiveness and coerciveness through displacement of strong, infantile loves and hates from the original family figures to group or social symbols in adult life. If children can grow up with a sounder reality sense, and with less of phantasies of anxiety, aggression and jealousy, they will be better fitted in adulthood for rational adaptation to the stresses and strains of life. Division of labour, specialisation and military and industrial training and apprenticeship often require

a prolonged regimentation of boys and young men necessary for success in difficult, strenuous and hazardous occupations and enterprises in adulthood. These are as old as the bachelor's dormitories which served their day in primitive culture, ensuring success in nomadic cultivation, organised hunt and periodic warfare. At the same time the system is not without grave risks of preparing the unconscious mind towards aggression and coercion. Long segregation of young men in public schools, barracks and industrial establishments is calculated to make them more susceptible to illusions and propaganda, and at the same time less immune from irrational fears, jealousies and hates that harness and divert exclusive, masculine solidarity along the dangerous and disruptive channels of strike, riot, revolution and direct action of all kinds.

Morale of Rational, Organised Publics

In an interesting work on mass psychology, Paul Reiwald has recently suggested that aggressive characters in modern communities should be directed to aggressive professions, such as butchery, dentistry and surgery. Life is a continuous challenge of the new against the old. One device of directing the impulses of self-assertion and aggression to constructive social outlets is the promotion of travels and adventures, geographical and scientific explorations and enterprises, and organised fights against the jungle, marsh and desert in the world's open spaces. In all industrial societies the periodic, destructive explosions of crowd energy can be forestalled and reduced in some measure by economic planning, focalised towards the objectives of economic and social security, and improvement of morale of workers by their participation in management or co-partnership in industry. Not before the chronic fear, anxiety and insecurity of job are dissipated and the masses of the workers' impulses of assertion, status, recognition and

construction adequately satisfied in industry as an enterprise-in-common, the impulsive outbursts of interest-groups that easily degenerate into crowds or masses in times of depression and hostility can be effectively checked.

The evil indeed goes deeper. While machine technology now extinguishes man's affection for his work, the vast, heterogeneous, impersonal secondary groups destroy his social affections. New technological conditions that may diminish the monotony of industrial and clerical work and satisfy the creative impulses, the decentralisation of industry, the revival of art and craftsmanship, and the development of various small, intimate functional and regional groups and cultural associations are necessary basic changes in the social structure that can reduce the supremacy of crowds, masses and interest-groups and the menace from crowd spontaneity and emotionalism.

More fundamental than "social engineering" of the above kind are democratic education and insight into the vital interests and values of life. The problems are to be approached here by way of the web of voluntary groups and peaceful public organisations than by way of forms of government. The intellectual climate most favourable for the twin processes, democratic social planning and social awareness of a democratically organised public, is characterised by freedom of opinion, judgment and communication and an open forum of scientific deliberation, persuasion and approval in which the ordinary men may participate.

Modern democracies can prevent a leader from playing the rôle of the hero, saviour or dictator only through a rational scrutiny of his programmes, policies and actions. A politician no doubt often cultivates a side line of virtues that may receive symbolical prominence and increase his prestige. But a free intellectual analysis of the items of his political programme and direction of public attention

constantly to its pros and cons compels him to remain in the background. It prevents the overdraw of his picture as a hero in romantic and mystical setting. A vivid image of the leader's personality lingers in the mind as long as emotions sustain it. An intellectual analysis of ideas and programmes dissipates emotions. As his personality fades from the field of attention, his power of swaying the masses diminishes. This is the method by which democracies as diverse as the Greek city states, Great Britain and the U.S.A. have avoided the risks of dictatorship. Myths, catch-phrases and facile formulae thrive in a social and intellectual climate where there is little examination of their intellectual contents, leaving their meanings largely below the threshold of consciousness. These can accordingly be employed for operating on the deep yearnings and attitudes that usually lie in the hinterland of the mind, release organic energy and precipitate mass actions of far-reaching consequences. Anthropological or psychological examination of all legends, doctrines and formulae would dispel the halo of romance and mystery and potency of magic wands that are waved before crowds or masses. A systematic, scientific analysis and exposure of the Nazi race-myths and geo-political doctrines could have indeed undermined Hitler's dominance over the Germans before it became too late.

Before the public or community, rather than before the crowd, interest-group and even the state, are placed various alternative economic and social policies and programmes, which may be in harmony or conflict with current goals and ideals, and call for its immediate decisions. Such decisions which are often necessary moral pronouncements can be aided and implemented better if the community can reach, through the analysis of the social, psychological and educational sciences, an agreed-upon set of common goals and values that can be embodied in social policies, laws and institutions. Through frank and public

discussion, the values of economic adequacy and security, health, housing, constructive work, participation in the affairs of life and other essential values, adding up to the worth and dignity of the human personality, can be agreed upon by the majority of the community. A strong majority of public agreement in respect of the community's immediate goals and the methods of their fulfilment through new procedures, codes and institutional rearrangements might be justified in coercing vested minority interests into the acceptance of these goals about which they themselves are convinced. The greater the use of the democratic techniques of persuasion, the greater the probability that irrational, antagonistic but powerful minorities and institutions will quickly lose their morale, and share in the common task of creating and controlling laws and institutions which can secure the maximum fulfilment of values for all. The ultimate rescue of industrial civilization from the psychoses and violent behaviour of crowds, masses and "herds" can come from a new industrial and institutional set-up as well as from a democratically organised and operative public opinion, freed from both the influences of vested interests and repressed complexes of the multitude.

CHAPTER XII

LEVELS OF PERSONAL AND SOCIAL CONTROL

Folkways and Morals as Emergent Imperatives of Society

It is unfortunate that scientific psychology, experimental and quantitative in its methods and techniques, largely overlooks man's total life and experience in his social-cultural setting and gives us a bare, naturalistic view of man. Man never lives in isolation from fellowman; his group and institutional milieu creates as distinct a situation for him as any change in the physical environment. His adjustment thus always includes elements of his group and cultural experience that guides his motivations and behaviour with reference to the future, i.e., to certain goals and values passing into, and integrating with, the immediate situations. Without such conceptual goals and values which man imports into his vital situations from groups and institutions, he neither can adapt nor realize himself; in fact he ceases to be a human being in the proper sense. Thus the goals and values that social culture sets before man, embodied in its various objects, persons and situations, are fundamental data of human experience as spatiality and temporality. Correspondingly his conscience and habits, folkways and manners as well as myths, morals and laws are fundamental phases of his collective mode of living, emergent imperatives of the vital-social configuration in which the life of man is organised.

Social culture presents itself to the individual in terms of traditions, institutions and rôles. Traditions embody vague, floating and generalised values. Institutions crystallise round certain definite values and are specific;

while rôles, with associated status-prestige, define exactly the function of each individual in a given time and space for the appropriation and achievement of values. The configuration of a culture is defined externally by the tradition-institution-rôle pattern for value-seeking and achievement.

In the making of this configuration both the social culture and the individual have their due share, which is conscious or normative, and unreasoned or automatic in each case. On the psychological level, many activities and contacts of a person in the complex social order hardly penetrate beneath the surface of his personality. But there should be some areas of social action in which he should be "ego-engaged" and be a true participant; otherwise he loses balance or wholeness, and society also undergoes proportionate stultification.¹ Without a deep-rooted conscious participation in some at least of the major values of life, man blindly submits to folkways and social habits, legal compulsion, external constraint and discipline, or gives way to frustration, anxiety and revolt. Social participation as contrasted with automatic, conforming behaviour taps central values, and leads to a true understanding and appreciation of social contacts and relations.

Habit in the Individual and the Societal Level

Folkways, mores and conventions are routine moulds, created and transmitted by culture to which the individual fits himself spontaneously as a matter of habit without any exercise of reason or judgment. Whitehead observes: "Unless society is permeated, through and through, with routine, civilisation vanishes."² Moral routine or conformity to requirements, as folkways, mores and conventions dictate,

¹ See G. W. Allport: The Psychology of Participation, *Psychological Review*, 1945.

² *Adventures of Ideas*, p. 114.

is constrictive but indispensable; without their support morality is impotent. The smoothness of man's adjustment to the routine of moral behaviour, to folkways, mores and conventions is the outcome of his dogmatic, authoritarian, admonishing conscience. Such conscience, that is partly acquired and partly inherited, has made both human morality and culture possible. Moral principles or sanctions of religion are not at all invoked in man's unconscious, unreasoned conformity to folkways, traditions and manners. At the same time society ponders over, idealises and abstracts the former, and provides the framework of myths, morals and faiths that are related to its deepest-felt interests, sentiments and values organised and integrated in both individual and social experience.

Such is the ideological frame of reference which is the product of ages of collective discussion, judgment and communication that defines the value situation for each individual. It is the ideology provided by the myth-morals-law defined expectations of the just, the good and the imperative that are embodied in the coercive practical procedures and expedient ways of action of society—folkways, mores, etiquette and manners that represent the minima of morals. At the time of a crisis, however, the individual finds his adjustment by reference not to his usual practical guides—folkways, etiquette or manners—but to the deeper, more compelling and socially tested and validated morals and values.

The process of maturation of the individual consists also in the assimilation of the myth-morals-law in the super-ego or moral sense. Folkways and mores correspond in the societal level to the habit system of behaviour which "is formed by the structuralization or mechanisation of what has frequently recurred, whether determined by the super-ego, the ego or the id." The habit system accounts for most rigidities, particularly those which the individual

himself cannot abandon.¹ Just as individuals act typically as creatures of habit, so do men under influence of folkways and mores act typically and so representatively not as individuals but as members of a group.²

Psychological Mechanisms of Conformity

The basic psychological mechanisms underlying the individual's conformity to folkways and conventions are conditioned response, imitation, suggestion, passive sympathy, identification and social facilitation. The individual imitates because the act imitated has helped others in the achievement of goals and values which he seeks or such act is approved by them. The underlying value situation creates and maintains imitation as a socially conditioned response. Thus he learns to imitate folkways and mores and the ways of thought and action of leaders. The individual also makes a response similar to that of another, whether adaptive at the time or not, due to suggestion that includes hypnosis, habit and the transferred condition response in which social and cultural factors enter. Especially is such response well-established when there is prestige associated with another individual or a group of individuals or their behaviour. There is the "prestige" effect of mere numbers and also of the powerful leaders or the élite. The leaders, the heroes, the family heads and the élite set the direction of human behaviour in all societies. Similarly a symbol, like the ideal character in myth, legend and history, fosters obedience to cultural patterns. Prestige effect is often secured in society by symbols eliciting strong reactions of fright, dependence and submission. As the dog salivates on the ring of a bell that is associated with the presentation of meat, at the stage of human mental evolution there are adaptive responses to a large and complex

¹ Murray and Others: *Explorations in Personality*, pp. 140-141.

² Park and Burgess: *Introduction to the Science of Sociology*, p. 30.

variety of signs and symbols, like the police prosecution, the court order, the mob hiss and the factory whistle, acquired under emotional conditions selected by society.

Man obeys various folkways, mores and conventions through the instrumentality of symbols and devices that induce a salutary fear of punishment and sense of guilt and shame. Conditioning is facilitated by formal and informal, direct and indirect education and acquisition of a very complex kind in social culture. Maxims, proverbs and commandments are as efficacious symbols of social control as those devised by law, religion and art. All these inculcate and spread habits of discipline and conformity from childhood that are reinforced by reward or punishment. Reward may be direct, practical and overt, or may assume highly symbolic and cultural forms such as wealth, status, power and prestige, and fortify cultural conditioning. Symbols of social praise and reward, reproof and punishment are met with in every group enforcing customary conformity. Further, the individual, dependent as he is on society, becomes conditioned, as Flugel observes, "to certain elementary forms of respect for the rights, feelings and conveniences of others."¹ This tendency of reciprocity, as it might be called, is strengthened by the individual interest in the behaviour, expressions and emotions of others due to the contagion of emotion or what McDougall calls "primitive passive sympathy" or to "conditioning" as Humphrey suggests, the visual and perhaps auditory impressions of another's pleasure and pain being similar to those of one's own.² Sympathy develops and extends on the basis of these elementary mechanisms, the individual fulfilling his goals and values in, through and with, the fulfilment of others. This establishes, as development proceeds, his "identification" with fellowmen, "loyalty" to the

¹ Flugel: *Man, Morals and Society*, p. 242.

² Humphrey: *The Conditioned Reflex and the Elementary Social Reaction*, *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology*, 1922.

group and subordination of personal wishes and interests to group standards. As memory, imagination and other higher mental processes are operative, identification and loyalty imply not merely automatic subservience to the standard of the group but also deliberate cultivation of appropriate goals and purposes as well as moral ideals and norms.

Freud mentions "identification" as the earliest expression of an emotional tie with another person. As a child grows up, he identifies himself with toys, playmates, members and friends of the family, the play group and the school. As his institutional world becomes more variegated, he identifies himself with models and prototypes, derived from literature, art, the newspaper, the cinema and the radio.¹ Then the social symbols and archetypes of personality, heroes, leaders, saints, poets, actors or cinema stars catch hold of his imagination and mould his attitudes, sentiments and values. Man derives from society symbols of various personality types which are psychologically assimilated as part of his self, and which contribute to enrich his life with a variety of orientations, values and experiences that his limited social milieu normally denies him. The social function of human symbols, which is the heritage of every individual from myth, legend, folk-lore, history, literature and the fine arts, in intensifying and enlarging identification and loyalty, and bringing about social conformity as well as fullness and variety of vicarious adventure and experience, deserves greater attention in sociology than is usually given to it.

In a group situation there is also found a direct social facilitation associated with group-aroused emotional interest, rapport and *esprit de corps* and removal of anxieties and fears. These result in ease and speed of action, output of effort and judgment. Thus group cohesion rests

¹ Margaret Mead has shown the divergence of patterns of socialisation and "cultural surrogates", other than the parent-ideal types, in different cultures such as Balinese, Samoan and Zuni.

on its obvious psychological advantages. In all such cases there is the "unreasoned" acceptance by the individual of society's ways of action that, strengthened by the inescapable need of his participation in the division of labour and social and economic life of the community, makes the fulfilment of his major values possible. Finally, the individual learns appropriate attitudes, sentiments and ideals relating to whole groups and becomes conscious of, and deliberately seeks, conformity. As memory, imagination and other higher mental processes are operative, identification and loyalty imply not merely automatic subservience to the conventions of the group but deliberate cultivation of appropriate goals and purposes as well as moral ideals and norms. The entire conditioning and integrating functions of education, myth and ideology are focussed towards the achievement and diffusion of conforming behaviour. F.H. Allport studied the uniformities of behaviour of different groups statistically and found that, instead of fitting into the pattern of the normal probability curve with the frequencies gradually tapering off in either direction from the mode, conformity behaviour takes the form of the J-curve. The great bulk of automobile drivers, employees and worshippers behaved according to the standardised pattern; the deviants were very few.¹ But social deviation is not a negligible phenomenon. It is no doubt sometimes significant for the rescaling of the values of life.

The Creative Role of Individual Deviance

To the extent the individual now and then deviates from the current myth, morals and values and rises above routine and rigid conformity, he is a custodian and respecter of the rational, interrogative, creative aspect of conscience and becomes a producer or a manipulator of his social culture,

¹ Allport: The J-Curve Hypothesis of Conforming Behaviour, *Journal of Social Psychology*, 1934, pp. 141-183.

aspiring to set up his own idealized standard or norm and exhibiting some ideal creativeness and criticism, some variation and improvement. Thus Bergson in his *Two Sources of Morality and Religion* stresses along with tradition and social pressure the creative factor in the ethics of community, provided by the example of moral heroes and inspiring leaders who are impelled by their critical, creative rather than dogmatic, authoritarian conscience and arouse new aspirations rather than a sense of duty. Crises and conflicts in social life stir men to moral clarification, criticism and reflection and sometimes to a challenge of existing social norms and standards. Such men inculcate the ethics of the open road rather than the ethics of customs, folkways, traditions. Even in primitive culture, as Malinowski has shown, the force of custom and tradition is not the only one. There is scope for much individual variation of conduct adjusted to specific needs and situations. Neither magic nor mythology governs the ordinary routine of life, restricted largely as it is to support the savage in dangerous and uncertain enterprises. In the ordinary routine of hunting, food-gathering and arts and crafts the savage does not take recourse to magical art and rite.¹

The individual grows up in a world of both routine and moral initiative, habit and reason, instinctive level of behaviour and deliberate preference and judgment. Ordinarily he lives more by habit and folkway than by conscience, reason and morals. Even if he be actuated by a high moral ideal, he cannot avoid conforming to the moral routine. But as society changes, moral habits and folkways become too rigid, and he would find conformity unethical. These, indeed, would prevent him from participation in new moral standards that make themselves felt

¹ *The Foundations of Faith and Morals*, p. 22; see also Murphy: *Personality*, pp. 778-783.

in the social consciousness. One may refer to the justification on moral grounds by philosophers of such institutions as monarchy, private property and even slavery through the centuries. At the same time there are discernible the efforts of both society and the individual by lying, casuistry, rationalisation and hypocrisy to convert habits and folkways into proper morals and values by relating these to the accepted attitudes, sentiments and moral premises of the community.

Similarly in the level of the mentality of the individual the super-ego is too dogmatic and inhibitive in childhood. The super-ego is defined by Freud as "the inner perception of objections to definite wish impulses that exist in us." The sense of guilt experienced by the child as his libidinal cravings threaten to express themselves in spite of the censorship of the inner monitor contains much of the nature of fear and anxiety. "Fear", says Alexander, "is the motive power behind all repression. Characteristic of the fear, however, is the fact that it is by no means rational or entirely conscious fear of external and actual danger, but an inner fear which appears in consciousness as a guilty conscience. The fear of the parents thus becomes embodied in the fear of one's own conscience."¹ In the Freudian analysis, then, it is the fear of social disapprobation or punishment with the associated anxiety due to the incalculable unconscious source of the dynamic tension that underlies man's moral call. With maturity and progress of socialization, however, myths, values and moral codes assimilate themselves to the super-ego, enabling the conscious ego to express its forbidden wishes in a manner acceptable to the super-ego or evade its restrictions without uncertain fear or dread. Sublimation also lightens the load of social prohibitions and taboos by offering substitutes and uninhibited outlets to

¹ *The Medical Value of Psychoanalysis*, pp. 75-76.

the baffled primitive *id* impulses for obtaining legitimate fulfilment, without coming into conflict with cultural norms and standards and even obtaining high moral approval. Rationalization produces intellectual justification of egoistic, antisocial desires and behaviour and represents another device that contributes towards the reduction of tension and anxiety, facilitating easy and smooth participation in social intercourse. Moral action now takes the character of the smooth, easy mechanisms of instinct and habit as a result of which the individual can easily resist temptations to sin, crime or social deviation without tension and struggle in his psyche.


The Internalisation of Values and Morals

Man's innate drives and wishes and society's taboos and prescriptions harmoniously coalesce. The 'internalization' of myths, morals and values is characteristic of the development of the psyche of the individual. There is a continuum of coercive or imperative patterns that constitutes the essence of morals, running from external constraint, law and public opinion to honour, super-ego or conscience. As we reach the last rung in this continuum or moral ladder, morals become habitual, instinctive, engendering no psychic tension, effort and judgment. This is the internal side of the configuration of human personality. On the external side of culture, the interpenetration of morals and values and folkways and conventions invests the latter with meanings and values, and intensifies social participation, like-mindedness and solidarity of the group. Hobhouse in his well-known work, *Morals and Evolution*, attempted to show that the ethical progress of humanity is marked by the progress from heteronomous code to the personal moral responsibility and autonomy of the individual. The 'rationalization' of morality, according to him, implies the development of personal freedom of the individual as a responsible moral agent which links him to his fellowmen and

to the whole society. But even Hobbhouse had to admit that the customary morality of primitive societies expresses ideals, and that underlying rigid customs, traditions and myths there is "the spirit in which they are conceived." In the moral consciousness of both individuals and societies, habits as well as aspirations, pressure as well as creativeness equally play their rôles, depending upon the level of moral life that constantly shifts. This implies that man's relationships to fellowmen become instinctively just, good and proper and he lives habitually a 'moral life'; he lives as much by his reason, conscience and honour as by law and public opinion, as much as by his myths, values and morals as by his folkways and conventions. Man's conscience, values and myths now become integrated into a harmonious pattern that invests the daily thought, sentiments and behaviour of himself and fellowmen with the supreme values and meaning.

Depth-levels of Self and Culture, their Contrasted Automatic and Rational Mechanisms and Values

The diagram on p. 320 presents the contrasts between automatic and conscious, compulsive experience as represented by folkways *versus* morals and by habit *versus* conscience in both social culture and individual behaviour. There is reciprocal interchange between man's reason and conscience and his automatic system of behaviour, proceeding without much conscious intervention, and between myth and morals and the automatic pattern of folkways and conventions in the social level. Such interchange is endless and ever-shifting. It gives an ever-variable picture of the configuration (Gestalt) of value-seeking and fulfilment by the individual in his social-cultural milieu. In this structural configuration both the individual and the culture have their superficial, practical and automatic as well as deep, rational and imperative *modus operandi*—values, ideals and patterns of guidance in social relationships.



LEVELS OF VALUE AS LEVELS OF ETHICAL ANALYSIS

These represent different degrees of social participation and of 'requiredness' or ought of social actions and institutional and status relationships. There are 'immoral' folkways and conventions and unconventional morals in societies, as there are immoral habits and interests as well as trans-social morality and ideals of individuals.

Herein lie the roots of both irresistible revolt of the individual conscience and irrefragable pressure of social conscience or collective morality. The revolt situation is marked, as Gurvitch points out, by the contrasts and revolts occurring among the depth-levels in the inner life of the individual with associated conflicts of ideas, values and ideals. Often do we take the conflicts between depth-levels that are parallel in the individual and society for conflicts between the latter.¹ The individual delving into the depths of his conscience, reason and faith may rebel against social conventions, accepted habitual patterns and goals of collective behaviour as well as against his own

¹ *Essais de Sociologie*; see also Is the Antithesis of Moral Man and Immoral Society True?, *Journal of Philosophy*, 1941.

moral inertia and habits. Society, achieving a new moral insight and burning with the passion of a new moral ideal and a more sensitive social conscience, may devastatingly attack individual beliefs and moral habits and call upon the individual to build up a new social order. The individual constantly seeks release from his own mental tensions and conflicts by readjusting his interests, habits and values not only to the demands of his own conscience and reason, but also to new ideals as these emerge on the collective consciousness. Society also constantly injects values and myths into the framework of established folkways and conventions, investing these latter with new meanings and ideals for individuals. In the development of culture it is sometimes the ideal creativeness of the individuals, sometimes the value aspiration of the community in a period of social revolution or intellectual and religious ferment, that becomes the focus of new values and ideals, seeking to embody themselves in new social relations and cultural forms through a revision of old values, ideals and patterns of behaviour. Just as the individual has his conforming habits and internal pressures as well as his rebellious moral urges, so also does society, to be sure, alternate between inert collective traditions and glowing faiths and aspirations of the multitude.

In both individual and social experience there are endless conflicts and accommodations between the automatic and the rational *modus operandi*, embodying contrasted processes that are grounded in the superficial or the deep levels of human personality and social consciousness. Reason, as Max Wertheimer stresses, enables both the individual and society to obtain the whole picture as well as the entire structure of means-and-ends. "Productive processes", he observes, "are often of this nature in the desire to get a real understanding, requisitioning and interrogating. A certain region in the field becomes crucial, is focussed; but

it does not become isolated. A new, deep structural view of the situation develops, involving changes in the functional meaning, the grouping etc. of the items. Two directions are involved: getting a whole consistent picture, and seeing what the structure for the whole requires for its parts."¹ Thus the simple picture of the inevitable antithesis and conflict between society and the individual in the orthodox theory of social control is to be replaced by the complex picture of tension between the dogmatic or authoritarian and rational or creative phase of conscience, of struggle and interpenetration of patterns and values emerging from the contrasted depth-levels of individual and social experience.

The incompatibility of adjustment within the personality and of adjustment to the social group often leads to psychic conflict, dissociation and neurosis, but sometimes elicits the psychic potentialities of the individual, high moral fervour, insight and ideal creativeness that are sources of new social valuation and judgment. On the other hand, the finer and more delicate balance and consistency within the personality cannot be maintained in the long run without external group adjustment that can foster the fullest realization of a rich and creative psychic life. The achievement of freedom, creativeness and completeness of the personality rests on the perfection of social participation and organisation. Conversely, the imperfection of group participation and instability of social bonds as between Crowd, Interest-group, Society and Commonalty call for different systems of control that are operative in the same community and indicate contrasted developmental trends and patterns. Different types of societies and groups require and apply different morals and means of control. Every culture, every group has the kind and degree of social control it deserves.

¹ See his *Productive Thinking*, p. 167.

From the viewpoint of the individual, the crux of personality adjustment consists in achieving conformity to the group and at the same time an internal flexibility appropriate for whatever outer adjustments that may be indicated from the viewpoint of the collective. The progress of a culture is also measured as much by the flexibility as by the continuity and integration of the pattern of values which moves individuals. The chaos of values and confusion of ideals in the social culture aggravate personality maladjustment. On the one hand, the individual loses his plasticity as he grows older, and cannot easily acquire new habits to cope with the changing circumstances. On the other hand, a confused and disorganised society calls for unpredictable adjustments for which the individual trained in the old social patterns and procedures is not prepared at all. In fact the more socialised the individual, the less prepared is he to play his successive social rôles in a disoriented culture. Social cultures also markedly differ in their encouragement or discouragement of individual variability and conformity, so important for working out internal adjustments to the fast changing social-cultural milieu. Moral progress is judged, finally, by the extent to which individuals conform relatively freely and spontaneously to the pattern of values without the prop of external pressure, social code and public opinion with the minimum of mental conflict and friction.

Parallelism between Personal and Social Self-control

Social control, accordingly, involves four elements: (a) a habitual or customary element of conformity; (b) an element of restraint, repression and pressure; (c) a rational, normative, ideal element of valuation both within the individual consciousness and in social experience, and involving homologous levels of both self- and social consciousness; and (d) a planned integration, hierarchy and co-ordination of different kinds and degrees

of control according to the behaviour problems dealt with. This may be illustrated by means of the following diagram in which 1, 2 and 3 represent the parallel depth-levels of individual and collective self-control.

SELF-CONTROL

| SOCIAL CONSCIENCE | INDIVIDUAL CONSCIENCE |
|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| 1. Folkway, tradition and institution. | 1. Conforming habit and mental inertia. |
| 2. External restraint, repression and pressure. Law, public opinion, social expectancy, laughter and ostracism. | 2. Internal restraint, repression and pressure. Super-ego or conscience and honour. |
| 3. Ideal scale of values and norms of society. | 3. Ideal scale of values and norms of the individual. |

PSYCHOLOGICAL LEVELS OF SOCIAL CONTROL

From man's inner life as well as from society, and from different strata in each, spring the influences—symbols, patterns and standards—that bring individual attitude, feeling and behaviour in harmony with those of society. There is a unity of the self-control processes due to the automatic, customary and ideal creative valuation, whether in the social or in the individual level, leaning on each other and forming phases of the ongoing stream of conscious mental life.

Social control is not something "external" but comprises internal restraint and pressure as well as normative traditional values and ideals by which society directs from within itself its own processes. It does not restrain nor punish individuals conceived in isolation and separation from the society, but regulates the dynamic reciprocal *relations* between the individual and the society as an integral whole. These *relations* under collective judgment and valuation become the patterns and foci of symbols, ideals and norms that maintain concord between the

society and individuals, appealing to external constraints and pressures or to spontaneous imperatives from the deeper strata of social and individual consciousness for control and guidance according to the concrete social conjuncture.

The reciprocal adjustment between the individuals and society is secured as much by conscious, normative as by unconscious, compulsive mechanisms of direction and control. Different levels of both individual consciousness and social experience, of personality adjustment and social adaptation are involved in social control that is generally a process by which harmonious, conforming responses are produced in all social situations.

Social control, then, comprises two interlinked functions: the socialization of the personality through the internalization of social norm and ideal, and the efficient maintenance of order and discipline in society without the hindrances of deviant behaviour of individuals challenging the social norm and ideal. An ordered and progressive society does not depend merely upon custom, tradition and law, nor on external regulation and punishment or reward and praise, just as a complete and integrated personality does not depend for his behaviour on mere habit, routine of life and internal pressure. Laughter, ostracism, propaganda and punishment may check the egoistic and aggressive individual. Unreasoned conformity to existing folkways, laws, rituals and institutions as a matter of social routine may repress the rebellious instincts. Social control is basically a process of valuation and symbolisation, by which society creates and arouses oneness of feeling, attitude and behaviour between the individual and the community, without taking recourse to physical constraint and pressure. The function of social control is on the whole less to establish conformity to fixed social patterns, rules and standards and more to guide and direct individual motivations and behaviour according to ideas, values and ideals that

the individual shares and renews with society for his own freedom, creativeness and completeness of social living. Ideal valuation is essential for both integration of personality and maintenance of social order and discipline. Social control implies the effort of both the community and the personality to reach social values, ideals and norms, and thus becomes more and more conscious, elevated and spiritual. Valuation and idealization, immanent in the social process, are the essential basis of social control, while symbolisation is the familiar, ubiquitous technique and method of communication of psychological pressure and control in the absence of physical contact.

Society fashions a vast number of signs, symbolic mechanisms, devices and organizations for this purpose. Thus the symbols of art and religion, the etiquette, manners and rituals of institutions, the ceremonies of inclusive groups, like the state, the church and the family, and the cultural ideals and norms expressed in stereotyped slogans, myths and ideologies function as more important means of control than threats and commands, punishments and rewards. Behind all symbols, patterns and standards are the moral values and ideals that validate and at the same time transcend the former. It is the ideal and evaluative element of social culture and human personality that constitutes the most spontaneous, intensive and imperative form of social control, and at the same time integrates the various kinds and forms of control in a unity and a hierarchy.

The hierarchy of the different kinds of control, ranging from physical coercion and social influence and pressure to an appeal to the moral and spiritual side of human nature, varies according to specific groups, institutions and social bonds. It also rests on the scale of values itself which is the ultimate judge in what forms of deviant behaviour would physical punishment, social convention and expectancy or propaganda and mass elicitation

of ideas and ideals or their combination be the appropriate form of social control. Conversely, the different kinds of social control influence social bonds and integration, patterns of behaviour and structured personality types.

Homologous Stages in the Development of Conscience and Social Control

Primitive cultures build a steel frame of caste-power-prestige in order to invest the élite with unchallengeable supremacy for rooting out social deviation; while the methods of control are also stern, inconsistent and repressive, saturated with emotions of revenge and destruction of the rebellious antisocial elements. As civilization progresses the social order becomes more flexible, though the rôles and statuses of legitimate power and prestige are defined beyond any uncertainty. This is indispensable for efficiency of the system of control; for legitimate power and status carry with them a moral right to command and guide and also a moral obligation of the community to obey and follow. At the same time there is no marked development of aesthetic-symbolical devices and techniques of social control, persuasion and guidance that contribute towards a natural solution of deviant behaviour problems and of education and social appeal in its manifold forms—reward, praise and adulation or blame, satire and ostracism. With social experience the imperatives of society, indeed, comprise less and less of elements of coercion and pressure, and more and more of symbolic cultural patterns that elicit conforming feelings, attitudes and ways of action, applying psychological influence on individuals without their being aware of this. Social imperatives are embodied in taboos and commandments, maxims and proverbs that lay down standards of conduct by creating favourable sentiments and attitudes towards appropriate mores, customs, institutions and ways of action. Such imperatives have to be

distinguished from judgments of value that foster a general attitude towards either prohibitions and commandments or the dispositions and attitudes underlying these. Judgments of values are cultivated by social art, symbolism, ritual, propaganda and education that now become the predominant agencies or phases of social control, focussed less towards conformity to fixed standards, patterns and rules and more towards inculcation of common social ideals and values of life. Finally, social culture develops the richness and poise of the personal life with its ideals, aspirations and norms that serve as at once the most intensive and the most creative forms of social control.

Psychiatrists find that in the inner life of the maturing human person there are homologous stages of evolution of the mechanisms of control. In infancy the super-ego or moral sense is tyrannical, incomplete and inconsistent. As the child develops normally, unimpeded by infantile fixations and conflicts, and fears and anxieties due to severe threats of the unassimilated super-ego, there is less pressure from the repressed urges and more of symbolisation, sublimation and rationalisation. The relaxation of the severity of the norms and standards dominant in the conscious prevents magnification, consolidation and entrenchment of the repressed tendencies within the unconscious, and at the same time aids the full variegated expression of the emotional life and its balanced emphasis and consistency. The way is thus prepared for mature and inclusive integration of desires and impulses, the rise of ideals and norms and the manifestation of any unfulfilled or partially fulfilled impulses in ways that are in consonance with the cultural patterns and standards and that carry, indeed, social approbation. When values and ideals are "internalised" and become a part of the super-ego, the latter's warning and admonition become no longer arbitrary and dogmatic but equivalent to man's highest aspiration and creation.

But man's moral life and achievement never run smooth, but are full of tensions and conflicts. What are most intensive experiences in personal vision, creation and discipline, and collective aspiration and order arouse the greatest tensions and antagonisms. There are conflicts between goals, values and symbols differing in degrees of ideal creativeness and patternisation. There are conflicts between groups and institutions as these embody values that overlap with and contradict other values. There are struggles between kinds and degrees of social control *vis a vis* the particular group organization, especially as it advances towards greater cohesion. Above all, there are marked conflicts between the hierarchy of values and norms as approved and decreed by society and as set up in individual conscience and faith. For both society and the individual evaluate, aspire, plan and test. All such tensions between society and the individual are all the deeper and stronger because it is the creative ideal elements and not the habitual elements nor external nor internal pressures that are involved in the situation.

Man's Symbolic-cultural Environment, its Depth-levels and Imperatives

The smooth, delicately adaptive moral behaviour of the highly integrated personality shows a conformity to the standards of the community far removed from tropisms and reflexes and the rigid, stereotyped instinctive behaviour of the social insects and animals. Man's instinctive equipment is much more flexible and shifting than that of any other animal. But his adaptive behaviour has the same biological ends—security, food, reproduction, survival, dominance and response. In the humans the adaptive mechanisms evolve into mental tension and relief, into the pursuit and achievement of values with their strong emotional tones. In this value-seeking and achievement, several factors are integrated together involving mental processes within the

individual and interactive processes with the environment, both physical and cultural: (1) the fundamental urges, interests and dynamic habits of the individual; (2) the values and norms of society that define native impulses and urges and acquired interests and wishes and the modes of their fulfilment; (3) the constant reciprocal interaction and resultant transformation of (1) and (2) in both individual and social experience. In this integration social and cultural conditioning, suggestion, sympathy, identification, social facilitation, repression, symbolisation and sublimation are the principal mechanisms for developing the specific patterns of values and conforming ways of behaviour that are both sifted in the sieve of social selection and survival. Thus these endure and contribute to man's permanent social heritage that comes to direct and control his evolutionary advance, lifted from the plane of biological functioning and survival to the pursuit of the supreme values that span time and space. It is the imperatives of social-cultural living from folk-ways and conventions to myths and morals that largely mould human nature through the integration and ordering of primitive drives and interests and the scaling of the values of life. The organisation of character and personality and the orientation of certain virtues and personality traits that emerge are largely the outcome of the social-cultural milieu. The civilizational environment of man becomes fully saturated in the passing epochs with the supreme values, and comes to define and regulate all social processes and relations in terms of the latter. Man's growth and development consist largely in transcending his ephemeral urges and adventitious responses to the external environment and subordinating these to the stable and universal values of life.

Over and above the man-made region, man raises the superstructure of his symbolic-cultural environment as his external legacy, transmitting ideas, values, ideals and experiences to the future generations. Three strata of such

superstructure representing distinct depth-levels of value and experience are distinguishable. The most superficial of these are represented by folkways, mores and traditions that are the patternised values and ideas, forming part of man's habitual routine of life, his technic, practical and social adjustment. Less superficial, more intensive and creative than these influences and controls are the various kinds of warning, admonishing and evocative myths and symbols that through sense expressions act as intermediaries of the supreme ideas and values in concrete mental situations. Finally, both man and society test, search and aspire, renovate ideas, values and ideals in new situations. These pristine, spontaneous experiences of individual and collective aspiration and creativeness embody at once society's strongest imperatives and deepest expressions of value consciousness, adding most richly to the value-configuration of mankind. Every society has its rigid, stereotyped standards, rules and institutions as well as its novel values, myths and utopias. To the extent as the former are grounded on and penetrated by the latter, the development of personality and social control and integration become easy and effective.

Between the plastic, versatile and dynamic human nature and the social environment, partly rigid and partly dynamic, there is a constant give-and-take, accounting for both the shifting character of goals, values and norms and the uniquely personal behaviour patterns and idiosyncracies of individuals. This give-and-take supplies the key to functional or processual thinking in social psychology.

This is analysis in terms of the whole *Gestalt* or total group situation in which morals or values, social living, human nature and personality are found to be interdependent, making in their togetherness the true picture. Human nature does not comprise a fixed assortment of innate drives, nor is personality an expression only of hereditary equipment and of isolated, unique traits and disposi-

tions. Personality is shaped largely by the social-cultural milieu and exhibits uniform characteristics as well as variations due to different rôles, positions and statuses of individuals. Society is not a later accretion superimposed upon the life of the individual, nor is it a consequence of biologically given, full-fledged herd or gregarious instincts. Morals and values also are neither specific by-products of society nor are absolute and unchanging, nor, again, independent of man's daily social routine and adjustment. Human nature and values function appropriately in "society" which represents not a fixed entity but dynamic social-cultural living in specific groups and integrations of groups. It comprises the process of social participation-cum-facilitation, differing in different types of groups, man's nature, morals and values being emergents of such a process. No single item or factor, whether human nature or morals or values, can be separated for purposes of analysis from the total group situation and its adaptive interactive processes. If in biology, medicine and psychiatry process thinking has succeeded so well not merely in causal and functional analysis but also in the judgment of functional appropriateness or inappropriateness, there is no reason why it should be delayed in social psychology and ethics.

CHAPTER XIII

MECHANISMS OF MORAL PROGRESS

Moral Progress as a Total Configuration

Moral progress can be neither defined nor understood from the viewpoint only of the ethicist or the sociologist. Like the myriad-faceted structure of the human personality that yet shows coherence and integrity, moral progress exhibits several distinct phases. It implies an enrichment of personality, an increase of social integration and a qualitative improvement of the values of life. These trends underlie the total configuration of the progressive adaptation and ordering of life, mind and society. The progress is of the whole configuration or system. Moral progress is, therefore, to be looked at from the synoptic viewpoints of social psychology, sociology and ethics by which alone we can achieve the functional, inclusive meaning of the entire process.

Moral progress is obviously directed by social symbols as it has begun in the human community with language and communication. Not before man perfected the use of language and developed his mythology, religion, literature and the fine arts that he could add a new dimension to the social reality and make of collective responses of adaptation to his environment moral aspirations of progress. The French sociologist, Mauss, remarks, "the activity of the collective mind is still more symbolic than that of the individual mind but in the same direction." Thus the special evocative agencies of religion, art, education, law and ethics disseminate through a variety of symbols, myths and rituals the ethical command, legal and social regulation and acquiescence of the community. All such imperatives are developed

and understood by man not as physical but as symbolic notions. The world of law and morals is not the actual world but an ideal, symbolic world. It is not the existential but the possible environment of man, pregnant with his moral potentials of justice, love and goodness. It can, therefore, conquer his moral inertia and habit, and invest him with a new capacity to remould his environment and transform ecological adaptation and economic efficiency into moral progress.

Man's symbolic means of social control and evocation of conscience form a unified system in every society; and in every type of grouping these function in a definite order or hierarchy according to their appropriateness. Thus the family, the interest-group and the state have different systems of social control to deal with deviant behaviour. Fear of punishment and insecurity; shame and honour; and finally the super-ego or conscience—such are the prime factors in the development of moral ideas and regulation of social deviance. These represent three depth-levels of forms of self- and social-control, from the coercive and crystallised to spontaneous and flexible patterns associated with the development of both self- and social consciousness. Moral progress as a total configuration exhibits a system of scaling of the means of social control according to the depth-level of experience.

The Development of the Child's Moral Structures

The super-ego or conscience with an associated inner sense of guilt and self-censure protects the essence and moral worth of the deepest and most intimate self, and ensures its aloofness from public opinion and judgment. It originates in the identification of the child with the father, the focus of the ambivalent tendencies of love and hate, and later on with such superiors as elders, teachers, friends, leaders and chiefs, all of whom elicit strict obedience as well as love and

admiration. Gradually the child builds up into the structure of his personality the infallible external authority not only of the parents, elders, leaders and élite of his group or community but also of the social and moral norms, and of the almighty gods and spirits and other external "projections." As the stern and forbidding parent, brother, teacher and other commanding persons are "introjected" i.e., incorporated in the self, these become, as Flugel suggests, more stern and aggressive than the actual persons, being reinforced by the child's inward recoiling, hate and aggression, aroused by frequent and inevitable frustration of his desires.¹ The parents' taboos and injunctions are distorted in the child's mind due to the inward hate and aggression; the sense of guilt and anxiety becomes at the same time grossly exaggerated, and the "imago" of the introjected parent becomes too severe and cruel and hardly resembles the real parent. It is the child's fantasy that indeed completely transforms, and introduces an intense emotional tone into, both the actual personality of the parent and his standards and prohibitions. On the other hand a parent, who is actually severe and unreasonable in his treatment of the child, induces an exaggerated guilt reaction that is sought to be dealt with by the latter through defiance, hostility and aggression. Another factor contributing towards the harsh and tyrannical morality of childhood is the employment of symbols and fantasies of parental restriction, coercion and punishment that have to be disproportionately severe because the mere image or symbolical envisagement of the punishment has to serve as an adequate deterrent. If the symbolical threat does not suffice to prevent deviation, the threat has to be carried out in actual life. The tyrannical character of the super-ego is strikingly manifest in the case of the melancholic, who gives himself up to self-censure and self-torture,

¹ See Flugel: *Man, Morals and Society*, p. 87.

the super-ego holding the ego completely in its mercy. With return to normality the ego would sometimes indulge in the pleasures of the senses with redoubled zeal. Recent workers in anthropology and psychoanalysis now find that the purely instinctive and biological approach of Freud cannot adequately explain all the elements in the establishment of the super-ego. K. Horney in particular emphasises the rôle of culture and the social environment in the acquisition of conscience and of moral standards and values, referring particularly to neuroses due to conflicts between the individual's achievement and his social expectation. Kardiner, an anthropologist, observes, "In his orientation on instinct, Freud left little room for the operation of societal influences. If we see the super-ego as a mental function we tend to lose sight of the fact that it represents an habitual and automatic method of reacting to other individuals to the end of being loved and escaping punishment. Fully recognizing the important rôle of helplessness of the child, Freud does not follow its influence on the acceptance of disciplines, but continues to view the relationship of the child and parent from the point of view of sexual object and aim."¹

The family, the circle of friends, the school, the play group, the club, the church, or any other institution and even metaphysical concepts and symbols, such as the notion of a cosmic order and the moral law of the universe,—all are sources of moral valuations, obligations and norms. From the child's early dependencies, loves and adorations of its supposedly perfect parents, brothers or sisters, friends, teachers and leaders, whether actual or fictitious, whose rôles it attempts to recapitulate, it develops notions of perfection which constitute an important element of conscience, expectation or goal. Where these are lacking and the child develops affectionless, deprived of the normal relation with

¹ *The Individual and His Society.*

parents or any parent substitutes with its attendant primal sense of guilt, shame and moral conflict, he fails to develop morally. Normal upbringing in the family and social environment, with its ministrations and loves, is indispensable for the evolution of his normal ethical mechanism as represented by the super-ego or conscience. Such is the conclusion of a study of forty-four juvenile thieves by Bowlby who shows that morally defective characters usually arise in home environments of little affection, apathy or hostility.¹ Modern economic and social institutions engender and exaggerate individual rivalry, competition and aggressiveness, resulting in emotional insecurity and isolation of the individual and hence in an intensified desire for affection as a remedy. It is for this reason that absence of affection or positive hostility in the home becomes an emotional calamity in modern culture. Karen Horney well points out that modern civilisation in so far as it exhibits definite contradictions, provoking on the one hand an exaggerated need for affection and satisfactory personal relations, and at the same time frustrating these, is a fertile ground for the development of neuroses.² Difficult experiences in the family lead to the projection of the child's fear and anxiety to the outside world, and the formation of a distrustful or spiteful attitude towards everyone. The neurotic is rightly called "a step-child of culture." The normal projection of the ambivalent desires of love and hate to the mother and the child's burden of unconscious guilt, which is repressed by the tyrannical primitive super-ego, are the necessary conditions of his acquisition of the core of moral sense without which he becomes a misfit in society.

¹ *International Journal of Psychoanalysis*: Vol. 25, 1944.

² *The Neurotic Personality of Our Time*, pp. 286-287.

Man's Acquisition of the Sense of Absoluteness and Completeness of Moral Laws

The child's relatively definite core of moral sense and perfection, partly inherited and partly acquired, both hardens and expands as he grows, and becomes the permanent central nucleus of his ethical attitudes and sentiments. The sense of guilt, shame, self-censure, honour and perfection are all built up into this primal moral structure that assimilates into itself allegiance to the group and institution, to the deity, to the law and the moral code and to the abstract ideal or symbol. Such fealty or obedience to "society" is the outgrowth of primal attitudes towards the parents, but is now extended to any object, institution, deity, symbol or abstract concept that is stronger and wiser. The super-ego relationship continually expands and amplifies itself. Man thus learns to make automatically subtle distinctions between right and wrong, good and bad, although hereditary endowment determines in some measure what kind of conscience he develops. Of course the verbalized concepts and approving and disapproving gestures in the institutional situations assist the individual in shaping and remoulding his inherited conscience. Thus conscience becomes the focus and carrier of the moral legacy of the community, whose threat of expulsion and ostracism has the same compulsiveness as it is derived from the child's primal anxiety not to lose his mother's love and care. Conscience comes as much from parents and other commanding persons as from dominant groups and institutions, moral and legal codes and abstract ideals and symbols. Like the parental prohibitions and injunctions, the self interiorises manners, laws and moral principles and the commandments of religion and metaphysics. Such interiorisation is accompanied in every case with a feeling of guilt and anxiety and other irrational reactions rooted in the unconscious, and having their genesis in early childhood experiences. The "Thou shalt" and "Thou shalt not" of society and its moral code become an intimate

part of man's psyche through the demands and aspirations of the super-ego, and hence are much harder to challenge or disobey than if imposed on him from outside, especially as there is always some amount of aggression intimately fused with the super-ego.

The Harsh, Admonishing Nature of Conscience

The harsh, admonishing nature of conscience is a result of the mechanism of repression by which primitive impulses and ideas that cannot bear the light of conscious reason or cannot be examined rationally are inhibited and driven into the unconscious so that psychic adjustment becomes easier through the avoidance of conflicts. Yet due to this very repression which begins in the career of the child before he can deliberate or have any adequate experience of his own to enable him to choose rationally, the super-ego is endowed with a certain amount of unbending sternness and ruthlessness fused with emotions of certitude, guilt and self-censure. Even more. Man is a relative creature. His morality is moulded to his group and social milieu. But as he distinguishes between "right" and "wrong," his language makes him think and feel "right" and "wrong" in abstract and general terms. Thus he unconsciously sets up through the medium of his speech and symbolic patterns an abstract and absolute moral law. Besides, the special mental mechanisms of inhibition and repression he has evolved greatly reinforce his emotional certitudes about "right" and "wrong." The greater the social barrier to particular impulses and their modes of satisfaction, the more frantic is his certainty about the right and wrong prescribed by the social injunctions and taboos, inhibiting and driving underground the rebellious impulses. Julian Huxley suggests that man's predilection and feeling for the absoluteness and completeness of moral laws, in spite of the fact that the concrete facts in the social

world stress moral relativity, are due to the emotional certitude engendered by the mental mechanisms growing out of the need of infantile repression and the cultural mechanisms of language and symbolism. "Thanks to repression," he observes, "it is natural for us not only to think in absolute terms, but to feel in them. The inhibiting influences of the super-ego tend to produce an intolerant assurance of being right, because only through such an assurance could they have succeeded in repressing their opponents into the unconscious. In so far as they succeed, they acquire emotional certitude; and that emotional certitude, given the construction of the human mind, inevitably tends to rationalize itself by claiming absolute value."¹ The absolute values are taken over by language and ethical and religious symbolism that significantly contribute to the interiorisation of the inviolability and completeness of moral principles and imperatives. Even those primitive peoples whose speech does not express causality or the telic relationship have the words "good" and "bad," that are not relational attributes but ingredient parts of delimited objects. Among the Trobrianders whose speech has been studied by D.D.Lee, goodness like magical potency is an ingredient element of an object which is sought not because it is of use but because it embodies certain supreme values.² In this manner even without use of adjectival concepts as attributes the supreme values are yearned for. The lack of interest in extraneous goals is not incompatible with hard work.

This is the super-ego aspect of conscience which provides the compulsive force to folkways, mores, taboos and injunctions as well as to rituals, moral and religious commands. In other words, man's primitive, emotional

¹ *On Living in a Revolution*, p. 55; also *Touchstone for Ethics*, p. 120; see also *Science and Ethics*, edited by Waddington.

² Lee: A Primitive System of Values, *Philosophy of Science*, 1940, pp. 355-365.

and irrational elements in conduct are principally 'due to the influence of the super-ego. The rôle of man's normal, primitive super-ego in the evolution of his morality and culture can hardly be overestimated. Conflict-torn man would not have the energy for any higher urgings and fulfilments of life or develop into the evaluating, symbolising responsible being as he is. Without the harnessing of the unconscious forces of the mind and acquisition of feelings of certitude and completeness in respect of social prohibitions and injunctions, his social adjustment also would have been considerably more difficult, 'chequered and uncertain. Moral progress is grounded on both these psychological features of man's evolution.

Man exhibits another aspect of conscience that is rational, creative and venturesome, and that appeals especially in a crisis to his reason and faith in values-ideals-norms. Such conscience has been through the ages the main lever of his moral progress. Here he is not the creature but the creator of moral laws and norms, experiencing the highest self-and social consciousness as well as self-status and esteem with associated emotional feelings of competence, completeness and joy that are the perennial springs of moral adventure. The moral man is a man of moral habits. The "super-ego" or the irrational and tyrannical aspect of conscience establishes this. He is also the critic and judge of morality. The rational, creative, unique aspect of conscience representing the acme of self-consciousness safeguards this distinctive feature of ethical conduct. In every individual the respective strength of the two aspects of conscience varies, resulting in differences in moral responsibility and initiative. The rational aspect of conscience always influences the dogmatic, irrational, harsh aspect of conscience, the internalised replica of the injunctions and prohibitions of overawing external authorities and models. As a matter of fact the normal individual,

as he matures, discards, modifies and refines many of the latter, his conscience becoming open to reason and suggestion and divesting itself of its harsh, admonishing and inflexible character. The rigid, irrational aspect of conscience ultimately is relegated to the guardianship of the routine of living, the rational, creative conscience concentrating its attention on new and more important adjustive patterns and relationships. Finally, the unique, rational, creative conscience projects its values and norms on the entire external authoritarian code of society and contributes towards refashioning this as well as its interiorised echo.

The Rôle of Pre-conventional Sense of Shame and Honour in Moral Progress

Conscience is the deeply entrenched acknowledgment of the social and moral order. In a less deep stratum of self-consciousness, the sense of honour, shame and social expectancy act as the "conscience" for good conduct and morals. Honour has positive while shame has negative and limiting functions. Max Scheler, who is one of the first to stress the rôle of the sense of shame in moral life, points out that the most notable area of application of this sense is sexual life. Sexual shame prevents the apperception of, or behaviour towards, the partner in sex relationship as a body, not as the expression of full and complete personality. But the meaningful feeling of shame develops secondary elaborations and functions in social life and relations. Shame, in the first place, safeguards, directs and regulates the sex impulse in the social milieu by contributing towards the integration of sex attitude and behaviour in the context of *Gemeinschaft* relations without which group life would have been impossible for an over-sexed creature like man. Secondly, the social expressions of shame tend to prevent all kinds of exploitation of fellowman, treated as mere body, chattel or good, and subordinate the biological to the social, in-

tellectual and moral values in every sphere of human relations. The use or "exploitation" of human beings as slaves and animals, as physical bodies for the satisfaction of lust, as guinea pigs for laboratory experiment or, again, as blood, tissues or bones for utilisation as fertilisers is forbidden and prevented by the universal feeling of shame. Shame protects and fosters the dignity of the human body and the human person. Thirdly, shame maintains a high standard of behaviour in society through attaching blame or discontent to man's low or mediocre goals and achievements. The latter aspects have not been discussed by Max Scheler in his well-known treatment of the social function of shame.

From the viewpoint of depth-psychology shame may be considered as the product of both man's desire for superiority (Adler) and "secondary narcissism" attached not only to the real self but to the ideal one (Freud). 'Pitch thy behaviour low and thy projects high' represents the wide-spread endeavour of the ego-ideal to reach a high standard of moral goal, attitude and conduct; and shame, as it dominates over complacency, spurs effort and increases efficiency and moral worth. Shame or self-abasement also plays an important rôle in worship. But sometimes "secondary narcissism", from which shame and the sense of guilt and unworthiness originate, becomes pathological due to the unrealistic and unreasonable aspirations and requirements of the super-ego, causing both chronic misery to the individual and annoyance and embarrassment to his fellows. Such a neurosis can be successfully treated only by the reduction of goals and demands of the super-ego so that the individual may be contented with less.¹

The sense of shame and honour is a universal element in the structure of human experience. Virgil C. Aldrich

¹ Flugel: *Man, Morals and Society*, p. 49.

indeed identifies the voice of conscience with the feeling of shame that he regards as the pre-conventional matrix of all moral conduct. Man feels shame as he runs counter, not to a convention or custom that gives rise to embarrassment or annoyance, but to human nature. There are shame-produced and shame-producing conventions in all societies which guard morals. The shame-produced ones are more enduring and less artificial. Thus shame has been "a potent factor in the production of civilization. Civilization is at lowest depth in those societies where shame plays least part."¹ On the other hand, where shame flickers feebly and threatens to be extinguished in some persons, it is rekindled in others. Thus shame-motivated persons lead moral reform and contribute towards moral progress through a "conflagration" of shame in society. Whenever there is deviation from the established hierarchy of values and from social and institutional norms, the social expressions of shame help to fight such deviance. Unlike shame, honour connotes a positive ethical attitude. The sense of honour represents a strong positive feeling of self-esteem or social approval of one's conduct or existence. Stanley Hall writes: "Conscience is no longer the supreme oracle it once was thought to be. In this twilight of conscience the guide most would now turn to is honour, which is a very different sentiment. A slur upon it makes the most cowardly boy fight, the most unabashed girl blush and weep, and the dread of the loss of it impels men to face death in almost any form. Life is a paltry thing if it must be lived in dishonor."²

Honour as a Positive Moral Sentiment

Psychoanalysts emphasise that the sense of self-esteem and status is most significant in the development

¹ An Ethics of Shame, *Ethics*, 1939-40, p. 73.

² *Morale*, p. 6

or organisation of the ego-feeling and ideal in both infantile and adult situations. On the other hand, the sense of shame, worthlessness and insecurity due, for instance, to prolonged unemployment is associated with basic anxiety, corresponding to the child's emotional loneliness and distress at the loss of parental love and support. Crime, and especially juvenile delinquency, are fought by social workers through engendering in the deviant a sense of shame, honour and enthusiasm in some work of social importance by which he can find his true rôle and position in society. The sense of self-status, which the sense of honour positively and the sense of shame negatively protect, is transferred easily to what the individual is identified with, viz. the family, the caste or any other primary group and the class, the profession or the nation. Thus personal shame and honour and dignity and honour of the small or exclusive and large or accessible group equally tend to maintain a high morale and level of performances in society. Depending as it does upon the social composition of groups and communities, the code of honour, whether of feudal landlords and chivalrous knights or of burghers, merchants and artisans or, again, of thieves, beggars and prostitutes, is elastic, capricious and sometimes fantastic. Social distance among the classes makes such discrepancy in standards of right and wrong possible. Yet no doubt the sense of honour binds man and man in each group and contributes towards protecting the whole society against brutality, impropriety and misdemeanour.

In the middle ages in Europe the code of honour and chivalry contributed immeasurably towards the refinement of courtly etiquette, manners and ways of living under precarious semi-barbarous conditions. "But the age of chivalry is gone." T.V. Smith observes, "The feudal aristocracy of Europe with its mixed ideals of chivalry, of chastity, of the sanctity of private property—this is the back-

ground of our code of honour. One notes little organic unity between codes of honour and norms of social welfare."¹ The social groupings of the middle ages are now replaced by vast, depersonalised, anonymous associations that are amenable to control only by the instruments of law. Codes of honour persist now only in families and the professions and in shrivelled, distorted forms among the *de classe*. Man encounters divergent codes of honour in the family, in business, in the professions and in politics. Where morality is compartmentalised and segregated in different fields of social relations, it is at a low ebb everywhere.

It is noteworthy that the world-wide supersession of Gemeinschaft relations characteristic of the modern industrial age has greatly diminished the rôle of the sense of shame and honour and their symbolic manifestations in the maintenance of the moral ideal. Social cultures condition different degrees of the sense of honour and shame among peoples. The Chinese and the Japanese in particular are, for instance, more strongly endowed with 'social' shame as the irrepressible universal sentiment and shame-producing conventions of "saving-face" imply, and less strongly with sexual shame. Hundreds of Japanese soldiers, especially air-fighters, trained in the chivalrous code of Bushido, preferred death by *harikiri* to the dishonour of surrender during the last war. *In India the sense of sexual shame and chastity is most marked, and the preference of death to dishonour by her womanhood, that was responsible in the past for many mass 'suttee' celebrations before the onslaughts of the victorious Moslems, still persists today in the midst of communal riots and atrocities.

The Hierarchy of Imperatives in Moral Progress

What elicits moral behaviour depends as much upon the total social situation as upon the level of individual ex-

¹ Article on Honour in *Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences*.

perience. In the superficial level of self-consciousness it is the fear of punishment, physical constraint and need of security that promote conforming behaviour. The sense of honour and shame regulates conduct in a higher level of experience, where the individual feels and acts neither from fear of the law and punishment nor as the result of conforming moral habits, but derives his standards of "right" and "wrong" from his intimate and cherished connection with his group, the family, the class or the profession with which he identifies himself. Here physical coercion hardly operates as a sanction of good conduct, and more than the sense of insecurity or loneliness and moral inertia, the positive sentiment of self-status and esteem, rooted in rapport with the group, impels behaviour. Finally, "the still, small voice of God" impels man, at least the man above the average, when a conflict situation makes him plumb into the depths of his self- and social consciousness, from which he derives the unquestionable standards that appraise both the code of honour of his group and conventional morality of the social culture as a whole. Conscience, shame and honour, fear and insecurity are matrices of good conduct according to the social situation and the level of self and degree of intensity of group participation involved.

A qualitative improvement of ethical conduct is implied as the latter is rooted not in fear and insecurity but in shame and honour, and, finally, in the voice of conscience. Law enforced by fear of punishment and the code of honour enforced by man's sense of socially accepted dignity and pride are not deeply internalised acceptances of a moral order as are conscience, shame and the sense of guilt and worthlessness—the pre-conventional matrices of good conduct. But even a code of honour among robbers and thieves may compel one of them to prefer death to dishonour through a betrayal of trustful fellows. This spon-

taneous personal assimilation of the code of honour or group conscience is of course due to the intensity of "we-feeling" or communion, born of persecution or fear of persecution. Many antisocial groups set their own codes of honour against laws and norms of larger social welfare. On the other hand, in small family groups, clans and tribes and neighbourhood communities, where contacts are face to face and loyalties warmly cherished, laws of libel and slander, breach of contract or divorce cannot repair a poignantly felt wrong which the code of honour remedies effectively by means of open duel, fight, feud or vendetta even against the existing laws. In a multi-group society the sense of honour and shame is in fact a more effective instrument of social control than in a uni-group society dependent upon laws. Family, craft, occupation, profession, business and trade, each has its code of honour or group conscience. Social integration, and particularly social mobility, make it difficult to maintain different codes of honour side by side. In other words, the codes of honour are rationalised and systematised as laws governing family, profession, industry, business or trade and other institutions, and also generalised and internally accepted as individual conscience. Yet the hierarchy of moral and social imperatives changes according to their practical effectiveness in the particular type of group relations. In the family and other primary groups shame and honour serve to maintain the morale at high levels. In secondary groups like the class and the state shame and honour are practically less effective than fear and insecurity. Finally, in all personal and private matters the individual's moral judgment comes neither from fear and insecurity nor from shame and honour, nor, again, from his whim or caprice, but from his own conscience which he sets against his group, his state and his social world in his warm faith in his deepest self. This is embodied in the challenge, "Here I

stand; I can do no other, God help me."

The Sequence of Ethical Categories in Moral Progress

Moral progress and development of social integration are interdependent. Mankind's earliest moral rules were not to inflict bodily injury, not to kill and not to dispossess others of their belongings based on principles of reciprocity and fair consideration. Human life ceased to be "nasty, brutish and short" as these principles were clarified and integrated and underlay a collective sanction, that involved the whole clan, tribe or folk and superseded individual or family retaliation of injury or wrong measured at the beginning by uncertain, chequered application of *quid pro quo*. Obviously a genuine society was born as the concepts of imperative and sanction were founded on reciprocity. As society develops from the primitive co-operation, division of labour and barter in the hunting, pastoral and agricultural stages to the elaborate socio-economic specialisation, integration and co-ordination demanded by technological advance, its ethical principles undergo marked change. Reciprocity and fair play implying mutual faith are the *sine qua non* of formation and maintenance of all communities, primitive, peasant and industrial-urban. "Do unto others as you would them do unto you" is a universal moral category without which all human relations and interactions break down. Society is a co-ordination of Interest-groups from which arises the reciprocal acknowledgment of the rights of others. This is as true of advanced as of primitive social culture. Each objective economic task in a highly complex industrial community calls for specialised aptitudes as well as co-operation and like-mindedness of large groups of independent, heterogeneous individuals. Certain inherent moral principles, fair dealing and consideration, freedom of choice and contract, impersonal service and conformity

to folkways, mores and conventions emerge out of this social connection. MacIver observes: "There are many social relationships of a give-and-take character, in respect of which both parties are animated alike by self-limited interest. This is the level on which most trading relationships take place. It is generally the level of contractual relationships, of legal relationships, of the incessant interchange of services which a highly specialised society involves. Wherever we are primarily concerned with the services rendered to us, apart from the personal values of those who render the services, we act on this level."¹ The focus of the reciprocity system is the limited service which an individual obtains from another in lieu of his own.

Soon, however, the focus shifts from the obligation of certain specific and situation-limited service to a more abstract and universal definition without which the system of mutual exchange and accommodation cannot be sustained. Thus justice and equity establish themselves as moral categories, distributing material and cultural goods and services to groups and individuals according to capacities. An advanced society does not rely upon *quid pro quo* but incorporates justice and equity into the laws of property, contract, employment and distribution of goods and services, and also into the rules and conventions of social rank, power and prestige. One of the distinctive characteristics of Hebrew ethics is the emphasis of abstract and universal justice which provides a norm of judgment even of God's actions. Justice here roots itself in the common human impulse and sense of common humanity. This has found expression in the teachings of Amos who asserts the common human bond binding the Hebrews with the Ethiopians and the Philistines, Israel's two enemies, and with the Syrians. Though justice is em-

¹ *Society*, p. 28.

phased as the supreme ingredient of the good life, the ideal of man stated is "to do justly, to love mercy and to walk humbly with his God." "The merciful man is merciful to his beast." Thus man's gracious qualities are also broadly conceived and we find in Solomon a "largeness of heart as the sand that is upon the sea-shore."¹

The approximation of the Interest-group to Society or Community involves the transformation of the self and group-limited principles of reciprocity into the abstract and universal principles of justice and equity binding for all to all. Justice is not only far-sighted and well-balanced in the reconciliation of personal interests but, as it measures reward according to capacity, stresses a social and moral principle of obligation. The social hierarchy based on an unequal but equitable distribution of wealth, privilege, power and prestige contributes towards the promotion of social order and progress. It is rooted in the principles of social and economic justice that find appropriate rights and obligations for the various Interest-groups or economic classes according to their rôles in the economic structure and establish their co-operation and harmony for the welfare of the community. A balanced social hierarchy through a general sharing of power, respect and deference is the best protection to society against the expressions of man's anti-social impulses of aggression and destruction. For when the ego suffers from loss of esteem and status, the individual too easily becomes a bully, gang-leader or rebel, or withdraws into himself as a schizoid neurotic. Thus justice and equity in the sharing of the major values in the community is the best antidote to crime, violence and social deviation of any kind through a democratisation of self-status and security.

¹ Frankfort and others: *The Intellectual Adventure of Ancient Man*, pp. 228, 266, 268.

Yet Society or Community based on justice and equity as its inherent moral principles remains an incomplete and imperfect group as it cannot establish the moral demand which will ensure altruistic devotion and sacrifice, freely given for it by individuals and groups. It has to rise to an attitude which is concerned, in the words of Bosanquet, "not with a world of rights and duties, claims and counter-claims, but with an ideal of service and counter-service."

Interrelationship of the Ethical Categories in Cultural Evolution

As society progresses towards the greater solidarity and integration of abstract Commonalty, love, sympathy and service become collective habits, and supplement and in some measure replace coercion and reciprocity, justice and equity as principles of ethical conduct and legislation. Justice and equity demand a shrewd balancing of reciprocal ends and interests, claims and counter-claims which the intimacy of love and sympathy cannot endure. Kantian morality does justice to the notions of justice and equity, but undervalues the notions of love and solidarity so much stressed in Oriental and Christian morality. Love, sympathy and equality obviously are grounded in, and build themselves upon, the relatively lower values of reciprocity, fair play, justice and equity, but lead continuously towards yet possible higher ideal values than those which are already given as real. Transcendence is characteristic of love leading to complete identification of self with the community and devotion and sacrifice for others "beyond duty". In Europe the ideal of Christian asceticism, the condemnation of self-love as sinful by Calvin and Luther and later on by Immanuel Kant, who has dominated ethical thought in Europe since the Age of Enlightenment, have prevented a

proper valuation of love. More recently Freud's identification of self-love with narcissism has contributed towards the same trend. A wiser judgment is that of Spinoza, according to whom the pursuit of one's "profit" is identical with virtue. He observes: "The more each person strives and is able to seek his profit, that is to say, to preserve his being, the more virtue he possesses; on the other hand, in so far as each person neglects his own profit he is impotent."¹ Self-love, in Oriental philosophy, is in its genuine expression the affirmation of freedom and expansion of self, grounded in self-knowledge. Love confined only to one person in the world with whom contact is established as a matter of simultaneous accident in two lives, as in the European 19th century romantic ideal, is pseudo-love. For love abolishes and transcends the barriers of self, and is dynamically rooted in the understanding and appreciation of generic human attributes and values. The neighbour thus is loved as the symbol and incarnation of common human traits and values that make the whole world kin. Self-love and love of neighbour aid and strengthen each other, born of an inescapable human responsibility towards the realisation of the inherent supreme worth, dignity and potentialities of man, not as the specific beloved individual, but as an abstract and generic fellow-human. Recent psychoanalytical experience has shown that both selfishness and "unselfishness" are neuroses. A selfish person does not take genuine care and responsibility for himself and in his egoistic pursuit of limited goals of life thwarts many fundamental cravings and suffers from many frustrations. Like the selfish person, the "unselfish" person 'who lives only for others' is also a neurotic, paralysed in his capacity to love or to enjoy anything. Fromm observes: "Behind the

¹ *Ethics*, IV.

facade of unselfishness a subtle but not less intense self-centredness is hidden." Cure lies in the interpretation of "unselfishness" as a symptom along with others such as depression, inability to work and failure in love relationships so that the patient's lack of productiveness which is at the root of both his "unselfishness" and his other troubles can be corrected.¹ Genuine love, goodwill and happiness are radiated only by persons who know the experience of self-love, fulfilment and expansion, and do not hide repressed hostility against life that often returns in the forms of excessive solicitousness and desire for dominance that may be devastating in their effects on others. Love, compassion, benevolence, pity and goodwill are feelings and ways of action that emerge together in the character structure as man's affirmations of his own life, integrity and perfection, rooted in self-knowledge, self-approval and self-striving for the freedom and happiness of others. Neither love, nor sympathy, nor solidarity can be planned and made operative in a rational and calculated fashion; these represent the communion or interpenetration of selves associated with both improvement of insights and enhancement of values. Their social functions can be fully realised only when the lower basic principles of fair play, justice and equity are well established in human relations and social interactions.

It is only in a society enjoying freedom from want, aggression, frustration, fear and anxiety that love, sympathy and compassion can perform their true rôles for the completeness of the human personality. Love, sympathy and compassion indeed require for their full and efficient realisation a virtuous society grounded on a spontaneous sense of co-operation, fair play and justice, permeating all groups, institutions and social relations.

• The more a society orders its distribution of goods,

¹ Fromm: *Man for Himself*, p. 132; see also Rogers: *Counselling and Psychotherapy*.

services and cultural acquisitions with equity and justice among its members, and equalises social and economic opportunities for all, the higher are the possibilities that love, service and sympathy unfold. The more virtuous the society, the more it operates on love, sympathy and service rather than on equity and justice. The former embody purer, more unselfish and more intimate aspects and ways of mutuality and communion, unlocking their limitless potentialities. In the virtuous society the abundance of human love, sympathy and service so works through and upon law, positive morality and the equalising agencies and apparatuses of social services, and so supersedes force and exploitation in all human relations that the exercise of personal charity, sympathy and love becomes occasional and sporadic, reduced to the minimum. And yet it is from the human heart that the passions of equality and solidarity exercise constant invigilation on the working of laws, social relations and institutions, and on the measure in which these fulfil the values these stand for. There is a perpetual reciprocity between the deepening and expansion of self, the ordering of values and the virtuous habits, laws and institutions of society.

Life in abstract Commonalty implies the greatest enhancement of morale, deepening of self-and social consciousness and accrual of the highest values. It demands the constant subordination of the interests of the individual to the whole, beyond agreement, contract and reciprocity relation. Such life is difficult to lead and is often strained. Complete unison in the family, the religious order or the totalitarian party or state is not possible. Solidarity is maintained in such cases under obligations based on justice and reciprocity relation or by a hierarchy of domination and subordination.

The ideal typical groups show, therefore, a waxing or waning of the social bonds founded on different evaluations,

and their distinctive attitudes and behaviours accordingly mingle in the social culture. There is a constant movement from social coercion and pressure through reciprocity to love and compassion upward, and downward from love through reciprocity to coercion and restraint as the basic social relation with its characteristic moral demand flowing from it. Coercion abolishes not only love and sympathy but even the standards of justice and reciprocity. It ranges from rudeness and impropriety to dishonesty, unscrupulousness, theft and offence against the person. It underlies the institutions of slavery, serfdom, economic exploitation and political conquest. A social rule of conduct based on reciprocity underlies the conventions and institutions of liberty, freedom of competition and enterprise, toleration and individualism with an emphasis, however, of rights without duties or 'costless' rights. The spirit of Commonalty is dominated by love, devotion and compassion. Groups and institutions in Commonalty are characterised by universalism as an ethical obligatory principle. Thus the loyalties to the family, to friends, to the church and to the state easily enrich themselves through their universalistic tendencies as obligations to the entire brotherhood of mankind. The world's universalistic ethical codes and churches as well as international economic and political institutions embody the institutionalised forms of the social bonds and values of love and sympathy. Poets, prophets and spiritual leaders today, more than ever, preach and promote universalistic morality, groups and institutions.

Love and Equality as Ways to Justice

Both from the viewpoint of personality development and that of moral and social progress, the highest and most comprehensive values and ideals are love, sympathy and service. Plato and Aristotle spoke of the good and worthy man as most worthy of love. The world's highest

religions—Hinduism, Buddhism and Christianity—formulate the supreme ethical ideal as love, sympathy and compassion, directed most towards the sinner, the ignorant and the irreclaimable, who are in most need of these. In both China and India a whole host of spiritual exercises is undertaken for the achievement of all-embracing love, compassion and harmony. Even in the Confucian system that is often regarded as non-religious, man's love and brotherliness are regarded as derived from Heaven, and moral conduct as pursuance of the true nature of man which he has obtained from Heaven. But these can be lost. Thus the feeling of brotherly love and kindliness are safeguarded by breathing exercises. Such a mystical practice has in this connection an essentially social purpose.¹ In India, where the spiritual exercises are more elaborate and advanced, the spiritual goal aimed at is a clear, strong and unwavering sentiment of oneness of the cosmic mind. The Bhagavad Gita definitely declares that the highest man is one who looks on the pleasure and pain of all beings as he looks on them in himself.² Equality of others with the self is here grounded in the profound unity of everything and everybody in the Divine. Thus can "one see," according to Sankara in his comment of the passage, "that whatever brings happiness to himself brings happiness to all creatures and that whatever brings pain to himself is painful to all beings." In the Hindu moral code we also read: "Just as one's own self is dear, so are the selves of others; the good man shows compassion to all creatures, on the basis of the equality of self and other beings." In the Siksasamuchchaya of the Mahayana ethicist Santideva, we have an almost identical verse:

¹ Feibleman, *The Ethical Basis of Chinese Unity*, *Ethics*, 1943.

² VI, 32; compare Sorokin: *The Reconstruction of Humanity*, Chapter XIV.

"Since to my neighbours as to myself
 Are fear and sorrow hateful each,
 What then distinguishes myself,
 That I should cherish above another's?"

or, in the Bodhicharyavatara (The Entrance into the Bodhi life)

"I must destroy other's suffering, for it hurts
 like one's own pain,
 I must do good to others, as they are beings
 like myself."

The traditional methods followed by men in the Orient across the centuries for establishing this widest communion or commonalty are the identification between self and not-self (knowledge), *yoga* exercise for the complete evacuation and silence of the mind, and gradual elimination or rectification of cravings and desires (*kama*) through the cultivation of the feelings of compassion, happiness in the happiness of fellowmen and joy and disregard in their good and bad conduct respectively. These practices are regarded as mutually aiding one another for the full realisation of identity consciousness, with associated infinite love and infinite compassion with which the life of action becomes saturated. The major schools of Oriental religion accordingly derive morality from this spiritual experience of identity and agree in prescribing a life of non-violence, and love, pity and compassion especially for the ignorant, debased and depraved. Compassion speaketh and saith: "Can there be bliss when all that lives must suffer. Shalt thou be saved and hear the whole world cry?"¹ Compassion for the most unworthy in society is the consummation of the highest interpenetration and communion accessible to the human self. In the personalistic myth of human life, the ways of love, charity and compassion are the only ways to equity and justice; the inter-

¹ *The Voice of the Silence.*

weaving and interdependence of selves make sharing and service the first laws. Santideva, in his *Bodhicharyavatara*, describes the vow of the Compassionate One in the following magnificent words: "Let me belong entirely to the Buddhas and to the creatures. All the merit acquired by my worship of the Buddhas I apply to the good of creatures and to the attainment of knowledge. I wish to be bread for those who are hungry, drink for those who are thirsty (*parinamana*). I give myself, all that I am and shall be in my future existence to creatures (*atmabhavaparitayaga*)."¹ It is noteworthy that this great Mahayana writer in his ethical system adopts the very original plan of subordinating the virtue of spiritual meditation or *samadhi* to the active virtues of compassion, humility and endurance. Meditation according to him becomes surer and easier by putting itself at the disposal of the active virtues that destroy passion. And soon by a just compensation this practice of abnegation, destructive of attachment and hatred, results much more surely than selfish meditation pursued for its own sake in purging the mind of error (*moha*).

Man should practise, first, the equality of self and neighbour (*paratmasamata*). This is the same as the *Atmaupamya* of the *Bhagavad Gita*. With the equivalence of self and other creatures, good deed becomes quite natural and spontaneous. Then he should practise the substitution of neighbour for self (*paratmaparivartana*).¹ "When otherness is identified with selfness, selfness in turn becomes identified with otherness." Due to the cumulative influences of heredity and environment and false judgment, man attaches the illusory notion of self to his body. "Why not rather consider our neighbour as our self and as far as the body is concerned regard it as foreign to ourselves?" Santideva writes paradoxically, yet ardently: "I crush you,

¹ Winternitz : *A History of Indian Literature*, Vol. 2, p. 373.

O self, the slave of your own interests. If I really love myself, I must not love myself. If I wish to preserve myself, I must not preserve myself?"¹ Sharing implies non-duality and non-contradiction. Man's perfect morality that is synonymous with perfect identity with fellow-creatures is the mind's practice of supreme wisdom or knowledge of what is (*tattva*).

Disvalues as Group and Institutional Products

Moral progress can be viewed from another angle, that of the progressive elimination of disvalues or unvalues—falsehood, injustice, wrong and ugliness—all what is dys-teleological in human life. These arise due to inadequacies in the hereditary constitution of the individual or tensions in the personality structure that emerge from early or permanent social relationship with certain fixed boundaries within which mental adjustment may take place. The pursuit of disvalues is determined by group attitudes, ways of action and opportunities. Dewey observes: "Deliberate unscrupulous pursuit of self-interest is as much conditioned upon social opportunities, training and assistance as is the course of action prompted by a beaming benevolence. The difference lies in the quality and degree of the perception of ties and interdependencies, in the use to which they are put."² The individual's aggressiveness, hate and fear are to be attributed less to his hereditary equipment and more to his dispositions and attitudes in the group, such as the Crowd and the Interest-group which also determine the ways of their social expression. The attack of a mob of industrial workers in a sudden outburst of anger or the flight of the panic-stricken crowd in lemming-like, suicidal confusion or disorder is a social event occurring within the crowd in its total situation. Similarly any further development

¹ Santideva: *Bodhicaryavatara*, translation by Barnett.

² *Human Nature and Conduct*, p. 317.

of mass behaviour, such as an exclusive and unscrupulous, though less aggressive, emphasis of the claims of industrial workers as against those of the employers by the trade-union, due to the rise and intervention of cautious and shrewd leaders, depends upon the concrete social goals of the Interest-group. Anger, hate, fear and other primitive passions that were formerly aroused are inhibited and replaced by conscious, organised trade-union activities that obtain moral justification from the union leaders as well as from some intellectuals—prestige-bearers of the masses. Yet the action or policy of organised trade-unionism may be socially unjust and disruptive though pursued as a concrete socially recognised goal or policy. What is significant in this kind of antisocial behaviour is that the particular group pattern, viz. the Interest-group, with its fixed moral boundaries, conditions the mode of conduct and morally justifies it.

Soon, however, the social intelligence and judgment of the entire community assert themselves and exercise pressure upon the Interest-group and upon its goals, judgments and plans. When social pressure or expectancy leads to the recognition of new moral demands, such recognition originates not outside the group but within it, and gives an added meaning to its goals and ideals. The coercive and selfish attitudes and programmes of the trade-union emerge, to be sure, out of economic conditions and opportunities that the industrial structure has guaranteed to organised unionism as a social institution. Further, the goals and ideals of a trade union are what they are because of insecurity and struggle for power and privilege in the economic system. In this way social disvalues are institutional, and coercive or violent antisocial actions of groups are 'social'.

The recognition of the above fact is fundamental for the improvement of morals. It is the reorientation of the group pattern from the Crowd and Interest-group to Society and abstract Commonalty, with associated change

in the habits, sentiments and interactions of individuals, that introduces new moral principles and ways of action. From epoch to epoch the norms of equality, justice and sharing have changed, sometimes stressing equality and freedom of contract and opportunities for individuals, sometimes emphasising the solidarity of the community that in some measure supplants justice to the individual. In each epoch the norms of individual and distributive or collective justice are adjusted to the social stratification and institutional trend in order to remove flagrant social disvalues. The latter also change their guise and grow, like the values and norms themselves, out of the necessities, tensions and possibilities of dominant, exclusive groups in society. Thus new ethical categories seek to renovate the moral quality of groups and institutions. Moral principles are good or bad in, and because of, group and institutional goals and ways of life, always pursued as standards and norms by individuals, whether these be right or wrong.

The social insight that man biologically and mentally lives in his groups now dominates modern psychiatric treatment. Group psychotherapy now insists upon the methods of reintegrating diseased individuals and groups by working upon the total sociological situation or the group context, rather than by isolating the individual and his deviance and its consequences from the milieu. There is less emphasis on the purely intellectual phases of development and more on matters like social adaptability and personality.¹ The entire social-cultural complex is often actively involved in ego-conflict and disorganisation, which utilise childhood traumas and insecurities as well as adult psychic tensions in the repressive social-cultural milieu for the development of neurosis as an established,

¹ Griffith: *Principles of Systematic Psychology*, p. 434; also Saul: *Emotional Maturity*.

accommodative pattern of life. Thus the whole problem of reorientation of groups, cultural values and aspirations in which the abnormal individuals can find a new adjustment that may break the vicious, pathological circles of causation obtains a new significance.

Principal Features of Moral Progress

Moral progress implies, in the first place, the removal of all fundamental disvalues and evils that are universal, rooted as these are in man's physical and social inequality, inadequacy and maladjustment. Such disvalues and evils are aggressiveness, selfishness, injustice, hatred and cruelty, that constantly change their guise in interpersonal relations and social interactions. Their elimination is a condition and prerequisite for the fulfilment of the higher values of life.

Secondly, moral progress emphasises affirmation and advance towards the complete and perfect life, and not mere negation. It implies the progressive realisation of the positive, creative values of justice, love and solidarity that vitalise and permeate all social interactions and relations, leading to a qualitative improvement of personality and moral character. Man's complete development and character are expressed in love, sympathy and sharing, rather than in reciprocity of relation and action. Thus there is the qualitative improvement of values as embodied in the supremacy of love, sympathy and solidarity over justice and equity in social relations.

Thirdly, not only in the individual must such completeness, expansiveness and depth of character be developed, but also in every group and institution. Society and the individual by ideal creativeness create and experience new values and situations. Initiative and variety are the *sine qua non* of the improvement of moral standards. The individual constantly quests for enhancement of values in both himself as well as in his group and institutional situation.

Society, nation, humanity constantly call for creativeness and new possibilities in the individual. Individual aspiration and collective wisdom march hand in hand on the road of moral progress. The life of Commonalty, the whole cosmic movement, speaks to the moral man not as something arbitrary, alien or external, but in the innermost depth of his being.

Moral progress is impelled not only by the majestic sweep of laws of the organic, cosmic wholes, but also by the joy and reverence of the individual. The road of moral progress ever stretches onward. Man does not reach his goal. Well does Martin Luther characterise human life with its imperfections and struggles: "It is not yet done and accomplished, but it is in working order and in full swing; it is not the end, but the way. All does not yet glow and shine, but all is being burnished."¹

Tests of Moral Progress

We may now briefly summarise the principal tests of moral progress: (a) With moral progress morality depends less upon physical coercion and external social pressure than upon inner controls—honour and shame, conscience and faith. (b) Morality being a net emergence of group expectancies and judgments, moral progress is judged by the intimacy of social bonds developing from those in an Interest-group, Society or Community to an abstract Commonalty. (c) Moral progress expresses itself in the substitution of the spirit of love, sympathy and service for reciprocity, justice and equity as principles of conduct. (d) Moral progress implies the full maturation and deepening of the personality that identifies the highest morale, "at homeness", competence and happiness with the most perfect communion and the widest society. (e) Mature morality relies

¹ Quoted in Eucken: *Ethics and Modern Thought*, page 104.

upon self-transcendence and communion of self or personality with the whole of mankind and the total whole of the cosmos that constitute the beyond-human ground of morality. This presupposes a metaphysical conviction or religious experience of a group or cosmic mind and gives cosmic meaning to the moral life. (f) Moral progress implies acceptance of the ideal of cultural democracy based upon the assumption of the worth of the common man, and equality of opportunities for all to share in the material and cultural heritage of the community. It is judged by the democratisation that deepens and accelerates the whole cultural process. (g) Moral progress places a premium upon social intelligence and communication, as embodied in literature and the fine arts that constantly enrich the common pool of values of humanity, and maintains an experimental attitude towards both the transformation of ideal motivations and values of individuals through education, cultural persuasion and guidance and the adaptation of moral norms and institutions to changed conditions in the environment. (h) Moral progress expresses itself as much in the ideal creativeness of society as of the moral freedom and initiative of the personality that both grow along with a growing, changing world. Without the risks of moral adventure in new and unknown ethical realms, there is only mechanical and slavish conformity to rigid codes and systems, and mankind cannot experience the genuine spontaneity and freedom of experiments with truth and goodness, which alone can unfold the infinitely rich variety of human goals and values and complex relations between man and man.

CHAPTER XIV

AN INSTITUTIONAL THEORY OF POLITICAL OBLIGATION

Need of an Empirical Political Philosophy

Since the days of Plato and Aristotle philosophical speculations provided theories of political obligation that varied from epoch to epoch due to changes in the political and institutional set-up, in religion and in the general intellectual climate. On the whole, historically speaking, philosophical idealism and rationalism gave to Europe the doctrines of equality of man before God and of "natural rights," freedom, property and liberty that strengthened the democratic trend. Philosophical theories also emphasised the conception of harmony, order and unity of the human community. Especially did the revival of idealism in England, as represented by T.H. Green and Bosanquet, reconcile the basic notions of human equality and the common good. Man's political as well as cultural development everywhere shows the institutionalisation of status, prestige and power on the one hand, and individual freedom and social mobility rooted in irreducible individuality on the other. But political philosophy, leaning heavily as it has done on the classical notions of natural equality and natural rights and on the more recent metaphysical individualism, has not done adequate justice to the empirical dynamic patterns of group and institutional imperatives, rights and duties in the total setting of the social community, as revealed by comparative ethnology and historical sociology. This is the reason why it has usually ended either in the absolutism of the individual with certain essential and inalienable rights or in the absolutism of

the state having an imprescriptible moral authority over the life of the citizen in all matters.

It is necessary, therefore, that political philosophy should ground itself on an empirical social-psychological theory of man as a social being, and of his group and institutional values, expectations and imperatives that have shown marked transformation, defining afresh the boundaries between the individual, institutional and political spheres and claims from epoch to epoch.

In the history of political development many institutions command obedience and conformity and issue rules and codes, as they also provide for man's basic interests and values of subsistence, security, social recognition and power. In so far as leadership and obedience, prestige and power inhere in such institutions, these are political institutions in a general sense. Institutions are, in spite of Rousseau, aids and means for the realisation of values and "natural rights" rather than obstacles and interferences, though a specific institution cannot be the full embodiment of them. The patterns of institutions are different among different peoples and countries. But there are certain common features in all established forms of human institutions in social cultures that reveal certain universal political judgments, expectations and obligations emergent in the total situation.

The Contrasted Sociological Laws of Status and Mobility

Every major group or institution develops an appropriate structure of status-prestige-power, and adjustive cultural functions as defined by rôles, positions and services of individuals that are co-ordinated by the group or institution. Status and power, rights and duties, all emerge in the ever-varying vital process of cultural adaptation. The history of culture exhibits the varying contents of rights, duties and power of dominant groups or institutions in a relatively stable scheme of social stratification derived from the scale

of values in the social community. The social hierarchy aids culture in defining, integrating and selecting its chief goals and values of life through the pattern of spatial and functional distribution of individuals and classes. On the one hand, it gives culture stability and security by accommodating individual life to the necessities of a well-oriented pyramidal pattern. On the other hand, it rests on a community of interests and common standard of values that obtains social acceptance and, at the same time, assures mobility or freedom to the individual in his struggle for appropriating *all* the interests and values which the social culture emulates. Mobility, freedom and rebellion are as much laws of politics as the laws of status, power and security. Status, the outcome of differential worth and capacity of individuals, thwarts man's desire in seeking the common interests and goods of life. Mobility, the outcome of the individual's self-assertion, versatility and achievement, enables him to share the rewards and acquisitions of life and culture from which a pyramidal social structure excludes him.

Social culture reflecting upon, clarifying and criticising the contrasted habit patterns of men, the power-stabilisation-security-pattern and the freedom-mobility-equalisation-pattern rationalises, generalises and idealises these as the political norm of justice.

In different epochs and cultures society has sought to safeguard and guarantee individual liberty, property and responsibility as justice. More often it has sought to achieve justice through an emphasis of stratification, stabilisation and security so as to restore harmony and balance in an individualist culture.

The Contrasted Norms of Collectivist and Individualist Justice

In Greek politics Plato was a great utopian, who was much struck in his days by political instability and the

claims of the democratic individual who lived through the day, indulging the appetite of the hour, whose life was neither order nor law. That order or law he wanted to introduce into Hellenic culture by a well-organised pattern of stratification of labour and services in society, guaranteeing to each individual his due place according to his capacity. Aristotle stressed more the equality and freedom of the individual rather than stabilisation and security, and yet in his opinion the best form of state will not admit mechanics to citizenship. The great masses of the people in Hellenic culture lived lives that were ignoble and inimical to virtue and were outside the pale of the state. In ancient Hellas, in spite of the glaring contradiction of slavery and certain oligarchical elements in society, the 'moral equality of man was proclaimed; while in Rome the extension of the Empire that embraced strange territories and peoples of different degrees of civilization was favourable to the idea of the essential unity of mankind. The Stoics, who believed in pantheism, maintained that all men were akin by nature, formed of the same elements and having the same purpose on the earth. Similarly the rationalistic naturalism of the thinkers of Imperial Rome stressed the notion of the common citizenship of all derived from descent of one common parent, the world. Marcus Aurelius declared: "My nature is rational and social, and my city and country so far as I am Antoninus is Rome, but so far as I am a man it is the world." All this humane tradition merged in Christianity that was, as Harold Laski points out, "in its original phase essentially a society of the disinherited to whom the idea of the immanent dignity of human personality as such would make an urgent appeal." In England the Puritan Revolution reformulated with pious fervour the Christian notion of man's natural "innate freedom, property and liberty." On the other hand, Calvinism with its dogma of predestination, by inculcating the individual's

worthlessness at a time when the dissolution of feudal institutions and the guild system of Europe threatened his security, prepared him for the acceptance of his subservient rôle in capitalistic society. Eighteenth century Europe believed in Nature. The current of pagan and Christian idealism was now reinforced by the intellectual movement for an examination of feudal, monarchical and ecclesiastical institutions and the struggle for human dignity and liberty. It is significant that at the time of the Sophists, and again in the eighteenth century, the tendency was discernible to view institutions as man-made and artificial, restraining individuals from the normal pursuit of the values of life. Thus demands for the restoration of usurped rights were formulated. Rousseau declared: "Man was born free but is now everywhere in chains." The French Revolution, of course, supplanted the ancient régime by the government of the common people. In England the dependence of the judiciary, the development of common law, freedom of speech and worship and Habeas Corpus ensured civil liberties even to the minorities. But the French example, without the "separation of powers," advocated by Locke and Montesquieu, spread to Europe. In every country in the Continent which passed from medieval feudalism, serfdom and corporatism to modern socialism, skipping over an intermediate stage of capitalistic individualism, not only minority rights but also certain other "natural rights" of individuals have been ignored. The differences in the industrial set-up account for the marked contrast in the contents of democratic freedom in the Anglo-Saxon countries and on the Continent.

Both in England and the United States of America there had flourished with the Industrial Revolution and development of capitalism, a strong and sturdy individualism. The individualistic creed, common law, constitutionalism and decentralisation were the bulwarks of many freedoms of

the English urban masses and the American pioneer settlers, traders and industrial entrepreneurs. With such freedoms the Continental peoples in Europe were not familiar, while some actually denounced democracy as an instrument of Western capitalism. With governments either becoming state collectivisms or passing under the sway of monopolistic productive and financial institutions, there has been great encroachment upon the freedoms formulated and implemented in the 19th century. This has coincided with the creation of a large number of social and economic rights unknown in the past, and the adaptation of the 17th and 18th century liberal creed to the needs of collectivist justice in the new industrial and economic set-up. Liberalism cannot be outgrown in any age, stress Dewey,¹ Hocking² and Max Lerner, for instance, in the United States of America. Only its emphasis is changing, in the words of Max Lerner, from its concern not so much with "freedom from" as with "freedom for." "We have never needed an affirmative liberal attitude more than today," he observes, "because we have needed freedom more—freedom for a huge, collective economic effort, freedom for the contrivance of new political forms to carry the burden of that effort, freedom to take the leisure that technology has brought us and build it in our culture."³ Hocking similarly exposes the weakness of the "cost-less" natural rights of the past, of rights-without-duties. An assumption of rights without "moral costs" or obligations is socially indefensible, if not perilous, and the state is justified in demanding that the so-called rights of men shall be understood to be conditional on the common weal without which such rights cease to exist. For in the age of machine technology, of concentration of control and of vast anonymous, second-

¹ *Liberalism and Social Action*.

² *The Lasting Elements of Individualism*, pp. 172-73.

³ *It is Later Than You Think*, p. 18.

ary groups, without organised social control of industry, individualism or the economic opportunity for the common man—the basis of democratic culture—cannot survive for a single day. At the same time there is reaffirmation of sacredness of the sphere of man's personal life that must be protected against any state law and policy. "Man," observes Hocking, "must be free to set his conscience against community and state, just because he is not free to manipulate it nor to disregard it. Conscience, as the most private of private matters, is rooted not only outside the individual but also outside the community and the State." More and more as in the 20th century men are exposed to the tyranny of crowds and masses which tends to embody itself in the form of the tyranny of the state, such civil rights as freedom of conscience, freedom of speech, freedom of association and freedom of communications, that were formulated and defended in the past, need reiteration even in democratic communities. For the individual requires protection even from the arbitrary treatment of democracies."

A considerable body of people under the leadership of H. G. Wells in Great Britain have drawn up recently a Declaration of the Rights of Man, the list being adapted to the changed institutional and economic conditions of today. In the preamble we read, "The history of the Western peoples has a lesson for all mankind. It has been the practice of what are called the democratic or Parliamentary countries to meet every enhancement and centralisation of power in the past by a definite and vigorous reassertion of the individual rights of man. Never before has the demand to revive that precedent been so urgent as it is now." The new social and economic rights should also have a place in a fundamental charter of the rights of man—the right to work, to health, to living wages, to recreation, to social security, to decent housing, to a fair share in the amenities

of collective living and culture—in order that the orthodox political and civil rights may not be nullified nor endangered under the new conditions of technology, capitalism, unemployment and low living standards for the majority community. Their formulation and implementation largely rest upon an ethical transformation of society, linking rights to functions and duties, and discovering a new community of values and ideals for society. Rights, political, civil, economic or social, indeed support one another and are also supported by corresponding functions and obligations. In the case of opposition between certain fundamental rights, as, for instance, between certain economic and political rights when the planning and control of industry essential to safeguard rights of social security lead to an attenuation of freedoms of choice, action and association associated with civil and political rights, it is the community's moral order or scale of values that can serve as the arbiter. Social and economic rights have also their institutional aspects; their effective operation depends upon the efficacy and development of various functional groups, such as families, trade-unions, co-operatives and professions, that extend and amplify the rights of individuals on the one hand, and also protect the individual from the possible tyranny of governments. The problems of law, of rights and fundamental freedoms, of security of work, of industry, of education and of culture are all co-implicated in their ethical bearing. All these are grounded in the entire moral and cultural configuration, the ethos of the community leaning now towards state intervention, next towards a new justice of freedom, equalisation and moral responsibility of the individual and restriction of the sphere of the state.¹

¹ See my *Institutional Theory of Economics*, pp. 270-273, 291-295, and *The Social Structure of Values*, pp. 354-357.

The Dialectic of Status and Mobility in Human Institutions

We accordingly find that different peoples and epochs have used different political methods, and prescribed the political norm of justice for regulating either an exaggerated freedom and mobility or an over-restrictive status and power-pattern in the see-saw struggle in human culture between the primary forces of status and mobility embodying themselves in the institutional and political set-up. It is from the institutional pattern, excessively individualistic or excessively coercive, that there emerge both the norms of individualist and collectivist justice and concepts of political obligation by way of either defence or reaction rather than a progressive reconciliation between the contrasted principles and habit patterns of status and freedom, security and equalisation. Ethically speaking, these two contrasted principles are linked with the generality of harmony, order or solidarity and the importance of development and expression of human individuality representing, according to Whitehead, the epitomised key values of mankind. Human institutions throughout the world exhibit a polarity between the dynamic values and aspirations for order and solidarity and for freedom and uniqueness among individuals as the result of the processes of cultural selection and survival through the centuries. There are, of course, periods of cultural transition between the great polarities, and hybrid, transitional forms of justice and goodness in institutions and the state are discernible. Mankind, in spite of a marked divergence of social and institutional types as determined by regional and historical factors and circumstances, shows in the broad the working of the dialectic of status and freedom, security and equalisation, collectivist regulation and anarchic individualism.

If this dialectical operation of the basic laws of authority and freedom, status and levelling in politics be true of the

whole society, now leaning towards state intervention, next towards a new justice of freedom, equalisation and moral responsibility of the individual, the same activity holds good also of groups and institutions in every human community. Every institution develops a framework of status-power, defines a pattern of rôles, positions and services for the individuals, imposes certain sanctions or imperatives on them for the achievement of common goals and values, and maintains a working balance between stabilisation and freedom through its rules, standards and laws. These reveal the common features of the elemental politics of all social groupings as interactive systems of status-freedom or dominance-subordination relations, inchoate or articulated, weak or strong, which we might call "micro-politics."¹

Groupings in society have been classified according to their social cohesion or participation into Crowd, Interest-group, Society or Community and abstract Commonalty. The higher the degree of cohesion of the group, the less is the tension between individual motivations and social laws and standards, between personal goals and values and group values and norms. In the Interest-group or class, based on the fulfilment of economic interests, men share a common good, but for each individual the good remains distinct since economic goods cannot be shared equally by all. As the Interest-group rises into Society or Community there is an integration of economic with cultural interests, goods and services that rest upon an essential democracy of free communication and participation. Shared goods, values and experiences, that are the highest goods of society, are, however, characteristic of the perfect

¹ W. F. Whyte, a social anthropologist, has recently emphasised that politics should study a particular organisation, the relative positions of all its members within the hierarchy and their functions as well as reciprocal interactions at the various levels in the interactive system. See his article, "A Challenge to Political Scientists," *American Political Science Review*, 1943.

group pattern—abstract Commonalty. Here we reach the deepest level of the self, the profoundest social integration and the final reconciliation between the individual and the common good, between freedom and authority, between levelling and organisation.

The Realism of Micro-politics

Man is a moral agent and creature of many groups and institutions to which he more intimately or remotely, more deeply or superficially belongs. No particular group or institution, however dominant or imperative be the satisfactions or values it fulfils for the individual, can become the exclusive focus of his social existence and exhaust all his values and value potentialities. Sociologically speaking, the conception of an all-inclusive absolute state is both unreal and mischievous. Man's social self, loyalties and achievements are distributed in all social cultures between a variety of groupings, associations and institutions, which coalesce, integrate and overlap, and which develop the multi-faceted structure of human personality. The nineteenth century pictures of the free, rational, truncated "economic man" with his predetermined rôle in the Invisible Providence's grinding mill, and of the irrational industrial worker swayed by the mass psychology of anger, hatred and revolution, are both figments of the imagination and caricatures of the true, complete social person. But it is these which have given rise in politics to the false and harmful myth of an omnipotent state that knows no moral limits of its sphere of regulation against the absolute individual, the sole and enlightened judge of both his economic interest and political action. It is the lack of sociological realism or inadequate attention to what may be called "micro-politics" or "comparative politics" of groups and their interrelations, integrations and conflicts of interests and loyalties, each with its expectations, codes and judicial and legal frameworks, that is indeed largely

responsible for extravagances in the "metaphysics" of the state.

Political Obligation in the Uni-group *versus* the Multi-group Polity

Historically speaking, many social cultures that have not been welded by the power of the sword have exhibited the exuberance, vitality and autonomy of various territorial, ethnic and functional groups. These have been co-agents and co-associates of the state in safeguarding even life and property and promoting both stabilisation and freedom through the maintenance of rights-and-duties, sometimes eclipsing the authority of the state. In my *Democracies of the East* and other publications I have characterised the system of political institutions, dominated less by the influences of war and conquest and more by those of gradual assimilation and absorption on the basis of the tribe and clan, groups based on kinship or neighbourhood (common land and agricultural water supply) and occupational and other functional associations as "Communalism."¹ The multi-group pluralistic type of polity (an abstracted ideal type) is to be sharply distinguished from the uni-group monistic type. The nature of political obligation, of law and of rights is different in the two cases. In political evolution the state develops as a necessary, but not inevitably a coercive institution, in order to provide the framework among many groupings to resolve conflicts, differences and maladjustments. Its aims are the preservation, clarification and co-ordination of the major institutional interests and values in their total functioning in society rather than uniformity. The state, accordingly, is the organisational tool of the community.

¹ *Democracies of the East* (1923), *Principles of Comparative Economics and Institutional Theory of Economics*.

The Western theory of state absolutism, which is in its essence super-social, and the correlated identification of legal and political sovereignty are due to special social-historical exigencies leading to the assumption by the state of a predominant rôle in the hierarchy of social groupings. In the East the social hierarchy in the multi-group pluralistic state, which has grown out of a process of gradual, peaceful comprehension and not out of conflict and struggle, corresponds to an equal emphasis of divergent cultural interests or functions and social groupings, when neither a permanent military-aristocratic class is dominant, nor the supreme social value set upon leadership in war or upon the power of organisation of the military or feudal overlord, which welds the peasantry into a semi-servile community for the purposes of the cultivation of the domain and the imposition of burdens. Regimentation does not continue beyond a certain stage and the gradation of authority is not marked. Differentiated social classes, ethnic groups, gentes, phratries as well as territorial groups like village communities, and functional groups like guilds and castes have their own codes of law and customaries, emphasising economic, ethical as well as religious values, which the political authority of the king, chief or feudal magnate cannot override. These are prior to the state in origin and purpose. These exercise, therefore, a quasi-independent jurisdiction within their own spheres, in which these are securely established, not by the fiat of the sovereign but by custom and tradition and the communal ethos. Both the competency of the state and the hierarchy of social groupings are governed by the social expectations and judgments and judicial customs and frameworks of the entire community. The tie between the inhabitants of villages is other than the will of the lord carried out under the command of his stewards. Village associations, courts and assemblies, with semi-independent jurisdiction, easily develop in settlements

which involve a good deal of intermixture of rights, and the districts are organised not on the principle of the king's, the territorial lord's or the steward's absolute rule, but on that of tributary self-government, which secures for each class its claims and status. The social organisation and the agrarian distribution are entirely different from those of the feudal arrangement or from any system based on the superimposition of princes and chiefs or a free dominant class on a semi-subject population. They involve a system of "Communalism" which entails an intricate and equitable adjustment of claims and the necessity of constant co-operation in neighbourhood groups. A system of agricultural practices grows up which gives the measure of rights in dwelling and close, in arable and meadow, in pasture, wood and water, and the basis for the co-operation of householders in rural husbandry. There is a community of interests and rights among all the household sharers of the village community, and its legal consequences are very important. Claims by the government and duties as regards local public works and municipal affairs are also apportioned according to it. Principles of communal action and communal responsibility lead to the harmonisation of conflicting claims and interests in neighbourhood associations right at the bottom of the political machinery, and to the subsequent formation of a common law which is decisive in submitting society to a system of personal duties and relations. Such a multi-institutional state-type usually does not suffer from class struggles and civil wars. Authority in the internal polity of the State is too evenly balanced to permit the political preponderance of any social class. Voluntary co-operation of local and communal groups increases the strength of all, and a confederation, political, economic, or religious in its type, is the inevitable step in order to resist a larger and more centrally organised enemy. But the correspondence does not rest here. Economic and social equa-

lity in a population equitably distributed in agriculture and industry, an equal emphasis of the diverse kinds of social and ethical values, a concord between classes and ethnic groups and between race and race, all go together in the same political system; and the type, monistic or pluralistic, is apt to be reproduced at the outset in inter-state relations, the former correlated with the subjection and exploitation of colonies and the conflict of races, and the latter with a loose connection of the daughter-states to the colonising race.¹

Law and Rights in the Multi-group *versus* the Uni-group State

In the multi-institutional state the criterion of law is not force, nor is disobedience always synonymous with moral offence. Political obligation rests on the form of sociality each group or institution embodies. Each group or institution is the direct primary source of law. Law, according to the legal philosophy of Hindu multi-institutional society, sets the ends and limits for the state, and the state is only the enforcing agent governed by the social goals and values shared in by all individuals and functional groups. This reads as sentences from Duguit's *L'Etat*. Recently Gurvitch has brought forward a new category of law—"social law" or law of integration which is not dependent upon the state, but is created by groups for the realisation of distributive justice in a given social structure. The examples of "pure" social law which he adduces are the supra-functional national law, international law, the law of the Churches and the law of economic society in a régime where economic law constitutes common and not a particularistic law. This juristic notion is very clearly applicable to the Eastern multi-institutional polity or "Communalism." Throughout the Orient the theocratic system of Brahmanism, of Islam, of the Talmud

¹ See my *Democracies of the East*, pp. 144-45.

and the oligarchic system of the Chinese intellectuals started from mankind and embraced within their folds multiple customaries, and ethnic, occupational and professional codes, evolving an order of distributive justice. Such customaries and codes were as varied as there were different interest-groups and functional and cultural associations and brotherhoods in a given region or social culture. The voluntary co-operation of different particularist and quasi-independent groups is the main root and source of law in pluralistic society.

In Oriental Communalism the realisation of rights-and-duties was from the beginning a social function; but its enforcement was incumbent on the unit groups of individuals (families, clans, tribes, village communities, castes or guilds bound together by kinship or neighbourliness). The acquisition by the state of supreme and unlimited power and jurisdiction over society and its economic, social and cultural interests had been a gradual but inevitable development in the West. This apotheosis of the State that has been a marked feature in the development of European culture gives a wrong trend to civilisation. In China and India the rules of conduct evolved by the congeries of unit groups of individuals still constitute the communal code; while the rules of ethics form a second code, set above the Communal law and embodying a larger aggregate of duties. The two together embrace the whole field of morals; and much that falls to state or government in the West to further public welfare by means of the creation and administration of law is left to myriad local groups and assemblies in the Communalistic polity. Unregulated individualism and absolute state authority go together. The over-emphasis of private rights in Roman jurisprudence encouraged social malformations and excrescences. The excessive authority of a mechanical-exploitative state was balanced by an unethical doctrine of natural rights of individuals, which, on the one hand, led to criticism

of positive justice followed by improvements, and, on the other, often "destroyed, revolutionary wise, fruitful germs of development, permitting artificial, unreasonable and immature formations and malformations to take their place." Among many a socialised ethnic stock in the East organised on a basis of peace, the notion of ideal duty guaranteed the harmony of individual and group action by evolving generalised principles of co-operative social functioning for different ethnic, territorial and functional groups; the cherished traditions of voluntary social co-operation checked the acerbities of individualism on the one hand, and the encroachment of the state on the other, leaving little room for the unattached individual or the social rebel.¹

It is noteworthy that in Europe in the middle ages the state was not legally supreme, there being many important juridical zones equal or superior in significance to the law of the state. The jurisdiction between the feudal law and the canon law remained sharply divided although there were certain fields like family, corporation or contract in which the two influences mingled together. In modern England and the U.S.A., the peculiar development and supremacy of the common law that is relatively free from the tutelage of the state are also significant. Roscoe Pound observes, "Through all vicissitudes the supremacy of common law, the insistence upon law as reason (and not arbitrary will) to be developed by judicial experience have survived. These ideas are realities in comparison whereof rules and dogmas are ephemeral appearances." A defender of the liberal creed in the U.S.A., like Walter Lippmann, stresses that social control need not be administered by the aggrandised state but by a Common law which defines the reciprocal rights and duties of persons and invites them to enforce the law by proving their case in a court of law. This method,

¹ See my *Democracies of the East*, pp. 78-9.

according to him, will be more appropriate for American democracy, and is "one of the oldest, best established and most successful methods of social control in human experience."¹ In many countries in modern Europe various kinds of semi-autonomous agricultural, industrial, professional and labour associations and organisations have arisen, whose "law" and code have contributed a great deal to regulate industrial and economic relations through agreement and compromise, and these now show a great vitality. Such law is sometimes recognised as "private law," sometimes obtains the status of "public law," thereby limiting the scope of state law in some degree.

Self, Status and Obligation, Moral and Political

There is no gainsaying the fact that the exaggerated emphasis of the absolutism of the state, pitted against unmitigated individualism, is now giving place in the modern world to the doctrines of political pluralism and of social law and personality, more responsive to the new teachings of social psychology. No longer is the state regarded as an independent being or super-person with its life, will and purpose, nor is the individual conceived as an isolated unit with his specific fundamental rights. The individual, we now discern, develops into his true and rational self as a moral agent only by participating in the values, loyalties and conflicts of groups. Unless he assimilates the expectations, judgments and imperatives of groups within his emotional life and experience, and brings these into some sort of order or unity, he cannot grow into a creative, independent self. The self is nurtured and sustained in the process of valuation and participation in the activities of a variety of groups and institutions that give him status, power and rôle, and at the same time meaning of his expect-

¹ *The Good Society*, p. 265.

tations, rights and obligations. Like his values and aspirations, all these are group-induced, and although social in their origin, are recognised, integrated and embodied in the developing self.

Political obligations comprise a part of the experience of the creative, evaluative social self. The state is the outcome not merely of an innate sociability of the individual but also of his safety and security, his desires for status and power. It presupposes not merely elemental desires and values, but also conscious agreement and co-ordination of desires and values and differential capacities of men for achieving these that lead to a social hierarchy. Man begins with values and groups, but achieves institutions, including the state, in the course of his struggle for security, prestige and domination in and for groups and institutions. The order of values, expectations and imperatives and the hierarchy of statuses and institutions are phases of the same moral achievement of the social person. Man's moral and political obligations accordingly intermesh, but are reduced to order and scale by the entire institutional process and the parallel, conscious realisation and integration of the total self of the individual.

Institutions are different from groups in that they represent more enduring values, ways of action and imperatives sanctioned by the experience of the past. Thus institutions develop stable structures of status, prestige and power, and distribute rôles and functions in an orderly manner among the individuals. Two moral obligations emerge in the history of all human institutions. One is that status, prestige and power must be associated with expectations, obligations and virtues. All institutions safeguard the moral structure of the coupling of rights-and-duties though of course this is more stressed in the case of the state. The second is that the status-power system must not be too rigid and constricting, but so worked as

to ensure maximum mobility and achievement of individuals. Rights-and-duties and freedoms emerge in all institutions in connection with the pursuit of major values of life—food, sex, security, recognition and power—which these define, order and satisfy, but they are most conspicuous in the state. Thus do all institutions maintain their continuity and autonomy and command the social and moral participation of individuals. In the total dynamic complex of social culture, strong and coherent groups and institutions seek to extend their ambit or influence over many individuals and groups or over their special interests and functions. This process may be called “institutionalisation” of one group by another. In the modern world the state has succeeded in “institutionalising” many groups, such as economic, educational, religious and cultural associations, extending the sphere of constraint and pressure over many domains of the personal life, and introducing sometimes acute conflicts between loyalties and obligations. Behind all groups and institutions, and also the social selves shaped by the former, stands the common society or Community. The state is only an institution or organisation among other institutions, differing in their sociality and autonomy, that are indeed the primary roots of moral and political obligation and law. Political obligation primarily rests on the consideration of the relevance of law to the genuineness of the sociality which gives birth to it as a normative fact.

Political Obligation, a Group Situational Imperative

In this context the sociological classification of groups or forms of social participation into Crowd, Interest-group, Society or Community and abstract Commonalty and the analysis of their functional relations and inter-adjustments is of rich import for political theory. The Crowd, being asocial and amoral or antisocial and immoral, cannot

be the source of law at all. On the contrary, the more the Crowd becomes the dominant group, and the Interest-group, in a régime of constant economic insecurity and conflict, transforms itself periodically or chronically into the "pressure group," "crowd" or "mass," the state gains greater influence and makes greater use of coercion to impose order upon the Crowd and Interest-group, superseding what Gurvitch calls "the law of integration" by "the law of subordination." But in the Interest-group and Society or Community we also come across genuine sociality, leading to the emergence of social expectancies, judgments and imperatives, both moral and legal. From this view-point each category of group or social participation is a primary source of morality and law. What is essential for the understanding of the different degrees of coerciveness of the imperatives that are emergents out of each group situation, is the intermingling of conscience, reason, faith and convention in both morality and law that have their habitual and instinctive, and rational or critical depth-levels.

Political obligation, like moral obligation, is, to be sure, an emergent of the group process that is the root of all imperatives. The same idea finds support from the Russian scholar, Petrazhitzky, who conceives law as an intercourse of "imperatives" and "attributions." All "impulsions," according to Petrazhitzky, attract or repel, whether aesthetic impulsions, "rules of decency" and ethical impulsions or virtuous actions that ought or ought not to be performed. All ethical impulsions are "imperative" i.e., these ascribe duties, but the legal ones are also "attributive" i.e., these ascribe to certain persons rights or claims corresponding to the duties of others.¹ The

¹ See Timasheff's article on Petrazhitzky's Philosophy of Law in *Interpretation of Modern Legal Philosophies*, p. 745.

criterion of law is the correlation—socially guaranteed—between the claims and expectations, on the one hand, and duties and obligations, on the other, the “imperative-attributive” character of the regulation.

The Coerciveness of Interest-groups and of the State

Interest-groups can co-operate with one another only when “social” laws of reciprocity and fair play guide their mutual relations and adjustment. Many industrial communities find their peace and security through new forms of contract and property-holding and conventions in respect of production, prices, employment and profit-sharing that have checked the arbitrary economic power of both employers and labour organisations. Out of these industrial laws and rules of the game, conceptions of economic justice are hammered out, along with forms of state control or management of industries that maintain equilibrium between rival and autonomous economic groups in planned society. More than state intervention, the social laws and conventions of the various professional, industrial and financial groups and institutions are favourable to the economic security and liberty of the individual on the one hand, and the democratic control over economic power and monopoly on the other. Without the mutual agreements and limitations of the vast secondary pressure groups, the Great Society shows today a most hazardous disequilibrium and the individual is denuded of most of his formal rights and liberties.

Economic groups under the stress of unemployment and depression and minority and cultural groups under the handicaps of political, social and economic discrimination are frustrated in their major values of life and become recalcitrant, sullen and hostile not merely to the dominant groups and institutions in society but also to the culture as a whole. On occasions of collective resentment

and excitement such Interest-or Pressure-groups are transformed into Crowds or Masses with their dangerous, distorted myths and images of the dominant classes and institutions and of their struggle for power. Such a situation is favourable for the development of the all-pervasive coerciveness of the state and the myth of state absolutism. For the law must stamp out quickly crowds and crowd-behaviour to ensure order and security, or, again, a dominant and strong Interest-group, like the economic class, or a coherent cultural group, like a racial and religious minority, extends its jurisdiction beyond the boundaries of state and threatens its integrity.

Interest-groups under capable and far-sighted leadership, however, may not be misdirected into devious anti-social ways but develop a strong sense of community, overflowing the narrow sociality within the bounds of the class. This is particularly encouraged by modern means of social education, free discussion and organised communication of classes and the breaking of the discrimination as between class and class.' It is a newly aroused strong community sense which underlies the creation of new social laws for a more equitable sharing of goods and services between the different sections of the community. Such social laws indeed break the rigidity of the existing status-power-prestige system and make social intercourse freer and less formal. Thus is fostered what is called the democracy of culture—the commonalty of values which is yet a distant social dream.

Cultural Pluralism and Democracy

A true democracy of culture is incompatible with an omnipotent state that would neither permit groups and institutions to be kept in proper vigour and force, nor foster and utilise freedom and sociality where they belong. It is also inconsistent with the blindness, inflexibility and

intolerance of state law that cannot adjust itself to the needs of different types and varieties of the human personality, nor to the exuberance, spontaneity and vigour of groupings that are the outcome of a wide variety of interests and values that bind men to a highly complex and ramifying group situation. In a cultural democracy man's social self is distributed between the multitude of groupings and institutions in such manner that no particular group or institution can command his undivided loyalty. He finds that a too rigid discipline or inclusive claim seriously jeopardises several other interests and values, besides those fostered and fulfilled by the particular group or institution. Civilisation itself involves the differentiation of human interests and values focalised by a multitude of groups and institutions demanding many loyalties and, as Walter Lippmann observes, "the complexity of man's allegiance cannot fail to be reflected in his political conduct." His myriad loyalties from his several fractionated selves are calculable and qualified, governed not by any inherent imperative but by expediency, habit, tradition and conscience in different levels of individual and group consciousness. Cultural pluralism is not a theory; it is "a sober description of the actual facts."¹ Only a crass materialistic democracy disintegrates or dissolves bonds of personal association, intimacy and friendship. The *sine qua non* of a highly complex, dynamic culture is the richness of its interests and values embodied in numerous groupings with their own claims, judgments and imperatives that are never self-sufficient nor exclusive but criss-cross with those of others. Only thus can men become active participants in the conduct of their own affairs in a plural society. Modern machine technology, science and social pluralism should help one another in distributing

¹ Lippmann: *A Preface to Morals*, pp. 269, 275.

power and leadership and diffusing the experience of responsible decisions throughout the population. This has been one of the remarkable achievements of the democratic T.V.A. experiment in the U.S.A. resting on the collective daily participation and responsibility of farmers, engineers, chemists, workers and preachers in the whole Tennessee Valley.¹

Democracy is both an institution as well as a method of social action. The application of this method is infinite in its range. Whether in the East or in the West, democracy as a method keeps alive the active citizenship of the whole people through a variegated cultural and social pluralism. The latter is based on the reciprocity of functions and interchange of goods, services and cultural acquisitions and experiences between different groups that run parallel to, overlap with, or supplement, the state in its tasks of social control. State law, with its inspection and inspectors, cannot safeguard adequately such reciprocity and interchange. "Social law," enacted by the various groups, which possesses greater flexibility than state law, and responds to shifting group relations and situations, as well as custom, tradition and public opinion, that react even more quickly to the intimacy and congeniality of group life, are necessary in order that the democratic spirit might not be smothered by lifeless, wooden form or mechanism. T.H. Green emphasised that the state should not command the doing of things the value of which depends on the spirit in which they are performed. The effectiveness of "social law" emerging out of agreements, compromises and new forms of sociality in Interest-groups arises in this context. In the complex industrial society of today, with its multiplicity of associations and hierarchy of expert controls, the greater opportunities for the arbi-

¹ Lilienthal: TVA—*Democracy On The March*, pp. 7-8, 83.

trary use of economic advantage and power and possibilities of conflict obviously call for greater regulation; but where compromises or agreements are not attained, nor are any explicit decisions necessary for the prevention of any real damage to the community or individuals, state legislation should not restrict freedom of groups and institutions, but leave the field for the code of honour, social law and public opinion to evolve, however tentatively, through compromise and consultation, the "rules of the game." Where in fact freedom is denied by state law rushing into such a sphere, groups and individuals cannot be considered to have an absolute obligation of obedience. Much of economic planning in free societies today consists in achieving co-operation and co-ordination between autonomous groups and institutions of employers, workers, technicians, consumers and the public for fighting the menace of unemployment, insecurity and economic monopoly. Social peace and solidarity are, however, sometimes put to severe strain, when a powerful group like the federation of trade-unions challenges state law on the ground that such law encroaches upon the field of pure collective bargaining, or jeopardises the free co-operation of the employers' and the workers' organisations as equals in the body politic by leaning on the side of the former. As such a show-down takes place, the state either takes recourse to more drastic coercive laws in order to safeguard peace and individual liberty—the very foundations of the economic good and opportunity for all—or, in the alternative, faces a revolution.

Progress from the Interest Pattern to the Cultured Pattern of Living

Political pluralism can foster real democracy of culture only when Interest-groups and institutions, instead of promoting highly differentiated and segregated systems of

instrumental values within their conventional areas and procedures, develop into cultural groups for the promotion of intrinsic, universal values. This is a matter at once of institutional rearrangement, social education and moral progress. The transition from segregated Interest-groups, classes and professions, with their objectives of aggrandisement and power, to cultural groups aiming at the richness of life largely depends upon basic equality of opportunity and status with respect to the cultural legacy. The democratic ideal of the equality of consideration can alone contribute towards the abolition of economic insecurity, fear and injustice without which an industrial civilisation cannot grow into a cultural democracy. Not before the material values of life are participated equitably by the community can democracy foster the cultured way of life. Such a transition involves the humanisation and socialisation of industry so that the industrial worker may not be a mere hand in the pool of labour or a tool in mass production, but a co-participant in industry as a co-operative enterprise.

Man must be creative and constructive in his routine tasks before he can appreciate the full significance of intellectual, aesthetic and spiritual values both in his experience and in the experience of others. As the vast secondary groups expand and multiply indefinitely in modern industrial culture, human relationships become abstract, pecuniary and impersonal, and the entire social culture trims itself towards aggrandisement of status and power. The struggle for status, power and prestige may threaten less the sanity of the individual and stability of the social order if human life be planned in terms of fewer promises and less frustrations than in terms of greater promises and more frustrations. The cultured pattern of life as contrasted with the interest-power pattern can thrive only where man wisely restricts his goals of life in some mea-

sure, choosing freedom and uniqueness with or without security, prestige and power with or without wealth, knowledge and saintliness with or without recognition and so on.¹ In this hard and difficult world man's pursuit of the higher values of life demands austerity in greater or lesser degree. Many individuals and groups, however, come habitually to pursue instrumental values of status, prestige and power for their own sake, and institutions become ends in themselves shaping law, and according to their special needs, interests and biases. The cultured way of life stands opposed to this, but it is only some sacrifice which may lead a political party to value patriotism above partisanship in certain circumstances, the legal profession to discard legalism for truth and righteousness, and the trade-union movement to work for longer hours and accept lower wages for the welfare of the community. In so far as the Interest-group can create values significant for the community it functions creatively on the higher cultural level, and at the same time builds up a communal mind. On the other hand, the cultured way of life is fostered by breaking down barriers between different Interest-groups and classes and equalising freedoms and opportunities. In this sense the natural democracy of culture is the essential foundation of political democracy, resting on and facilitating, as it does, free communication between groups and classes. Individuals too can create more easily cultural values that can be shared by the community, by choosing and selecting according to their dispositions and capacities some categories of values to the exclusion of others, for living rationally and steadfastly. Such shared values are the most supreme of human values and the necessary means for the realisation of all other values. The improvement of the character of the

¹ See my *Social Ecology*, p. 202.

individual and of the moral consciousness of groups and institutions is interdependent in the total movement from the interest-pattern to the cultural pattern of living, which is, above all, shared living and experience.

The pattern of interest-groups is relatively fixed and concentric, with individuals forming small subsidiary groups that amalgamate with others in expanding circles of jurisdiction until they reach huge dimensions for the pursuit of special interest, enhancement and power. The cultural groups, on the other hand, coalesce, intersect and overlap, permitting the individual greater freedom to play more than one rôle in the complicated system of division of labour and specialisation of functions in human society, and stress general qualities and virtues rather than specialised talents and capacities. Thus the "status" and "occupation" personality, lacking in that versatility and richness of life that the progress of industrial civilisation places at his door, can reach towards a full and complete personality. Instrumental values of the segregated Interest-groups and institutions can now blend easily with intrinsic values that develop into comprehensive social ideals uniting man and man, and class and class. As cultural groups and institutions become more dominant in society, and cultural pursuits become more widely diffused rather than confined to the upper and directive classes, the sphere of state action and legislation becomes severely restricted. For law is most coercive and effective in the physical and economic spheres, and least so in moral, intellectual and aesthetic fields. Moral, aesthetic and religious values cannot be regulated by the state without gravely upsetting both the nature and the pursuit of the values themselves. As a matter of fact, the free interchange of ideas, faiths and beliefs is not only indispensable for happiness and full expression of the social personality but also for the harmony and balance of all groups in society. In such a type

of society the scope of law and state regulation becomes very limited. With intensified and spontaneous sociality that is the outcome of oneness of faith, ideology and way of life, social law as well as the code of honour and public opinion become more flexible and more independent of the guidance and power of the state.

Political Obligations in the Coming Polity

Two distinct trends will be marked in respect of obedience or disobedience as Community or Commonalty prevails over Crowd and Interest-group in the coming type of society. First, political obligation will depend on the social nature and obligations of the individual according to which he can disobey the law concerned as the result of his moral insight and social acumen and prevision; while the method of disobedience will take the form of non-co-operation and non-violence appropriate for the ethical end in political action so that the risks of anarchy or revolution are minimised. This is the dramatic method of mass resistance inculcated by Mahatma Gandhi that ushered in the Indian independence. Secondly, with the dominant groups embodying and expressing a more intensive and comprehensive sociality, the moral norms of collective justice, harmony and solidarity that have not as yet adequately expressed themselves as legal norms will assert themselves. Such norms are those of the planned conservation and development of resources and the continuity of race in the realm of man's ecological adaptation; of minimum sacrifice and maximum satisfaction in his economic adaptation; and sharing, service and solidarity in the field of his social adaptation. Roscoe Pound, speaking of the broad trends of legal development, stresses that the doctrine of natural rights and the greatest possible assertion of individual freedom and will belonged to "a philosophy of law for discoverers, colonisers, pioneers, traders, entre-

preneurs and captains of industry." "I am content," he forecasts, "to see in legal history the record of a continually wider recognising and satisfying of human wants or claims or desires through social control, a more effective embracing and more effective securing of *social* interests, a continually more complete and effective elimination of waste."

Mankind in the coming type of society needs to stress new political obligations—obligations that reconcile the interests of unborn generations to the present society so far as wise husbandry and improvement of physical resources and technical and scientific skills is concerned (Euthenics); obligations that promote the perpetuation and improvement of the organic heritage of the people (Eugenics); and obligations that express themselves in terms of community service and solidarity rather than in those of isolated personality qualities (Eudemics). No solid and permanent progress can be achieved by man unless his collective aspirations and obligations are integrated and correlated together for the triple improvement of his environment, of legacy of his genes or quality and of his functions, goals and values. Appreciation and implementing of such sort of obligations do not thrive on compulsion, but on improvement of intelligence and moral character of both individual and the community, and an effective public opinion of a humane, tolerant kind articulated by groups and associations functioning on the higher levels of culture. This would mark the transition from the present class state or the uni-group state, born of the dominance of Interest-groups and masses, to the state of the plural commonalty that will indeed represent the next stage in political evolution.

Such a state will reflect the universal social values and ideals of the individual and will be saturated with a sense of collectivist, humanist mission and purpose. It will build up a commonalty of mankind on the basis of the law

of justice, solidarity and sharing and of equalisation of natural resources, raw materials, and standards of living of the advanced and backward peoples of the world, irrespective of race, colour and political status. In "justice" or "goodness" politics of the future, as contrasted with "power" or "prestige" politics of today, such national goals as aggression, aggrandisement and domination, that in the uranic age will also be self-defeating, will recede in the background. The state will come to realise more fully its cultural mission and responsibility according to its resources and capacities in the same manner as its gifted scientists, artists and statesmen realise as individual citizens. The spiritual and cultural mission of the future state will canalise all the talents and discoveries in science, technology and the fine arts along the channels of increase of global productivity, food, health and happiness. The U. N. O. cannot, to be sure, succeed in bringing peace and harmony into the world unless and until the conscience and faith of the individual citizen become first the conscience and faith of his own state and then of the international community. Only an improvement in the moral consciousness of the state, implementing the Platonic notion of the just community, can transform nationalism, which has been the devastating epidemic disease since the nineteenth century, into the constructive, humanistic goal of bearing the burden of the unfortunate and backward peoples of the globe. This international burden in the commonalty of humanity will have to be borne by each nation according to its capacity, advantage and power.

The third quarter of the twentieth century will probably witness mankind's most far-reaching intellectual and moral changes, if *Homo sapiens* is to survive. Even though a naked and precarious balance of power has so soon superseded the U. N. O., the atom bomb may delay war. Such delay may convert the U. N. Security Council or an International Police Force into a real and effective organ of a

world state. For the atom bomb will then be no secret ; every power station in the world will be a potential bomb factory, and no international inspection will be able to restrict nuclear splitting to peaceful and constructive purposes. Thus the atom will abolish the sovereign state by simply focussing mankind's fateful choice between the world community and destruction. Abolition of war will no doubt mitigate or eliminate its twin sisters, class exploitation and individual selfishness, aggression or cruelty. The unprecedented increase of wealth, leisure and opportunities of adventure in the uranic age will surely call for a socialistic distribution of income and property, social security, collectivisation of agriculture and industry, and above all, an overhaul of the educational system, eliciting a new cooperativeness and team spirit in practical and intellectual enterprise. Mankind, if it has to outlive its crisis in the atomic age, will have to be educated in a new moral insight and alertness and sense of social equality and sharing. An extension of the boundaries of the mind, through intuition, yoga or mysticism—whatever it may be called—may overcome the unprecedented crisis in man's history brought about by the sudden accession to his power and the lop-sided development of his intellect at the cost of the moral and spiritual side of his nature. The next step in man's evolutionary advance may perhaps be represented by his direct access to another's mind, without which he will probably be thrust back to his simian origin as the remaining half-century becomes uranic.

CHAPTER XV

MASS, MORALS AND METAPHYSICS

The Moral Consequences of the Evolutionary Myth

The social sciences have so far obtained their frame of reference from the twentieth century evolutionary myth, identifying human persons with organisms, human relations with means to certain specific functions of the mass organisation, the mass organisation with political and economic organisation and the ideal man with the ideal producer or citizen. Since human beings are considered not as ends in themselves but as means to the efficiency of the mass organisation as a whole, moral standards are replaced by the standards of expediency. Yet it must be pointed out that the great exponent of social Darwinism, Herbert Spencer, did conceive of the moral principle of balance rather than of expediency in the organic structure of society. He observes: "Strange as the conclusion looks, it is nevertheless a conclusion to be drawn, that the performance of every function is, in general, a moral obligation. It is usually thought that morality requires us to restrain such vital activities as in our present state are often pushed to excess, or such as conflict with average welfare, special or general, but it also requires us to carry on these vital activities up to their normal limit." In the emphasis, however, of progressive differentiation and specialisation of the functions of groups and individuals, and of the quantitative and the mechanical rather than of the qualitative and the organic in the social climate, adjustment and conformity rather than balance, organic or moral, become the focus of attention in social evolutionary treatment. The mass-society fosters transitory,

contractual and impersonal relations of mobile crowds of individuals, governed by the rules of exchange and proportion. It disestablishes them from the countryside, disintegrating family, neighbourhood and other primary groups and their mores and folk-ways. One result is that human beings are emotionally starved as they live in social void in the vast urban aggregations of today. The interest-groups grip them all. These foster the impersonality of human relations in the context of certain very limited and specific rôles or functions of large numbers of individuals assembled together as fast moving, replaceable cogs in an extensive, ramifying system of machine technology. Impersonal, anonymous dealing, mobility and low degree of social participation aid one another. In the absence of social cohesion men develop egoism, aggressiveness, toughness and formality in human relations. Just as a calculating pursuit of certain specific ends, rather than a wholeness of living characterises their motivations, their behaviour is also split up into specialised, segmental and utilitarian patterns. The collective purposes of speed, mobility and efficiency in mass-society altogether replace the more ancient and essential personal-ethical standards, which seek to determine the form of life from within rather than to receive it from an external source as a general schematically precise form.¹ Rural society is predominantly an area of primary, organic relationships; the mass society is predominantly one of secondary, intellectual and specified relationships, developed out of man's variegated, transitory, rational-contractual contacts with fellowmen. The latter are limited to a highly fractionalised aspect of behaviour, and can neither develop emotional bonds, that hold primary groups together, nor that morale arising out of the individual's sense of participation in collective living in the intimate, primary groups

¹ See my *Man and His Habitation*, p. 142.

of the rural community. The twentieth century evolutionary myth of modern industrial mass-society idealises the segmental rôles and functions of man, and the associated non-sentimental, pecuniary social relations and absence of the sense of group identity and morale as social norms.

Individualism and Mass-Society, Twin Enemies of Morality

An economic or sociological individualism and its counterpart, the nationalistic or totalitarian stateism, are twins, born of the evolutionary myth in society, both enemies of the human personality. Individualism tends to depersonalisation, to loss of original individuality and character, and to denial or exclusion of the manifold values of life. Individualism is to be rejected because it limits the range of fulfilment of values, and through inhibition and suppression of many impulses leads to neurosis. On the other hand, sacrifice of personal life and values to the demands of the nationalistic or totalitarian state or the economic institutions of the mass-society is equally immoral and unspiritual. Nicholas Berdyaev observes: "The civilisation of the West, during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, is characterised by the extreme socialisation of man (both in his thoughts and habits he is determined more and more by external social pressure), and at the same time by his isolation as an individual, by the loss of the communal spirit, for socialisation and communisation are very different things." According to him ethics must begin by opposing the final socialisation of man which destroys the freedom of spirit and conscience.¹ The personalistic myth of human life avoids the drawbacks of both individualism and collectivisation. The human personality is at once unique and social. It is in and through his uniqueness and freedom that the

¹ *The Destiny of Man*, p. 76.

human person can and should contribute his best to society. Society, ideally speaking, is communion of human persons; while values give it its true meaning, worth and purpose. In so far as it is a communicating, conserving and transmitting medium of the values of life, it has its own claims on the individual; but such claims proceed only from those values which the human person alone has the power to create and to achieve, and should not invade the self-determining and unique part of personal consciousness and experience that is the basis of all valuation.

No values are higher in life than those of the human personality. T.H. Green aptly remarked: "Values are always for, of, or in a person, in persons as such. Our ultimate standard of worth is an ideal of personal worth." There is grave peril to the human person and community if the state comes to possess such all-pervasive control or monopoly of the economic life and organisation that groups and individuals find it economically difficult or impossible to pursue their own goals and values with complete freedom. Such a state ends by imposing its own values, the instrumental values of power, territory or domination, on the entire community, by crushing personal initiative and freedom without which no values of the human personality can survive for a single day.

The Personalistic Myth

A personalistic myth of human life safeguards the supreme values against the tyranny of groups and institutions, and upholds the inviolable moral hierarchy by subordinating utility, power and efficiency to the needs of worthy, humane living. Man's complete living and self-realisation rest on the deliberate pursuit of the intrinsic values of life, his creativeness in literature, the fine arts and scientific enterprise, his appreciation of nature and cosmic infinitudes, his intimate friendship, comradeship and service to fellowmen, his combat

with the imperfections of man and society and with his own imperfections relative to the Perfect. The arts of living that enrich the human personality also vivify a social culture that is worthier and more permanent than economic or political power, the fluctuating external aspects of nationality that are now extolled, stimulating chronic rivalry and conflict between the nations. For human persons as well as for groups and nations, the reverence for the intrinsic and the personal, as contrasted with the instrumental values, establishes co-operative and harmonious relations with fellowmen, while the illusions of efficiency, power and domination sunder social bonds. What is necessary for both personality expression and development of the distinctive culture and ethos of a people cannot be permitted to be dictated or controlled by the state. For the state by specious propaganda can and does easily alter or suppress the myths, beliefs and faiths of individuals, warp the development of personalities, and mutilate and obliterate the social culture.

The personalistic myth of human life not only stands against any state control or direction of the intellectual and cultural life and interests of the community, but also insists on the autonomy of a large number of functional and regional groups and associations within which different types of personality must seek and find full adjustment and realisation. Small functional and regional groups rightly oriented, indeed, provide for greater opportunities of active citizenship, democratic control and promotion of science, the fine arts, education and co-operative living than the modern expansive, impersonal associations, organised for the cultivation and aggrandisement of economic or political interests that constantly clash or overlap, bringing discord in society. Conversely, it is the passion for the personal and the intrinsic values that creates the appropriate group organisation as the medium of the highest inspiration and culture of man.

Groups, Values and Personality

The evolutionary myth emphasises the organic necessities of differentiation, integration, co-ordination and control in society, and measures the life of human persons and groups in terms of social functions. Not only is the social life reduced to the performance of economic and political functions, but several obsessions are also engendered that are of serious detriment to the maturation of morals and of personality: viz. that institutions are much more important than individuals, that social coercion becomes more and more necessary in society with its vast network of depersonalised groups and segmented functions, and also that institutions, laws and rules are adequate to smooth out any social friction and conflict, remedy any recalcitrant and deviant behaviour of individuals and groups. The abiding values of justice, love and fellowship that bind together men in groups and communities are relegated to the background.

We now realise that the cultivation of the spirit of mutuality and justice are better solvents of individual and social antagonisms than the multiplication of institutions, laws or rights that often create the demand for more institutions, laws and rights in a vicious circle. Even for successful administration it is found that government has to co-operate with skill and understanding with, or delegate its own authority to, expert specialised groups of many kinds instead of swallowing these up under a rigorous, bureaucratic management. The democratic spirit can be kept alive both inside the framework of government and outside in the community through the activities of various autonomous groups and institutions in towns and countryside, where there are a balanced judgment of the relations of means and opportunities to goals and values and a wide diffusion of control and responsibility. In the search for and achievement of the intrinsic values of life without ambition for particularist monopoly and power in one activity or another,

the small-scale group organisation and simple institutional structure succeed much better, as the remarkable cultural progress and social harmony of the small nations such as Denmark, Finland, Sweden, Norway and Switzerland amply testify. The autonomy of groups in which every person is an active, self-conscious partner is an aid to personality expression. The integration of a variety of interests and the values that the groups foster and fulfil, and that do not conflict with the interests and values of other groups, is conducive to harmonious, co-operative living. These comprise the setting of a balanced development of personality. Personality is warped in its development by the exclusiveness of the family, the aggression of the class and the tyranny of the state. Recently Ernest Simon, a liberal and an economist, went from London in search of genuine living democracy which gives the true meaning to the outward constitutional and economic forms and procedures of democracy. After visiting Copenhagen, Moscow and Wellington, where he was disappointed, he found it only in a Swiss canton in the Bernese Alps. If the variety, flexibility and vitality of free and independent functional and regional groups are the mainstay of the democratic process in government and of social harmony and co-operation in the entire community, the personality process is also a function of broad social awareness and education.

The Social Integration of Personality

The psychoanalytic view of the relations between the human personality and the standard of society is that the maturation of the self implies the "internalisation" of social values and norms, and their assimilation in the self as the super-ego, which is more or less equivalent to conscience. The super-ego asserts itself in the unconscious of the normal self whenever it commits deviant behaviour. It keeps constant vigilance and represses dangerous hatred and aggression of

the id. In the fully developed and integrated personality the super-ego's repression of the libidinal and aggressive cravings is not tyrannical but easy and smooth, and provokes no tension or strain of the ego. This implies that the social-cultural milieu is not too inhibitive, but gives opportunities for either direct fulfilment or sublimation and symbolisation of the instinctual tendencies. There is a constant give-and-take between the super-ego and the id, between the ambivalent tendencies of life and death, love and hate, reparation and aggression within the organism set in the environment, particularly the civilisational milieu. Through childhood compulsions, repressions and phantasies and adult experiences of fulfilment, sublimation, rationalisation and symbolisation, the human person minimises the number of complexes or frustrations and, in the interaction between the processes within the self and the social-cultural processes, develops adjustive patterns of freedom, realisation and completeness. Thus the personality becomes spontaneous in its creativeness, love and goodness. This forms the essential basis of achievement of higher integrations of self that become the sources of new insight, love and goodwill. These, again, react very favourably upon social harmony and solidarity and give birth to new valuations that become assimilated to the unconscious compulsions, repressions and phantasies of childhood. This beneficent circle repeats itself in man's social and mental development.

The Laws of Personality and Social Living

The sociological conception of personality is that the human person realises himself through belonging to as many groups as he has values in life, and through conforming to such patterns and ideals of behaviour as his divergent rôles and statuses in such groups impose upon him. Scarcely any values, except the aesthetic, escape from the group and institutional web. Out of the goals and ideals of a large number

and variety of groups and the person's approximations to them in his numerous actual rôles giving him both social status and self-esteem, out of his many comradeships, loyalties, devotions and sacrifices is hammered out the complex dynamic personality of the individual. The personality process is intimately connected with the smooth, unfettered working of the network of groups and institutions, freed from any political, economic or social discrimination or dominance of any master group like the class, or of any master institution like the nation state or the totalitarian state. In each major group or institution the hierarchy of status and rôles should also be elastic enough to give means and opportunities to the common man for democratic participation in its interests and values on every level, and rise to power and leadership positions of high status and prestige. This is the surest road to personality expression, depending on general education, alertness and social equality.

Personality development also fundamentally rests on a balanced perception and pursuit of intrinsic values, undisturbed by the processes of social mechanisation that roll on obliterating the creative interests and values of the individuals. The trends of large-scale organisation, universal bureaucracy and managerial oligarchy are equally deadening in modern culture. As the machine rides humanity, and standardisation invades every sphere of life and relations, people suffer from 'anomie,' a complete absence of goals and values of life. Here, again, the personalistic myth of human life with its stress of the intrinsic and personal values formulates a truer social judgment and policy.

Secondly, the notion of personality directly involves mutuality and communion, sharing and service, that lift the plane of social living. More than *quid pro quo*, more than equity and justice, communion and sharing mark the deepening and moralising of the social processes, and represent the patterns of the truly social community. The social

life, truly understood, is a life shared and *solidare*. Such sharing can easily transcend the bonds of classes, states and races, and embody the progress of Interest-group and Society to abstract Commonalty, which also implies the ascent of the human person from the superficial, egoistic and evanescent self to the deep, altruistic and universal self. Such is the "law" of both personality development and of social living. The personalistic myth eminently suits a cosmopolitan, uranic age anxious to replace the nation-communities by a single world-community.

The evolutionary myth tried to build up the oneness of mankind on the basis of a unity in racial diversity. For there are marked differences of races rooted in their hereditary constitution and environmental stimulus and response. Prejudices that spring from such differences die hard. Even after the scotching of the Nazi myth, racial superiority myths in different continents still have their corroding effects on the commonness of humanity. The personalistic myth of human life stresses the common supreme values that are shared by men, irrespective of race, colour, country or epoch. The pool of spiritual values as embodied in artistic and cultural products is a pan-human heritage, that binds peoples and races by ties of sentimental attachment, respect or reverence that are no less enduring than economic and political affiliations. Thus the philosophy of personality meets the needs of the age in so far as it provides the sure basis of building up the real commonalty of the world.

The Metaphysical Ground of the Personalistic Myth

Sociology must finally transcend and reject the evolutionary myth and accept the myth of human personality and values as its central frame of reference. Man, in the personalistic myth, is psychologically and spiritually related to society and finds "the highest good in neither war nor civil strife, but peace with one another and friendly feel-

ing", as Plato said; but no particular society can exhaust all the values that the personality seeks. For the personality is seldom satisfied with the values that the present society offers for fulfilment, but strives after more and better values. It identifies itself with the humanity and the universe; and it is from the trans-social universal that it brings supreme potential values, ideals and symbols to reshape the particular social and moral order. Sociology has in the last decade emphasised the instinctive tendencies of human nature; it should now stress its idealising, symbolising tendencies as determinants of social processes, moral relations and institutional ways of living.

The personalistic myth of society has its ground in metaphysics and religion. For the infinite worth, dignity and majesty of the human person is a metaphysical and religious concept. Modern ethics and sociology sometimes speak of man's shared experience as the final good. But man and society emerged on the scene of the earth at a relatively late stage in its history, and may also disappear early. Human life and development are episodes in an infinite, incomprehensible, super-sensible universe of which all men are even now members, and which is the source of religious sentiments of wonder, awe, holiness and reverence. Rooted as these are in the universal nature of the human consciousness, these sentiments cannot be fully met by the brotherhood of men and the earth-society. Beyond the earthly fraternity of the human species man can yet conceive and realise a vaster solidarity and harmony of the cosmos.

Man's worship that is a part of his universal mental make-up and organisation comprises three indispensable functions of adjustment in his total milieu. First, with reference to man's relation to the environment, worship elicits the sense of holiness and reverence inevitably associated with it among all peoples and cultures. It does not rest on a purely rational and intellectual approach to the phenomena of the universe. Like art, music and poetry, worship takes

the whole world "in a heap" in its togetherness. This is a mode of apprehension very different from that of science which considers the phenomena of the world piecemeal and in their discreteness. The sense of wholeness or holiness is not merely not irrational but is an indispensable supplementary way of understanding the world. A person who is not a mystic cannot adequately comprehend the mysteries of "the goings-on in the universe". Man has to weave his fabric of meanings and values from the luminous creations and dark catastrophes of the universe, from the vicissitudes of human history as well as from the enlightenments and darknesses of his own mind. Unless he can do so his adaptation to the world in which he lives and moves fails. From this view-point a mere intellectualist approach to morality becomes inadequate. Worship finds the roots of the most imperative obligation in a trans-human, trans-social cosmic order whence it derives the Ideas and Values of Goodness, Justice and Love. Second, man's adaptation implies his inner integration and poise. His mental security demands his dependence upon something which must be infinitely above him, yet with whom he can enter into intimate communion. Herein lies the truth of Freud's stress on the psycho-biological rôle of worship fulfilling the unconscious wish of the grown-up man for the protection and security of his childhood days. No society, no earth-community can adequately cope with the individual's demands of mental and moral stability and security. Science and human organisation, though these may have enormously reduced man's dependence on nature, his privations and hazards of life, cannot safeguard him against all his misfortunes, frustrations, anxieties and sorrows. Dialectical materialism today represents the faith of mass-man, but is no proof against the unhappiness and insecurity of the individual as individual. Man's mastery of his destiny comes not from the dialectical forces of history, which he cannot assi-

milate to his own nature as a part of himself, but from self-discipline, concentration and a faith in something or some Being, incomprehensible to his reason and intellect and yet accessible to his love and devotion. It is from a direct intuitive experience of Reality that man achieves his highest poise and freedom of action through ordering his desires and values and augmenting and raising these to their highest conceivable power derived from the superhuman reality. The mystic's Goodness, Justice and Love, bearing the indelible impress of his own universal personality, become the channels through which, and for which, his fellowmen's morality flows in torrential wave after wave.

Worship pushes the principle of morality beyond society and life to Reality, and provides the clue to the paradoxical combination in the mystic of adventure with serenity, sensitivity with silence, action with withdrawal. For many persons and many religions, again, the intellect cannot obtain its complete sustenance and fulfilment by its relations to the deity in personal terms. It posits not an infinite and eternal personality but an infinite and eternal Reality, impersonal but at the same time the source of Goodness, Love and Solidarity in the world. Neither the earth-community, which is the hope of modern science, nor the classless society, which is the promise of dialectical materialism, assures peace, freedom and stability to the human mind and adequately satisfies as well as fully harnesses its supra-rational faculties that find their spontaneous embodiment in the intuitions of art, morality and religion, especially in the self-competence, ecstasy and illumination of mythical experience.

The improvement of social integration and moral standards and the depth and enrichment of the human personality all imply the treatment of fellowman as an end in himself. This is associated with the sentiment of the infinite dignity and majesty of the human personality. It is religion which is at the root of this sentiment, and thus

can best create and sustain the conditions of good and just human relationship, of social and moral perfection. Worship postulates the worth of personality not as a mere idea or sentiment. It does not rest before its achievement in concrete individual as well as social life and relationship. The mystery of elevated worship is the pulling down of all screens of objects, persons and their verbal generalisations. This promotes a profound sense of participation and solidarity in the universe, an intimate communion and interpretation of minds in the social world that can best create and maintain both supreme reverence for personality as well as universal equality and sharing. Man's perceptual and moral intuitions, through worship, seek and enjoy the prerogative of achieving the most intensive social participation, and the most extensive society of the cosmos—a living, intersubjective continuum in which he lives and moves, and which controls everything and everybody. Unless he is most profoundly stirred to the depths of his consciousness by worship, he cannot realise the full creative potentialities of his love, sharing and sacrifice for the discovery and sustenance of the earth-community.

Morals, at once Human and Beyond-human.

Religion accordingly provides a dynamo charged with the highest potential voltage for the perfection of human relationship, the charge being transmitted to the battery of the human mind from an infinite, supra-rational, beyond-human reservoir. It is probable that the new age will be more impressed by what sociology and politics cannot do for society than by what these can, and turn from these to religion. Hocking has recently pointed out the inadequacy of sociology offering, through some of its spokesmen, society as a moral equivalent of God. Humanity can be an adequate object of worship only if there is in man something which stretches beyond and above man, some trait of the universe

which calls out effortless attachment and service; a trait which is there permanently and for all men. The word "God" has been used to signify this trait. Otherwise our devotion is diluted by the perception of the universal imperfections of men—unless through these something perfect i.e., something more-than-human can be glimpsed. "Just for the deepest wishes of the human heart," says Hocking, "society has neither understanding nor sympathy. Society can expect every man to do his duty on one condition: that it speaks for a divine will which expects every man to do his duty."¹ The ultimate values are more-than-human values. The value-situation involves its own potentiality and direction, as when the total configuration of the cosmos gives rise to life and man and evaluating minds, societies and cultures. Yet man projects into such a universal super-human ground and pool of values his own vision of the most harmonious and complete personal values he can conceive. Values are both self-centred and self-transcendent, human and beyond-human. These are at once the truest measures of man's being and most expressive symbols of his understanding of the universe.

Thus sociology in its analysis of value-seeking and achievement requires the aid of "social" metaphysics and religion that postulate the incarnation of the supreme values within existence and reality in social process and human relation. Social experience, even if it be that of Commonalty or earth-community, cannot be regarded as ultimate. For the personality transcends society. Society itself is an object of moral valuation by the personality, who by this means imports spiritual meaning and ultimate value into moral and social experience. The Commonalty of the human species, of which the personality is a functional part, is in itself part

¹ *Science and the Idea of God*, pp. 70, 83; see also my *Theory and Art of Mysticism*, Preface.

of a still larger environment that he can hope to understand, appreciate and control only through his religious insight, ecstasy and inspiration. These are the ultimate sources of moral valuation and judgment; and it is the supreme duty and privilege of the human person as the religious being to arrive directly and immediately at the supreme moral value without the intervention of society, church, theology or accepted ideology, and to impregnate social relations with these. Thus moral values are at once cosmic and personal, transcendental and social.

The Concepts of the Cosmic Mind, Bridge between Metaphysics and Morals

Man's moral obligations are grounded, to be sure, on the metaphysical or religious reality of the trans-human mind of the Commonalty. He lives for himself as well as for others. He cannot live for the sake of group, society or Commonalty conceived as a mere collection, merely a set of interrelated selves. To make the sum of human values itself a value and the all-inclusive value, we need to posit the metaphysical or religious experience of the cosmic mind of the Commonalty. To quote Charles Hartshorne, "The only way to avoid a certainly false, purely self-interest theory of motivation, and at the same time do justice to the principle that value lies in concrete individual satisfaction, not in mere collection, is to recognise a super-human mind. If this includes the sum of being, if it be the cosmic mind, then the problem is solved, since such a mind would indeed find satisfaction in the satisfactions of all, for all would be integral parts of its own body, whose health would be inseparable from the prevailing health of its parts."¹ There is a remarkable passage in the Bhagavad Gita, an echo of an early Rigvedic hymn, which mentions the Supreme Self as endowed with hands and feet

¹ Elements of Truth in the Group Mind Concept, *Social Research*, May 1942, p. 260.

everywhere, with eyes, heads and mouths everywhere, possessed of ears everywhere and pervading all things. The Rigveda speaks of the all-comprehending Man, born of the sacrifice of the Primordial Being as he became many, extending itself beyond its original form. He of countless heads, eyes and feet (as representing all created beings) offered up in sacrifice the body out of which the universe was made, its creatures, the four functional groups of mankind, the stars, the four quarters and also supreme knowledge.—

“A thousand heads hath Puruṣha, a thousand eyes, a thousand feet.

On every side pervading earth he fills a space ten fingers wide.

So mighty is his greatness; yea, greater than this is Puruṣha,

All creatures are one-fourth of him, three-fourths eternal life in heaven.”

The Supreme Self has both a universe body and a universe mind. It exercises the functions of the various sense organs of the finite human body and takes satisfaction in the being-satisfied of all. Such is the metaphysical consummation of the movement of the finite mind to the super-mind of the Commonalty in which the ultimate value is a satisfaction inclusive of all satisfactions, and the ultimate resolve is to enhance the ultimate value by contributing one's own enjoyment and that of all.

Thus does religious experience offer transcendently based reasons for love, service, sharing or communion, and bridge metaphysics and morality. Infinite love or compassion and infinite wisdom are one, and not separate in the cosmic mind, in the realisation of Being. In India morality, to be sure, is a derivative of the person's identity with the Cosmic Person and of his worship of the Cosmic Person in all sentient creatures. Self-transcending know-

ledge and self-transcending love alike simultaneously proclaim oneness. The golden rule of Hindu Ethics is given in the following from the Bhagavad Gita: "The person who having been established in oneness, worships the Supreme Person as dwelling in all beings—that person in whatever way he leads his life, lives in God." Or, again, we read in the Srimad Bhagavata: "The Supreme Being is not pleased with those men who are heedless of the world of sentient creatures, and yet worship with offerings of various material goods and sacrifices. It is the duty of man, knowing that Supreme Being is present in all beings, to lead a life of complete non-violence and of charity, brotherliness and compassion to all creatures, human or sub-human." Similarly in Mahayana transcendental idealism, absolute knowledge and illumination translate themselves into all-encompassing compassion and love. The Bodhisattva makes no difference between himself and other creatures. The Mahayanist metaphysician, Asanga, writes: "When by the impersonality of the Ideals, the Bodhisattva has penetrated their equality (their identity), he has always with regard to all beings, the same thought as for himself. He makes no more difference between ego and others. He desires equally the cessation of pain for himself and others. And he no longer congratulates himself on being repaid either by himself or by others." The ancient formula of spiritual contemplation in Hindu metaphysics, viz., "That Thou Art" has several variants according to different schools of worship, all establishing the purest morality as the immediate consequence of the identification between self and society as integral parts of the cosmic mind.

Its variant in Mahayana Buddhist metaphysics has been most significant for the inculcation of love, compassion and brotherliness in the Asian world. "That which is sin is also Wisdom: The realm of becoming is also Nirvana." From this ideal man as the Bodhisattva enters

into action in the realm of life out, of compassion to the world at large, both gods and men, for the sake of complete Nirvana of all beings that are "as numerous as the grains of sand of the Ganges." The Hinayana myth of the unique Buddha and of the Primordial Buddha is first dispelled. There is a single, common Buddha-being into which all sages enter, as the waters of the rivers, appearing separate because of the diversity of their beds, re-enter the Ocean. The Bodhisattva trains himself for realisation of this complete Buddha-being, but as he does so he makes the supreme pious resolve of bringing salvation and happiness for the world at large, for gods and men, for complete Nirvana of all beings. Thus the Bodhisattva is called Bodhisattva Mahasattva—the Universal Being of Wisdom. As the Universal Being, he leads all to the All through his all-pity and all-compassion. Asanga says: "The multitude drawn by the Ideals is led by the Compassionate Ones who act upon it through fascination as do serpents. The Bodhisattva has in his innermost bowels love for creatures as one has love for an only son. As a dove cherishes her young and stays to take it under her wing even so is the Compassionate One with creatures which are his children." No other metaphysics in the world has been able to influence such vast populations extending over a whole continent with the ideal of all-embracing love, compassion and tenderness to all sentient existence where dwells the Universal Buddha-being. Mahayana idealism largely accounts for the spirit of non-violence, tolerance, goodwill, piety and kindness of the Asian peoples, for the spontaneous flow of charity in the establishment of hundreds of poor-houses, orphanages, animal shelters and rest places, and for general humanisation of social intercourse through the centuries.

Another significant school of metaphysics became prominent, especially in Southern India, in the middle ages after Buddhism had left Indian shores, and developed the

conception of Bheda-bheda (distinction without difference) in the hands of Bhartr-prapancha, Bhaskara, Ramanuja, Nimbarka and Vijnana Bhikṣu. This metaphysics may provide a satisfactory ground for a dynamic, melioristic social philosophy. The fundamental position of the Bheda-bheda doctrine is that it believes in the reality of the universe as well as in its spirituality, the distinctness of the individual souls as well as in their being centres of the manifestation of God, moral freedom and responsibility as well as spiritual determinism, a personal God as well as an impersonal reality, the ultimate spirit in which matter and pre-matter are dissolved into spirituality, an immanent theology, pervading through matter and souls both in their origin and mutual intercourse as well as in the holiness of the Divine will, omnipotence and omniscience, in the superior value of knowledge as well as love, in the compulsiveness of moral and social duties as well as in their abnegation.¹

Social Metaphysics

All existence including life, mind and society is, according to such metaphysics and religion, the self or person, an aspect of the self or communion of selves. Values also are aspects of the self that rises from the superficial, ephemeral and inconsequential selves of the Crowd, Interest-group and Society through the pan-human and super-human selves of the Commonalty to the Cosmic Person, the Self of Selves, in whom all nature and values have their ground. The universal, eternal norms are purposes of the Self of Selves. It is these which determine the direction of cosmic, including human, evolution, and guide or transmute the unspiritual and dysteleological in human relation and behaviour. Such a metaphysical and spiritual background serves as the basis of the moral myth of human society as the Kingdom of God

¹ See Das Gupta: *A History of Indian Philosophy*, Vol. III, p. 472

in which the self, active and purposive, remakes nature and directs history by identifying itself with the regulative aims of all evolutionary struggle. The self, in this myth, enters into a sacred and responsible relation to the eternal realiser of human ideals and norms—the Supreme Self. It is a dual relationship and communion. The Supreme Self is also bound in eternal relationship of love and sacrifice to the limited, distracted self, and guides it to full knowledge, realisation and bliss through the stormy and chequered processes of society. The toil and travail of man are involved in the Divine suffering, human imperfection in the Divine self-limitation. The infinite goodness and grace of the Divine life shine in the tribulations, aspirations and sacrifices of man. Some such social metaphysics can successfully bridge the yawning chasm in the present day frames of reference in Sociology and Ethics.

The Loss of Central Values together with Ancient Metaphysical Myths and Symbols

Between metaphysics and morality the bridge is the symbolic and mythical formulation of metaphysical meanings, values and experience. The evolutionary myth of science must be replaced by the metaphysical myth of Supreme or Cosmic Person and His Supreme Sacrifice or Sport bringing into being the world, life and society for the stimulation of man's highest moral and spiritual endeavours. Such myths have been known in the ancient worlds of India, China and Iran and also in Christendom. In the modern world all myths are gone, and man has nothing to feed his imagination as he lives in the de-natured towns, cities and depersonalised groups in mass-society and turns the wheel or handles the knob monotonously in a vast complicated system of mass production which he can neither control nor understand. Men created their ancient myths round their permanent home, hearth, family, neighbourhood,

community, deity of clan, guild, village or town and even animals with whose lives their life and prosperity were interlocked. As they have come to live away from the mother earth, and as their interests and values become entirely dissociated from nature and the procession of the seasons as well as from the familial social order from which sprang their many metaphysical symbols and myths, they have been uprooted from many anchor lines of their minds. In the urban industrial environment men have lost with their myths and symbols many central values and goals, as well as the worth and significance of themselves and their activities.¹ Making a fraction of a pin, needle, button or shoe or feeding a conveyer belt in the same manner day in and day out, how can men invest the daily routine of life with symbolical and ethical contents? When they live in vast tenements, move, eat and go to shops, cinema houses, salons and brothels in casual crowds, even their recreations are emptied of their meaningful symbolical import. In mass-society the round of family celebrations in the year, associated with historic symbols, rituals and observances, is almost lost. The mass-society is so heterogeneous and fluid that few symbols are significant or meaningful for the many. Where man does not find adequate interest, zest and adventure in work, that is on the contrary full of frustrations, rigidities, compulsions and insecurities, neither the steam engine nor the boiler, nor the factory nor the machine technology can blend meanings, appreciations and actions together so as to become foci of any symbolic configurations. On the other hand, depersonalised secondary groups dominate all his values, insights, appreciations and moral demands, and disintegrate or destroy old life and nature symbols and social symbols as well as familial ceremonials, gestures and attitudes that provided the

¹ See S. K. Langer: *Philosophy in a New Key*, pp. 290-294; also Romero: *Man and Culture*, in Northrop (Ed): *Ideological Differences and World Order*.

links between sentiment and behaviour and the ultimate metaphysical concepts and values in the past.

The atomic age has produced the symbol of the fecund atomic "Breeder-pile," suggestive of nubile neutrons and procreating protons, that spells the doom of humanity unless she be caged under international supervision. The Pregnant Atom is a symbol, today, of world conflagration and destruction just as in the last decades the symbols of Frankenstein's Monster and of the Robot in revolt presaged the ruin of technological culture. Characteristically enough the age is producing only fantasies of evil, sin and death rather than those of life, goodness and salvation. At no time in the world's civilisation has man's round of activities been so much cut away from the deep springs of creative imagination, and yet his logical and symbolising mind abhors vacuum. Thus the myths of the Mass, State, Race, Nation, Wealth, Power, Kultur, Imperialism, Democracy, Dictatorship of the Proletariat and the central myth of Evolution have arisen in place of the ancient Nature, Life, Person, Sacrifice, Communion, Commonalty of the Earth and other vast symbols and myths that nourished the human mind. The modern myths, though as much valuable as the ancient ones for man's definition and expression of his major values and experiences, are dynamos of conflict and upheaval rather than of peace, harmony and wholeness of living.

Comparison between Indian and Japanese Myths of Universal Obligations

We may in this connection refer to the ancient Hindu myth of the Five Obligations and Sacrifices which are generative master notions in Hindu culture and make work a sacrament for everybody. Men's five obligations according to the familiar myth charged with cosmic meanings are: obligations to gods, to ancestors, to spiritual teachers, to fellow-men and to animals with all of whom they live interlocked

lives. A chain of reciprocal duties and services binds together all creatures in the universe. This is the basic concept for the moral order. It is imperative that such "debts" are to be repaid by every person through the performance of five obligatory Sacrifices (Yajna). These sacrifices are sacrifices to the gods or worship, sacrifices to the spiritual teachers i.e., cultivation and advancement of learning, sacrifices to ancestors i.e., procreation and upbringing of the family and transmission of family faith and culture, sacrifices to fellowmen i.e., love, sharing and service, and, finally, sacrifices to animals i.e., love, care and devotion to the welfare of all sentient creatures. Man's daily round of activities becomes neither empty nor jejune, but gains in full symbolic meaning and significance and is entirely denuded of self-reference when it becomes a sphere of ritual. Since such myths and symbols of infinite indebtedness or obligations encompass and organise almost the entirety of man's interests, values and activities, there are few unfamiliar things to which he cannot orient himself in the world and in society easily and quickly, but which fill him with anxiety or bewilderment. In other words, the myths and symbols ensure his intellectual and moral security and freedom.

Similarly in Japan persons, as soon as they are born, automatically incur great indebtedness and their repayments, called Gimu, are limitless. The Japanese saying is: One never repays one ten-thousandth part of this debt. Such universal obligations are those to parents, to the Emperor, to one's lord, to one's teacher, and also there are obligations in all social contacts in the course of life. Morals in Japan is Gimu education, the Gimu or debts being automatically incumbent upon all persons and above all accidents of life. In the Japanese code of morality Gimu obligations which are universal and unconditional are contrasted with another type of obligations called Giri, based on reciprocity and repaid with mathematical equivalence

to the favours received. Often, therefore, there are conflicts between Gimu and Giri both of which are in themselves binding. Few cultures in the world have given such moral stress on obligations and drastic renunciations that are man's universal lot and on his self-discipline, concentration and control of senses for the fulfilment of obligations sometimes under most difficult circumstances.¹ The Hindu myths of the Five-fold Obligations and Sacrifices on the whole place a greater emphasis, however, on the moral law of the universe, the cosmic scheme of things and the way of meeting the challenge of death. Such myths move man, the finite creature, to and fro at regular intervals every day with profound emotional certitude between Heaven and Earth, between his rites and sacraments and the usual round of activities, between ultimate meanings and values and practical common tasks. "Myth," observe H. and H.A. Frankfort, "is to be taken seriously, because it reveals a significant, if unverifiable truth—we might say a metaphysical truth. It is concrete, though it claims to be inassailable in its validity. It claims recognition by the faithful; it does not pretend to justification before the critical." Again, "myth is a form of poetry which transcends poetry in that it proclaims a truth; a form of reasoning which transcends reasoning in that it wants to bring about the truth it proclaims; a form of action, of ritual behaviour, which does not find its fulfilment in the act but must proclaim and elaborate a poetic form of truth."² Similarly Feibleman observes: "The myth is the explicit expression in symbolic form of the feeling of the philosophy of a social group. Its character as a general social affair may account for its anonymity."³ Associated

¹ See Ruth Benedict: *The Chrysanthemum and the Sword*, Chap. 6 for a careful analysis and discussion.

² See Frankfort and others: *The Intellectual Adventure of Ancient Man*, pp. 7-8; *Adventures of Ideas* (1933), p. 84.

³ Feibleman: *The Theory of Human Culture*, pp. 53-60.

as these myths also are with appropriate symbolic gestures, postures and genuflections, man is made to enact, and not only to meditate upon and appreciate, the eternal law of the universe and the cosmic pattern of life. This contributes materially to the enhancement of morale and the sense of freedom, meaning and purpose in life.

Comparison between certain Western and Eastern Myths and Symbols

“Mankind”, remarks Whitehead, “chiefly suffers from the frustration of its prevalent purposes, even such as belong to the very definition of its species. The literary expression deals mainly with the frills. The Greek myth was more to the point. Prometheus did not bring to mankind freedom of the press. He procured fire, which obediently to human purpose cooks and gives warmth. In fact, freedom of action is a primary human need. In modern thought the expression of this truth has taken the form of the economic interpretation of history.” In the ancient Hindu and Christian myth, corresponding to the Greek myth of Prometheus we have the Creator or Architect of the Universe, teaching man all the arts, crafts and technologies, providing him with the highest opportunities and freedom without any kind of chronic, archetypal struggle between him and the Gods as in Greek thought. The Visvakarman in the Vedic myth is “the skilled architect of the worlds”, who is invoked to aid human skill, ingenuity and invention. As the presiding deity of all the arts and crafts of India, Visvakarman is the source and fountain-head of mechanical, technical and economic progress. The modern Western myth of the economic interpretation of history, which is an amplification and expansion of the myth of Prometheus, assures but precarious mental security for the mass-man in mass-society. It is a spasmodic source of sustenance of diseased mind in its bitter and chronic struggles as well as in defeats and

bafflements in industrial society. In the hands of Sorel and his modern followers it has been magnified into the passionate myth of the Revolution, which the mass-society cannot discern as a symptom of social neurosis, just as the psychopathic patient does not regard his daydream or hallucination as anything abnormal in his mentality. Many other legends, phantasies, ideologies and stereotypes have also cropped up, and are now eagerly absorbed especially by the proletariat, particularly susceptible to the propaganda techniques of interest-and pressure-groups. In the ancient Eastern myths of the Cosmic person and His Cosmic Sacrifice or the Hindu and Japanese myths of Debts and Obligations, we see systematic attempts at symbolic understanding and expression of that unity of personal life and its intimate communication with the environment, without which mankind will suffer from chronic anxiety, fear, distraction and restlessness. It is for the spiritual leaders of society, poets, prophets, artists, psychologists and philosophers to discover and propagate new myths and symbols in the mass-society on which the moral security, freedom and creativeness of personality and the harmony and stability of groups largely depend. The human personality in its development towards maximum autonomy and completeness must be sustained by appropriate metaphysical symbols and myths, through which alone it can discern sense, meaning and appreciation in the world, and cultivate loyalties and sacrifices by which the world can be made better and nobler. The world cannot be fashioned into a utopia without the personality finding its spiritual dynamic in metaphysical symbols and myths.

CHAPTER XVI

MORALS BEYOND SOCIETY

Morality and the Unitive Consciousness

A dynamic view of ethics reconciles the antithesis between the individual and group, between conscience and social norm, between symbolic behaviour and achievement. Such reconciliation of the dilemmas of life, mind and society is possible only through the medium of symbol patterns that guide man, as reason and intellect always cannot do, in living harmoniously in a hostile, baffling or incompatible universe. Man's intellectual, moral and metaphysical myths, symbols and paradigms comprise his external social legacy from which he chiefly learns his various patterns of adjustment. These provide the models which most subtly and effectively influence the development of patterns of overt behaviour both of the growing child and the mature man, and also the materials for his dreams and aspirations by which he can tide over his many bafflements and emotional and moral crises. It is out of the stuff of myths and symbols, dreams and phantasies that man weaves the fabric of morality, the warp and woof of his symbolic living in the socio-cultural milieu.

Man's unflagging conscience and self-transcending love are best nourished not by social but by trans-social doctrines and symbols. Metaphysics is the law of his social living. Humaneness, benevolence, charity, tenderness and even love can be best fostered on the basis of the realisation of the supreme worth of fellowman which essentially requires for stability also the sense of worth of the universe, totality, or whole transcending Nature, Man and Society. This is a metaphysical notion that can effectively sustain

perennial self-transcending human love, devotion and enthusiasm. The fellowman is too full of defects of character, and society too full of imperfections, injustices and cruelties to elicit man's unbounded love and service. It is the infinitely vast universe or whole of which all beings, Nature and Society are inseparable organic parts that can be the infinite source of man's love and sharing, grounded on convictions regarding the nature of self, non-self and the universe or whole. Thus may the fellow individual and society direct to themselves human allegiances and enthusiasms felt as initiations into the deeper mystery of the beyond-human and beyond-social.

Many ancient ethical systems indeed are built on the foundations of metaphysics and its doctrines and symbols, that all invest morality with rich trans-human meanings. A mere "scientific" meaning attached to the evolutionary march of organic life and mind cannot be soul-stirring and entralling nor elicit enthusiastic service for lack of identification of the cosmic goals with human values and purposes, without which the cosmic process cannot shed its bewildering immensity, insensibility and alienness. It is the prerogative of man to criticise, evaluate and direct both organic and human evolution, and he must import into this judgment, control and direction his own scale of values. Now values he derives not from the world-stuff nor from the all-comprehending cosmic process, but from within his self, and its relatedness to other selves and to the cosmos. Thus it is metaphysical notions and values that conserve and elevate his dignity in a fathomless, infinite universe and inspire and energise him for his tasks of control of the evolutionary forces and intellectual and moral adventure in spite of his natural finitude and mortality. Metaphysics and religion both import beyond-human meanings to the evolutionary process and seek to evaluate, order and direct it as recurrently as mankind suffers defeats from the hands of

nature. Such trans-human meanings and values indeed make man a creator and participator in the immortal life and evolution of the universe that no longer holds any terrors for him. Modern humanism replaces the deity not only by Nature but also by society, and seeks to elicit man's supreme self-surrender and sacrifice, although such devotion is too often restricted to the "cause" of the country, class, race or nation—that "mortal god" to which he owes his livelihood, peace and defence—at the time of crises, and to blind conformity to established laws, customs and institutions in normal times. In each case society, taking the place of the "immortal God", does havoc with man's deeper non-collectivisable feelings, consciences and values. Similarly a mere "social" or "moral" meaning attached to the brotherhood of the nations or commonalty of fellow creatures remains an illicit fancy, so long as it is unleavened by a real and profound affirmation and appreciation of the infinite worth of both self and non-self, which is an introduction of metaphysics into society. The notions of the organic perfectability of man and of brotherhood of a free and unlimited society—the goals of scientific humanism cannot provide the impulsion of flagging human enthusiasms, without these latter being oriented and channelled in an infinite, super-human, super-social frame of reference.

Mahayana morality markedly differs from Hinayana morality in boldly over-stepping the boundaries of obligations to Sangha, fellowman and the human community—charity (*dana*), friendliness (*metta*) and noble wish for the peace of Nirvana, constituting the whole of good conduct (*sila*), and attaching a moral meaning and value to the unity and continuity of all sentient existence, grounded in the Buddhature. The trans-human morality of the Mahayana ethicists makes man a co-participant and co-seeker of Nirvana with all sentient beings "as numerous as the sands on the banks of the Ganges", without whose enlightenment and salvation

he cannot free himself, in spite of his own omniscience, from the bondage of Samsara. The Arahant of the Hinayana ideal is silent, self-luminous and self-sufficient in his enlightenment. The Bodhisattva of the Mahayana ideal, in whom the individual-existence is also dead, yet aspires, even to an infinite cycle of births and deaths, to succour fellowman and alleviate world-sorrow with his self-transcending compassion (*karuna*). Thus his enlightenment and salvation are perpetually carried on for the sake of the complete Nirvana of all beings. He is called the Great or 'Complete Being' (*Mahasattva*) as distinct from the Arahant and private Buddha (*Pacceka-Buddha*).

This may be best illustrated by a reference to the Mahayana Buddhist metaphysical notion of the Buddha-essence (*Dharmakaya*) filling the world, immanent in all sentient creatures and inspiring the enlightened creature (*Bodhisattva*) to serve all, that has supplied the staying power of the most ardent emotions and ways of altruism and compassion in the world's ethical systems. In the Mahayana ideal it is also recognised that mere understanding or knowledge cannot give man the unbounded feelings of love, sharing and solidarity, but that he must take recourse to spiritual contemplation (*dhyana*), cultivate wisdom (*prajna*) and practise the moral precepts of non-violence and compassion as formulated by Buddha (*sila*). The goal of Mahayana perfection is expressed in the following memorable words by Aryadeva: "Those who feel only for themselves may enter Nirvana, but the aspirant to Buddhahood who feels for the sufferings of his fellow-creatures as though they were his own, how can he bear the thought of leaving his fellow-creatures behind, while he himself is making for salvation and reposing in the calm of Nirvana? Nirvana in truth consists in rejoicing in others being made happy, and Samsara means not feeling happy. Whosoever feels a universal love for his fellow-creatures will rejoice in conferring bliss on them and by so

doing attaining Nirvana." The above is but the amplification and enrichment of the ancient Hindu ethical tradition as expressed in the *Isopanishad* and the *Bhagavad Gita*: "He whose self is integrated and harmonised by Yoga sees the self abiding in all creatures and all creatures in the self; everywhere he sees the same."¹ On the basis of his apprehension of non-duality, he overcomes ignorance and sorrow, attains peace and never suffers degradation. On the moral plane man, after the realisation of oneness of understanding or equality in life with all sentient creatures (*Tat tvam asi*), experiences a profound joy and absolute compassion from which well forth infinite sharing and service for the world. On the other hand, he achieves a supreme detachment and freedom, that belong to the universal man from whose nature the various passions and dispositions of unrighteousness, egoism and separatism have been completely eradicated. The culmination of Yoga in Indian thought and practice is the adoption of the rule of identity in life that leads to instinctive happiness at the happiness of others and instinctive pain at the pain of others. The stages of spiritual progress, indicated on the basis of the *Gita* slokas by the commentators, Ramanuja and Baladeva, are as follows: (1) the all-pervasiveness of knowledge or of self, (2) the sense of equality of life rooted in the pervasiveness of self-knowledge, (3) the life of detached and passion-less altruistic devotion and service to all creatures, (4) the realisation of the absolute and the transcendental divine that is immanent in the self and in all existence, sentient and non-sentient, and, finally, (5) the consecration of life with all action as service to the Divine immanent in all sentient creatures and with silence as identification with the non-dual, undifferentiated, unconditional and peaceful. From the metaphysical establishment of oneness with the whole current of life and

¹ *Isopanishad Slokas*, 6, 7; and *Bhagavad Gita*, Canto VI, 29.

consciousness proceeds all creative, spontaneous morality. The highest adept (Yogi) described in the Bhagavad Gita is one who on the basis of his identity with all sentient creatures and of their happiness with his happiness and of their pain with his pain serves every body with all-Compassion (anukampa).¹ Kierkegaard has recently given a similar interpretation of Christian love as an interest in the true or eternal welfare of all other creatures. In loving "the man one sees", regardless of merits and demerits, we not merely fulfil the divine command which is the law of our nature truly understood. In so doing we also love God in the truest and highest sense through a sharing of His love for men. "From the Christian standpoint to love men is to love God, and to love God is to love men; what you do to men you do to God."² "To honour every man, absolutely every man, is the truth, and this is what it is to fear God and love one's neighbour. The neighbour is the absolutely true expression for human equality." In man's chequered intellectual and moral adventure in the world, the symbol complex in his metaphysical and ethical system has aimed at both full personal realisation and productive sharing and service, both discipline and transcendental self-knowledge and both self-sacrifice of the individual personality and perfect harmony and enlargement of Society, universe or wholes.

Spiritual contemplation, whether Oriental or Occidental, demonstrates through the centuries that the highest morality is reached not through repression and asceticism but through the way of unitive knowledge or communion, fused with love, compassion and sympathy that imply positive self-transcendence, power and service. With unitive consciousness and elimination of ego-centric impulses and

¹ *The Bhagavad Gita*, Canto 6, Sloka 32.

² Kierkegaard: *Works of Love*, p. 309.

desires all human activity becomes *per se* moral, spontaneously conducive to the good of all, though the distinction between egoism and altruism, rightness and wrongness altogether disappears. Man becomes totally unimpeded in his impulse, thought and behaviour; he is beyond moral and social imperatives. Yet he can do no wrong, as all the while he is merged in the unitive consciousness, and, engaged in action, is really inactive or has no separate action of his own. Such is the Indian conception of the liberated man of wisdom (Jivanmukta), sovereign, self-luminous and self-giving. Similarly in the Mahayana Buddhist conception the Bodhisattva is the great Healer (Bhaisajya-guru) who loves and serves for the sake of love and service on the basis of profound detachment and understanding that in Bodhi nothing dual exists, nor is any thought of self present. Nirvana (enlightenment) and Samsara (the world of births and deaths) are in essence one (Yas Samsāra tat Nirvanam). It is contrary to reason to imagine that the one lies outside the pale of the other and therefore that we can attain enlightenment after we have annihilated or escaped the world of births and deaths. "If we are not hampered by our confused subjectivity, this our worldly life is an activity of Nirvana itself." "All sins transformed into the constituents of enlightenment. The vicissitudes of Samsara transformed into the beatitudes of Nirvana."¹ In the Chinese conception, the Sage man may quite well be engaged "in the deeds of ordinary virtue and devote himself to ordinary speech", "to carrying water and chopping wood", "to serving his father and serving his sovereign", but his sphere of living is one with the universe and his humble offices are "a ferrying over into the Beyond". "In its substantiality it pairs with the Earth, in its solemnity it pairs with

¹ The quotation is from *Vasubandhu*. See Y. Sogen, *Systems of Buddhist Thought*, p. 280.

Heaven, in its permanence it is infinite time." Such is moral living at its highest and simplest.

In Western ethics the identity of man's sphere of living with the cosmos as the matrix of morality is stressed vigorously by Bergson in his *Two Sources of Morality and Religion*. This is what he calls the mystic's "open society"—the community "which is deemed in principle to embrace all humanity" with its perfect and complete morality associated with a kind of obligation that supervenes above and beyond the social pressure. Bergson grounds both morality and mysticism on a "depth psychology", on the notion of the solidarity of consciousness of every one with that of other. Such a view of "the whole essential of morality being performed in nature" is opposed, however, to the current trend of what is called scientific ethics and stems from Fouillee and Guyau.

Morality, the Unconscious and the Super-conscious

The psychoanalytic theory of the unconscious gives us the fundamental notion of conscience or super-ego as the repository of the moral and cultural tradition of the social group heavily laden with the sense of guilt and reparation. The theory of the unconscious in French scientific psychology, of which Charles Richet, Charcot, Ribot and Maine de Biran were the pioneers, stresses another essential, supplementary aspect of conscience, buried equally in the unconscious, independent of and anterior to sensory perception and its laws, and spurring will and effort in the case of seers, sensitives and other gifted individuals to infinite possibilities. It is such conscience that establishes complete freedom and perfect identity of will with the whole personality. About this will and conscience Maine de Biran observes: "The will is a hyperorganic force, independent of the body and bodily instinct and ruling them like an emperor over his often unwilling subjects. The will of man

or the power of effort remains independent in the internal conscience, beyond every injury and excitation from the outside. Neither the enticements of pleasure nor the good of pain are able to overcome it completely.”¹ Jung also draws attention to this phase of the unconscious in connection with the development of personality that according to him is synonymous with an increase of awareness. He calls it “vocation”, “the voice of the inner demon” (the ‘daimon’ of Socrates), of a fuller life, of a wider and more comprehensive consciousness. It is often veiled and unconscious, but sometimes distinct, and fatefully forces a man to emancipate himself from the herd and its trodden ways. According to him only the person who is able consciously to affirm the power of the vocation confronting him from within becomes a personality and achieves completeness. Each individual has accordingly his own inborn law. He is linked with the primary universal psyche which acts through unconscious channels in society. But he can and does subject himself of free choice to “his” vocation, “his” law. The personality thus liberates itself from the all-powerful, all-oppressing psychic life that is its own and its people’s affliction, and consciously translates into its own individual reality what would lead only to ruin if it were lived unconsciously by the group.²

It should be pointed out here that the universal psyche is conceived not as the unconscious but as the cosmic mind or the super-conscious in Hindu psychology. Aldous Huxley in a comment on Akhilananda’s *Hindu Psychology* aptly observes: “According to the theories of Western psychology, the human mind may be visualized as a structure consisting of a ground floor and basement, a conscious and a subconscious. To Hindu psychologists this simple model

¹ Maine de Biran: *Oeuvres* VIII, 185, 199, quoted in Scharistein: *Roots of Bergson’s Philosophy*.

² Jung, *Integration of Personality*, pp. 292-297.

of the soul seems inadequate to the observable facts. The facts, they maintain, demand the addition to the model of a paranormal mezzanine to accommodate extra-sensory perceptions and psychic phenomena, and above that, a purely spiritual second floor, having no roof, but communicating directly (if the rubbish and lumber of egotisms can be cleaned away) with the open sky. Tat tvam asi—the space within each second floor room is identical with the infinite spaces of the Universe: Atman and Brahman are one.”

Psychoanalytic theory does not discriminate between the unconscious and super-conscious, and psychotherapy in its emphasis of man's sexuality, social inhibition and moral regression and of his ignorance of his own unconscious life largely misses the exaltation and regeneration of the psyche and liberation of its new energies due to conscious control, sublimation and correction of fear, anxiety, self-deception and indirection. True psychotherapy leads the way towards self-fulfilment through conscious mastery and direction of the unconscious, and through social participation, relying upon symbolisation or unconscious and conscious identification with higher moral and spiritual values, models and archetypes for an effective combat with the 'dæmonic' unconscious trends.

As man's impulses and cravings, memories and images are cleared away, the pure light of knowledge illumines both the conscious and the unconscious and transmutes the life of the senses and social action that become continuous with the super-conscious experience. In the thought of Guyau, Bergson and the French spiritualists mental life is much vaster than the cerebral life, and its activity largely lies veiled in the unconscious. Like Jung, Bergson also stresses that the higher morality, or dynamic morality as he calls it, has for its essence liberation from the social pressure and is supra-rational, based on mystical intuition that is defined by Jung as “perception of relations via the uncon-

cious." Poetic myth, religious inspiration, moral intuition and creative adventure of all kinds spring from the depths of the unconscious. Berdyaev aptly points out: "Moral consciousness which formulates laws and norms lies between two abysses, the lower and the upper, the sub-conscious and the super-conscious. It comes up both against the instinctive, sub-conscious primeval nature and against grace, super-consciousness and the divine. This is what makes the moral problem so complex."¹ Mystical morality, Bergson insists, comes from a super-abundance of life, and has a boundless impetus that hurls it into vast enterprises. "The mystic love of humanity is not an extension of any instinct or sympathy, nor does it originate in an idea. It belongs neither to the sensitive nor to the rational. It is implicitly both and effectively much more. For such a love lies at the very root of feeling and reason as of all other things. It is more metaphysical than moral in its essence."² The mystical will or conscience which is vital impetus communicated in its entirety to exceptional individuals seeks to transform man and make him co-extensive with the macrocosm and thereby to "complete the creation of the human species." Similarly in Indian and Chinese thought, the Sage is also regarded as participating in the creation of the universe, saturated with a love that in Bergson's words "coincides with God's love for his handiwork."

The recognition that higher morality, like higher religion, is supra-rational and supra-social and that man's obligation is to make himself a detached instrument of the forces of growth inherent in the cosmos is essential for reuniting personal and social ethics as well as axiology and sociology without which the present crisis in moral theory and practice cannot be dealt with successfully.

¹ *The Destiny of Man*, p. 99.

² Bergson: *The Two Sources of Morality and Religion*, pp. 200, 272.

Moral Idolatry

Ethics as it becomes an implement in the hands of man for evolutionary advance embodies and establishes his supra-human universal values and meanings in the interpretation and direction of his destiny. It redefines the norms of human culture and progress and reconciles the opposition between the individual and society in more than one sense. First, social morality is found to be variable, changing according to the external factors of the environment or social conditions and circumstances. Each social culture has its distinctive ethos and differs in its favourability to certain types of personality, character and virtues. Secondly it embraces also the individual's adjustive freedom, happiness and self-fulfilment. Morality and culture are to be judged according to the creative opportunities and potentialities these provide for the finest and stablest internal personality adjustment. Thirdly, the individual's full realisation and development are seen to depend clearly upon the enhancement and enrichment of intrinsic values—knowledge, beauty, goodness, love and mystical communion that are shared values in the social culture. Fourthly, the full creative potentiality of morality lies in the enlargement of consciousness and experience of the individual and their intimate identification with the forces of growth inherent in the cosmos. Yogic morality grounded on the individual's natural integrity and conformity to the inner order and harmony of the universe has an impulsion identical with the divine will or divine love of the world process.

There are three major contradictions in individual and social life that every system of ethics has to solve. All ethics has to reconcile, first, the demands of personal fulfilment and happiness with those of the welfare of the aggregate or the community, secondly, the immediate needs of the community with other universal norms of human

culture and progress, and, thirdly, the need of maturation and completeness in the process of living with the unalterable, constant facts of human finitude and mortality. Different ethical systems have given different answers to man's threefold basic emotional needs for his orientation and for avoidance of constant disequilibrium. Ethics is to be catholic, progressive, universalist and non-anthropomorphic or trans-human if it has to annul effectively the above basic dichotomies and contradictions and unfold the true meaning of human life and destiny. Oriental ethics, on the whole, solves most successfully the contradiction between man's awareness of the meaning of life and death by inculcating that "the wise man should pursue knowledge and wealth as if he is immortal and cultivate righteousness as if he faces imminent death." Much in the same manner Spinoza observed: "The wise man thinks not of death but of life." In Hindu and Buddhist way of living, man's life is treated as a part of the experience of unity and oneness in different spheres of existence, the body being regarded as the vehicle of the eternal spirit that changes it according to its needs as man changes his garments or as the wind leaves the flower and carries away the perfume. While the Christian concept of immortality of soul focusses its attention to the other world, the Hindu and Buddhist concept of immortality stresses the spiritual need for knowledge and completeness in the process of living and sharing. Both theistic and non-theistic systems of thought in the Orient have indeed sought to identify the human quest for poise and illumination with love, sharing and productive service.

And yet in a sense Oriental, and especially Hindu and Buddhist ethics, being concerned largely with the discipline, poise and perfection of the individual, does not relate good conduct to mores, customs and institutions which Western ethics does. Man has an 'ought' and cannot escape certain

imperatives even if he does not live in society. Ethical thought in India, stressing as it does levels of spiritual experience that seeks to transcend even the subject-object relationship, not to speak of contingent moral codes, and control, discipline and transmutation of desires, sentiments and attitudes for the attainment of the Supreme Self or Reality, has been less society-centred and more personalist and universalist. It has treated morality and virtue as conditions of psychic inwardness, integration and balance indispensable for the intuitive apprehension and supreme knowledge of Reality; such conditions are predicated as are universally binding for self-fulfilment of the individual to whatever community, region or race he may belong. For the contemplative aspiring man, Self, God and Reality are eternal, peaceful, undifferentiated and all-comprehensive. Social cultures, morals, customs, laws and institutions, rooted as these are in divergent, fluctuating human desires and values of groups and individuals, are changeful. But these cannot eclipse man's supreme obligation for the realization of Self and knowledge of God and Reality. Such an obligation that Oriental ethics puts in the forefront also pushes into the background the claims of human desires emphasised by Western ethics. The latter becomes for the same reason more sociomorphic, since socially approved and harmonised impulses and desires rather than impulses and desires in the raw become for an enjoyment-seeking West the sources of moral values and virtues, howsoever these may lead to more craving, enjoyment and action and checkmate the pursuit of poise, self-enlightenment or self-fulfilment. Yet a trans-social ethics cannot only reach more easily a universal code of moral values and imperatives that it seeks to apply without discrimination to out-groups and societies but also meet more successfully the moral challenge that man's intrinsic finiteness and mortality present to all peoples.

In *The Perennial Philosophy* Aldous Huxley speaks of three forms of modern higher idolatry as corrosive of human culture and progress, viz., technological idolatry, the most ingenious and primitive of the three, that attributes human redemption and liberation to material goods; political idolatry that substitutes the worship of redemptive social and economic organisations for that of gadgets as abolishing all human unhappiness and evils; and finally, moral idolatry that is the worship not of god but of human ethical ideals. Aldous Huxley thus comments on the last form of idolatry: "The idolatrous worship of ethical values in and for themselves defeats its own object—and defeats it only because the acquisition of virtue is treated as an end in itself and not as a means—the necessary and indispensable condition of the unitive knowledge of God. Thus there is a lack of all-round watchfulness. Even the highest form of moral idolatry is God-eclipsing, a positive guarantee that the idolater shall fail to achieve the enlightening and liberating knowledge of Reality."¹

His distinguished brother, Julian Huxley, while regarding technical and political idolatries as disastrous modern errors, however, considers that communion with the Divine, which moral idolatry is said to obscure due to man's narrowness and projection of his limited joys and sorrows, frustrations and fulfilments upon the infinite universe in his ethical system, is scientifically "unproven" and thus, presumably, cannot provide the basis of any scientific ethics. Not only the mystical but also the traditional ethical view, both Oriental and Occidental, on this point is in agreement, however, with Aldous Huxley's position. It must be pointed out that the emphasis of moral obligations is absent from most ancient codes of morality, and has become prevalent in Europe only since the nine-

¹ Isherwood (Ed): *Vedanta for the Western World*.

teenth century, the age of reason and ethics, which has also witnessed the lapse of the religious attitude. Kant has been the leading force in the establishment of supremacy of the moral viewpoint, dissociated from religious conceptions. Both metaphysics and religion particularly in India and China eschew all traces of sentimentality and the attachment of the code of morality to doctrinal principles. In post-Kantian thought in the West, the Hegelian, Marxian and totalitarian ethics ultimately eclipsed the freedom and self-realisation of the Kantian ethical individual and subordinated spiritual values to a rigid moral, cultural and economic determinism. Yet the Kantian delimitation of the autonomous spheres of religion and ethics still holds good in contemporary Western thought. Recently, however, Western ethicists have turned to the philosophy of intuition of Bergson and Croce and to the existence theory of Keirkegaard and Heidegger, but, as Northrop shows, "what they actually provide is neither a genuine religion of intuition of the Oriental type nor a genuine religion of doctrine of the theistic Western type but a muddled confusion of both."¹ In Oriental religion Turiya, Brahman, Nirvana, Tao and Zen, that are all kindred categories, denote a phase of consciousness that rises above every sort of flux or motion and is characterised by a complete cessation of sensations, ideas and concepts and the absence of subject-object relation. The classical description of the "transcendental" intuition (Turiya) is given in the Mandukya Upanishad. "The wise think that Turiya is not that which is conscious of the external (objective) world, nor that which is common of both, nor that which is a mass of all sentiency, nor that which is simple consciousness, nor that which is insentient. It is unseen, unrelated, incomprehensible to the mind, uninferable, unthinkable,

¹ Northrop: *Logic of the Sciences and Humanities*, pp. 379-85.

indescribable, essentially of the nature of consciousness constituting the Self alone, with no trace of the conditioned world, the peaceful, all bliss, and the non-dual. This the self and it is to be realised (through meditation).” With such realisation, the sage not merely attains complete wisdom, freedom and detachment but also a profound identity of self with all creatures of the world.¹ He practises non-violence to all creatures and becomes a quiet man, devoid of conflicts of right and wrong, ignorance and sorrow and of discriminations between himself and the creatures of the universe. Such is the silence of the Universal Man in mind, word and deed.

Yogic Morality

Modern clinical psychology stresses that the formidable obstacle to man’s psychic poise and moral security is his inner aggression, dissociation or conflict rooted in his sense of guilt, too often magnified and distorted by his upbringing and circumstances in life. The experience of emotional growth and maturation of the child among most social cultures indicates that neurosis is not rooted in the universally postulated sexual rivalry between the child and parent of the same sex, but primarily in the overawing parental authority inseparable from the patriarchal organisation of society. An exaggerated feeling for guilt is the reaction of an early childhood situation against a general system of taboos and injunctions thwarting normal impulses and desires whose harshness, irrationality and purpose differ in different cultures. On the whole, psychoanalysis exaggerates the inherent evil in human nature, promulgating a natural-mechanistic version of the doctrine of the original sin in Christianity—the besetting ambivalence

¹ Jivah Siva Sarvameva Bhuteshu Evam Avasthithah, *Jivanmukta Gita*, 2, 6, 8, 20.

of loving and murderous desires. Where, however, the Oedipus complex is the unconscious source of hostility, fear and self-censure, morality has a difficult start as being essentially a reaction against dangerous primitive urges implanted in childhood. There is also what psychoanalysts call the Polycrates complex, due to which the individual is frightened by his own sense of power and mastery of the environment (Hubris) and unconsciously sees, combats and falls a victim to suspicion and resentment all round that reap their harvest in his ultimate ruin attributed to divine or cosmic indignation (Fate) or Nemesis. Such a complex is primarily due to man's unreasonable dread of his finitude and death and of incompleteness of self-development or achievement even under favourable circumstances in his short span of life. This seriously retards human striving and progress and engenders an eat-and-drink-and-be-merry attitude. Often does man show a reaction-formation against the fear of Hubris and nemesism in the forms of faith in a glorious consummation or immortal achievement occurring after death, other-worldly piety and asceticism or an exaggerated view of the works and experiences of the present generation or, again, magnification of the power of the Mass, the Great Society or the State as transcending the happiness and fulfilment of the individual. Man's sense of limitation of his own powers and existence tragically aggravated by his insistent demand for the full realisation of all his potentialities gives him no poise nor security unless he can orient the human situation to a large and comprehensive frame of reference and devotion. The classical myth of the rebellion and guilt of Prometheus reflects, indeed, an immature attitude of self in respect of its own power and understanding. Anxiety and fear are, as psycho-pathology insists, the fundamental symptoms of neurosis and obstacles to maturation and development of emotional life. On the other hand, as Ernest Jones points out, freedom from

irrational anxiety is perhaps the best single criterion of a normal mind. Moral development consists in a complete annulment of the Polycrates and Prometheus complexes. Now, yogic contemplation fuses the ego and the super-ego, gets the repressed complexes and all inner conflicts and paradoxes clearly into consciousness, resolves these and achieves a serenity and security of the self through a complete integration of the different parts of the structure of the consciousness. In the language of the Vedas, the adept, who comprehends that Contemplative, Immortal, Ageless Self, in whom nothing whatsoever is wanting and who wanteth nothing, has no fear of death. The Jivanmukta, who is liberated from himself, from the fear of death and from the code of rights and duties in society, achieves the most complete freedom; he moves at will, like the Spirit, and is active or silent as he chooses. The sense of guilt completely vanishes in the unitive consciousness that acquires the fullest richness and freedom for maximum realisation of externally adjustive and creative potentialities. The ego that is interstitial between the super-ego and the *id*, now, to use the language of psychiatry, can enlarge its domain to the fullest extent, completely freed from inner tensions and pressures from repressed or surmounted elements of the consciousness. The personality and the social group being organically interrelated and interwoven, the enlargement of personality and its complete freedom lie in the perfection of social integration and group organisation. Not any kind of limitation of the group but rather its maximum extension i.e., the largest brotherhood or Commonalty is necessary for full personal realisation and adjustment. The social conscience of Commonalty waits on both full individual self-enhancement and freedom and ultimate extension, solidarity and perfection of human culture, such as being experienced today only by a few gifted seers, poets and artists. Society and personality have

accordingly similar integrative moral imperatives. Humility, sufferance, compassion and brotherhood are moral imperatives of the yogi. All his virtues are regarded as the necessary condition of the unitive experience of Commonalty. He achieves a tremendous sense of power. But the power, derived as it is from unison, is associated with grace, blessedness, holiness or a numinous mystery (in the sense of Otto) by which power is consecrated, guilt transformed and fear of Hubris or inevitable Nemesis for ever dispelled.

Scientific ethics, as recently extolled by Flugel, Julian Huxley and Waddington, can never give the individual the mental assurance and security against the Polycrates complex without the accession of certitude, faith and strength from the unitive knowledge of transcendental Reality; and yet without the negative freedoms from primal guilt and repression and from primal fear and expiation no positive moral well-being and development can be achieved by the individual.

Ethical Neutrality in Oriental Thought

In the Orient a different kind of ideology as well as mental and spiritual exercises have largely contributed towards the supersession of the sense of primal inner guilt, repression and fear by a less harsh and more rational conscience and by supernatural grace that have contributed towards a more hopeful ethics and a more integrated personality development, so that one phase of personality does not thrive by apathy in another. As a matter of fact Hindu ethics never grounds itself in any sense of guilt as postulated by Christian morality. There is on the other hand a sense of inadequacy or imperfection leading to positive, constructive strivings towards regeneration and fulfilment. This has contributed towards an emphasis less on inhibition and repression and more on self-development and self-transcendence into progressively higher integrations and wholes in the courses and exercises of man's moral and spiritual discipline. Thus in the

vicissitudes of his moral endeavour man is never a victim of a tyrannical sense of self-abasement and self-torture, nor a prey to the inexorable constraints of a dark, incomprehensible destiny or fate. The aspiration for self-perfection is the law of his innermost being binding him to the unity and solidarity of the universe as a whole. Thus moral perfection implies the fulfilment of true and complete self-hood, on the one hand, and its unison with the process of the cosmos, on the other.

Man from the point of view of Oriental metaphysical thought and experience is a part of the greater human whole and is conscious of his many duties and obligations towards it. From this emerges his ethical life. But he is also an integral and conscious part of the universe, the Greater Whole or Cosmic Reality and accordingly seeks to transcend the human in a symbolic life of identification with the latter which is beyond joy and sorrow. Thus he transcends society and morality. Confucius observes: "All things live together without injuring one another. All courses are passed without collision with one another." Again, "The moral law is to be found everywhere, and yet it is a secret. The simple intelligence of ordinary men and women of the people may understand something of the moral law; but in its utmost reaches there is something which even the wisest and holiest of men cannot understand. The ignoble natures of ordinary men and women of the people may be able to carry out the moral law, but in its utmost reaches even the wisest and holiest of men cannot live up to it."¹ In neo-Confucian metaphysics there is, according to W.T. Chan, an essential harmony and an interdependence between the One and the many, the Li and the Ch'i. The ideal is a harmony or unity of man and nature and of each man with all men and with all things.² Morality thus takes the

¹ Lin Yutang: *The Wisdom of China and India*.

² Quoted in Moore: *Philosophy East and West*, p. 306.

form of a harmonious and co-operative complex of activity. There is a book in China called the I Ching or The Book of Mutations that reveals the universe as a system of constant interplay between a masculine and spiritual force called Yang and the feminine and natural force called Yin. Their possible permutations and combinations that are recorded and commented upon in this book reveal the common man's attitude in China towards morality. "The I Ching," observes Richard Wilhelm, "exhibits the scenes of what is happening and with them the rise of conditions in *statu nascendi*. While with the help of this one may recognise the germination (of the happening) one learns how to foresee the future and to understand the past. The image, which serves as a basis for a symbol, may thus serve to provide examples for opportune action in the circumstances indicated. The opinions indicate whether an action will produce good or evil, remorse or mortification. Man is thus enabled freely to determine whether he must leave a given direction, which seems to follow from the momentary situation, because it is evil, thus making himself independent of the coercion of events. The Oracle, by means of this survey, enables him to shape his life, organic and supreme, so that it is brought into harmony with the Ultimate Meaning, which is the foundation of everything." In both India and China the function of philosophy is to raise man from the ethical life to the liberating and illuminating communion with Reality, which places the mind above rights and duties, social codes and conventions that all presuppose his narrow, unrenovated self. Thus the sphere of morality belongs to philosophy that alone can reveal both the consciousness of moral man and the true nature of moral actions and regulations. We read in one of the Vedanta texts: "In one that has awakened to a knowledge of the Self, virtues like kindness make their appearance spontaneously but these are no longer the means (for

any ends whatsoever)."¹ The Indian teacher Sankara says: "Action is for the mind's purification, not for the understanding of Reality. The realisation of Truth is brought about by discrimination, and not in the least by ten million of actions."² In the same key the great Chinese teacher of the Chan School of Buddhism observes: "Knowledge—this one word—is the fountain-head of all mysteries."³ The highest state of human consciousness in which the self is completely absorbed in the vast numinous mystery of the not-self maintains an ethical neutrality; for ethics belongs to the lesser reality of the human whole. This is profoundly expressed in *Tao te Ching*, the masterpiece of Chinese wisdom, in the following:

"When the great Tao is lost, spring forth benevolence and morality,
When wisdom and sagacity arise, there are great hypocrites,
When family relations are no longer harmonious, we have filial children and devoted parents,
When a nation is in confusion and disorder, patriots are recognised.
Where Tao is, equilibrium is.
When Tao is lost, out come all the differences of things,"⁴

And again. "Banish human kindness, discard morality, And the people will be dutiful and compassionate." Morality in Chinese thought is but following the Tao, which is subtle and obscure, inherent and natural, and acts by non-assertion. "The Tao of the sage acts but never contends, nor strives."

¹ Sadananda: *Vedantasara*.

² Sankara: *Atmabodha*.

³ Fung Yu-lan: *The Spirit of Chinese Philosophy*, XIII and XIV.

⁴ Ch'u Ta-Kao, *Tao te Ching*, Ch. XVIII.

The Ways of Unitive Experience

Schools of philosophy and spiritual contemplation that stress the unitive consciousness are both theistic and non-theistic. But this makes no difference for ethics as long as its outlook is enlarged by communion with the vast and incomprehensible Great Whole that is immensely larger and profounder than society and morality. The Great Whole, the yogi's macrocosm, combines science and speculation, knowledge and apprehension, fact and ideal, physical happening and spiritual purpose. It not only safeguards him against all possible fears, anxieties and darkneses of the mind, giving him the most complete security of childhood experience, which Freud regards as the primary psycho-biological function of religion, but also unfolds the mind's limitless possibilities in relation to fellowmen. Out of both theistic and non-theistic unitive understanding emerge a human love and compassion of such numinous and mysterious strength and sweep as embrace all sentient creatures in the vast universe and harness most effectively human will and capacity to both individual fulfilment and moral perfection and the achievement of human solidarity.

The means of maintenance of the unitive consciousness in life and action are four-fold: (a) the way of action with non-attachment grounded on the realisation of the presence of the Universal Self or God in every sentient creature (Karma Yoga), (b) the way of metaphysical knowledge or understanding of this unison (Jnana Yoga), (c) the way of elevated contemplation for the direct and intuitive apprehension of this unison (Yoga), and (d) the way of devotion and feeling of the immanence of the Universal Self or God through prayer and worship (Bhakti Yoga).¹ In India the above means are considered as following one another in succession in spiritual progress and perfection; but at

¹ *The Bhagavad Gita*, VI, 29-32.

the same time since man cannot always continue in the same state of consciousness, he takes to yogic contemplation, worship, metaphysical discrimination or social action as he chooses or according to his circumstances in life. Thus he becomes the perennial self-luminous yogi—"like a lamp in windless place that does not flicker," or "that shines inwardly placed inside a jar"—whether he is in meditation or in action. "Action is true worship, when it serves the creatures of the world in whom the Man Universal is immanent; inaction is true worship when it is the profound silence of unitive contemplation", says Sankara.¹ Similarly in Mahayana thought the Bodhisattva, in spite of his unceasing activities of beneficence, succour and relief of the sorrow of mankind, is completely detached and passionless. Asanga in his famous hymn to the Bodhisattva sings: "Thou art free from every obstacle, thou hast mastery over the whole world, O Muni (sage), thou occupiest all the knowable with thy knowledge. Thy thought is liberated. Thou hast impassivity, thou hast no attachments, thou art in mystical communion (Samadhi). Night and day thou watchest over the world. Thou art given over to the Great Compassion. Thou seekest only Salvation."

Since the publication of the well-known works of William James and Leuba, Western scholars have been apt to view man's intuitive transcendental experiences as somewhat abnormal and single-tracked. Such analysis has been to a great extent due to the exclusive attention paid in the West to the systems of discipline, control and "repression" (nirodha) of the impulses and desires in the Yoga system of Patanjali to the neglect of the "spiritual practices" in respect of the training and expansion of altruistic emotions that are also largely practised in the

¹ See my *Theory and Art of Mysticism*.

Orient. In Buddha-ghosa's *Visuddhimagga* there is a detailed description of Buddhist methods of contemplation (Jhana and Yoga) by which man, calming the passions and transmuting the false mind of life and death into the clear intuitive mind, makes this the starting point for its concentration upon, and inundation of, the universe with the emotions of Benevolence, Compassion or Pity and Sympathy with Happiness. His constant prayer is that all creatures of the world may be friendly, healthy, unharmed, live in bliss and get free. We read in the Metta Sutta: "As a mother, even at the risk of her own life, protects her son, her only son, so let there be good-will without measure between all beings. Let good-will without measure prevail in the whole world, above, below, around, unstinted with any feeling of differing or opposing interests. If a man remain steadfastly in this state of mind all the time he is awake, then is come to pass the saying, 'Even in this world holiness has been found.'"

Thus the mind reaches successively the pure consciousness of Infinite Space (sky), of Joy and of Void. Each successive level or sphere of cosmic consciousness, "formless" and "supra-mundane," brings to the adept its own depth, subtlety and mystery of infinitude, "just as cotton and silk texture varies in fineness and softness of wear although the size of the woman's cloth remains the same." The metaphysical concepts of Beauty, Infinite Space, Joy and Void are correlates of the unbounded feelings of Benevolence, Compassion, Sympathy and Serenity respectively. Remaining constantly and steadfastly in an attitude in which he fills the world with his Benevolence, Compassion and Sympathy that transcend the boundaries of space and time, the adept acquires a new sense of the worth of sentiency. Perfecting himself in the "divine" emotional ecstasies (Brahmavihara) or "infinite" sentiments (Appamanna) of Benevolence, Compassion and

Sympathy, he prepares himself for the practice of Serenity or Equal-mindedness that is next door to Nirvana.¹ The Bodhisattva's life is humane and compassionate, but his mind is serene through his profound ecstasy and experience of the unreality of the phenomenal world and of the essence of the Buddha-nature immanent in it. Such serenity (upeksha) is also what is regarded as the final spiritual experience—even-mindedness (samata), joy and establishment in truth—in the Upanishads and the Bhagavad Gita. The Lankavatara Sutra warns:

“Abide not with dualism
Carefully avoid pursuing it;
As soon as you have right and wrong
Confusion ensues and Mind is lost.
One in all
All in one—
If only this is realised,
No more worry about your not being perfect!”

In the Anguttara, the disciple asks, “We carry on life with different attitudes. What mode of life is the best?” The teacher replies, “Reverence is eternally dynamic. One who lives a life of constant activity acquires the supreme knowledge of reality.”

Man reaches his highest moral stature when his identity-feeling, joy and reverence reflect themselves in his relations to the external world through a more sensitive, universalised conscience in terms of complete acceptance, peace and transcending compassion or love. Such is the indispensable contribution of the yogic consciousness to the elevation of moral standards and peace of the universe through the discipline and direction of human nature for human progress. The destiny of man, the microcosm,

¹ See *The Path of Purity (Visuddhi Magga)* translated by Maung Tin, and *Manual of a Mystic* by Woodward.

is linked, no doubt, with the law of the interstellar spaces and immensities of the macrocosm. But he must accept and appreciate it within the circumscribed fold of duties and obligations of his lesser social macrocosm. His enlarged knowledge and intensified love lead to expanded sharing and service, strengthen his fight against misfortune, disease, ignorance, poverty—both the handicaps of nature and the defects of his social organisation—and, indeed, invest ethics with an indescribable purity and mystery, an overwhelming numinous significance. Widely practised, yoga, the experimental technique of higher meditation, is the impulsion of any future evolutionary advance of man.

CHAPTER XVII

THE SYMBOLIC NATURE OF MORALS

Communication and Communion

Society is based on communication, and since communication whether through the medium of gesture, speech or any other device must employ symbols, no society exists without its own pattern of symbols. A symbol is an object, sign, person or activity which is of meaningful and evaluative significance for a group or community and serves as a means of communication of ideas, emotions and experiences. A symbol mediates between an object, event or situation and its perception and understanding. Thus the symbol is, in the first instance, a means of communication. By gesture and speech that express objects and events man communicates with fellowman. A symbol also mediates between value and existence, between appearance and reality. As such it is a means of communion.

Communication and communion are to be carefully distinguished. Communication is largely social contact or participation; communion is social identification through the mediation of ideas, feelings and values. The inner world of symbolic living and experience is of course derived from the external world, but its strength and vitality are shown in the psychotic who sometimes lives in a subjective universe of his own, yet a social world of persons and objects with whom he communes. Under normal conditions the symbolic world, however, interpolates and fuses with the external world, constantly guiding, restraining or limiting human communication or communion. Yet the normal man's conscious life is full of symbols,

myths and fictions reflected from the unconscious. Jung stresses the existence of both the collective or racial and the individual unconscious; from the former are derived myths, archetypes and phantasies of art and religion that down the centuries direct the moral behaviour and experience of men, groups and cultures.

Communication presupposes isolation and separation between men which may be bridged by mobility or by technology. But technology may also indirectly make human contacts rational, impersonal and abstract, and doom large aggregations of men in cities to "social" loneliness, destroying intimacy and fellow feeling that are the soul of communion. Communion takes place in the ideal and spiritual rather than in the biological and economic planes. The latter are the fields of communication. At the same time so far as the discoveries and inventions of communication bring about the physical proximity of men, separated by long distances or physical barriers, it greatly enlarges the scope of communion which is a cognitive and emotional perception of oneness between men and fellowmen. While the locomotive, ship, radio, aeroplane and jet plane have successively spanned the distances of the continents and drawn peoples together, man cannot yet think and feel universally. Communication is not communion. And yet communion is unconsciously built up by communication. In the modern age man's mechanical skill and ingenuity will contribute to his true cosmic evolution by making individuals and nations "cells in the giant organism called humanity."¹

Origin and Development of Symbolic Living

Man's mental life has evolved along two dimensions. There is the physical and biological plane of experience which calls for human adaptation leading to the emergence

¹ See Lecomte du Noüy, *Human Destiny*, p. 261.

of impulses, perceptions, thoughts, emotions and volitions. Out of the give-and-take between man's primary environment and his mental organisation the hereditary equipment and individual variegation of vital impulses, thoughts, perceptions or emotions arise as mechanisms of adaptation. This is the functional phase of the mind. But there is another environment, the secondary symbolical environment, which human culture creates, and to which also the perceptions, thoughts and feelings of man are directed. Thus the mental life shows another dimension, another line of development. This is the mind's logical, introspective or symbolising phase which embodies relations expressed primarily in words, symbols, concepts and standards and also in the external elaborations of man's culture, groups and institutions. Human language and symbols develop in the context of social culture serving certain essential purposes of man's social adaptation. These store and transmit experiences of the control of the physical world from one generation to another and also free the human mind from the stresses and strains of the present vital-social situation. Finally, these envisage the predicaments to come and the modes of adjustment possible through certain great natural goals and values that supply the key to man's conscious activities and behaviour in this dimension of mental life. In the setting of his cultural milieu he develops dispositions, attitudes and values, trends of thought and behaviour, as well as moral standards and ideals that render his mental operations smooth, stable and flexible. Man's associated life, intercourse and culture are not possible unless the logical, reflective, symbolising mind can inhibit certain responses, feelings and emotions and abbreviate or telescope certain chains of thought, sentiment and behaviour. In his social intercourse he has to develop an appropriate organisation or pattern of behaviour in which certain emotions are inhibited and rele-

gated into the background and certain images, sentiments, beliefs and volitions condensed or short-circuited for the purpose of adaptation. No business transaction, for instance, is possible in a state of violent emotion. But a flushed countenance may not be incompatible with even a delicate negotiation that rules out stamping, blustering and other expressions of anger. Similarly a complete train of opinions, valuations and goals may block social interaction. The active participation in a sports club, a church, a trade-union and a political party is impossible if all opinions, sentiments and judgments of the individual are to be expressed in chalking out specific plans of action. Unless a balance is struck between incipient and overt responses, man obviously cannot be a social participant. Herein lies the psychological rôle in social intercourse of symbols by which man can abbreviate his responses to others and also control his or his fellowmen's incipient behaviour.

Symbolic living, relations and behaviour are true only of the human animal. Man's basic need, Mrs. Langer stresses, is symbolisation shown in dream, gesture, speech, magic, myth, ritual, art and science.¹ The correspondence of symbols serves the primary purpose of his adjustment in a social milieu, i.e., communion, insight, morale and emotional experience.

His responses and behaviour, ideas and emotions, judgments and evaluations are symbolic or depend upon the use of symbols. His gesture, like a cordial hand-shake or an angry frown, derives its meaning from his cultural tradition, which thus transforms the value of a physical object—whether human behaviour, or natural sound, colour or material thing. Human speech is of course the most important and universal form of symbolic behaviour that also includes ritual, etiquette and manners. Incipient

¹ Susanne K. Langer: *Philosophy in a New Key*, pp. 41-45.

thoughts, feelings and behaviour are the *sine -qua non* of social behaviour. This invests social behaviour with a certain stability and Gestalt-qualitat. Social behaviour is therefore largely symbolical and is carried on through the mechanisms of attitudes, dispositions, values and norms, self-experience and awareness functions.

By exhibiting various symbols of the consequences of behaviour man prevents his fellowman's incipient offences from being overt offences; while many of his own egoistic and aggressive attitudes and responses remain merely incipient simply because of the various signs and symbols of social prescription and disapproval that surround him on all sides. His behaviour is circumscribed, restrained or encouraged in all spheres of social relations by a wide variety of symbols that he also implants within as forms of self-control. His moral life is largely mediated through symbols that throw whole systems of belief, judgment, valuation and expectation into ever-changing social situations, and encourage, admonish, reward or punish his implicit or articulate actions without sometimes his being aware of them. Improprieties, misdemeanours, offences and crimes of various grades are prevented in society largely through the power of symbols that envisage their anticipated effects in human relationships, and are carried over into the insight, precision and self-discipline of the individuals.

The Evolutionary Role of Man's Symbolical Milieu

Mental life due to symbolical negotiation achieves a new control over perceptions, thoughts, emotions and volitions, manipulating and combining them into varied patterns. The logical or introspective mind frees itself to a greater or less extent from the stress of physical and biological factors. It learns in a social culture to associate words or symbols with organic conditions and their qualitative variety just as readily as it links them with the external objects of the environment. A symbol is a device of the

reflective mind by which a whole forest of experience can be annexed, marked and fixed, so to speak, by means of a trail, enabling man, in the words of William James, "to use the forest, wend across it with companions and enjoy its quality." Mental life can thus build up a new symbolical plane of experience in which all its past is conserved in an abbreviated but imageless form, and which shows a line of development in the direction of greater mental variegation, speed, plasticity and control. As human attitudes, ego-feelings and values carry on the mental transactions with the environment, perceptions, feelings and thoughts attenuate. This is true not only on the introspective plane for individuals but also in the history of social cultures. "There are", remarks Griffith, "Oriental cultures in which the dependence of the organism on a physical world order is quite disregarded and a language mechanism for the description and verbal control of organic or vital and of remembered and thought-about events is highly developed. In psychological terms this difference is really a difference in the direction in which trained introspection can move."¹

The culture of a people centres around adjustments to external objects and situations. Long mental commerce with them has led to the acquisition of a vast, precise and operationally defensible set of symbols. Culture consists, in its psychological aspect, largely of the finer filiations of dispositions, attitudes, values and modes of thinking. A person belonging to an advanced social culture lives more symbolically and enjoys a wider range and nuance of the higher subjective processes so that subtle alterations in the patterns and course of events in the external world come to him laden with fuller meanings and values. In such a plane of variegated subjective experience, life is raised from the level of "all or none response" to one of discrimi-

¹ *Principles of Systematic Psychology*, p. 338.

native and nicely graded reactions and enjoyments. The secondary symbolical environment of man stimulates and leads his symbolising, creative mind into evolutionary excursions in fields that over-reach the physical and biological plane.

This is associated with man's responses towards symbolical objects that by epitomising ideas, feelings and emotions enable a quicker and stabler adjustment to be made than if it were directed towards the primary objects or stimuli themselves. In the social-cultural milieu man also responds to symbolised rôles and positions of fellow human beings. Through the transactions between symbols of objects and of the rôles and positions of other persons based on speech reactions and other signs for operations a large sector of human attitudes, behaviour and experience is divested of biological contents and lifted to a level in which the high-level functions of the mind, such as abstraction, idealisation, valuation and symbolisation, become more prominent than the low level functions of sensory perceptions, thoughts, emotions and volitions. It is possible for certain gifted individuals such as poets, artists, scientists and mystics to live entirely in the domain of symbols and of verbally or symbolically organised experience. A group of logicians or mathematicians lives in a field which appears to be completely abstracted from reality. Their thought appears to move in a world which is mentally unique. But such stress on mental transactions on a highly abstract plane, although it forestalls the future development of man's creative mind, cannot naturally hold good for a whole community. Yet every culture has its elaborate apparatus of words, symbolic, short-hand concepts and judgments and symbolic devices of operations and behaviour, whose objectivity depends upon the acquisition by the community of the same set of signs, formulae and conventions. Every culture seeks to build up homogeneous personality struc-

tures of the individuals through the socially communicated and understood symbols of judgment and valuation of the true, the good and the beautiful. Society's set of symbolical appraisals and prescriptions become interiorised. This is the education or socialisation process, entirely dependent upon symbol configurations and techniques of their diffusion.¹ Upon these rest not only society's success in adaptation to the external environment but also its level of higher collective and individual mental processes and culture—memory, imagination, reflection, valuation and judgment. The verbally organised experience is at the roots of man's intellectual mastery and of moral and spiritual advance—the creation and promotion of the higher values of life—, and this is true of both the individual as well as of the race or people.

Stabilisation and Co-ordination of Value Symbols by Myths

The factors of the external environment present themselves to the logical or introspective mind not as "stimuli" or "objects" but as "goals" or "values" that are signified to the individual by the major symbols of society. The logical mind grasps the vital-social situation through a concept in which the past and the present of the objects are included as well as man's relations to these in the form of goals or values into which his elementary desires and impulses are transformed. Goals or values are human symbols that are interwoven with the ideas and potentialities of the natural objects for the fulfilment of those goals and values both in imagination and in fact. In this process of transformation of the stimulus and object into conceived potentialities, and of individual desires and interests into socially derived symbolical goals or values, the social myth plays an important rôle. For it is the myth that facilitates, like the hypo-

¹ See Morris: *Signs, Language and Behaviour*, pp. 204-216.

thesis of science, the manipulation and control of environment by native man. Myth is simply society's device of projection of human goals, values and ideals in a concrete and immediate manner into the environment so that the goals, values and ideals obtain a sort of objective content and become like the objects themselves fearful, marvellous, beautiful or tragic "immediately and in their own right and behalf", to use the words of Dewey. Thus the goals and values, though these are symbols and abstractions, are invested with immediate qualities and become stable and persistent through time, giving a meaning and significance to man's tense endeavours to achieve them. Mythopoeic thought also scales and co-ordinates the goals and values, constructs an invisible order of truth, goodness and justice, and relates it to the visible order of the cycle of the seasons and stars, the sun and the moon. Or it elaborates what Wensinck has called a "dramatic conception of nature," which sees everywhere a strife between divine and demoniac, cosmic and chaotic powers. Or, again, it adumbrates a universal moral order or law of sequence and metamorphosis of souls according to man's good and evil deeds in this world. All this facilitates man's choice of approved social goals and ideals, heartens him in his struggle against the demoniac, unconscious urges that give peace neither to him nor to society, and makes of his behaviour a ritual and observance. Myth orders the life of the individual and society in harmony with cosmic events. Marriage, hunt or economic enterprise, inauguration of temple worship, war expedition or coronation of tribal leaders and kings, all become associated with propitious beginnings of the cycle of nature, and thereby gain peculiar meanings, values and significances. Myth adds a new quality and dimension to man's effort, and assures him success, joy and competence by integrating his goals and values and their fulfilment into a beyond-human frame and order of reference. The sociological school of Durkheim and

his followers showed that myths cannot be explained adequately as intuitions of the phenomena of nature. Myths are entirely social in their aim and purpose, nature reflecting not only the fundamental features of the organisation of society but also its cherished goals and values, wishes and dreams that thus acquire reality and sanction or guide human behaviour. Intelligence is guarded by myth symbolism against coming to grief in the face of failure and is prevented from "sliding down a slope which is dangerous to the individual and society," to use Bergson's well-known phrase used in respect of the myth-making function.

The Significance of Self-images and Symbolic Rôles in Internalising Morals

Social symbols and myths come to mould and direct the mind of the individual early in childhood. The child "introjects" to himself symbolically his contacts with others, and develops within himself a symbolic moral ego, called the super-ego or conscience. The commands and admonitions of parents, elders and nurses are interiorised as conscience through the processes of symbolisation and myth-making. The entire process of "rôle-taking," introjection, identification or empathy, by which the child "internalises" his rôle position in the family, appropriate to his age, sex or class, and evolves not only a sense of shame and honour but also a sense of perfection through social expectancy and judgment, also involves symbolisation and myth-formation. Thus is evolved the "self-image," the "symbolical" or "ideal" me, a central dominant picture of man of himself, of his rôles, system of values and relationships to the social milieu that represents a frame of reference to which his impulses, habits and behaviour must reasonably conform. The "self-image" or "symbolical" self is different from reality; it represents his perception and evaluation of his own habits, attitudes and rôles, his concep-

tion of what others believe him to be and abstraction of his imagined traits, rôles and achievements. As the child grows he comes to acquire or interiorise several self-images, symbolised or ideal selves or expectancy-response rôles between which he distributes his attitudes, values and activities; in each he builds up through his group contacts a symbol, ideal or model that he incorporates into himself partially or competely. Man thus learns to mediate all his interaction with fellowmen according to age, sex or economic class by symbolic labels that denote his self- and other- "rôles" for various groups and institutions claiming his loyalty. Within his personality he establishes and integrates a composite symbolic "self-social" image and rôle with an organised expectancy-response pattern or model, which acts as his guide in group interaction, and to which he clings firmly, even though it may prove a misfit in certain objective situations.

Such symbolic introjection or identification of expectancy and response rôles enables him on the whole to function appropriately and effectively in complex social situations. His adjustment to others and to the group and institution and his perception and interpretation of relations and events in society that provides him status, position and power are all through the medium of symbolised self-images and -rôles as well as "other"-images and -roles and positions with their incorporated structure of expectancies and responses. It is from such symbolised expectancy-response images and rôles of both himself and of other persons, which everybody must fulfil in order that the complex social pattern may be kept going, that he derives all his evaluations, appraisals and prescriptions in behaviour. He judges and prescribes for his self- and other-rôles as others judge and prescribe with respect to his and theirs. To his own "self-social" images and rôles is added the goal of achieving self-status and avoiding self-disesteem; the various symbols in society

that indicate social recognition for himself or accrual of self-status themselves become coveted goals, the denial of which causes neurosis and psychosis. His various "self-social" images together constitute his personality structure that is a subject of constant strains and stresses arising out of both the efforts that the enactment of specific rôles calls for and the incompatibility of the separate rôle patterns. Yet he achieves a somewhat stable and consistent "self-image," "symbolical" or "ideal" self that inhibits definitely incompatible motives, values and rôles. This co-ordination of "segmental" selves and rôles into an integrated self-image depends to some extent upon the groups with whose divergent social patterns and evaluations man unconsciously identifies himself. But every man has to cultivate insight and detachment before he can judge properly the segmental group "selves", rôles and patterns that deviate to the extent of exaggerating certain impulses, interests and values—sociability, sexuality, economic motives, class prejudice—appropriate to the special group "fields", and piece these together into his established self. Simultaneously he builds up a consistent, rational conscience out of different rôles and conflicting expectancies and imperatives of different groups at different times. Sociologists have found that when people have to live in contrary cultural worlds and assume sharply different rôles they cannot easily achieve a single all-inclusive integration. The "marginal man" exposed to contradictory cultural imperatives and social patterns cannot develop a consistent self-image and morality and suffers from emotional and moral insecurity. In a period of rapid social, political or cultural transformation or in transitional ecological areas, whether in fast-changing, mobile urban aggregations or in pioneer clearings in the jungle and new mining settlements, there hardly exist a single dominant culture and a uniform moral code for the individual to conform to. In a stable, mature culture man's rôles imposed

upon him by society in different phases of his life-history and career are shifting enough along with his frames of reference. In working out his adaptations to different rôles, moral norms and frames of reference successively or even simultaneously, it is not easy for him to maintain the integrity of his "self-image" and his evaluation of himself and of his group milieu.

In his major rôles man is conforming and submissive to social expectations in order to achieve his immediate or distant goals. In other rôles in the fractionalised culture of today he imposes his own scale of values and judgments upon both the rôles of expectancy and response and does not accept the conventional code of behaviour. Sometimes he plays different rôles to different men, dissembling or hiding his goals. Ordinarily he seeks a variegated set of goals through a devious course of conduct amidst the many conflicting patterns or codes, reconciling or driving underground in different social contacts or at different times one or other of his several rôles in society. His logical, creative mind usually finds a compromise between his own motivations and symbolic expectancy-response rôles demanded in the many sectors of his social participation, granted that his own hereditary traits and dispositions do not resist the process nor the mechanisms of sublimation, rationalisation or projection prove inadequate. When his major rôles and symbolised self- and "other"-rôles become incompatible with his needs and impulses or when these are in marked conflict with one another, his interpersonal relations become permeated by insecurity about status and deference, and frustration and psychic conflict and personal disorganisation ensue. Such is the special danger of a society in which the majority of individuals are offered the high tension rôle of aggression-power and characterised by an exaggerated amount of self-esteem.

Social culture however develops by way of reaction

other appropriate rôles, canalising antithetic or supplementary attitudes and feelings that might in time change the dominant norms or patterns. The institutions of chivalry and monkhood in medieval Europe are illustrations of the counterpoise against the reigning brutality and toughness of the mighty lords and combative knights. The rôles of scholars, saints and ecclesiastics of the universities, churches and monasteries as well of the ladies of the courts of love largely preserved the richness of human personality and the broad range of values that were sacrificed in the epoch of insecurity, confusion and terror of the barbarian incursions. Capitalistic industrial society today nourishes highly specialised rôles of self-assertion, self-maintenance and power that control it. But these elicit complementary rôles of self-sacrifice, philanthropy and social service, bringing about balance in both the individual personality and in interpersonal relations. As a matter of fact, the greater the ego-centrism, toughness and aggressiveness in any society, the more are the balancing soft rôles induced that keep human warmth, intimacy and communion alive. On the other hand, every society has its comic or burlesque rôles that offer release from rôles calling for tensions and that derive from the primary obligations of humanity. Laughter is a simple and effective social gesture of criticism and evaluation of any rôles of the group. Dominant rôles, subsidiary rôles, complementary rôles and comic rôles, each with its symbolic expectancy-response demands, are the cultural mechanisms by which groups are maintained, morals internalised and personalities shaped in society.

Finally, it is the tensions, conflicts and contradictions of the various rôles that lead to a fresh integration and organisation of the various behaviour patterns and ways of living into a myth, ethics and philosophy of life, which sustain the unique character of the individual and give the true meaning to his social participation. This is the final consummation

viz., the development and re-embodiment within personalities, groups and institutions of harmonised symbolical rôles and expectancy and response attitudes that are essential for the continuity of culture. But there is neither automatic transference of such symbolised rôles nor is their integration easy and smooth within individuals. The whole process rests on the conditioning and control techniques of education, praise, criticism, evocation, social pressure and coercion exercised by the various agencies (groups and institutions) of regulation and guidance in a community; while there are both passive adoption and dynamic shaping of the symbolic rôles and attitudes.

Symbolic Goals, Rôles and Means of Social Control

It is the interrelationship of rôle-playing that leads to the structuring of mores, morals and personality in a fluid, dynamic pattern. The symbolic rôles, in the first place, orient a man to other rôles with their structure of expectancies and responses, and to the total scheme of social life. Secondly, these induce self-perception and self-enhancement, enabling him to obtain a picture of the social universe he has to fulfil by his own appropriate rôle-enactment that obtains meaning and value in his own eyes. Self-status and rôle-playing activity march hand in hand in a disciplined society that adopts various techniques for the individuals to internalise the forms of social control and appraisal for the achievement of status within the group and between groups. But rôle-playing may also be irrational, sudden and impulsive when he derives his thinking and feeling about his rôle from the mass or crowd or when there is institutional deviation from the moral routine on certain festive or ceremonial occasions. All rôles gather round them a headlight of distinct ideas, feelings and sentiments that are conditioned and canalised along certain specific types of polarised reaction expressed by symbol patterns, integrating and mediating

between these and organising these into a gestalt.

Symbolic labels of families, classes, occupations, castes, communities or nations help in the differentiation of socially idealised types, the interiorisation of group pattern of values and standards and the crystallisation of both collective and personal traits, habits and rôles—the definition of fundamental social constants, “symbol” groups, individualities and interpersonal rôles. Sometimes symbolic labels like “we, the people,” “they, our enemies,” “our family, caste, race, nation or community” “we, working class” and “they, capitalists” are so saturated with opinions, attitudes and sentiments that man’s adjustive rôles and behaviour are unconscious, quick and automatic, cooperative or aggressive as the case may be.

Man and society project into the symbolic rôles, positions and statuses appropriate patterns of ideas, sentiments and values. Groups and institutions also often reward, admonish and punish individuals playing their defined rôles in life by the use of symbols. There are symbolic rewards such as marks of distinction, status and position and the bestowal of wealth, power and privilege. The latter including the standard of living are sought and realised as symbols of position in the community. There are also symbolic punishments such as ostracism, social isolation, badges and epithets of opprobrium and contumely. Symbols of position and relationship in groups and institutions acquire highly specialised and formalised meanings and values guiding the individual in desired or moral relationships and actions. Many activities of man in his cultural milieu are symbolic as represented by socially approved etiquette, manners and structure of deference-dominance acts, all of which have their functional appropriateness. As modern man lives more and more in the vast depersonalised, secondary groups, rather than in the primary, face-to-face groups, it is the symbols, myths and values of the latter that govern his

symbolic social participation and expression of his many symbolized rôles and positions that he acquires through his membership in various groups.

The secondary groups and institutions that struggle in modern civilization for high states of power, privilege and prestige grip individuals through both highly artificial symbols of success or goals in life as well as through symbolic methods or techniques of propaganda for eliciting appropriate group participation and behaviour. Their struggles, before they may resort to physical coercion, take the form of the substitution of symbol and sign configuration indicating their respective status, power and privilege that are challenged as strongly as defended. In society as a whole, in industry, in politics and in education there go on a constant modification, rectification or substitution of symbols that can but imperfectly formulate and express values and experience. Group communication, struggle and co-operation are all through the medium of symbols. In a highly unbalanced, chaotic or disintegrating society, where there are chronic struggle, uncertainty and confusion of values struggling for articulation, symbols and signs themselves become often pathological. Distracted, diseased groups and cultures like individuals have their psychotic regressions, phantasies and symbols not adapted to the reality.

Ethics as Symbolisation

We have stressed that so far as each particular group or institution is concerned, the primary social and moral relations and processes are status (and mobility), rôle and position of the individual. These are symbolical categories that represent the social world in which he lives and acts. It is with reference to symbolical rôles and positions in different social fields that he also defines his moral principles and standards. His enlargement and transcendence of the present moral standards also imply the revision of the present social and

political order or hierarchy of social values on the basis of reorientation of the existing statuses, rôles and positions of individuals with their system of claims and duties. Each individual defines his rôle, position and patterns differently, though such differences are not carried to a point that prevents social participation. His personality traits, attitudes, values and ideals are all emergents in the world of symbolic self-identification and participation in the group organisation, just as his moral ideas, values and standards, belonging as these do to the ideal plane, are also symbolic notions. Not merely is the moral order a symbolic structure, but the system of expectancies and sanctions of morality is also symbolic. It is the symbol that forcefully tells man what is right and wrong and also through its threat makes him follow the right and shun the wrong. All ethics is symbolisation.

Ethics and Semantics

Social symbols have not been adequately classified so far. For a scientific classification we have to go back to the distinction made in an earlier paragraph between communication and communion. Communication relates to nature and external objects; communion relates to men and internal experiences. Symbols are means of either communication or communion, comprising signs and devices by which men become oriented not only to men *as objects*, but also to the thoughts, values and experiences of other men, facilitating their reciprocal exchange and interpenetration. Language is the ubiquitous symbol device of man developed and transmitted by him for the mediation of social behaviour. For the communication of experiences like anger, fear and pain at the biological level, speech is not necessary at all. The expressions of the emotions are enough. But as man experiences needs, interests and values that transcend primitive levels, symbolic signs or words or language

come to play an increasingly important rôle in communication and understanding for communion. Conversely, as has been well pointed out, symbols with more complete and contingent motivational referents such as 'home,' 'family,' 'class,' 'state,' 'work,' 'leisure,' 'religion' and so on—not to mention ethereally elaborate concepts as 'right and wrong,' 'truth,' 'beauty' and 'holiness'—have wide ranges of meanings among individuals and groups with different experiences and social backgrounds.¹ Men belonging to different social classes and levels of culture in the same community react, indeed, very differently to the familiar abstract nouns, adjectives and adverbs of the vocabulary that express moral notions and experiences. It is the immediate group environment that instils the peculiar ethical connotation and significance of particular words into the mind of men. Yet because of a high degree of similarity of human motivations, frustrations and adaptations in a common physical milieu and social atmosphere, language develops communion on the basis of understanding of each other's symbolic expressions. Language is the indispensable thread in the garland of culture, conjoining the many-coloured beads of symbolic relations and behaviour of the community.

In so far as language is perceptual and conceptual, it is a means of communication. But primarily language is emotional, imaginative and evaluative and is thus the most efficacious instrument of communion. K. Burke observes: "Speech takes its shape from the fact that it is used by people acting together. It is an adjunct of action—and thus naturally contains the elements of exhortation and threat which stimulate action and give it direction. It thus tends naturally towards the use of implicit moral weightings; the names for things and operations smuggle in connotations of good and bad—a noun tends to carry with it a kind of invisible adject-

¹ Masserman: *Language Behaviour and Dynamic Psychiatry*, *International Journal of Psychoanalysis*, 1944.

tive and a verb an invisible adverb.”¹ The study of Chinese language for instance has shown that there are distinctive social traditions and ethical patterns underlying its grammar, syntax and vocabulary which make translation of the Chinese classics to another language difficult for a person brought up in a different cultural environment. I. A. Richards finds particularly in Chinese thought of Mencius’ period a great stress of the tradition of social purpose which underlies conception and distinction in the language. Mencius’ philosophy of life stressed a social purpose, “the enforcement of a scheme of conduct” that governs the system of meanings which change with change in social habits.²

The study of semantics from a sociological viewpoint has much advanced in recent years. It is now stressed that the meanings of words are dependent upon human behaviours and social relations and that semantical changes are “surrogates and foci of cultural conflicts and groupal behaviours.” In a society rent by class antagonisms the interpretations placed upon words by the different social strata vary in more or less degree and communion may be jeopardised. Mills rightly observes, “A block in social actions, e.g., a class conflict, carries a reflex back into our communicative medium and hence into our thought. We then talk past one another. We interpret the “same” symbol differently. Because the co-ordinated social actions sustaining the meaning of a given symbol have broken down, the symbol does not call out the same response in members of one group that it does in another, and there is no genuine communication.”³

Classification of Social Symbols

Ernst Cassirer aptly defines man as *animal symbolicum*. Man is not only the speaking but also the myth-making,

¹ *Permanence and Change*, 243-244.

² *Mencius on the Mind*.

³ *Language, Logic and Culture*, *American Sociological Review*, 1939.

god-fearing, art-loving and knowledge-seeking animal. By such a definition Cassirer has expressed a fundamental moral imperative for man. Through language, myth, religion, art, government, institution and morals man builds up and transmits a rich and variegated symbolic world that satisfies his moral aspirations to remould his milieu. He thus adds to his primary physical environment a secondary symbolic environment, which as his external cultural legacy plays an even more significant rôle than his natural environment for his selection and survival. Besides speech every society, savage or civilised, has its elaborate repertory of symbolic religion, magic, myth, art, ritual and moral code integrated in its culture. For primitive culture the totem plant or animal serves as the symbol uniting the group. The extraordinary or mysterious traits of the plant or animal aid group identification and communion. In early stages of man's social evolution tribes and folks are also welded together through the mediation of legendary heroes and ancestors. Thus animals and heroes as enduring realistic symbols, nuclei of intense subjective experiences, command the allegiance of peoples and knit them together. Men project their moral ideas, feelings and experiences into the symbols which become more than objects of social communication. They subjectively add to the physical properties of symbols their meanings, values and experiences. The symbols themselves accordingly become more and more abstract, intellectualised and impersonal. The higher the culture, the subtler, more abstract and more universal is its symbolic system of art, religion, morality and law. Abstract, impersonal symbols function as more efficacious agencies of identification, communion and social control than personal symbols, whether totem plants or animals or mythical ancestors, heroes and leaders. The struggle and survival of cultures on the scene of history are the struggle and survival of symbol patterns that, indeed, embody people's central,

fundamental values and ideals.

All of man's communication or communion with fellow-men takes place, then, in the context of symbols. These may be classified into two categories following a similar classification in art: (a) Representational or realistic symbols, or, more properly, signs that are based on direct portrayal or objective reference aiding the denotation of qualities of the referents. Just as photography, realistic painting and portraiture identify specific persons, scenes and experiences, so bodily gesture, language and writing and such signs and symbolic devices containing direct references as the sign-post on the road, verbal slogan, telegraphic code, signalling by the flag, whistle and light, advertisement in the shop or the national flag and seal of the government illustrate symbols used for denotation or identification. The goal of symbolism here is communication rather than communion. These symbols are usually devoid of emotional content and often become standardised and elaborated into complex and sophisticated codes of reference. (b) Abstract or expressional symbols which are mainly based on the expression of certain generic, universal or abstract meanings, value attitudes and experiences. These are characterised by a more deeply affective and experiential colouring and abstract treatment than the representational symbols. Expressional symbols are the chief means of communion in groups and in a whole system of culture, bringing about a unity in the frame of reference, value attitude and experience of a people.

Expressional Symbols in Morality

Moral values and ideals are adapted to the basic group patterns and situations by expressional symbolism. The norms of reciprocity, compensation and proportion are unerringly conveyed by such symbols as weights and measures of all kinds and denominations, conventions of barter,

exchange and trade and scales of proportion that embody ideas and values of fair dealing and justice in the economic transactions of the community. Justice that is symbolised in many civilised societies as 'holding the scales even' extends from the notion of an equal measurement and proportioning of material objects in industry, trade or business to fair dealing in all human relations where incommensurable values and services are involved. From Interest-group as we rise to Society or Community we mark an elaborate symbolic development of etiquette, manners, codes, ceremonies and rituals, incarnating and diffusing the moral values that various social groups and institutions focus and conserve for the individuals. The moral values embodied by the type of social grouping represented by Commonalty are so abstract, complex and subtle that these can be expressed and transmitted only by the symbols and myths of religion, literature and the fine arts. No society is able, however, to devise such symbolic patterns and devices as can express fully and adequately all moral and spiritual values conceived by it in social facts and relations.

It is to expressional symbolism, focalising especially towards the expression of moral values, that social culture owes its inner harmony and consistency of motivations and goals and ordering of the values of life. Since the aim of abstract expressional symbols is largely reciprocal understanding, interpenetration and authentic communion and not merely communication, such aim is achieved through a stress not of specific and personal but of typical and generic feelings, value attitudes and experiences. This explains why expressional symbolism, rooted in the universal as contrasted with the particular, is largely the field of fine arts and religion. Realistic symbolism appeals to imitation, suggestion, passive sympathy and identification (in the Freudian sense) and is the product of the mass functional mind. It embodies the collective representation

of elemental perceptions, impulses and emotions. Expressional symbolism works through the rational and spiritual side of human nature, reason, memory and imagination, and embodies deep meanings, value attitudes and faiths, involving the higher level processes of the logical, contemplative mind.

Folkways, mores and conventions that are usually accepted as given forms of social control in the moral routine of the individual depend often upon realistic or representational symbolism, which is non-emotional and personal. But myths, morals and values, which represent the more creative and spontaneous forms of control, are operative in society through expressional symbolism rich in meanings and affective and teleological attitudes. The wisdom of the common people of the ages is also conserved and transmitted through a large variety of expressional symbolic maxims, proverbs, anecdotes and aphorisms that take precedence over custom, ritual and legalistic morality and play an important rôle in the actual rather than the conventional or doctrinal realisation of goodness, justice and love. The depth-levels of self-consciousness and of forms of social control are reflected in the forms of symbolism, integrated together in a consistent framework for guiding common understanding, motivation and orientation of people in the social culture. Some of these social symbols and patterns are adapted to unique social situations and disappear as their immediate task of regulation of conduct is over; others are generalised and standardised and have continuous evocative, admonishing and regulative functions in society.

Trans-human Moral Paradigms and Symbols

Communion, as we have seen, is authentic unification of selves and not-selves. Civilisation projects the highest values, aspirations and ideals of man to certain mythical, symbolical super-selves or super-men, who become not mere "collective representations" or images but foci

of action. The most potent social symbols of communion are in fact represented by images of "charismatic," mythical and ideal personality types, which are the foci of values, sentiments and attitudes and are supremely prized by society, and which mould the motivations and behaviour of men. Max Scheler called such personality types "exemplars" or "models" (Vorbilder), "which stand in a "charismatic" and symbolic relation to members of a community and which constitute ideal types to be at least partially realised in the action of the members of the community by virtue of a process of introjection and identification." Examples of such paradigmatic personality types are the mythical ancestors, heroes and leaders who possess certain physical and mental characteristics not accessible to all, and who, therefore, can easily become models for the orientation of values and behaviours. Mythological figures of warriors, poets and saints govern the development of different personality traits and norms of behaviour in different cultures. Thus the Vorbilder moulds history even without his historical existence.

Even more fundamental in the system of orientation and control of cultures is the influence of the great archetypes and symbols in religion and art. The symbols of Buddha in the seat of meditation and of Bodhisattva, Tara and Manjusri looking with love and compassion upon human misery in Buddhist art, the images of Siva, Vishnu and Mother-goddess and of various divinities slaying the legendary demons in Hindu and Indonesian art, of the Scourging, Crucifixion and Deporation of Christ, the Pieta, Madonna and Child, and the Annunciation and Coronation of the Virgin in medieval European art are but a few examples of expressional symbols culled from the world history of art. These ardently express the cherished value attitudes of different cultures in which whole communities participate.

The world's highest expressional symbols are or-

ganised into abstract, impersonal aesthetic patterns for the expression of generic social attitudes, values and aspirations. These are "social universals" which bring about elevated communion and insinuate themselves into the consciousness, purpose and ideal of peoples and epochs.¹ The artist, the poet and the saint adopt, beautify and enrich these expressional symbols that capture the imagination and elicit the devotions and sacrifices of whole peoples and cultures through successive generations.

The moral rôle of the heroes of the ancient epics, of the Holy Bible, of Plutarch's Lives and of medieval Christian stories and legends has considerably diminished in significance due to changes in social conditions. Nor have history's somewhat mythical Hampdens, Cromwells, Napoleons, Washingtons and Lincolns much adjustment value in the modern age. Their places have been taken up by symbolic models from literature, drama and film, which are vague composite images serving as patterns of imitation and learning. Each country or epoch has its own mythical, symbolised person or model. In the U.S.A. the mythical or idealised persons successively have been the Pioneer, the Financial Buccaneer, the Great Engineer, the Executive, the Banker and the New Deal Reformer—"stereotyped personifications of the behaviour of many men, real and fictitious."² Each group or class also builds up from its need and experience its own ready-made, composite stereotype—the Businessman, the Politician, the Revolutionary, the Fuhrer and recently the Dictator. Due to the fractionalisation of culture, the mythical, idealised persons today are no longer "given constants", but vary from group to group, and even according to the value patterns and situational imperatives of single individuals. In an unstable social culture not merely are there

¹ See my *The Social Function of Art*.

² La Pierre and Farnsworth: *Social Psychology*, p. 126.

fewer symbolic models and stereotypes that provide well-defined patterns of the good and righteous life for moulding human behaviour but these become thin, vague and empty.

Often do we find individuals and groups accordingly clinging to conventional stereotypes and models and symbol patterns without any realisation of love, goodness and justice that the moral and spiritual models stand for. The lapse to immediacy, impulsiveness and superficiality of individual and group experience, indeed, accompanies a customary ritual morality expressed merely in signs and symbols that establish communication rather than communion replete with meanings and value experiences. It is thus that the life of such ancient Commonalty groups as the family, the church and the neighbourhood degenerates, when love, justice and reverence are lacking, into a humdrum routine, or even sham and hypocrisy. Men transfer their devotions to symbols, myths, formulae and doctrines; morality is brought down to 'its minimum of propriety and good manners that are also symbolic in nature and keep the social transactions going. It is the task of morality to get over models, symbols and myths through creative imagination and leaving the kernel enter into their core—the spiritual meanings and values these embody. All through the ages as legendary models become ineffective, as the vows, gestures and sign-patterns of conjugal fidelity in marriage, of celibacy in the church and of unswerving devotion to learning in the academy degenerate into sham and make-belief, and as sophisticated manners and etiquette, elaborate codes and ceremonies fail to bring about a real transformation of human relations, seers, saints and prophets arise to reinterpret models, symbols and myths and breathe a new spirit into them. Between symbol and the creative, aspiring individual there must be a constant interchange in order that the qualities of perfection move freely from life to symbol and from symbol to life.

Due to the secularisation of life and its interests and modern scientific and materialistic outlook, cultures throughout the world are losing their appreciation of the ultimate values and sentiments and the "paradigmatic" experiences. Thus the meaning and function of these expressional archetypes and symbols for the stability of society and for the perfection of the individual are being missed. Such lapse of moral significance and purpose is even more true of the religious-metaphysical sign and symbol-patterns in a social culture. Man's intellectual development enables him to project ideas, emotions and experiences to certain objects or reified signs which have only subjective reference. The symbol here does not define or denote any features of the external or the human world but is the focus of abstract, metaphysical concepts that cross the boundaries of time and space. Illustrations of such metaphysical symbols are the swastika, the trident and the cross and the many mystic syllables, such as the Aum and Hring, used in Asian religions and arts. The more intellectual the people, the larger is the variety of symbols focalising abstract, metaphysical concepts rather than objective relationships, feelings and experiences. Religion and art everywhere abound in such symbols which are trans-human and refer to forces that have nothing to do with this world.

Man's life gains in fullness, richness and zest to the extent that well-defined, integrated and harmonious myths, symbols, models, signs and figures, human and trans-human, dominate his imagination and interpolate with their poetic and transcendent meanings and purposes in his daily orientation of values and goals and routine of conduct. The common man in India and China as he accomplishes a good deed, whether an oblation to the gods or ancestors, a work of charity or a pilgrimage, adds the prayer that the merit be shared by all the sentient creatures in the universe.

In India along with the oblations to the gods (Deva-yajna) and ancestors (Pitri-yajna) that symbolise the beyond-human order of the cosmos and continuity of the race, there is enjoined for all the pursuit of higher knowledge as embodied in the study and reading of the Vedas and meditation (Brahma-yajna). Man has also to link himself to fellow-humans and sentient beings around him. The Bhuta-yajna makes it obligatory that he should daily feed and serve birds, animals and insects and the Nri-yajna that he should offer hospitality and succour to fellowmen. The five ritual Sacrifices in Hinduism are a daily reminder of the grand symbiosis of the universe in which man is eternally and indissolubly linked to fellowman, animal, culture, race and the cosmic powers. Thus does the ordinary round of human duties become an observance and ritual, full of meanings, significances and values, and establishing a communion of the universe. In Buddhism the myth and ritual worship of the Bodhisattva similarly arouse cosmic loves and devotions even among the humble folk. A common man in China after having had the images of Buddha and Bodhisattva in stone inscribes the prayer: "I hope that happiness will spread among the living and the dead, and that the animals as the creatures endowed with feeling will all attain the fruits (of the merits of the Bodhisattva)."¹ Here also the myth and the symbol are in the highest degree generative of man's feeling of oneness with the rest of the universe.

True myths are not fantasies nor illusions and have to be distinguished from tales and legends. These are irrational, but present images, imaginary actors and situations with compelling authority and universality. These are foci and repositories of the dominant spiritual values of a social culture and guide the ritual behaviour of the

¹ Quoted by Grousset: *In the Footsteps of the Buddha*, p. 327.

faithful along channels that transcend reason and intellect. It is the pattern of myths and symbols which most effectively aid towards perfect Communion and group identification in religion and the fine arts at the highest level—the level of abstract Commonalty or Community of the earth or cosmos.

Such a consummation rests obviously on his trained contemplation, his capacity to live and move in a new plane of universal feeling and experience through the medium of moral and metaphysical myths and symbols that dramatise and perpetuate his fulfilment of the supreme values, at once concrete and speculative, unquestioned and poetic. Man's fulfilment of the highest values of knowledge, goodness and beauty—his perfection can be realised indeed only symbolically, not actually. Yet it is the symbols which give him the certitude of such realisation in everyday life and experience and make the latter an endless adventure, throwing off ever new meanings and values through the mingling of the finite and the infinite, the concrete and the universal.

CHAPTER XVIII

VISVATMAN (*HOMO UNIVERSUS*)

Myth and Mind's Poise and Cure

Man's formulation and prescription of moral principles and standards demand conceptualisation and symbolisation. Without his language, logic and symbolism he could not have evolved culture, nor progressed both morally and intellectually. It is the frame of reference provided by his social myths and symbols, products of his abstract thought and creative imagination, that moulds and directs his moral life, and enables him to control the social and physical environment according to his and the community's scale of values. Mankind in the early stages of civilisation evolved social symbols, myths, universals and norms that were invested with an apparent absoluteness and emotional certitude. For millenia civilised man cherished absolute ideals of truth, goodness or justice. His faith in fate or destiny and belief in a long scheme of things, an infinite chain of causes and consequences of his actions saved him from many inner conflicts arising out of social inequalities and injustices. Similarly his belief in the invisible, beneficent hand of the Divine Providence or the myth of the Divine incarnation gave him the much-needed moral support in periods of widespread social dissolution and chaos. It is the rigid external authority of myth, religion and custom that is interiorised as his conscience. But when conscience projects these into the social world, these are taken by the people as emanating from the Divine Revelation or inspiration. A code of morals and myths discovered in heaven or a complete scheme of human destiny from birth

till death and from future lives to emancipation or annihilation revealed to prophets and saints prop up the morals of a people and satisfy their intellect in the midst of bewilderments, anxieties and fears in a dangerous, precarious environment.

It is true that Freud spoke of religion as the great pre-scientific myth or illusion—the grand compulsive neurosis that would disappear as man can comprehend and manipulate the forces of nature and the situations of life without tension, fear and anxiety.¹ But his later postulation of the Death impulse and surrender of the pleasure-pain principle as the only regulator of psychical events re-established the rôle of ethics and religion in psychoanalytic therapy. This has been recently pointed out with ability by Max Levy-suhl.² Psychoanalytic treatment is founded on an education or re-education for the overcoming of inner resistances. For the conquest of the resistance of the super-ego we must appeal to the rigour of the conscience i.e., to forces “beyond the pleasure principle”, in Freud’s words, to the Death impulse. This is an ethical demand. It is not only through the help of tolerance and insight in which the Life impulse reigns, but also through the appeal to the conscience institutions with their injunction to truthfulness, uprightness, sacrifice when duty demands, and therefore beyond the pleasure principle, that the psychoanalyst can overcome the patient’s final resistance. This Levy-suhl calls an ethical achievement which enables the patient to eradicate his senseless and pathological guilt-feeling. Secondly, there is also the opposition of human Narcissism which sets a limit to the psychoanalyst’s ability to influence the patient “even

¹ See his *The Future of an Illusion*.

² The Rôle of Ethics and Religion in Psychoanalytic Theory and Therapy, *International Journal of Psychoanalysis*, Vol. XXVII, 1946.

with the best analytic technique." Here a religious change must take place in order that cure might be effected through moderating the patient's Narcissistic striving after pleasure, through sublimating it, through inducing the patient to lower the proud pedestal upon which he has placed his ego, through uplifting him in the religious sense. Thus in psychoanalytic therapy, and perhaps in psychotherapy in general, symbols, myths and processes of an ethical and religious kind work together and are indispensable for the cure of souls in the best sense of the phrase. Even where spiritual discipline and meditation do not materially contribute towards bringing about internal poise and organisation and in orienting the individual to life and towards fellowman with devotion and humility—concepts not alien to psychoanalysis—religion and myth and their sense of values greatly enrich the meanings and experiences of the daily life in the family, church, state and even industry. Man's impulses and desires, indeed, obtain abundant satisfaction, though at a low level, and gain in meaning and respectability from the rationalisations of myth, religion and ritual. But the absoluteness and completeness of myths, dogmas and morals soon confine the human spirit to too narrow and cramping moral boundaries. Man's logical, reflective mind, therefore, not only attacks the theological myth and philosophical frame of reference of an ancient religion but also seeks a new morality and a higher level of values and value experience over and above a full and abundant life of desires and satisfactions and individual and racial survival.

Causes of the Modern Man's Moral Insecurity

The progress of civilization implies a greater flexibility, differentiation and specialisation of groups and individuals and of their symbols, myths and modes of living. The social myth and frame of reference which human cul-

ture was carrying forward from generation to generation as its inherited spiritual skeleton are gradually split up into several myths, symbols and frames as the results of specialisation, over-individuation and orientation of classes and individuals to different ideal goals and objects. Man in the civilized world of today finds not only that his groups and institutions with their goals and scales of values are constantly changing but even his social myths, folkways and customs, which he was hitherto accustomed to regard as divinely ordained, fixed and complete, are also shifting. Thus the modern man, in spite of his individualism, efficiency and feverish search for the higher values of life, has no moral security in his changeful social world. Neither institutions nor folkways, values and attitudes assure him the necessary guidance to his primal equilibrium.

Several social trends have stressed modern man's moral helplessness. First, the replacement of primary, face-to-face groups and institutions by the secondary, depersonalised ones, and the rapid tempo of life associated with it, have destroyed old scales of values, symbols, myths and morals that were built up through age-long processes of equilibrium between human interests and values and the conditions of their realization in a simpler primary-group world. But new symbols, myths and morals have not emerged as a result of gradual expectancies, responses and habituations in the specialised and complex secondary-group world. Second, due to technological, industrial and political changes, scales of ranges of business have become world-wide. The vicissitudes of crops, epidemics and political movements in one continent may bring about unemployment and misery in another. The global scarcity of food, raw materials and mineral resources and the development of the aeroplane and radio with the revolution these presage in transport and communication have brought about an interdependence between nations un-

known before. The secondary groups now have reached world-wide dimensions. Yet man has been able to develop neither the world economic control and international government nor the sensitive world conscience without which civilization in spite of its scientific knowledge, skill and efficiency will perish. Thus in his search for readjustment he clings helplessly and naively all the more to the secondary groups—the economic classes and independent political communities or sovereign states that have replaced or disintegrated the primary groups in the early phases of the industrial and commercial revolution, but that are equally inappropriate in the expanded and interdependent world economy and politics of today. He leans upon the class attitudes and political ambitions of the previous social age with such ardency as to prevent any transformation or reorientation of social myths, expressional symbols and stereotypes that might be in greater conformity to the needs of personal and social equilibrium in a world order.

On the one hand, man has shown a greater individuation and uniqueness of his personal traits and capacities than ever before in the history of his development. There is a far greater difference in the mental organisation of the man of talent and genius like Goethe, Einstein and Gandhi and the average man of today than that between the tribal chief or the feudal landlord and the average man in past epochs. A man is introduced today into vaster possibilities of value experience than ever before. But more often superior traits, attitudes and dispositions are smothered by the uncongenial social-cultural environment. Much of individual talents, with associated possibilities of value-creation, are being wasted or deflected to anti-social and illegitimate channels.

It is the group which always nurtures and stimulates special human endowments or acquisitions, whether it is

a more alert conscience or super-ego, a profounder love and compassion or a more sensitive perception of beauty and holiness. The group, indeed, is man's future. Not to speak of a genius, a man of subtle or sensitive mind who is somewhat higher than the average is in the modern age without the aid of his group to his personal equilibrium, far less to his personal fulfilment. On the other hand, man's secondary, depersonalised groups, classes and institutions fulfil only limited fragments of human nature. Yet their blatant, irrational, comprehensive demands invade even the domains of personal life, destroying for a great many by a process of regimentation and standardisation the very freedom of personal self-expression—the gift of modern science and democracy for humanity.

The Genesis of the Myth of the Mass-man

Modern civilization seems to be convinced that the ideal society can be realised without the moral striving of man himself. The individual's main sources of effort and aspiration are in mass life. The modern average individual, obviously, is now reduced to a mechanical atom in mass society. He has taken to this change so naturally, due to the inexorable economic forces and trends of the Great Society, that no social myth is more powerful today than the myth of the Mass-or Crowd-man, unthinking, credulous and pugnacious—the creature of the class, the mass, the race, the nation, the state or any other idol of collectivity. For him the collective would provide everything from food, health and enjoyment to sex and salvation. The Mass-or Crowd-man is shaped after the image and likeness of his own tyrannical God, the apothecosed absolute collectivity.

Both modern Western democracies and totalitarian systems of administration equally disregard the claims of the individual man, and replace him by vast, proliferating

groups, classes, parties and institutions. Berdyaev remarks: "In the 19th and 20th centuries the ideal of man has grown dim and almost disappeared. When man was recognised as the product of society, a result of social environment, the ideal of man was replaced by the ideal of society. For the last time the ideal image of man showed itself for a moment in the Romantic movement as the ideal of a complex personality."¹ The Oriental world puts forth the myth of the Contemplative, the Liberated and the Universal Man. India cherishes the myth of the Liberated Man in action (Jivanmukta and the Bodhisattva); action in the divine, as Thomas Aquinas would say, "should be something added to the life of prayer not something taken away from it." The Contemplative, Emancipated Man sees himself as the macrocosm, the reflection of the harmony, joy and beauty of the cosmos. His ideal of self-fulfilment is the cosmic or Supreme Person, described in the Bhagavad Gita as the Universe body of the Deity that pervades the entire creation and manifestation, and is at the same time the innermost consciousness in all beings. This is no metaphor. Man strives and knows himself only by self-transcendence, expanding himself into the cosmos community in intuition and knowledge, and feeling himself in the experience of every sentient creature through love, sharing and service. The transcendental principle of creation on the cosmic plane becomes the ethical principle in the social order. Love, compassion, kindness, humility and other supreme values make their appearance in the Contemplative Man spontaneously, no longer as means of attaining any ends. The Emancipated Man (Jivanmukta or the Bodhisattva) does not abjure the world. He very often plunges into action without, however, the feelings of egoism and the distractions of success or fail-

¹ *The Destiny of Man*, p. 306.

ure. Thus his attitude to life and society becomes all-embracing, complete and harmonious. We read in the *Jivanmukta Gita*: "He is called emancipated who sees himself in all sentient creatures of the world, practises non-violence and does good to every being." al-Ghazzali, the famous Arab philosopher-mystic, similarly stressed the identity between God and every being, God becoming ears, eyes and tongues of men. This is almost a reminiscence of a Rigvedic hymn that has been reiterated in the *Upanishads* and the *Gita*, describing God's hands, feet, eyes, ears, faces and heads in all. al-Ghazzali writes, "God has said, "My servant seeks proximity to me, that I may make him my friend, and when I have made him my friend, I become his ear, his eye, his tongue. A certain servant of mine was sick; hadst thou visited him, thou wouldst have visited me." The myth of the Emancipated, Self-transcending, Universal Man, by removing the fixation upon a self-contained self-hood, contributes materially to extend the boundaries of man's feeling and consciousness among Eastern peoples. "The love of the Bodhisattva," writes the Mahayanist poet-philosopher Asanga, "is his joyous love in giving. The Bodhisattva works upon creatures, whom he thus serves by giving, as more beneficent than himself, telling himself that they are the framework of the all-perfect and insurpassable illumination." "His love for creatures is the supreme marvel of the world, or rather it is not, since other and self are for him identical, since creatures are to him as himself." In the whole field of the world's literature there is no more glorious litany of universal compassion as that sung by the Mahayanist poet Santideva, a prince who renounced the world: "This insignificant particle which causes to arise in us the virtues of a Buddha, is present in all creatures, and it is by reason of this Presence that all creatures are to be revered. For creatures the Buddhas lacerate their bodies, they enter into

hell. What is done for creatures is also done for them. Therefore we must do good even to our worst enemies. From today, therefore, in order to please the Buddhas with my whole soul I make myself a servitor of the world. May the mass of mankind set its foot on my head and kill me, if so be that the Protector of the world is satisfied." The myth of the Compassionate Man has perennially inspired sublime devotion and sacrifice and kept alive the springs of charity and compassion through the centuries in Oriental civilisation. In Buddhist art and literature the marvellous super-human images of the various archetypes of wisdom, goodness and compassion still arouse the ardent faith and touching dream of the middle ages of Asia when love and compassion went even beyond justice and equity. Even today in China the vows of the Bodhisattva are taken every year by scores of newly ordained monks who thereafter are respectfully addressed by their disciples as Ta-Pura (great Bodhisattva).¹

The Ideal Imageries of Man in Civilisation

European civilisation is built up by several distinct myths in succession through the centuries. The Greco-Roman society was dominated by the myth of the Sagacious Political Man, first the philosopher-king of the city states of Hellas, and then the citizen of the world in the Roman Empire. Christianity introduced into Europe in the early middle ages the myths of the Saintly Man of the cloister and the Chivalrous Knightly Man of the court with a yawning gulf between the two ideal images, the former influencing the church and the monasteries and the latter the average man in Christendom. The Renaissance created the myth of the Aesthetic-intellectual Man who had an abundant life, enlightened by the Greek cultural heritage, and enriched by the access to the Asiatic luxuries through trade

¹ Johnston: *Buddhist China*, p. 76.

and commerce. In 19th century Europe the myth of the Economic Man made its appearance associated with the first phase of capitalistic industrialism. It had two variants, according to Hocking, the Economic Gentleman, "independent and free-thinking—the flower of Mill's philosophy, and the Economic Workman, "dependent and un-free-thinking—the flower of Marx's philosophy."¹ Hocking adds that both as pictures of the complete man are human failures. In the 20th century, with the second phase of capitalistic industrialism, the ideal of the Economic Gentleman has receded and that of the Economic Workman has been magnified and transfigured as the Class-man, the Mass-man or the Crowd-man—a new creature that has abandoned its old nature and is of sinister significance to social harmony and world peace.

After the second World War the myth of the Mass-man has become familiar everywhere, based on the emphasis of planning and bureaucratic control and management in all spheres of life and the power rivalry of vast industrial and financial groups and institutions, with their highly organised and subtle techniques of propaganda. The Mass-man is a mechanical cog in the many complicated and proliferating machines—the office machine, the labour machine, the education machine, the police machine, the state machine or the war machine—and is deliberately induced, regimented or enslaved in every sphere in the age of wars and post-war conflicts and reconstructions.

It is remarkable how that great humanist, Dostoyevsky, anticipated the despotism, corruption and brutality of the Mass-man and mass-society in his Shigalovism. In this régime, "to begin with, the level of education, science and talents is lowered. Great intellects are not wanted. They will be banished or put to death.

¹ Hocking: *The Lasting Elements of Individualism*, p. 97.

Slaves are bound to be equal. There has never been either freedom or equality with despotism but in the *herd* there is bound to be equality and that is Shigalovism. The one thing wanting in the world is discipline." In spite of the overthrow of Fascism and Nazism, the myth of Shigalovism dies hard. For the Mass-man, dominated by his own frustrations and impulsions and by group egoisms and irrationalities, revels in symbols and myths of Struggle, Revolution, Power and Dictatorship.

Like people, like myths. The myths of mass-society persistently express deep-lying impulses of anxiety, fear, hate and aggression of the people. Such myths have to be distinguished from the older myths of tradition and religion that are expressions not of primitive impulses but of generic and stable emotions and sentiments as well as of sublimations and integrations of a complex kind focussed towards human perfection rather than power. These, however, have now ceased to stimulate imagination and action of large and increasing sections of humanity.

The Integrated Image of the Whole or the Universal Man

If men and cultures live by myths, symbols and symbolic images, which are no mere poetic inventions, but are living and momentous revelations of the highest moral and spiritual values, the social myth that will stimulate the moral transformation of the Mass-man of today is the myth of the Whole Man, moral, spiritual, divine or cosmic.¹ The mind of humanity now gropes after a more complete ideal image or myth of man as it ponders over the tragedy, mutilation and degeneration that have come in the way of the inadequate and perverse images. The myth of the

¹ Recently E.C. Tolman in his *Drives Towards War* has emphasised a new ideal of man and of his rôle labelling it "the myth of the Psychologically Adjusted Man" which is required for ushering in the stable democratic society.

Whole Man must include not only the elements of freedom and adventure of the Economic Man and of social participation, levelling and solidarity of the Mass-man, but also moral and spiritual qualities that are not mere derivatives either of his economic predicament or of his class or group relations. Such qualities were in view in the myth of the Universal Man, the Contemplative Man, the Buddha, the Magi or the Sage in the ancient world. But the ideal image of man as a complete personality is now obliterated by the pressures and compulsives, snares and illusions of the Great Society and the Leviathan.

Man's daily economic life and experience, his moral routine, education and discipline should all contribute towards an integrality of his personality. His complex, variegated social selves that are mechanically distributed between segmented sections in society have to be pieced together, balanced and co-ordinated in terms of a dynamic, prophetic, spiritual wholeness, freedom and sovereignty. Thus alone the Mass-man's sacrifice of his personality and higher values of life to the machine and organisation and the stereotyping of his rôles, habits and experiences could be successfully combated. Rigidities, fixations, impulsions and automatisms in personal and group life with their inevitable sequences of anxieties, fears, hates, obsessions and sadisms are now the greatest obstacles to a mature moral life. Thus the recovery of the Mass-man must have to begin with a re-education of his inner self, his conscience or super-ego, of his code of honour, scale of values and sense of justice and goodness; and this in all his areas of social participation—the family, the church, the trade-union, the political party or the neighbourhood.

Such recovery is however not possible, first, until the group organisation is reoriented so as to stimulate this as far as possible, and, secondly, until the mass-society replaces its methods of attaining solidarity through unifor-

mity, specialisation and regimentation of the individuals by exploring the possibilities of communication and communion through love, sharing and service. The vast, elaborate, sensitive and interdependent economic and social organisation of Mass-man grows in greater size and efficiency like the limbs of many extinct species of gigantic reptiles. But such largeness, specialisation and efficiency along limited directions are at the cost of man's supreme and central values. The group environment also records its purpose in the power-personality of the Mass-man who fits well into its mechanical procedures and quantitative judgments. The group machine, greased and geared for the aims of power-economy and politics, can produce only the power-personality and not the goodness-personality.

Today an increasing number of individuals possessing some of the higher personality traits find themselves unable to experience shared living and enhancement of values and morale in group life. They live isolated lives, depending upon their own moral and spiritual resources. On the other hand, the planners, who take up the tasks of refashioning groups and institutions, have themselves experienced no mental or moral change. They are mere reflections or counterparts of the Mass-man writ large in the magnifying mirror of mass psychological wish-fulfilment. The Mass-man has to be transformed into the Whole, Moral, Spiritual or Universal man. The Interest-or power-group has to rise to the higher level of the whole or integral group. The two developments will aid each other. A most drastic change will, however, have to be brought about in the organisation and folkways of groups and institutions if the integration of personality and moral progress might be achieved.

Principles of a Natural Functional Hierarchy in Society

Two lines of progress can be visualised. One is the growth of sociality and social participation as represented by the progressive development of Crowd and Interest-group to the Community and abstract Commonalty. This is man's development from survival and power to culture and sociality, to self-fulfilment and humanity. This is best represented by the Hindu and Christian symbol of the cosmic or Universal Man, that is in such striking contrast with the modern conception of the Mass-man. The other line of development will be represented by the approximation of social stratification in an organic society to a natural hierarchy based upon the degrees of sociality, love, sharing and personal responsibility of individuals and groups. While class consciousness breaks up the solidarity of the community, the sense of a natural hierarchy acts as the binder of groups. The natural functional hierarchy which is a moral norm or social ideal, rather than actual social reality or experience, implies a co-partnership in social control and management by the different groups in proportion to their sociality and culture and the significance of their social functions. At the top of such a natural functional hierarchy there will be the teachers, preachers, artists and scientists—the philosopher-kings of Plato, whose functions will be social control and evocation, engendering among the whole community an insight into the organic and hierarchic structure of every society. It is they who will also live the most austere lives of devotion and detachment. Philosophy, sociology and religion must have pre-eminence in society. Those whom H.G. Wells characterises as the “brain trust,” whom Berdyaev calls “the spiritual aristocracy, those who are free from resentment and sense of injury and whose qualities are a free gift,” and whom Gerald Heard describes as “the Neo-

Brahman order"—the philosophers, socio-psychologists, creators, teachers, planners, law-givers and judges—should be above the State. Second in rank will be the experts, technicians, rulers, organisers and administrators. H.G. Wells envisages a social structure in which men will be classified and ordered on the basis of their mental and spiritual qualities. He has distinguished four principal classes, viz., the Poetic, the Kinetic, the Dull and the Base, and considers that social progress can be best promoted if the leadership and governance rest with thinkers and scientists.¹ Bertrand Russell thinks that since the importance of experts is likely to increase in the future, as the part played by science in daily life grows greater, government by experts will largely replace government by the will of the people, even if the outward forms of democracy are preserved in tact.² Such leaders and experts, as are reservoirs of love, goodness and justice and as do not affect personal enjoyments in life, are best fitted both to rule and plan as well as to educate the whole population in the organic character of community life and functions. Nietzsche also considers that "life should grow colder towards the summit," implying that men who are at the top of the social ladder should adopt a severe ascetic mode of life. In one of the Indian Dharma Sastras we read: "There are two persons in the world whose lives are perpetual vows. The one is the King, the other is a Brahman."³ Such a social principle has the advantage that all grades of persons would not desire to ascend the social ladder. Under such a régime, which reduces the enjoyments of life as one climbs higher in the social scale, the perplexing biological problem of diminution of the size of family in the upper classes, due to sacrifice of children at the altar of the standard of living (according to Dumont's law of

¹ See H. G. Wells: *Modern Utopia*.

² The Scientific Society in *Science in the Changing World*, p. 202.

³ *Gautama*: V-X.

social capillarity), will not arise. On the contrary a natural hierarchy, with associated higher family ethics for the upper grades, will adjust numbers to economic conditions through abstinence rather than birth-control. The latter will be left to the lower grades instead of being adopted universally by all threatening community suicide. This will be obviously one definite consequence of the improvement of individual moral responsibility as we ascend the natural social scale. Below the grades of teachers, preachers, planners, artists, scientists and administrators will be the two other grades viz., those employed in trade and distribution and those engaged in manual labour and industry of all kinds. The fifth group may be represented by the pseudo-social and anti-social section as represented by the habitual paupers, vagabonds, criminals and prostitutes.

The Ethics of Social Gradation and Vocation in Life

The entire theory of a natural hierarchy, which was conceived in Europe by Plato, Aristotle and some of the medieval scholastics and also embodied in the Iranian and Indian conceptual scheme of the four Varnas (natural grades), is rooted in the formation of groups and adoption of vocations according to natural dispositions and attitudes, with difference in moral standards corresponding to the degrees of sociality and of moral responsibility reached. Many distinguished modern thinkers such as Nietzsche, Eucken, Simmel and Wells have stressed the notion of a natural functional hierarchy, where there is a downward movement of privilege, power and knowledge whereas in the social stratification of many countries, as we find today, privilege, power and knowledge extend through the upward movement of the individual. Hierarchy is not social segregation or coercion. On the other hand, as Simmel observes, "hierarchical tyranny is generally far greater in a democratic state

than in a monarchy.”¹

There is in organic society neither struggle for power, privilege and prestige among the vocations nor maladjustment of individuals and groups in respect of their reciprocal interests, goals and jobs. Each individual finds his proper vocation, rôle or status in society. Each group finds a stable equilibrium as its power and privilege correspond with its sociality, social conscience and social responsibility. Man finds his self-fulfilment in his true vocation. He belies his own moral norm if he wishes to adopt the way of action of another social group. In the upper groups man’s social conscience, sacrifice and sharing constantly call for service to the people lower down whose unsocial or antisocial dispositions are diseases of the body politic. The true social hierarchy conforms to the principle of differentiation of social functions according to the dispositions and aptitudes of individuals that determine their qualifications for the specific functions of each social group.

In the traditional Indian conception there is a level or order of existence for each individual or group of individuals in conformity to the essential nature of beings (Dharma) in the cosmic cycle of life. It is the principle of cosmic order (Rita, Dharma), or of cosmic equilibrium in action according to the inherent organisation and disposition (Karma), which reproduces analogically a hierarchy in human society embodying the principle of righteousness or justice stripped of its specifically moral import. The same principle is regarded as the prototype of man or the Universal Man, what Hinduism calls Manu and Taoism calls the King. The Universal Intelligence or Justice finds its

¹ The ideology of the natural hierarchy which is the basis of Varna in ancient Hindu culture is ably propounded by G. H. Mees: *Dharma and Society*, see especially pp. 150-152 and 186-191; see also Rene Guenon: *Introduction to the Study of Hindu Doctrines*, pp. 219-22.

replica in a correspondence between the cosmic and the human order i.e., the correspondence, which finds natural expression in the organisation of the individual whether the latter is regarded integrally or even simply corporeally, should also be realised in an appropriate manner in the organisation of society.¹ In Varna the determining factor is vocation or culture and not race nor colour. Most Western scholars misunderstand the Hindu theory. The theory of the four Varnas is as old as the Rigveda, associated with the conceptions of the cosmic person (Purusha) and the cosmic order (Rita or Dharma), constraining to regulate morals, social groupings, vocations and institutions. Varna or the functional group is mentioned as a deity in the Brahmanas, "who works for the sake of another, not for himself." The norm of the Varna is altruistic social function. The Bhagavad Gita, the principal scripture of India, delineates the duties of the four Varnas, according to the qualities born of their inborn natures. In India through the centuries there has been a see-saw struggle between the trend of caste crystallisation, based on social or institutional rather than organic or spiritual hierarchy, and the egalitarian trend, rooted in the conception of the infinite worth and dignity of the universal man, that challenged the traditional social stratification. In the Bhagavata-purana, that became the fountain-head of various mystical Bhakti cults which were socially levelling, the differences between the four traditional Varnas were minimised, while men characterised by the absence of piety, aggressiveness and violent impulses were relegated to outside the pale of the four Varnas.² Saṅkaracharya, who led the movement both against decadent Buddhism and the abominations and excrescences of Hinduism and made the Vedanta

¹ See an illuminating discussion of the relation between Dharma and the principles of social hierarchy in India in Rene Guenon's *Introduction to the Study of Hindu Doctrines*, pp. 211-22.

² Bhagavata-purana, XI, 17-20.

the foundation of Hindu revivalism, stressed that in self-enlightenment or realisation of the universal man neither Varna nor its rules exist. The Mahabharata also observes: "Righteousness and not birth is the cause of the division into Varnas." Each group is organically interwoven with others in a reciprocal system of rights-and-duties, in which duties prevail over rights, services over expectations and sacrifices over rewards.

The Vocation, a Means and Symbol of Complete-creative Living

Nothing is more symptomatic of the crisis in modern civilization than personal and social equilibrium with its dual trends, first, of all men struggling to reach the summit resulting in the frustration and loss of self-status for the majority, and, secondly, of all classes struggling with one another for power and privilege accessible only at the summit in the status-system. The moral downfall of modern man emerges out of this chronic disequilibrium and the excessive mobility and feverish tempo of life resulting from it. The organic view of society is the scientific view, emphasising at once the natural hierarchy of groups and the codes of honour and duties of vocations for the individuals. Man's highest moral imperatives can be realised truly only in his vocation, calling or speciality. It is the vocation which focuses both maximum realization of society and maximum personality-expression. The individual can contribute his best to humanity through his vocation and its duties, according to the uniqueness of his traits and attitudes. For each vocation has its own moral standard corresponding to its degree of sociality, grade of social function and responsibility in the natural hierarchy. Thus does the Bhagavad Gita enjoin that to fulfil one's duties in his vocation determined by his nature without self-referent motives is the way to perfection. All work is sac-

rifice or ritual. Each group or vocation is literally born of the Divine Sacrifice. Bradley's 'My Station and Its Duties' similarly stresses this significant aspect of man's moral life.¹ "Every individual," Max Scheler observes, "ought to undertake the culture of the values accessible or applicable to him alone and this applies also to groups, nations, races or civilizations. To every phase and every moment of development belongs a specific relation to value that will never recur, involving facts and duties that belong in the nexus of the objective order to just this moment, and, if unfulfilled, are lost for ever."

From the vast reservoir of general values set before the individual by nature and society man can but appropriate only a few. If he endeavours to achieve a whole series of values in turn and pretend that each one is imperative, not only does he meet with many frustrations but he also brings about such chaos of efforts and values that many central values perish. Life-fulfilment is impossible without a scheme of value-hierarchy and facilitated by a selection of certain definite life-goals for each individual rather than with the search by each of all goals and values. Man's moral autonomy and his duty consist in determining integrally what he should seek according to the potentialities of both himself as a limited social creature and the limited social situation marked out for him as his vocation in life. The vocation, in other words, represents the halting place of the supreme values, which the individual can realise in his unique way in his own particular situation according to the attributes and possibilities of his personality. The love of vocation transcends its economic utility. It is associated with the super-individual meaning and value man attaches to it. The vocation becomes a symbol—a unified rational frame of reference

¹ A Roumanian thinker Dr. C. Nărlău emphasises also that man is pre-eminently constructive-creative in the realisation of his vocation. See his chapter on the Destiny of Man in *The Religions of the World*, Vol. 2.

according to which a worthy and complete life can be lived.

Can the Mass-man rise to the summit of his self-fulfilment in the "vocational profession"? Does the modern system of mass standardised production, dissociating ownership and control from production as an enterprise and the creative and constructive impulses from production as a process, permit this? Perhaps some kind of a technological revolution, decentralisation and regionalisation of industry may be necessary before such a moral change may be brought about. More will depend upon the transformation of the group environment on which, more than on the individual, human natural selection seems mainly to be operative. Can the major economic classes and political parties now bitterly struggling with one another for power and privilege transform themselves into a natural stratification where a group's rank and privilege are measured by its social usefulness and responsibility and where each individual falls into his proper vocation, rôle and position?

The Historic Metaphysical Myths of Communion and Sacrifice

In the 19th century the world expansion of predatory power economy, finance and politics and the configuration of power personality went hand in hand. Both were stimulated by the social myth of the Economic Man of early liberal capitalism. That myth is now demolished and superseded by the myth of the Mass-man, the joint product of mass standardisation in industry, education and culture, class alignment in social organisation and regimentation in government, whether capitalistic or communistic in pattern. The myth of the Whole, Complete, Universal Man is now emerging in the present epoch stressing the moral ideal of an integrated, balanced, enlarged personality. Man's next step in evolutionary advance consists in the perception of the emotional and moral unity of mankind, built

on the foundations of an integral personality, free from inner conflict and group irrationality. Evolutionary ethics, psychology, economics and politics are all contributing towards strengthening this myth with its stereotypes and ideals of humanisation, brotherhood and integral and dynamic wholeness of living, shifting the interest from the mechanical to the organic, from the quantitative to the qualitative. There is also today a profound recognition of the essential communion or solidarity of the human community, stratified, however, into a natural hierarchy.

In the ancient Hindu myth of the creation of society and its four-fold functional groups in the spiritual hierarchy, the Progenitor in the beginning multiplies Himself into His many children as the Supreme Sacrifice. As He creates mankind, He also creates the organic hierarchy of groups with their appropriate vocations, rôles and duties. The latter are also called Sacrifices to be undertaken in this world as expiation by the mortals. Through Sacrifice man, society and groups are created, and through Sacrifice again the mortals not only safeguard the fulfilment of their life-goals but also assemble together the dismembered God and his multiplicity, for in essence God is one.¹ The wheel of the cosmos is thus set in motion and maintained by the Divine Communion and Sacrifice. The Sacrifice (Yajna) is the symbol of creation and its processes and a constant reminder to man of the laws of his being and of self-sacrifice as a part of the cosmic plan and purpose. "Man, like his Creator, has to embrace mortality and the limited life of the world, like the sacrificial animal tied to the post (Yupa). He must bind himself to the ties of relationship, tie the animal in him to the yupa of self-control, and sacrifice that animal at life's *yajna*."² The Sacrifice of the in-

¹ *The Mahabharata*, Anusashan Parva, 48, 3; *The Bhagavad Gita* III, 10-12, 16. IV.

² Mookerji: *Ancient Indian Education*, p. 9.

dividual comprises performance by him of the different classes of obligations, different kinds of Yajna, viz., penance, meditation, study and knowledge. The Aitreya Brahmana holds that man is born with three Debts—Debts to ancestors, to teachers and to gods that can be discharged only by parenthood, sacrifice and study. A man of no sacrifice upsets the cosmic symbiosis of nature, earth, man, culture and deity and is a thief, since he enjoys the gifts of the cosmos without offering anything in return. In Hindu scriptures Sacrifice is also used in a generic sense as knowledge, action, works and *elan vital* that maintain the continuity of life, the Cosmic Person being at once Lord of the Sacrifice and immanent in the universe which is born of the Sacrifice.

The above is the Brahmanical doctrine. More potent and ardent in its implications of social obligations and unceasing action for the relief of pain, suffering and sorrow of the sentient world is the Mahayana Myth of sacrifice of the Bodhisattva. In the most important Mahayana scripture, the Saddharmapundarika or the Lotus of the Perfect Truth, Buddha is described as the Lotus of the Creation, servitor of the world but not belonging to it, making the lotus flower unfold in every human heart. Man here takes the vow of allegiance to truth, compassion and sacrifice that ultimately realise in the communion of saints the Kingdom of Buddha on earth. Having reached Nirvana and refused its fruition the Bodhisattva remains on earth as an Adept, invisible to uninitiated mankind, to watch over, serve and protect it from sorrow and misery. This grand Mahayana epic of goodness, tenderness and beauty which poignantly expressed the immeasurable pity and compassion of Buddhism gave birth in India, China, Tibet and Japan to innumerable sculptures and paintings with their marvellous apparitions of Buddhas and Bodhisattvas. The mystic gestures of these super-human heroes of sacrifice depicted in all their glory and tranquil sweetness in painting

and sculpture and the various legends of miracles of compassion wrought by them in the name of salvation have elicited goodness, devotion and sacrifice of the common people for many long centuries. Such is the power of a myth that generates innumerable cosmic archetypal images of universal goodness in popular religion, art and poetry. —super-human apparitions whose pure, fresh waters of wisdom and compassion are used to sweeten the bitter waves of that mighty sea of sorrow formed of the tears of men.

Another example of an organic spiritual hierarchy rooted in a metaphysical myth, as in India and in Christian Europe in the middle ages, is the traditional social gradation in China into six functional groups, viz., the teachers and scholars, the soldiers, the farmers, the artisans, the merchants and the de-classe comprising the actors, runners, slaves etc. These are all held together in their proper places by the Confucian myth of Mingfen or social status, which implies that if every man knows his Ming or name, defining his relationships to others, he undertakes his duties (Fen) accordingly and the social order is ensured. Thus Mingfen binds society together by a moral ideal. It teaches benevolence in the Emperors and obedience in the common people, friendliness in the elder brother and humility in the younger brother. "The Emperor should remain an Emperor, the nobles, nobles; the ministers, ministers and the common people, common people." Every man must have his own vocation, rôle and rights-and-duties. As Lin Yutang observes: "Instead of social equality, the emphasis is on rather sharply defined differentiation, or stratified equality. For the Chinese word for the five cardinal relationships, lun, means equality within its class."¹ Each individual must know his distinct name, title or status in

¹ *My Country and My People*, p. 177.

any society whence flow not only all his rights-and-duties but also his etiquette and manners. The Chinese ethical postulate makes Jen or propriety or goodness in interpersonal relations imperative. Jen assures proportion and reciprocity in all human relations. Both parents and children, rulers and the ruled, elder and younger brothers must have Jen. The Chinese ethical system is the best example of the transformation of social status (Mingfen) into a specific code of morality and culture. Mingfen or the status-duty scheme objectifies a universal principle of organic hierarchy and social control at the same time.

It must be pointed out that the Chinese system of morality is family-centric and ego-centric. Developed as it has been in the more inclement, north-temperate climate and less bounteous soil than in India, it is on the whole less humane and universalistic than the Indian ethical system and more suited to intimate relations and ways of living in the family, clan and primary-group world. It gives less emphasis than the Indian code upon the union of personality with universal humanity. Manners, etiquette or good form, based on a necessary distance between persons and groups, are the Chinese criterion of group conduct focalising the relations of domination and subordination in familism by conscious and unconscious symbols and myths. The emphasis of universalism rather than familism in India is largely due to the potent symbol and myth of the Divine Communion and Sacrifice, and of the Supreme Self or Deity dwelling in every sentient creature that has time and again sponsored large-scale moral demands on the people as well as vast humanitarian movements. It is also institutionalised in the obligation (Asrama-dharma) of every person, whatever his vocation, attainment or status, to adopt in old age the life and habits of a recluse (Muni) for contemplation, when all family, clan, vocation or caste rules and forms merge in the universal. We cannot, however, regard the Confucian

system as hide-bound and conservative to a degree. For a new morality and a new social order are implicit in a programme of the Confucian Rectification of Names (and also of duties), the person, object or relation changing with the change of name. Confucian morality merges into a metaphysical myth as human conduct is conceived as right and true, when it accords with the nature of man derived from Heaven. "Heaven is a kind of natural law; the Heavenly way a moral one."¹ The Tao is the method of ordering, understanding and bettering man in the world. From this follows the famous Confucian doctrine of the Mean. "Let the status of equilibrium and harmony exist in perfection, and happy order will prevail throughout heaven and earth, and all things will be nourished and flourish." In Chinese myth society is not distinct from the universe. Everything has its peculiar virtue. Names by creating social relationships "possess" the individuals much more than the individuals possess them. Similarly words, gestures, attitudes, music, dancing, etiquette, manners are all endowed with efficacy. Their function is to tame the world for man himself.² Chinese morality is a rational ordering of life according to the most inward and at the same time clearly manifest laws of the universe. The reign of the moral order is the mirror of the harmony of the universe. "The absolute identification of nature and society, after having endowed nature with something living, endows society with that which is fixed and regular in nature." Chinese ethics is also often considered as unreligious or irreligious. But the above metaphysical conceptions bring it entirely in line with the dominant note in Hindu Rita or Dharma and Iranian Asha—the moral and cosmic order derived from the religious myth of the Divine Communion and Sacrifice. The profound metaphysics, on which Chinese morality

¹ Tang Leang-Li: *The New Social Order in China*.

² See Granet: *Chinese Civilisation*, pp. xvii, xxii and 195.

is based, is accordingly akin to the impersonal, transcendental note underlying Indian morality. It is, however, somewhat more practical and rational and associated perhaps with a greater society-centred moral fervour than in India. Similarly in Persia, where the metaphysical notion of the cosmic binding order corresponds to that of Hindu Rita or Dharma—"that which makes for righteousness in the universe as well as in moral and social life,"—Asha or Arta of the Zendavesta has stressed moral rectitude and truth. The Sanskrit word Rita is derived from the root *ar* (to regulate) with which the Latin words *ritus* and *ordo* are connected, indicating the universality of the conception of the Divine Sacrifice or ritual as holding and regulating the order that pervades the universe as well as the scheme of human life—man's moral order.¹ Rita, rhythm, order or Dharma underlies the transmigration of soul and continuity of life and mind in the evolution of man and other creatures. In Indian cosmogony there is evolution from the beast to man and from man to superman or avatara rising from economic toil, heroism and humaneness to intellectual and moral grandeur. All through the upward sweep of life and mind from level to level of existence is operative as the regulative force the Communion and Sacrifice of the Divine. The ritualistic section of the Vedic literature developed a philosophy of Sacrifice that was conceived as the primal cause and reflection of the entire world process, with the Brahman pervading both process and reality. The notion of Dharma that developed later stressed more moral than ceremonial aspects. Dharma in Hindu thought stands as much for the cosmic as for the moral and social order, the eternal law of Right and Reason both within and without, the binding force of the functional groups, occupations and professions and of

¹ See Mees: *Dharma and Society*, pp. 9-10; and Dawson: *Progress and Religion*, p. 124.

the four stages of a man's life as well as the principle of Justice and Harmony in the endless quest and struggle of the individual through an infinite sequence of births and deaths. The daily rite, which many modern Indians undertake, symbolises the sacrifice that the Brahman made in the beginning of the world process and that still sustains it, and is the stimulus of all social and moral duties and obligations, of love, charity and compassion to all sentient creatures in a consecrated life of Dharma.¹

The Oriental mind is spiritually supported and stimulated by the above and similar meaningful, emotional and cosmic myths and symbols, enabling it to move smoothly and skilfully between earth and heaven, between society and cosmic community. There is regular, subtle and exciting interweaving of the sensory perceptions, memories, valuations, judgments and vague cosmic loves and intuitions. Unless man has a few meaningful, ultimate, historic symbols to which he can be oriented consciously or unconsciously, unless his sense of reality, his life and communion incorporate certain conscious or unconscious symbols of Reality, Life and Communion, his personal activity and social intercourse will remain meaningless, unacceptable to his impoverished imagination and emotional life. Modern man in his urban-industrial and technological environment, sadly lacking metaphysical symbols, myths, ritual expressions, gestures and attitudes, has no mental or moral life-lines to save him from conflicts, defeats and frustrations, and lives in a state of perpetual fear and anxiety.

Moral Myth, Truer than History

Can the ancient Hindu myth of Communion and Sacrifice of the Universal Man and Architect of the Uni-

¹ For the Hindu philosophy of sacrifice, see Coomaraswamy: *Hinduism and Buddhism*, pp. 10-25; also Mukerjee: *The Indian Scheme of Life*.

verse or the similar Gnostic Christian myth of the Divine Sacrifice, both of which demand a co-operation of all the arts, sciences and technologies of life, reintegrate science, religion or the fine arts that work today with conflicting aims and frames of reference? Can it harmonise and reconcile the conflicting classes in society through a functional hierarchy determined by the requirements of the collective sharing and sacrifice on which their status and privilege would depend? Can it, again, help towards world government and co-operation based on the leadership of those nations who are most willing to share with the backward ones? There are Ravana's and Lucifers in all ages and societies, embodiments of anti-social uses of power and privilege, that challenge the 'natural hierarchy in the human milieu in its different levels and extensions. But in no age has the natural hierarchy been exposed to such devastating onslaughts to the detriment of human character and social peace and well-being. The Mass-man's impulsiveness and unreason and the society's collective egoism and pugnacity today lead culture back to savagery. Only collective faith and belief can transform the social reality and modify history. An insistent, metaphysical and religious symbol is truer than reality, just as a vivid moral myth or legend is truer than history. Symbol, myth, religion and ethics are all made of the same stuff, intuition and imagination giving rise to strong and intensely vivid pressures and strange powers that guide men as well as whole cultures when the unaided human intellect comes to grief in the realm of life.

Moral progress cannot be foreseen. But its trend as that of the entire social configuration, in so far as it can be anticipated, is revealed by the intuitions of myth, fantasy and symbolism, that all refuse to accept the frustration or inadequate fulfilment of deep-lying desires, emotions and values in the social environment. The class

or mass-society as an ideal of human solidarity is as much a failure as the ideal of the Mass-man which in fact drags down the individual. Mankind has to rise today to the ideal of the Perfect Society of Sacrifice, the Spiritual Society, in which first and foremost groups orient themselves on the basis of a natural hierarchy, in which power and privilege are distributed according to love, service and sharing. In the spiritual hierarchy "the greatest is the server; the first shall be the last and has the greatest task and responsibility" in the midst of inequalities. Those will be at the summit who will manifest the strongest sense of sharing and service. It is they who by thought and action will best promote a collective moral insight into the Divine Communion and Service.

No egalitarian, communistic myth of the classless society can ensure that self-forgetful altruism and devotion of the elite to the masses as the Hindu myth of Communion and Service, the Buddhist myth of the Bodhisattva or the Christian Pauline myth of Gifts do. In a natural or spiritual hierarchy the service or gift is rooted in a profound sense of brotherhood or communion of God-in-Man; man carries out his vocation as a sacrament—the fulfilment of God-given traits, aptitudes and capacities in the service of the community; while social groupings find their proper places and rôles in the status-power scheme according to their degrees of sociality and moral or social responsibility. Thus groups struggle not for class interests but for the full realisation of their creative calling, vocations and gifts in the world, establishing a harmonious and stable personal and social equilibrium that reflects the Kingdom of God. Such is the ancient Hindu, Buddhist, Iranian and Christian myth of the Communion and Sacrifice of the Cosmic or Divine Man in an organic, spiritual hierarchical society.

Myth, the Implement of Prophecy

Hindu, Iranian and Christian symbols and myths were not borrowed from one another but drew upon the 'philosophia perennis'—mankind's common way of spiritual living in society. It is the task of both ethics and religion to use and direct into constructive channels the dynamic power of symbol and myth for shaping the destiny of man and society. Where modern science or even metaphysics discard symbols and myths, it is high time that ethics revives the glory of the myths of the Universal Man and his Supreme Sacrifice for the happiness of mankind and salvage of civilisation. Language, myth, religion, morals, art and knowledge are, to be sure, the various forms of human culture, comprising symbolic forms and relations integrated together into a coherent system. These are the means by which human society develops a continuously increasing communion or solidarity between man and fellowman and man and the rest of the universe. In the achievement of profounder and wider communion man's primary implement is symbolic and mythical construction.

Symbols and myths link human life both to the remote past and to the distant future. There are in organic evolution remarkable examples of an entire series of instinctive activities of insects that are directed to very remote goals connected with their life history. This phenomenon has not been adequately explained except with reference to certain metaphysical presuppositions like those of the creative *elan vital*, organic memory and emergence within the whole evolutionary situation. There is no doubt that brainy animals can not only anticipate future events but can also plan the future. This is well borne out by the famous studies of Koehler with reference to the apes. Koehler remarks, "The number of observations is small

in which any reckoning upon a future contingency is recognizable, and it seems to me of theoretical importance that the clearest consideration of a future event occurs than when the anticipated event is a planned act of the animal itself. In such a case it may really happen that an animal will spend considerable time in preparatory work (in an unequivocal sense) where such preliminary work, obviously undertaken with a view to the final goal, lasts a long time, but in itself affords no visible approach to that end, there we have the signs of at least some sense of the future." Of all organisms man has the most vivid anticipation of the future and his sense of future makes him undergo sacrifices for future generations unthinkable for any other organism. In him the mental life and organisation cannot, indeed, be understood at all without reference to future goals symbolised into values, ideals and norms.

Man looks before and after, and both the past and the future are an indispensable part of his bio-cultural world of space and time. All this is possible only because of his symbol-and myth-making capacity. Through his symbolic and mythopoeic thought man becomes the prophetic being and overcomes the limitations of a time-and space-oriented animal. When the Hindu contemplates the symbolic formula (mantram), "I seek Man the Divine and the Universal" (Aum Nomo-Narayanayaya) or the Buddhist takes the vow, "I take refuge in the Buddha, I take refuge in the Law, I take refuge in the Order" (Buddham Dhammam Sangham Saṇanam Gacchami), it is no mere acceptance of a formula or creed, but a dedication and struggle in Yoga contemplation and action to universalism, to truth, goodness and compassion that become prophetic of his moral and spiritual status. One takes refuge in the Buddha in order to take refuge in himself (*atta sarana*), to become a lamp to himself (*atta dipa*); he does not betake himself to

any one else as his shelter but works his own salvation with vigour and energy. Creed, dogma or religious truth become far less significant than concrete religious striving and achievement when the religious symbol or myth of entry into the church or congregation is not the formulation of a creed but the cultivation of certain attitudes and performances of certain duties and obligations. Yogic morality is concerned with the infinite; its experiment with truths and symbols has boundless horizons and possibilities of renewing and perfecting the finite world. If man's present milieu denies him the fulfilment of essential values and ideals of life, man obviously seeks these in myth, religion, art and philosophy and remoulds his narrow, imperfect and chaotic environment through his elaborate symbolic behaviour that overreaches the limits and possibilities of his concrete life. The prophetic animal as man is, he cannot be satisfied with anything except perfection in his circumscribed milieu. Language, symbol, myth, art, religion, morals and science bring into a common focus the ideal of human perfection in every social culture. Alternating as these do in their chequered course of development between social tradition and individual creativeness, between ancient custom and novel invention, these guide and direct all the while man's manifold moral and spiritual aspirations towards the perfect, the complete and the universal.

The Myth of Communion as Embodying and Epitomising the Destiny of Individual and Society

Although particular myths, religious codes of morality and ideologies record more or less incompletely the particular circumstances of social culture, certain general principles that have become universal imperatives for human perfection can be established as underlying cultural con-

figurations.¹ These are, as we have seen, the principles of uniqueness and completeness of human personality development and expression, on the one hand, and the full control of, and coherence and harmony with, the environment, on the other. The above principles harmonise, integrate and give direction to the entire range of man's symbolic activities and are complementary. Man's mind is so constituted that the uniqueness and full realization of his complete life i.e., love, sharing and service are linked with order, solidarity and harmony of the environment of the highest grades in both imagination and fact. The richer the uniqueness of personal experience i.e., love and equality, the greater the promotion of order and harmony in the environment. On the other hand, the type of order and harmony is measured according to the possibilities thrown open for individual self-expression. Man's symbol, myth and ethics are all devoted towards refashioning both the human personality and environment towards their proper perfection. Through the ages he has installed the symbolic kingdom of God within himself, and in his frustration and struggle often found refuge from the chronic disorder and unhappiness of the earth in the order and happiness in heaven. But modern man builds a new heaven and a new earth here and now both within and outside himself, and at the same time seeks a fundamental, symbolical unity between the inner and the outer. Without this unity he can never be at peace with himself.

¹ Cassirer's philosophy of man, in so far as it does not bring to light any end or ends which bring into harmony and guide man's various symbolic activities, is somewhat disappointing as philosophy. Human culture is no doubt described as "the process of man's progressive self-liberation." But the various phases of human creativity tend in different directions and obey different principles, and "cannot be reduced to a common denominator." In Cassirer's thought, man is not a conscious moral agent; he does not choose nor evaluate what he symbolises. See the last chapter in *The Essay on Man*.

What are the metaphysical myths and symbols that embody the dual universal principles guiding man's social and spiritual destiny, viz., Man's Harmony and Solidarity with the Environment and the Endless Quest of his Love? The two principles coalesce in the myth and symbol of Communion or Self-transcendence (Yoga). The secret of Communion is the union of Process with Reality, Differentiation with Wholeness, Sensitivity with Serenity. Communion unfolds the supreme freedom, adventure and joy of the human personality as it expands in relation to fellow-man and universe—a ceaseless striving after the Commonalty of the universe as Unity and Peace. It implants the ultimate and eternal meaning of the cosmos and the social-historical process into the human personality as Love, Goodness and Compassion. Communion or self-oblivious transcendence, as the harmonising of the harmonies, is the one and the only authentic Reality or Truth, and includes in it the notions of Goodness and Justice. Communion rests on Human Reason, Love and Action in their togetherness. The Divine, Universal Man's Paths of Knowledge, Worship and Work converge in Communion of the Universe—the merging of the One-in-the Many and of the Many-in-the One. Such is the configuration of individual and social culture at its height.

“Calm and unmoved the Pilgrim glides up the stream
that to Nirvana leads. He knoweth that the more
his feet will bleed, the whiter will himself be
washed.

Such is the Aryan Path, Path of the Buddhas of Perfection.

Yea; on the Aryan Path thou art no more Srotapanna,
Thou art a Bodhisattva.

Now bend thy head and listen well, O Bodhisattva!
Compassion speaks, Can there be bliss when all

that lives must suffer? Shalt thou be saved and
hear the whole world cry?

A Pilgrim has turned back from the other shore,
A new Arhat. is born."

(The Seven Portals). •

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